

**ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
(Commercial List)**

BETWEEN:

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS  
ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, C. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN  
OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT WITH RESPECT TO  
GROWTHWORKS CANADIAN FUND LTD.  
(THE "APPLICANT")

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**BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF THE FUND**

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October 1, 2013

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**Tab 1**

*Case Name:*  
**Stelco Inc. (Re)**

**IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Creditors  
Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended  
AND IN THE MATTER OF a proposed plan of Compromise or  
Arrangement with respect to Stelco Inc. and the other  
applicants listed in Schedule "A"  
AN APPLICATION UNDER the Companies' Creditors  
Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended**

[2004] O.J. No. 1257

[2004] O.T.C. 284

48 C.B.R. (4th) 299

129 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1065

2004 CarswellOnt 1211

Court File No. 04-CL-5306

Ontario Superior Court of Justice  
Commercial List

**Farley J.**

Heard: March 5, 2004.

Judgment: March 22, 2004.

(70 paras.)

*Creditors and debtors -- Debtors' relief legislation -- Companies' creditors arrangement legislation  
-- Setting aside or varying order.*

Application by the applicant union to rescind an initial order and dismiss the application of Stelco Inc for access to the protection and process under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, on

the basis that Stelco was not a debtor company as it was not insolvent. Stelco filed its application for protection on January 29, 2004. Experts deposed that Stelco would run out of funding by November 2004. It did not expect any increase in its credit line with its lenders or to access further outside funding. Its cash had gone from a positive \$209 million to a negative \$114 million.

HELD: Application dismissed. The time to determine whether Stelco was insolvent was the date of filing. Stelco was insolvent at the date of filing as there was a reasonably foreseeable expectation that there was a looming liquidity condition or crisis that would result in Stelco running out of "cash" to pay its debts as they generally became due in the future, without the benefit of the stay and ancillary protection and procedure by court authorization, pursuant to an order. Stelco was therefore a debtor company as at the date of filing and was entitled to apply for the CCAA initial order.

**Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:**

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, ss. 2(1), 43(7), 121(1), 121(2).

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, ss. 2, 12.

Winding-Up and Restructuring Act.

**Counsel:**

Michael E. Barrack, James D. Gage and Geoff R. Hall, for the applicants.

David Jacobs and Michael McCreary, for Locals 1005, 5328 and 8782 of the United Steel Workers of America.

Ken Rosenberg, Lily Harmer and Rob Centa, for United Steelworkers of America.

Bob Thornton and Kyla Mahar, for Ernst & Young Inc., Monitor of the applicants.

Kevin J. Zych, for the Informal Committee of Stelco Bondholders.

David R. Byers, for CIT.

Kevin McElcheran, for GE.

Murray Gold and Andrew Hatnay, for Retired Salaried Beneficiaries.

Lewis Gottheil, for CAW Canada and its Local 523.

Virginie Gauthier, for Fleet.

H. Whiteley, for CIBC.

Gail Rubenstein, for FSCO.

Kenneth D. Kraft, for EDS Canada Inc.

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**1 FARLEY J. (endorsement):**-- As argued this motion by Locals 1005, 5328 and 8782 United Steel Workers of America (collectively "Union") to rescind the initial order and dismiss the

application of Stelco Inc. ("Stelco") and various of its subsidiaries (collectively "Sub Applicants") for access to the protection and process of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") was that this access should be denied on the basis that Stelco was not a "debtor company" as defined in s. 2 of the CCAA because it was not insolvent.

2 Allow me to observe that there was a great deal of debate in the materials and submissions as to the reason(s) that Stelco found itself in with respect to what Michael Locker (indicating he was "an expert in the area of corporate restructuring and a leading steel industry analyst") swore to at paragraph 12 of his affidavit was the "current crisis":

12. Contending with weak operating results and resulting tight cash flow, management has deliberately chosen not to fund its employee benefits. By contrast, Dofasco and certain other steel companies have consistently funded both their employee benefit obligations as well as debt service. If Stelco's management had chosen to fund pension obligations, presumably with borrowed money, the current crisis and related restructuring plans would focus on debt restructuring as opposed to the reduction of employee benefits and related liabilities. [Emphasis added.]

3 For the purpose of determining whether Stelco is insolvent and therefore could be considered to be a debtor company, it matters not what the cause or who caused the financial difficulty that Stelco is in as admitted by Locker on behalf of the Union. The management of a corporation could be completely incompetent, inadvertently or advertently; the corporation could be in the grip of ruthless, hard hearted and hard nosed outside financiers; the corporation could be the innocent victim of uncaring policy of a level of government; the employees (unionized or non-unionized) could be completely incompetent, inadvertently or advertently; the relationship of labour and management could be absolutely poisonous; the corporation could be the victim of unforeseen events affecting its viability such a as a fire destroying an essential area of its plant and equipment or of rampaging dumping. One or more or all of these factors (without being exhaustive), whether or not of varying degree and whether or not in combination of some may well have been the cause of a corporation's difficulty. The point here is that Stelco's difficulty exists; the only question is whether Stelco is insolvent within the meaning of that in the "debtor company" definition of the CCAA. However, I would point out, as I did in closing, that no matter how this motion turns out, Stelco does have a problem which has to be addressed - addressed within the CCAA process if Stelco is insolvent or addressed outside that process if Stelco is determined not to be insolvent. The status quo will lead to ruination of Stelco (and its Sub Applicants) and as a result will very badly affect its stakeholder, including pensioners, employees (unionized and non-unionized), management, creditors, suppliers, customers, local and other governments and the local communities. In such situations, time is a precious commodity; it cannot be wasted; no matter how much some would like to take time outs, the clock cannot be stopped. The watchwords of the Commercial List are equally applicable in such circumstances. They are communication, cooperation and common sense. I appreciate that these cases frequently invoke emotions running



high and wild; that is understandable on a human basis but it is the considered, rational approach which will solve the problem.

4 The time to determine whether a corporation is insolvent for the purpose of it being a "debtor company" and thus able to make an application to proceed under the CCAA is the date of filing, in this case January 29, 2004.

5 The Monitor did not file a report as to this question of insolvency as it properly advised that it wished to take a neutral role. I understand however, that it did provide some assistance in the preparation of Exhibit C to Hap Steven's affidavit.

6 If I determine in this motion that Stelco is not insolvent, then the initial order would be set aside. See *Montreal Trust Co. of Canada v. Timber Lodge Ltd.* (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 14 (P.E.I.C.A.). The onus is on Stelco as I indicated in my January 29, 2004 endorsement.

7 S. 2 of the CCAA defines "debtor company" as:

"debtor company" means any company that:

- (a) is bankrupt or insolvent;
- (b) has committed an act of bankruptcy within the meaning of Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act ["BIA"] or deemed insolvent within the meaning of the Winding-Up and Restructuring Act, whether or not proceedings in respect of the company have been taken under either of those Acts;
- (c) has made an authorized assignment against which a receiving order has been made under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act; or
- (d) is in the course of being wound-up under the Winding-Up and Restructuring Act because the company is insolvent.

8 Counsel for the Existing Stelco Lenders and the DIP Lenders posited that Stelco would be able to qualify under (b) in light of the fact that as of January 29, 2004 whether or not it was entitled to receive the CCAA protection under (a) as being insolvent, it had ceased to pay its pre-filing debts. I would merely observe as I did at the time of the hearing that I do not find this argument attractive in the least. The most that could be said for that is that such game playing would be ill advised and in my view would not be rewarded by the exercise of judicial discretion to allow such an applicant the benefit of a CCAA stay and other advantages of the procedure for if it were capriciously done where there is not reasonable need, then such ought not to be granted. However, I would point out that if a corporation did capriciously do so, then one might well expect a creditor-initiated application so as to take control of the process (including likely the ouster of management including directors who authorized such unnecessary stoppage); in such a case, while the corporation would not likely be successful in a corporation application, it is likely that a creditor application would find favour of judicial discretion.

9 This judicial discretion would be exercised in the same way generally as is the case where s. 43(7) of the BIA comes into play whereby a bankruptcy receiving order which otherwise meets the test may be refused. See *Re Kenwood Hills Development Inc.* (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 44 (Ont. Gen. Div.) where at p. 45 I observed:

The discretion must be exercised judicially based on credible evidence; it should be used according to common sense and justice and in a manner which does not result in an injustice: See *Re Churchill Forest Industries (Manitoba) Ltd.* (1971), 16 C.B.R. (NS) 158 (Man. Q.B.).

10 Anderson J. in *Re MGM Electric Co. Ltd.* (1982), 42 C.B.R. (N.S.) 29 (Ont. S.C.) at p. 30 declined to grant a bankruptcy receiving order for the eminently good sense reason that it would be counterproductive: "Having regard for the value of the enterprise and having regard to the evidence before me, I think it far from clear that a receiving order would confer a benefit on anyone." This common sense approach to the judicial exercise of discretion may be contrasted by the rather more puzzling approach in *Re TDM Software Systems Inc.* (1986), 60 C.B.R. (N.S.) 92 (Ont. S.C.).

11 The Union, supported by the International United Steel Workers of America ("International"), indicated that if certain of the obligations of Stelco were taken into account in the determination of insolvency, then a very good number of large Canadian corporations would be able to make an application under the CCAA. I am of the view that this concern can be addressed as follows. The test of insolvency is to be determined on its own merits, not on the basis that an otherwise technically insolvent corporation should not be allowed to apply. However, if a technically insolvent corporation were to apply and there was no material advantage to the corporation and its stakeholders (in other words, a pressing need to restructure), then one would expect that the court's discretion would be judicially exercised against granting CCAA protection and ancillary relief. In the case of Stelco, it is recognized, as discussed above, that it is in crisis and in need of restructuring - which restructuring, if it is insolvent, would be best accomplished within a CCAA proceeding. Further, I am of the view that the track record of CCAA proceedings in this country demonstrates a healthy respect for the fundamental concerns of interested parties and stakeholders. I have consistently observed that much more can be achieved by negotiations outside the courtroom where there is a reasonable exchange of information, views and the exploration of possible solutions and negotiations held on a without prejudice basis than likely can be achieved by resorting to the legal combative atmosphere of the courtroom. A mutual problem requires a mutual solution. The basic interest of the CCAA is to rehabilitate insolvent corporations for the benefit of all stakeholders. To do this, the cause(s) of the insolvency must be fixed on a long term viable basis so that the corporation may be turned around. It is not achieved by positional bargaining in a tug of war between two parties, each trying for a larger slice of a defined size pie; it may be achieved by taking steps involving shorter term equitable sacrifices and implementing sensible approaches to improve productivity to ensure that the pie grows sufficiently for the long term to accommodate the reasonable needs of the parties.

12 It appears that it is a given that the Sub Applicants are in fact insolvent. The question then is whether Stelco is insolvent.

13 There was a question as to whether Stelco should be restricted to the material in its application as presented to the Court on January 29, 2004. I would observe that CCAA proceedings are not in the nature of the traditional adversarial lawsuit usually found in our courtrooms. It seems to me that it would be doing a disservice to the interest of the CCAA to artificially keep the Court in the dark on such a question. Presumably an otherwise deserving "debtor company" would not be allowed access to a continuing CCAA proceeding that it would be entitled to merely because some potential evidence were excluded for traditional adversarial technical reasons. I would point out that in such a case, there would be no prohibition against such a corporation reapplying (with the additional material) subsequently. In such a case, what would be the advantage for anyone of a "pause" before being able to proceed under the rehabilitative process under the CCAA. On a practical basis, I would note that all too often corporations will wait too long before applying, at least this was a significant problem in the early 1990s. In *Re Inducon Development Corp.* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.), I observed:

Secondly, CCAA is designed to be remedial; it is not, however, designed to be preventative. CCAA should not be the last gasp of a dying company; it should be implemented, if it is to be implemented, at a stage prior to the death throee.

14 It seems to me that the phrase "death throee" could be reasonably replaced with "death spiral". In *Re Cumberland Trading Inc.* (1994), 23 C.B.R. (3d) 225 (Ont. Gen. Div.), I went on to expand on this at p. 228:

I would also observe that all too frequently debtors wait until virtually the last moment, the last moment, or in some cases, beyond the last moment before even beginning to think about reorganizational (and the attendant support that any successful reorganization requires from the creditors). I noted the lamentable tendency of debtors to deal with these situations as "last gasp" desperation moves in *Re Inducon Development Corp.* (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.). To deal with matters on this basis minimizes the chances of success, even if "success" may have been available with earlier spade work.

15 I have not been able to find in the CCAA reported cases any instance where there has been an objection to a corporation availing itself of the facilities of the CCAA on the basis of whether the corporation was insolvent. Indeed, as indicated above, the major concern here has been that an applicant leaves it so late that the timetable of necessary steps may get impossibly compressed. That is not to say that there have not been objections by parties opposing the application on various other grounds. Prior to the 1992 amendments, there had to be debentures (plural) issued pursuant to a trust deed; I recall that in *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101; 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.), the initial application was rejected in the morning because there had

only been one debenture issued but another one was issued prior to the return to court that afternoon. This case stands for the general proposition that the CCAA should be given a large and liberal interpretation. I should note that there was in *Enterprise Capital Management Inc. v. Semi-Tech Corp.* (1999), 10 C.B.R. (4th) 133 (Ont. S.C.J.) a determination that in a creditor application, the corporation was found not to be insolvent, but see below as to BIA test (c) my views as to the correctness of this decision.

**16** *In Re Lehndorff General Partner Ltd.* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div.) I observed at p. 32:

One of the purposes of the CCAA is to facilitate ongoing operations of a business where its assets have a greater value as part of an integrated system than individually. The CCAA facilitates reorganization of a company where the alternative, sale of the property piecemeal, is likely to yield far less satisfaction to the creditors.

**17** *In Re Anvil Range Mining Corp.* (2002), 34 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.), the court stated to the same effect:

The second submission is that the plan is contrary to the purposes of the CCAA. Courts have recognized that the purpose of the CCAA is to enable compromises to be made for the common benefit of the creditors and the company and to keep the company alive and out of the hands of liquidators.

**18** Encompassed in this is the concept of saving employment if a restructuring will result in a viable enterprise. See *Diemaster Tool Inc. v. Skvortsoff (Trustee of)* (1991), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 133 (Ont. Gen. Div.). This concept has been a continuing thread in CCAA cases in this jurisdiction stretching back for at least the past 15 years, if not before.

**19** I would also note that the jurisprudence and practical application of the bankruptcy and insolvency regime in place in Canada has been constantly evolving. The early jails of what became Canada were populated to the extent of almost half their capacity by bankrupts. Rehabilitation and a fresh start for the honest but unfortunate debtor came afterwards. Most recently, the Bankruptcy Act was revised to the BIA in 1992 to better facilitate the rehabilitative aspect of making a proposal to creditors. At the same time, the CCAA was amended to eliminate the threshold criterion of there having to be debentures issued under a trust deed (this concept was embodied in the CCAA upon its enactment in 1933 with a view that it would only be large companies with public issues of debt securities which could apply). The size restriction was continued as there was now a threshold criterion of at least \$5 million of claims against the applicant. While this restriction may appear discriminatory, it does have the practical advantage of taking into account that the costs (administrative costs including professional fees to the applicant, and indeed to the other parties who retain professionals) is a significant amount, even when viewed from the perspective of \$5 million. These costs would be prohibitive in a smaller situation. Parliament was mindful of the time

horizons involved in proposals under BIA where the maximum length of a proceeding including a stay is six months (including all possible extensions) whereas under CCAA, the length is in the discretion of the court judicially exercised in accordance with the facts and the circumstances of the case. Certainly sooner is better than later. However, it is fair to observe that virtually all CCAA cases which proceed go on for over six months and those with complexity frequently exceed a year.

**20** Restructurings are not now limited in practical terms to corporations merely compromising their debts with their creditors in a balance sheet exercise. Rather there has been quite an emphasis recently on operational restructuring as well so that the emerging company will have the benefit of a long term viable fix, all for the benefit of stakeholders. See *Sklar-Peppelar Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 314 where Borins J. states:

The proposed plan exemplifies the policy and objectives of the Act as it proposes a regime for the court-supervised re-organization for the Applicant company intended to avoid the devastating social and economic effects of a creditor-initiated termination of its ongoing business operations and enabling the company to carry on its business in a manner in which it is intended to cause the least possible harm to the company, its creditors, its employees and former employees and the communities in which its carries on and carried on its business operations.

**21** The CCAA does not define "insolvent" or "insolvency". Houlden & Morawetz, *The 2004 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Toronto, Carswell; 2003) at p. 1107 (N5) states:

In interpreting "debtor company", reference must be had to the definition of "insolvent person" in s. 2(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act ...

To be able to use the Act, a company must be bankrupt or insolvent: Reference re *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (Canada), 16 C.B.R. 1 [1934] S.C.R. 659, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75. The company must, in its application, admit its insolvency.

**22** It appears to have become fairly common practice for applicants and others when reference is made to insolvency in the context of the CCAA to refer to the definition of "insolvent person" in the BIA. That definition is as follows:

s. 2(1)

... "insolvent person" means a person who is not bankrupt and who resides,

carries on business or has property in Canada, and whose liability to creditors provable as claims under this Act amount to one thousand dollars, and

- (a) who is for any reason unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due,
- (b) who has ceased paying his current obligations in the ordinary course of business as they generally become due, or
- (c) the aggregate of whose property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or, if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process, would not be sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due.

23 Stelco acknowledges that it does not meet the test of (b); however, it does assert that it meets the test of both (a) and (c). In addition, however, Stelco also indicates that since the CCAA does not have a reference over to the BIA in relation to the (a) definition of "debtor company" as being a company that is "(a) bankrupt or insolvent", then this term of "insolvent" should be given the meaning that the overall context of the CCAA requires. See the modern rule of statutory interpretation which directs the court to take a contextual and purposive approach to the language of the provision at issue as illustrated by *Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex*, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 at p. 580:

Today there is only one principle or approach, namely the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

24 I note in particular that the (b), (c) and (d) aspects of the definition of "debtor company" all refer to other statutes, including the BIA; (a) does not. S. 12 of the CCAA defines "claims" with reference over to the BIA (and otherwise refers to the BIA and the Winding-Up and Restructuring Act). It seems to me that there is merit in considering that the test for insolvency under the CCAA may differ somewhat from that under the BIA, so as to meet the special circumstances of the CCAA and those corporations which would apply under it. In that respect, I am mindful of the above discussion regarding the time that is usually and necessarily (in the circumstances) taken in a CCAA reorganization restructuring which is engaged in coming up with a plan of compromise and arrangement. The BIA definition would appear to have been historically focused on the question of bankruptcy - and not reorganization of a corporation under a proposal since before 1992, secured creditors could not be forced to compromise their claims, so that in practice there were no reorganizations under the former Bankruptcy Act unless all secured creditors voluntarily agreed to have their secured claims compromised. The BIA definition then was essentially useful for being a pre-condition to the "end" situation of a bankruptcy petition or voluntary receiving order where the upshot would be a realization on the bankrupt's assets (not likely involving the business carried on - and certainly not by the bankrupt). Insolvency under the BIA is also important as to the Paulian

action events (eg., fraudulent preferences, settlements) as to the conduct of the debtor prior to the bankruptcy; similarly as to the question of provincial preference legislation. Reorganization under a plan or proposal, on the contrary, is with a general objective of the applicant continuing to exist, albeit that the CCAA may also be used to have an orderly disposition of the assets and undertaking in whole or in part.

**25** It seems to me that given the time and steps involved in a reorganization, and the condition of insolvency perforce requires an expanded meaning under the CCAA. Query whether the definition under the BIA is now sufficient in that light for the allowance of sufficient time to carry through with a realistically viable proposal within the maximum of six months allowed under the BIA? I think it sufficient to note that there would not be much sense in providing for a rehabilitation program of restructuring/reorganization under either statute if the entry test was that the applicant could not apply until a rather late stage of its financial difficulties with the rather automatic result that in situations of complexity of any material degree, the applicant would not have the financial resources sufficient to carry through to hopefully a successful end. This would indeed be contrary to the renewed emphasis of Parliament on "rescues" as exhibited by the 1992 and 1997 amendments to the CCAA and the BIA.

**26** Allow me now to examine whether Stelco has been successful in meeting the onus of demonstrating with credible evidence on a common sense basis that it is insolvent within the meaning required by the CCAA in regard to the interpretation of "debtor company" in the context and within the purpose of that legislation. To a similar effect, see *PWA Corp. v. Gemini Group Automated Distribution Systems Inc.* (1993), 103 D.L.R. (4th) 609 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed, [1993] S.C.C.A. No. 343, wherein it was determined that the trial judge was correct in holding that a party was not insolvent and that the statutory definition of insolvency pursuant to the BIA definition was irrelevant to determine that issue, since the agreement in question effectively provided its own definition by implication. It seems to me that the CCAA test of insolvency advocated by Stelco and which I have determined is a proper interpretation is that the BIA definition of (a), (b) or (c) of insolvent person is acceptable with the caveat that as to (a), a financially troubled corporation is insolvent if it is reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring. That is, there should be a reasonable cushion, which cushion may be adjusted and indeed become in effect an encroachment depending upon reasonable access to DIP between financing. In the present case, Stelco accepts the view of the Union's affiant, Michael Mackey of Deloitte and Touche that it will otherwise run out of funding by November 2004.

**27** On that basis, allow me to determine whether Stelco is insolvent on the basis of (i) what I would refer to as the CCAA test as described immediately above, (ii) BIA test (a) or (iii) BIA test (c). In doing so, I will have to take into account the fact that Stephen, albeit a very experienced and skilled person in the field of restructurings under the CCAA, unfortunately did not appreciate that the material which was given to him in Exhibit E to his affidavit was modified by the caveats in the source material that in effect indicated that based on appraisals, the fair value of the real assets

acquired was in excess of the purchase price for two of the U.S. comparators. Therefore the evidence as to these comparators is significantly weakened. In addition at Q. 175-177 in his cross examination, Stephen acknowledged that it was reasonable to assume that a purchaser would "take over some liabilities, some pension liabilities and OPEB liabilities, for workers who remain with the plant." The extent of that assumption was not explored; however, I do note that there was acknowledgement on the part of the Union that such an assumption would also have a reciprocal negative effect on the purchase price.

**28** The BIA tests are disjunctive so that anyone meeting any of these tests is determined to be insolvent: see *Re Optical Recording Laboratories Inc.* (1990), 75 D.L.R. (4th) 747 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 756; *Re Viteway Natural Foods Ltd.* (1986), 63 C.B.R. (N.S.) 157 (B.C.S.C.) at p. 161. Thus, if I determine that Stelco is insolvent on any one of these tests, then it would be a "debtor company" entitled to apply for protection under the CCAA.

**29** In my view, the Union's position that Stelco is not insolvent under BIA (a) because it has not entirely used up its cash and cash facilities (including its credit line), that is, it is not yet as of January 29, 2004 run out of liquidity conflates inappropriately the (a) test with the (b) test. The Union's view would render the (a) test necessarily as being redundant. See *R. v. Proulx*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61 at p. 85 for the principle that no legislative provision ought to be interpreted in a manner which would "render it mere surplusage." Indeed the plain meaning of the phrase "unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due" requires a construction of test (a) which permits the court to take a purposive assessment of a debtor's ability to meet his future obligations. See *Re King Petroleum Ltd.* (1978), 29 C.B.R. (N.S.) 76 (Ont. S.C.) where Steele J. stated at p. 80:

With respect to cl. (a), it was argued that at the time the disputed payments were made the company was able to meet its obligations as they generally became due because no major debts were in fact due at that time. This was premised on the fact that the moneys owed to Imperial Oil were not due until 10 days after the receipt of the statements and that the statements had not then been received. I am of the opinion that this is not a proper interpretation of cl. (a). Clause (a) speaks in the present and future tenses and not in the past. I am of the opinion that the company was an "insolvent person" within the meaning of cl. (a) because by the very payment-out of the money in question it placed itself in a position that it was unable to meet its obligations as they would generally become due. In other words, it had placed itself in a position that it would not be able to pay the obligations that it knew it had incurred and which it knew would become due in the immediate future. [Emphasis added.]

**30** *King* was a case involving the question in a bankruptcy scenario of whether there was a fraudulent preference during a period when the corporation was insolvent. Under those circumstances, the "immediate future" does not have the same expansive meaning that one would attribute to a time period in a restructuring forward looking situation.



**31** Stephen at paragraphs 40-49 addressed the restructuring question in general and its applicability to the Stelco situation. At paragraph 41, he outlined the significant stages as follows:

The process of restructuring under the CCAA entails a number of different stages, the most significant of which are as follows:

- (a) identification of the debtor's stakeholders and their interests;
- (b) arranging for a process of meaningful communication;
- (c) dealing with immediate relationship issues arising from a CCAA filing;
- (d) sharing information about the issues giving rise to the debtor's need to restructure;
- (e) developing restructuring alternatives; and
- (f) building a consensus around a plan of restructuring.

**32** I note that January 29, 2004 is just 9-10 months away from November 2004. I accept as correct his conclusion based on his experience (and this is in accord with my own objective experience in large and complicated CCAA proceedings) that Stelco would have the liquidity problem within the time horizon indicated. In that regard, I also think it fair to observe that Stelco realistically cannot expect any increase in its credit line with its lenders or access further outside funding. To bridge the gap it must rely upon the stay to give it the uplift as to pre-filing liabilities (which the Union misinterpreted as a general turnaround in its cash position without taking into account this uplift). As well, the Union was of the view that recent price increases would relieve Stelco's liquidity problems; however, the answers to undertaking in this respect indicated:

With respect to the Business Plan, the average spot market sales price per ton was \$514, and the average contract business sales price per ton was \$599. The Forecast reflects an average spot market sales price per ton of \$575, and average contract business sales price per ton of \$611. The average spot price used in the forecast considers further announced price increases, recognizing, among other things, the timing and the extent such increases are expected to become effective. The benefit of the increase in sales prices from the Business Plan is essentially offset by the substantial increase in production costs, and in particular in raw material costs, primarily scrap and coke, as well as higher working capital levels and a higher loan balance outstanding on the CIT credit facility as of January 2004.

I accept that this is generally a cancel out or wash in all material respects.

**33** I note that \$145 million of cash resources had been used from January 1, 2003 to the date of filing. Use of the credit facility of \$350 million had increased from \$241 million on November 30, 2003 to \$293 million on the date of filing. There must be a reasonable reserve of liquidity to take into account day to day, week to week or month to month variances and also provide for unforeseen

circumstances such as the breakdown of a piece of vital equipment which would significantly affect production until remedied. Trade credit had been contracting as a result of appreciation by suppliers of Stelco's financial difficulties. The DIP financing of \$75 million is only available if Stelco is under CCAA protection. I also note that a shut down as a result of running out of liquidity would be complicated in the case of Stelco and that even if conditions turned around more than reasonably expected, start-up costs would be heavy and quite importantly, there would be a significant erosion of the customer base (reference should be had to the Slater Hamilton plant in this regard). One does not liquidate assets which one would not sell in the ordinary course of business to thereby artificially salvage some liquidity for the purpose of the test: see *Re Pacific Mobile Corporation; Robitaille v. Les Industries l'Islet Inc. and Banque Canadienne Nationale* (1979), 32 C.B.R. (N.S.) 209 (Que. S.C.) at p. 220. As a rough test, I note that Stelco (albeit on a consolidated basis with all subsidiaries) running significantly behind plan in 2003 from its budget of a profit of \$80 million now to a projected loss of \$192 million and cash has gone from a positive \$209 million to a negative \$114 million.

34 Locker made the observation at paragraph 8 of his affidavit that:

8. Stelco has performed poorly for the past few years primarily due to an inadequate business strategy, poor utilization of assets, inefficient operations and generally weak management leadership and decision-making. This point is best supported by the fact that Stelco's local competitor, Dofasco, has generated outstanding results in the same period.

Table 1 to his affidavit would demonstrate that Dofasco has had superior profitability and cashflow performance than its "neighbour" Stelco. He went on to observe at paragraphs 36-37:

36. Stelco can achieve significant cost reductions through means other than cutting wages, pensions and benefits for employees and retirees. Stelco could bring its cost levels down to those of restructured U.S. mills, with the potential for lowering them below those of many U.S. mills.
37. Stelco could achieve substantial savings through productivity improvements within the mechanisms of the current collective agreements. More importantly, a major portion of this cost reduction could be achieved through constructive negotiations with the USWA in an out-of-court restructuring that does not require intervention of the courts through the vehicle of CCAA protection.

I accept his constructive comments that there is room for cost reductions and that there are substantial savings to be achieved through productivity improvements. However, I do not see anything detrimental to these discussions and negotiations by having them conducted within the umbrella of a CCAA proceeding. See my comments above regarding the CCAA in practice.

35 But I would observe and I am mystified by Locker's observations at paragraph 12 (quoted above), that Stelco should have borrowed to fund pension obligations to avoid its current financial

crisis. This presumes that the borrowed funds would not constitute an obligation to be paid back as to principal and interest, but rather that it would assume the character of a cost-free "gift".

**36** I note that Mackey, without the "laundry list" he indicates at paragraph 17 of his second affidavit, is unable to determine at paragraph 19 (for himself) whether Stelco was insolvent. Mackey was unable to avail himself of all available information in light of the Union's refusal to enter into a confidentiality agreement. He does not closely adhere to the BIA tests as they are defined. In the face of positive evidence about an applicant's financial position by an experienced person with expertise, it is not sufficient to displace this evidence by filing evidence which goes no further than raising questions: see *Anvil*, supra at p. 162.

**37** The Union referred me to one of my decisions *Standard Trustco Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Standard Trust Co.* (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 7 (Gen. Div.) where I stated as to the MacGirr affidavit:

The Trustee's cause of action is premised on MacGirr's opinion that STC was insolvent as at August 3, 1990 and therefore the STC common shares and promissory note received by Trustco in return for the Injection had no value at the time the Injection was made. Further, MacGirr ascribed no value to the opportunity which the Injection gave to Trustco to restore STC and salvage its thought to be existing \$74 million investment. In stating his opinion MacGirr defined solvency as:

- (a) the ability to meet liabilities as they fall due; and
- (b) that assets exceed liabilities.

On cross-examination MacGirr testified that in his opinion on either test STC was insolvent as at August 3, 1990 since as to (a) STC was experiencing then a negative cash flow and as to (b) the STC financial statements incorrectly reflected values. As far as (a) is concerned, I would comment that while I concur with MacGirr that at some time in the long run a company that is experiencing a negative cash flow will eventually not be able to meet liabilities as they fall due but that is not the test (which is a "present exercise"). On that current basis STC was meeting its liabilities on a timely basis.

**38** As will be seen from that expanded quote, MacGirr gave his own definitions of insolvency which are not the same as the s. 2 BIA tests (a), (b) and (c) but only a very loose paraphrase of (a) and (c) and an omission of (b). Nor was I referred to the *King* or *Proulx* cases supra. Further, it is obvious from the context that "sometime in the long run ... eventually" is not a finite time in the foreseeable future.

**39** I have not given any benefit to the \$313-\$363 million of improvements referred to in the

affidavit of William Vaughan at paragraph 115 as those appear to be capital expenditures which will have to be accommodated within a plan of arrangement or after emergence.

40 It seems to me that if the BIA (a) test is restrictively dealt with (as per my question to Union counsel as to how far in the future should one look on a prospective basis being answered "24 hours") then Stelco would not be insolvent under that test. However, I am of the view that that would be unduly restrictive and a proper contextual and purposive interpretation to be given when it is being used for a restructuring purpose even under BIA would be to see whether there is a reasonably foreseeable (at the time of filing) expectation that there is a looming liquidity condition or crisis which will result in the applicant running out of "cash" to pay its debts as they generally become due in the future without the benefit of the stay and ancillary protection and procedure by court authorization pursuant to an order. I think this is the more appropriate interpretation of BIA (a) test in the context of a reorganization or "rescue" as opposed to a threshold to bankruptcy consideration or a fraudulent preferences proceeding. On that basis, I would find Stelco insolvent from the date of filing. Even if one were not to give the latter interpretation to the BIA (a) test, clearly for the above reasons and analysis, if one looks at the meaning of "insolvent" within the context of a CCAA reorganization or rescue solely, then of necessity, the time horizon must be such that the liquidity crisis would occur in the sense of running out of "cash" but for the grant of the CCAA order. On that basis Stelco is certainly insolvent given its limited cash resources unused, its need for a cushion, its rate of cash burn recently experienced and anticipated.

41 What about the BIA (c) test which may be roughly referred to as an assets compared with obligations test. See *New Quebec Reglan Mines Ltd. v. Blok-Andersen*, [1993] O.J. No. 727 (Gen. Div.) as to fair value and fair market valuation. The Union observed that there was no intention by Stelco to wind itself up or proceed with a sale of some or all of its assets and undertaking and therefore some of the liabilities which Stelco and Stephen took into account would not crystallize. However, as I discussed at the time of the hearing, the (c) test is what one might reasonably call or describe as an "artificial" or notional/hypothetical test. It presumes certain things which are in fact not necessarily contemplated to take place or to be involved. In that respect, I appreciate that it may be difficult to get one's mind around that concept and down the right avenue of that (c) test. See my views at trial in *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp.*, [2001] O.J. No. 3394 (S.C.J.) at paragraphs 13, 21 and 33; affirmed [2003] O.J. No. 5242 (C.A.). At paragraph 33, I observed in closing:

33 ... They (and their expert witnesses) all had to contend with dealing with rambling and complicated facts and, in Section 100 BIA, a section which is difficult to administer when fmv [fair market value] in a notational or hypothetical market involves ignoring what would often be regarded as self evidence truths but at the same time appreciating that this notational or hypothetical market requires that the objects being sold have to have realistic true to life attributes recognized.

42 The Court of Appeal stated at paragraphs 24-25 as follows:

24. Nor are the appellants correct to argue that the trial judge also assumed an imprudent vendor in arriving at his conclusion about the fair market value of the OYSF note would have to know that in order to realize value from the note any purchaser would immediately put OYSF and thus OYDL itself into bankruptcy to pre-empt a subsequent triggering event in favour of EIB. While this was so, and the trial judge clearly understood it, the error in this submission is that it seeks to inject into the analysis factors subjected to the circumstances of OYDL as vendor and not intrinsic to the value of the OYSF note. The calculation of fair market value does not permit this but rather must assume an unconstrained vendor.
25. The Applicants further argue that the trial judge eroded in determining the fair market value of the OYSF note by reference to a transaction which was entirely speculative because it was never considered by OYDL nor would have it been since it would have resulted in OYDL's own bankruptcy. I disagree. The transaction hypothesized by the trial judge was one between a notational, willing, prudent and informed vendor and purchaser based on factors relevant to the OYSF note itself rather than the particular circumstances of OYDL as the seller of the note. This is an entirely appropriate way to determine the fair market value of the OYSF note.

43 Test (c) deems a person to be insolvent if "the aggregate of [its] property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or of disposed at a fairly conducted sale under legal process would not be sufficient to enable payment of all [its] obligations, due and accruing due." The origins of this legislative test appear to be the decision of Spragge V-C in *Davidson v. Douglas* (1868), 15 Gr. 347 at p. 351 where he stated with respect to the solvency or insolvency of a debtor, the proper course is:

to see and examine whether all his property, real and personal, be sufficient if presently realized for the payment of his debts, and in this view we must estimate his land, as well as his chattel property, not at what his neighbours or others may consider to be its value, but at what it would bring in the market at a forced sale, or a sale where the seller cannot await his opportunities, but must sell.

44 In *Clarkson v. Sterling* (1887), 14 O.R. 460 (Div. Ct.) at p. 463, Rose J. indicted that the sale must be fair and reasonable, but that the determination of fairness and reasonableness would depend on the facts of each case.

45 The Union essentially relied on garnishment cases. Because of the provisions relating as to which debts may or may not be garnished, these authorities are of somewhat limited value when dealing with the test (c) question. However I would refer to one of the Union's cases *Bank of Montreal v. I.M. Krisp Foods Ltd.*, [1996] S.J. No. 655 (C.A.) where it is stated at paragraph 11:

"11. Few phrases have been as problematic to define as "debt due or accruing due". The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed. defines "accruing" as "arising in due course", but an examination of English and Canadian authority reveals that not all debts "arising in due course" are permitted to be garnisheed. (See Professor Dunlop's extensive research for his British Columbia Law Reform Commission's Report on Attachment of Debts Act, 1978 at 17 to 29 and its text *Creditor-Debtor Law in Canada*, 2nd ed. at 374 to 385.)

46 In *Barsi v. Farcas*, [1924] 1 D.L.R. 1154 (Sask. C.A.), Lamont J.A. was cited for his statement at p. 522 of *Webb v. Stanton* (1883), 11 Q.B.D. 518 that: "an accruing debt, therefore, is a debt not yet actually payable, but a debt which is represented by an existing obligation."

47 Saunders J. noted in 633746 Ont. Inc. (Trustee of) v. Salvati (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 72 (Ont. S.C.) at p. 81 that a sale out of the ordinary course of business would have an adverse effect on that actually realized.

48 There was no suggestion by any of the parties that any of the assets and undertaking would have any enhanced value from that shown on the financial statements prepared according to GAAP.

49 In *King*, supra at p. 81 Steele J. observed:

To consider the question of insolvency under cl. (c) I must look to the aggregate property of the company and come to a conclusion as to whether or not it would be sufficient to enable payment of all obligations due and accruing due. There are two tests to be applied: First, its fair value and, secondly, its value if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process. The balance sheet is a starting point, but the evidence relating to the fair value of the assets and what they might realize if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process must be reviewed in interpreting it. In this case, I find no difficulty in accepting the obligations shown as liabilities because they are known. I have more difficulty with respect to the assets.

50 To my view the preferable interpretation to be given to "sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due" is to be determined in the context of this test as a whole. What is being put up to satisfy those obligations is the debtor's assets and undertaking in total; in other words, the debtor in essence is taken as having sold everything. There would be no residual assets and undertaking to pay off any obligations which would not be encompassed by the phrase "all of his obligations, due and accruing due". Surely, there cannot be "orphan" obligations which are left hanging unsatisfied. It seems to me that the intention of "due and accruing due" was to cover off all obligations of whatever nature or kind and leave nothing in limbo.

51 S. 121(1) and (2) of the BIA, which are incorporated by reference in s. 12 of the CCAA, provide in respect to provable claims:

S. 121(1) All debts and liabilities, present or future, to which the bankrupt is subject on the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt or to which bankrupt may become subject before the bankrupt's discharge by reason of any obligation incurred before the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt shall be deemed to be claims provable in proceedings under this Act.

- (2) The determination whether a contingent or unliquidated claim is a provable claim and the valuation of such claim shall be made in accordance with s. 135.

**52** Houlden and Morawetz 2004 Annotated, supra at p. 537 (G28(3)) indicates:

The word "liability" is a very broad one. It includes all obligations to which the bankrupt is subject on the day on which he becomes bankrupt except for contingent and unliquidated claims which are dealt with in s. 121(2). However contingent and unliquidated claims would be encompassed by the term "obligations".

**53** In *Garden v. Newton* (1916), 29 D.L.R. 276 (Man. K.B.), Mathers C.J.K.B. observed at p. 281 that "contingent claim, that is, a claim which may or may not ripen into a debt, according as some future event does or does not happen." See *In Re A Debtor* (No. 64 of 1992), [1993] 1 W.L.R. 264 (Ch. D) at p. 268 for the definition of a "liquidated sum" which is an amount which can be readily ascertained and hence by corollary an "unliquidated claim" would be one which is not easily ascertained, but will have to be valued. In *Re Leo Gagnier* (1950), 30 C.B.R. 74 (Ont. S.C.), there appears to be a conflation of not only the (a) test with the (c) test, but also the invocation of the judicial discretion not to grant the receiving order pursuant to a bankruptcy petition, notwithstanding that "[the judge was] unable to find the debtor is bankrupt". The debtor was able to survive the (a) test as he had the practice (accepted by all his suppliers) of providing them with post dated cheques. The (c) test was not a problem since the judge found that his assets should be valued at considerably more than his obligations. However, this case does illustrate that the application of the tests present some difficulties. These difficulties are magnified when one is dealing with something more significantly complex and a great deal larger than a haberdashery store - in the case before us, a giant corporation in which, amongst other things, is engaged in a very competitive history including competition from foreign sources which have recently restructured into more cost efficient structures, having shed certain of their obligations. As well, that is without taking into account that a sale would entail significant transaction costs. Even of greater significance would be the severance and termination payments to employees not continued by the new purchaser. Lastly, it was recognized by everyone at the hearing that Stelco's plants, especially the Hamilton-Hilton works, have extremely high environmental liabilities lurking in the woodwork. Stephen observed that these obligations would be substantial, although not quantified.

**54** It is true that there are no appraisals of the plant and equipment nor of the assets and

undertaking of Stelco. Given the circumstances of this case and the complexities of the market, one may realistically question whether or not the appraisals would be all that helpful or accurate.

**55** I would further observe that in the notional or hypothetical exercise of a sale, then all the obligations which would be triggered by such sale would have to be taken into account.

**56** All liabilities, contingent or unliquidated would have to be taken into account. See King, *supra* p. 81; Salvati, *supra* pp. 80-1; Maybank Foods Inc. (Trustee of) v. Provisseuers Maritimes Ltd. (1989), 45 B.L.R. 14 (N.S.S.C.) at p. 29; Re Challmie (1976), 22 C.B.R. (N.S.) 78 (B.C.S.C.) at pp. 81-2. In Challmie the debtor ought to have known that his guarantee was very much exposed given the perilous state of his company whose liabilities he had guaranteed. It is interesting to note what was stated in Maybank, even if it is rather patently obvious. Tidman J. said in respect of the branch of the company at p. 29:

Mr. MacAdam argues also that the \$4.8 million employees' severance obligation was not a liability on January 20, 1986. The Bankruptcy Act includes as obligations both those due and accruing due. Although the employees' severance obligation was not due and payable on January 20, 1986 it was an obligation "accruing due". The Toronto facility had experienced severe financial difficulties for some time; in fact, it was the major, if not the sole cause, of Maybank's financial difficulties. I believe it is reasonable to conclude that a reasonably astute perspective buyer of the company has a going concern would have considered that obligation on January 20, 1986 and that it would have substantially reduced the price offered by that perspective buyer. Therefore that obligation must be considered as an obligation of the company on January 20, 1986.

**57** With the greatest of respect for my colleague, I disagree with the conclusion of Ground J. in Enterprise Capital, *supra* as to the approach to be taken to "due and accruing due" when he observed at pp. 139-140:

It therefore becomes necessary to determine whether the principle amount of the Notes constitutes an obligation "due or accruing due" as of the date of this application.

There is a paucity of helpful authority on the meaning of "accruing due" for purposes of a definition of insolvency. Historically, in 1933, in *P. Lyall & Sons Construction Co. v. Baker*, [1933] O.R. 286 (Ont. C.A.), the Ontario Court of Appeal, in determining a question of set-off under the Dominion Winding-Up Act had to determine whether the amount claimed as set-off was a debt due or accruing due to the company in liquidation for purposes of that Act. Marsten J. at pp. 292-293 quoted from *Moss J.A. in Mail Printing Co. v. Clarkson* (1898), 25



O.A.R. 1 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 8:

A debt is defined to be a sum of money which is certainly, and at all event, payable without regard to the fact whether it be payable now or at a future time. And an accruing debt is a debt not yet actually payable, but a debt which is represented by an existing obligation: Per Lindley L.J. in *Webb v. Stenton* (1883), 11 Q.D.D. at p. 529.

Whatever relevance such definition may have had for purposes of dealing with claims by and against companies in liquidation under the old winding-up legislation, it is apparent to me that it should not be applied to definitions of insolvency. To include every debt payable at some future date in "accruing due" for the purposes of insolvency tests would render numerous corporations, with long term debt due over a period of years in the future and anticipated to be paid out of future income, "insolvent" for the purposes of the BIA and therefore the CCAA. For the same reason, I do not accept the statement quoted in the *Enterprise factum* from the decision of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in *Centennial Textiles Inc., Re* 220 B.R. 165 (U.S.N.Y.D.C. 1998) that "if the present saleable value of assets are less than the amount required to pay existing debt as they mature, the debtor is insolvent". In my view, the obligations, which are to be measured against the fair valuation of a company's property as being obligations due and accruing due, must be limited to obligations currently payable or properly chargeable to the accounting period during which the test is being applied as, for example, a sinking fund payment due within the current year. Black's Law Dictionary defines "accrued liability" as "an obligation or debt which is properly chargeable in a given accounting period, but which is not yet paid or payable". The principal amount of the Notes is neither due nor accruing due in this sense.

**58** There appears to be some confusion in this analysis as to "debts" and "obligations", the latter being much broader than debts. Please see above as to my views concerning the floodgates argument under the BIA and CCAA being addressed by judicially exercised discretion even if "otherwise warranted" applications were made. I pause to note that an insolvency test under general corporate litigation need not be and likely is not identical, or indeed similar to that under these insolvency statutes. As well, it is curious to note that the cut off date is the end of the current fiscal period which could have radically different results if there were a calendar fiscal year and the application was variously made in the first week of January, mid-summer or the last day of December. Lastly, see above and below as to my views concerning the proper interpretation of this question of "accruing due".

**59** It seems to me that the phrase "accruing due" has been interpreted by the courts as broadly identifying obligations that will "become due". See Viteway below at pp. 163-4 - at least at some point in the future. Again, I would refer to my conclusion above that every obligation of the corporation in the hypothetical or notional sale must be treated as "accruing due" to avoid orphan obligations. In that context, it matters not that a wind-up pension liability may be discharged over 15 years; in a test (c) situation, it is crystallized on the date of the test. See Optical, supra at pp. 756-7; Re Viteway Natural Foods Ltd. (1986), 63 C.B.R. (N.S.) 157 (B.C.S.C.) at pp. 164-63-4; Re Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd. (1986), 62 C.B.R. (N.S.) 156 (B.C.S.C.) at p. 163. In Consolidated Seed, Spencer J. at pp. 162-3 stated:

In my opinion, a futures broker is not in that special position. The third definition of "insolvency" may apply to a futures trader at any time even though he has open long positions in the market. Even though Consolidated's long positions were not required to be closed on 10th December, the chance that they might show a profit by March 1981 or even on the following day and thus wipe out Consolidated's cash deficit cannot save it from a condition of insolvency on that day. The circumstances fit precisely within the third definition; if all Consolidated's assets had been sold on that day at a fair value, the proceeds would not have covered its obligations due and accruing due, including its obligations to pay in March 1981 for its long positions in rapeseed. The market prices from day to day establish a fair valuation. ...

The contract to buy grain at a fixed price at a future time imposes a present obligation upon a trader taking a long position in the futures market to take delivery in exchange for payment at that future time. It is true that in the practice of the market, that obligation is nearly always washed out by buying an offsetting short contract, but until that is done the obligation stands. The trader does not know who will eventually be on the opposite side of his transaction if it is not offset but all transactions are treated as if the clearing house is on the other side. It is a present obligation due at a future time. It is therefore an obligation accruing due within the meaning of the third definition of "insolvency".

**60** The possibility of an expectancy of future profits or a change in the market is not sufficient; Consolidated Seed at p. 162 emphasizes that the test is to be done on that day, the day of filing in the case of an application for reorganization.

**61** I see no objection to using Exhibit C to Stephen's affidavit as an aid to review the balance sheet approach to test (c). While Stephen may not have known who prepared Exhibit C, he addressed each of its components in the text of his affidavit and as such he could have mechanically prepared the exhibit himself. He was comfortable with and agreed with each of its components. Stelco's factum at paragraphs 70-1 submits as follows:

70. In Exhibit C to his Affidavit, Mr. Stephen addresses a variety of adjustments to the Shareholder's Equity of Stelco necessary to reflect the values of assets and liabilities as would be required to determine whether Stelco met the test of insolvency under Clause C. In cross examination of both Mr. Vaughan and Mr. Stephen only one of these adjustments was challenged - the "Possible Reductions in Capital Assets."
71. The basis of the challenge was that the comparative sales analysis was flawed. In the submission of Stelco, none of these challenges has any merit. Even if the entire adjustment relating to the value in capital assets is ignored, the remaining adjustments leave Stelco with assets worth over \$600 million less than the value of its obligations due and accruing due. This fundamental fact is not challenged.

62 Stelco went on at paragraphs 74-5 of its factum to submit:

74. The values relied upon by Mr. Stephen if anything, understate the extent of Stelco's insolvency. As Mr. Stephen has stated, and no one has challenged by affidavit evidence or on cross examination, in a fairly conducted sale under legal process, the value of Stelco's working capital and other assets would be further impaired by: (i) increased environmental liabilities not reflected on the financial statements, (ii) increased pension deficiencies that would be generated on a wind up of the pension plans, (iii) severance and termination claims and (iv) substantial liquidation costs that would be incurred in connection with such a sale.
75. No one on behalf of the USWA has presented any evidence that the capital assets of Stelco are in excess of book value on a stand alone basis. Certainly no one has suggested that these assets would be in excess of book value if the related environmental legacy costs and collective agreements could not be separated from the assets.

63 Before turning to that exercise, I would also observe that test (c) is also disjunctive. There is an insolvency condition if the total obligation of the debtor exceed either (i) a fair valuation of its assets or (ii) the proceeds of a sale fairly conducted under legal process of its assets.

64 As discussed above and confirmed by Stephen, if there were a sale under legal process, then it would be unlikely, especially in this circumstance that values would be enhanced; in all probability they would be depressed from book value. Stephen took the balance sheet GAAP calculated figure of equity at November 30, 2003 as \$804.2 million. From that, he deducted the loss for December 2003 - January 2004 of \$17 million to arrive at an equity position of \$787.2 million as at the date of filing.

65 From that, he deducted, reasonably in my view, those "booked" assets that would have no value in a test (c) sale namely: (a) \$294 million of future income tax recourse which would need

taxable income in the future to realize; (b) \$57 million for a write-off of the Platemill which is presently hot idled (while Locker observed that it would not be prohibitive in cost to restart production, I note that neither Stephen nor Vaughan were cross examined as to the decision not to do so); and (c) the capitalized deferred debt issue expense of \$3.2 million which is being written off over time and therefore, truly is a "nothing". This totals \$354.2 million so that the excess of value over liabilities before reflecting obligations not included in the financials directly, but which are, substantiated as to category in the notes would be \$433 million.

**66** On a windup basis, there would be a pension deficiency of \$1,252 million; however, Stephen conservatively in my view looked at the Mercer actuary calculations on the basis of a going concern finding deficiency of \$656 million. If the \$1,252 million windup figure had been taken, then the picture would have been even bleaker than it is as Stephen has calculated it for test (c) purposes. In addition, there are deferred pension costs of \$198.7 million which under GAAP accounting calculations is allowed so as to defer recognition of past bad investment experience, but this has no realizable value. Then there is the question of Employee Future Benefits. These have been calculated as at December 31, 2003 by the Mercer actuary as \$909.3 million but only \$684 million has been accrued and booked on the financial statements so that there has to be an increased provision of \$225.3 million. These off balance sheet adjustments total \$1,080 million.

**67** Taking that last adjustment into account would result in a negative equity of (\$433 million minus \$1,080 million) or negative \$647 million. On that basis without taking into account possible reductions in capital assets as dealt with in the somewhat flawed Exhibit E nor environmental and other costs discussed above, Stelco is insolvent according to the test (c). With respect to Exhibit E, I have not relied on it in any way, but it is entirely likely that a properly calculated Exhibit E would provide comparators (also being sold in the U.S. under legal process in a fairly conducted process) which tend to require a further downward adjustment. Based on test (c), Stelco is significantly, not marginally, under water.

**68** In reaching my conclusion as to the negative equity (and I find that Stephen approached that exercise fairly and constructively), please note my comments above regarding the possible assumption of pension obligations by the purchaser being offset by a reduction of the purchase price. The 35% adjustment advocated as to pension and employee benefits in this regard is speculation by the Union. Secondly, the Union emphasized cash flow as being important in evaluation, but it must be remembered that Stelco has been negative cash flow for some time which would make that analysis unreliable and to the detriment of the Union's position. The Union treated the \$773 million estimated contribution to the shortfall in the pension deficiency by the Pension Benefits Guarantee Fund as eliminating that as a Stelco obligation. That is not the case however as that Fund would be subrogated to the claims of the employees in that respect with a result that Stelco would remain liable for that \$773 million. Lastly, the Union indicated that there should be a \$155 million adjustment as to the negative equity in Sub Applicants when calculating Stelco's equity. While Stephen at Q. 181-2 acknowledged that there was no adjustment for that, I agree with him that there ought not to be since Stelco was being examined (and the calculations were based) on


an unconsolidated basis, not on a consolidated basis.

69 In the end result, I have concluded on the balance of probabilities that Stelco is insolvent and therefore it is a "debtor company" as at the date of filing and entitled to apply for the CCAA initial order. My conclusion is that (i) BIA test (c) strongly shows Stelco is insolvent; (ii) BIA test (a) demonstrates, to a less certain but sufficient basis, an insolvency and (iii) the "new" CCAA test again strongly supports the conclusion of insolvency. I am further of the opinion that I properly exercised my discretion in granting Stelco and the Sub Applicants the initial order on January 29, 2004 and I would confirm that as of the present date with effect on the date of filing. The Union's motion is therefore dismissed.

70 I appreciate that all the employees (union and non-union alike) and the Union and the International have a justifiable pride in their work and their workplace - and a human concern about what the future holds for them. The pensioners are in the same position. Their respective positions can only be improved by engaging in discussion, an exchange of views and information reasonably advanced and conscientiously listened to and digested, leading to mutual problem solving, ideas and negotiations. Negative attitudes can only lead to the detriment to all stakeholders. Unfortunately there has been some finger pointing on various sides; that should be put behind everyone so that participants in this process can concentrate on the future and not inappropriately dwell on the past. I understand that there have been some discussions and interchange over the past two weeks since the hearing and that is a positive start.

FARLEY J.

cp/e/nc/qw/qlgkw/qlkjg



2004 CarswellOnt 5200, 338 N.R. 196 (note)

2004 CarswellOnt 5200, 338 N.R. 196 (note)

Stelco Inc., Re

Local Union No. 1005 United Steelworkers of America, Local Union No. 5328 United Steelworkers of America, Local Union No. 8782 United Steelworkers of America v. Stelco Inc., CHT Steel Company Inc., Stelpipe Ltd., Stelwire Ltd., and Welland Pipe Ltd. (collectively "STELCO"), CIT Business Credit Canada Inc., GE Commercial Finance, Fleet Capital Canada (collectively the "Senior Lenders")

Supreme Court of Canada

Binnie J., Charron J., McLachlin C.J.C.

Judgment: December 9, 2004

Docket: 30447

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Proceedings: Leave to appeal refused, 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.); Leave to appeal refused, 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 2004 CarswellOnt 1211 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])

Counsel: None given


Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

Bankruptcy and insolvency

**Per Curiam:**

1 The application for leave to appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, Number M31129, dated May 5, 2004, is dismissed with costs.

END OF DOCUMENT





2004 CarswellOnt 2936,

2004 CarswellOnt 2936

Stelco Inc., Re

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, As Amended

In the Matter of a Proposed Plan of Compromise or Arrangement with Respect to Stelco Inc. and the other Applicants  
Listed on Schedule "A" Application under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, As  
Amended

Ontario Court of Appeal

Doherty J.A., Laskin J.A., Moldaver J.A.

Judgment: May 5, 2004

Docket: CA M31129

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Counsel: David P. Jacobs, for Moving Party

Michael E. Barrack, for Responding Party

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

Bankruptcy and insolvency

**Per Curiam:**

1 Leave to appeal refused. Costs to the respondents Stelco in the amount by \$2,000 and to the "primary lender" in the amount of \$1000.

END OF DOCUMENT

Tab 2

*Case Name:*  
**Priszm Income Fund (Re)**

**RE: IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act,  
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended  
AND IN THE MATTER OF a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of  
Priszm Income Fund, Priszm Canadian Operating Trust, Priszm  
Inc. and Kit Finance Inc., Applicants**

[2011] O.J. No. 1491

2011 ONSC 2061

75 C.B.R. (5th) 213

2011 CarswellOnt 2258

Court File No. CV-11-915900CL

Ontario Superior Court of Justice

**G.B. Morawetz J.**

Heard: March 31, 2011.

Judgment: March 31, 2011.

(48 paras.)

**Counsel:**

A.J. Taylor and M. Konyukhova, for the Priszm Entities.

G. Finlayson, Conflict Counsel for the Priszm Entities.

M. Wasserman, for FTI Consulting Canada Inc., Proposed Monitor.

P. Shea, for Prudential Insurance.

P. Huff, for Directors of Priszm.

C. Cosgriffe, for Yum! Restaurants International (Canada) LP.

D. Ullmann, for 2279549 Ontario Inc. (Chief Restructuring Officer).

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### **ENDORSEMENT**

**1 G.B. MORAWETZ J.:**-- Priszm Income Fund ("Priszm Fund"), Priszm Canadian Operating Trust ("Priszm Trust"), Priszm Inc. ("Priszm GP") and KIT Finance Inc. ("KIT Finance") (collectively, the "Applicants") seek relief under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the "CCAA"). The Applicants also seek to have the stay of proceedings and other benefits of an initial order under the CCAA extended to Priszm Limited Partnership ("Priszm LP"). Priszm Fund, Priszm Trust, Priszm GP, Priszm LP and KIT Finance are collectively referred to as the "Priszm Entities".

### **BACKGROUND**

**2** The Priszm Entities own and operate 428 KFC, Taco Bell and Pizza Hut restaurants in seven provinces across Canada. As a result of declining sales and the inability to secure additional or alternate financing, the Priszm Entities cannot meet their liabilities as they come due and are therefore insolvent.

**3** The Priszm Entities seek a stay of proceedings under the CCAA to allow them to secure a going concern solution for the business including approximately 6,500 employees and numerous suppliers, landlords and other creditors and to maximize recovery for the Priszm Entities' stakeholders.

**4** On the return of the motion, the only party that took issue with the proposed relief was Yum! Restaurants International (Canada) LP (the "Franchisor"). Counsel to the Franchisor indicated that the Franchisor was not opposing the form of order, but explicitly does not consent to the stated intention of the Priszm Entities not to pay franchise royalties to the Franchisor.

**5** The background facts with respect to this application are set out in the Affidavit of Deborah J. Papernick, sworn March 31, 2011 (the "Papernick Affidavit"). Further details are also contained in a pre-filing report submitted by FTI Consulting Canada Inc. ("FTI") in its capacity as proposed monitor. FTI has been acting as financial advisor to the Priszm Entities since December 13, 2010.

**6** Priszm LP is a franchisee of the Franchisor and is Canada's largest independent quick service restaurant operator. Priszm LP is the largest operator of the KFC concept in Canada, accounting for approximately 60% of all KFC product sales in Canada. In addition, Priszm LP operates a number of multi-branded restaurants that combine a KFC restaurant with either a Taco Bell or a Pizza Hut

restaurant.

7 As of March 25, 2011, the Prizm Entities operated 428 restaurants in seven provinces: British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.

8 The business of Prizm LP is to develop, acquire, make investments in and conduct the business and ownership, operation and lease of assets and property in connection with the quick service restaurant business in Canada.

9 Prizm Fund is an income trust indirectly holding approximately 60% of Prizm LP's trust units.

10 Prizm Trust is an unincorporated, limited purpose trust wholly-owned by Prizm Fund created to acquire and hold 60% of the outstanding partnership units of Prizm LP, as well as approximately 60% of Prizm GP's units, for Prizm Fund.

11 Prizm GP is a corporation which acts as general partner of Prizm LP.

12 KIT Finance is a corporation created to act as borrower for the Prudential Loan, described below.

13 The principal and head offices of Prizm Fund, Prizm LP and Prizm GP are located in Vaughan, Ontario.

14 As at March 31, 2011, the Prizm Entities had short-term and long-term indebtedness totalling: \$98.8 million pursuant to the following instruments:

- (a) Note purchase and private shelf agreement dated January 12, 2006 ("Note Purchase Agreement") between KIT Finance, Prizm GP and Prudential Investment Management ("Prudential") - \$67.3 million;
- (b) Subordinated Debentures issued by Prizm Fund due June 30, 2012 - \$30 million - \$31.5 million.

15 The indebtedness under the Note Purchase Agreement (the "Prudential Loan") is guaranteed by and secured by substantially all of the assets of Prizm GP, KIT Finance and Prizm LP and by limited recourse guarantees and pledge agreements granted by Prizm Fund and Prizm Trust.

16 In addition, the Prizm Entities have approximately \$39.1 million of accrued and unpaid liabilities.

17 As a result of slower than forecast sales, on September 5, 2010, Prizm Fund breached the Prudential Financial covenant and remains in non-compliance. As a result, the Prudential Loan became callable.

18 Prizm Fund has also failed to make an interest payment of \$975,000 due on December 31, 2010 in respect to the Subordinated Debentures.

19 The Prizm Entities have also ceased paying certain obligations to the Franchisor as they come due.

## FINDINGS

20 I am satisfied that Prizm GP and KIT Finance are "companies" within the definition of the CCAA. I am also satisfied that Prizm Fund and Prizm Trust fall within the definition of "income trust" under the CCAA and are "companies" to which the CCAA applies.

21 I am also satisfied that the Prizm Entities are insolvent. In arriving at this determination, I have considered the definition of "insolvent" in the context of the CCAA as set out in *Re Stelco Inc.* (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. S.C.J.), leave to appeal refused, [2004] O.J. No. 1903, 2004 CarswellOnt 2936, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336, 2004 CarswellOnt 5200. In *Stelco*, Farley J. applied an expanded definition of insolvent in the CCAA context to reflect the "rescue" emphasis of the CCAA, modifying the definition of "insolvent person" within the meaning of s. 2(1) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("BIA") to include a financially troubled corporation that is "reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring".

22 In this case, the Prizm Entities are unable to meet their obligations to creditors and have ceased paying certain obligations as they become due.

23 Further, the Prizm Entities are affiliated debtor companies with total claims against in excess of \$100 million.

24 I accept the submission put forth by counsel to the Applicants to the effect that the Applicants are "debtor companies" to which the CCAA applies.

25 At the present time, the Prizm Entities are in the process of coordinating a sale process for certain assets. In these circumstances, I have been persuaded that a stay of proceedings is appropriate. In arriving at this determination, I have considered *Re Lehndorff General Partner Ltd.* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div.) and *Nortel Networks Corporation (Re)* [2009] O.J. No. 3169 (S.C.J.).

26 The CCAA definition of an eligible company does not expressly include partnerships. However, CCAA courts have exercised jurisdiction to stay proceedings with respect to partnerships and limited partnerships where it is just and convenient to do so. See *Lehndorff, supra*, and *Re Canwest Global Communications Corp.*, 2009 CarswellOnt 6184 (S.C.J.).

**27** The courts have held that this relief is appropriate where the operations of the debtor companies are so intertwined with those of the partnerships or limited partnerships in question, that not extending the stay would significantly impair the effectiveness of a stay in respect of the debtor companies.

**28** Having reviewed the affidavit of Ms. Papernick, I have been persuaded that it is appropriate to extend CCAA protection to Prizm LP.

**29** The Prizm Entities are also seeking an order: (a) declaring certain of their suppliers to be critical suppliers within the meaning of the CCAA; (b) requiring such suppliers to continue to supply on terms and conditions consistent with existing arrangements and past practice as amended by the initial order; (c) granting a charge over the Property as security for payment for goods and services supplied after the date of the Initial Order.

**30** Section 11.4 of the CCAA provides the court jurisdiction to declare a person to be a critical supplier. The CCAA does not contain a definition of "critical supplier" but pursuant to 11.4(1), the court must be satisfied that the person sought to be declared a critical supplier "is a supplier of goods or services to the company and that the goods or services that are supplied are critical to the company's continued operations".

**31** Counsel submits that the Prizm Entities' business is virtually entirely reliant on their ability to prepare, cook and sell their products and that given the perishable nature of their products, the Prizm Entities maintain very little inventory and rely on an uninterrupted flow of deliveries and continued availability of various products. In addition, the Prizm Entities are highly dependent on continued and timely provision of waste disposal and information technology services and various utilities.

**32** With the assistance of the proposed monitor, the Prizm Entities have identified a number of suppliers which are critical to their ongoing operation and have organized these suppliers into five categories:

- (a) chicken suppliers;
- (b) other food and restaurant consumables;
- (c) utility service providers;
- (d) suppliers of waste disposal services;
- (e) providers of appliance repair and information technology services.

**33** A complete list of the suppliers considered critical by the Prizm Entities (the "Critical Suppliers") is attached at Schedule "A" to the proposed Initial Order.

**34** Having reviewed the record, I have been satisfied that any interruption of supply by the Critical Suppliers could have an immediate material adverse impact on the Prizm Entities business, operations and cash flow such that it is, in my view, appropriate to declare the Critical Suppliers as

"critical suppliers" pursuant to the CCAA. |

**35** Further, I accept the submission of counsel to the Prizm Entities that it is appropriate to grant a Critical Suppliers' Charge to rank behind the Administrative Charge.

**36** The Prizm Entities also seek approval of the DIP Facility in the amount up to \$3 million to be secured by the DIP Lenders' Charge.

**37** Subsection 11.2(4) of the CCAA sets out the factors to be considered by the court in deciding whether to grant a DIP Financing Charge. These factors include:

- (a) the period during which the company is expected to be subject to proceedings under the CCAA;
- (b) how the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;
- (c) whether the company's management has the confidence of its major creditors;
- (d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company;
- (e) the nature and value of the company's property;
- (f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and
- (g) the monitor's report.

**38** Counsel submits that the following factors support the granting of the DIP Lenders' Charge:

- (a) the Prizm Entities expect to continue daily operations during the proceedings;
- (b) management will be overseen by the monitor who will oversee spending under the DIP Financing;
- (c) while it is not anticipated that the Prizm Entities will require any additional financing prior to June 30, 2011, actual funding requirements may vary;
- (d) the ability to borrow funds from a court-approved DIP Facility will be crucial to retain the confidence of stakeholders;
- (e) secured creditors have either been given notice of the DIP Lenders' Charge or are not affected by it;
- (f) the DIP Lenders' Charge does not secure an obligation that existed before the granting of the Initial Order; and
- (g) the proposed monitor is supportive of the DIP Facility and the DIP Lenders' Charge.

**39** Based on the foregoing, I am of the view that it is appropriate to approve the DIP Facility and



grant the DIP Lenders' Charge.

**40** The trustees and directors of the Prizm Entities have stated their intention to resign. In order to ensure ongoing corporate governance, the Prizm Entities seek an order appointing 2279549 Ontario Inc. as the CRO. They have also requested that the Chief Restructuring Officer be afforded the protections outlined in the draft Initial Order.

**41** The Applicants are seeking an Administration Charge over the property in the amount of \$1.5 million to secure the fees of the proposed monitor, its counsel, counsel to the Prizm Entities and the CRO. It is proposed that this charge will rank in priority to all other security interests in the Prizm assets, other than any "secured creditor", as defined in the CCAA, who has not received notice of the application for CCAA protection.

**42** The authority to provide such a charge is set out in s. 11.5(2) of the CCAA.

**43** The Prizm Entities submit that the following factors support the granting of the Administration Charge:

- (a) the Prizm Entities operate an extensive business;
- (b) the beneficiaries will provide essential legal and financial advice and leadership;
- (c) there is no anticipated unwarranted duplication of roles;
- (d) secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge were provided with notice and do not object to the Administration Charge; and
- (e) the proposed monitor, in its pre-filing report, supports the Administration Charge.

**44** I am satisfied that this is an appropriate case in which to grant the Administration Charge in the form requested.

**45** I am also satisfied that it is appropriate to grant a Directors' Charge in the amount of \$9.8 million to protect directors and officers and the CRO from certain potential liabilities. In arriving at this determination, I have considered the provisions of s. 11.5(1) of the CCAA which addresses the issue of directors' and officers' charges. I have also considered that the Prizm Entities maintain directors' and officers' liability insurance ("D&O Insurance"). The current policy provides a total of \$31 million in coverage. It is expected that the D&O Insurance will provide coverage sufficient to protect the directors and officers and the draft Initial Order provides that the Directors' Charge shall only apply to the extent that the D&O Insurance is not adequate.

**46** For the foregoing reasons, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant the CCAA Initial Order in the form requested.

**47** Paragraph 14 of the form of order provides for a stay of proceedings up to and including April 29, 2011. Paragraph 59 provides for the standard comeback provision.

48 The Initial Order was signed 9:30 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time on March 31, 2011.

G.B. MORAWETZ J.

cp/e/qlxr/qlvxw/qlana/qlhcs

---- End of Request ----

Download Request: Current Document: 1

Time Of Request: Monday, September 30, 2013 08:41:32

**Tab 3**

*Case Name:*

**Canwest Global Communications Corp. (Re)**

**IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Creditors Arrangement  
Act, R.S.C. 1985, C-36. as amended  
AND IN THE MATTER OF a Proposed Plan of Compromise or  
Arrangement of Canwest Global Communications Corp. and  
the other applicants listed on schedule "A"**

[Editor's note:  
Schedule "A" was not attached to the copy received by  
LexisNexis Canada and therefore is not included in the  
judgment.]

[2009] O.J. No. 4286

59 C.B.R. (5th) 72

2009 CanLII 55114

2009 CarswellOnt 6184

Court File No. CV-09-8241-OOCL

Ontario Superior Court of Justice  
Commercial List

**S.E. Pepall J.**

October 13, 2009.

(60 paras.)

*Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) matters --  
Application of Act -- Affiliated debtor companies -- Application by Canwest Global for relief under  
the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and to have the stay of proceedings and other  
provisions extend to several partnerships allowed -- Applicant Canwest Global owned CMI which  
was insolvent -- CMI Entities and Ad Hoc Committee of noteholders had agreed on terms of a going  
concern recapitalization transaction -- Stay under Act was extended to several partnerships that*

*were intertwined with the applicants' ongoing operations -- DIP and administration charges approved -- Applicants were also permitted to pay pre-filing liabilities to their critical suppliers.*

Application by Canwest Global for relief under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and to have the stay of proceedings and other provisions extend to several partnerships. The applicants were affiliated debtor companies with total claims against them exceeding \$5 million. The partnerships were intertwined with the applicants' ongoing operations. Canwest was a leading Canadian media company. Canwest Global owned 100 per cent of CMI. CMI had direct or indirect ownership interests in all of the other CMI Entities. The CMI Entities generated the majority of their revenue from the sale of advertising. Fuelled by a deteriorating economic environment, they experienced a decline in their advertising revenues. This caused problems with cash flow and circumstances were exacerbated by their high fixed operating costs. CMI breached certain of the financial covenants in its secured credit facility. The stay of proceedings was sought so as to allow the CMI Entities to proceed to develop a plan of arrangement or compromise to implement a consensual pre-packaged recapitalization transaction. The CMI Entities and an Ad Hoc Committee of noteholders had agreed on the terms of a going concern recapitalization transaction which was intended to form the basis of the plan. The applicants anticipated that a substantial number of the businesses operated by the CMI Entities would continue as going concerns thereby preserving enterprise value for stakeholders and maintaining employment for as many as possible. Certain steps designed to implement the recapitalization transaction had already been taken prior to the commencement of these proceedings.

HELD: Application allowed. The CMI Entities were unable to satisfy their debts as they come due and were insolvent. Absent these proceedings, the applicants would lack liquidity and would be unable to continue as going concerns. It was just and convenient to grant the relief requested with respect to the partnerships. The operations and obligations of the partnerships were so intertwined with those of the applicants that irreparable harm would ensue if the requested stay were not granted. The DIP charge for up to \$100 million was appropriate and required having regard to the debtors' cash-flow statement. The administration charge was also approved. Notice had been given to the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge, the amount was appropriate, and the charge should extend to all of the proposed beneficiaries. The applicants were also permitted to pay pre-filing liabilities to their critical suppliers.

**Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:**

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. c. 36, s. 11, s. 11(2), s. 11.2, s. 11.2(1), s. 11.52

**Counsel:**

Lyndon Barnes, Edward Sellers and Jeremy Dacks, for the Applicants.

Alan Merskey, for the Special Committee of the Board of Directors.

David Byers and Maria Konyukhova,> for the Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

Benjamin Zarnett and Robert Chadwick, for Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders.

Edmond Lamek, for the Asper Family.

Peter H. Griffin and Peter J. Osborne, for the Management Directors and Royal Bank of Canada.

Hilary Clarke, for Bank of Nova Scotia,

Steve Weisz, for CIT Business Credit Canada Inc.

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### **REASONS FOR DECISION**

S.E. PEPALL J.:--

#### **Relief Requested**

1 Canwest Global Communications Corp. ("Canwest Global"), its principal operating subsidiary, Canwest Media Inc. ("CMI"), and the other applicants listed on Schedule "A" of the Notice of Application apply for relief pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.<sup>1</sup> The applicants also seek to have the stay of proceedings and other provisions extend to the following partnerships: Canwest Television Limited Partnership ("CTLP"), Fox Sports World Canada Partnership and The National Post Company/La Publication National Post ("The National Post Company"). The businesses operated by the applicants and the aforementioned partnerships include (i) Canwest's free-to-air television broadcast business (ie. the Global Television Network stations); (ii) certain subscription-based specialty television channels that are wholly owned and operated by CTLP; and (iii) the National Post.

2 The Canwest Global enterprise as a whole includes the applicants, the partnerships and Canwest Global's other subsidiaries that are not applicants. The term Canwest will be used to refer to the entire enterprise. The term CMI Entities will be used to refer to the applicants and the three aforementioned partnerships. The following entities are not applicants nor is a stay sought in respect of any of them: the entities in Canwest's newspaper publishing and digital media business in Canada (other than the National Post Company) namely the Canwest Limited Partnership, Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Canwest Books Inc., and Canwest (Canada) Inc.; the Canadian subscription based specialty television channels acquired from Alliance Atlantis Communications Inc. in August, 2007 which are held jointly with Goldman Sachs Capital Partners

and operated by CW Investments Co. and its subsidiaries; and subscription-based specialty television channels which are not wholly owned by CTLP.

3 No one appearing opposed the relief requested.

#### Background Facts

4 Canwest is a leading Canadian media company with interests in twelve free-to-air television stations comprising the Global Television Network, subscription-based specialty television channels and newspaper publishing and digital media operations.

5 As of October 1, 2009, Canwest employed the full time equivalent of approximately 7,400 employees around the world. Of that number, the full time equivalent of approximately 1,700 are employed by the CMI Entities, the vast majority of whom work in Canada and 850 of whom work in Ontario.

6 Canwest Global owns 100% of CMI. CMI has direct or indirect ownership interests in all of the other CMI Entities. Ontario is the chief place of business of the CMI Entities.

7 Canwest Global is a public company continued under the *Canada Business Corporations Act*<sup>2</sup>. It has authorized capital consisting of an unlimited number of preference shares, multiple voting shares, subordinate voting shares, and non-voting shares. It is a "constrained-share company" which means that at least 66 2/3% of its voting shares must be beneficially owned by Canadians. The Asper family built the Canwest enterprise and family members hold various classes of shares. In April and May, 2009, corporate decision making was consolidated and streamlined.

8 The CMI Entities generate the majority of their revenue from the sale of advertising (approximately 77% on a consolidated basis). Fuelled by a deteriorating economic environment in Canada and elsewhere, in 2008 and 2009, they experienced a decline in their advertising revenues. This caused problems with cash flow and circumstances were exacerbated by their high fixed operating costs. In response to these conditions, the CMI Entities took steps to improve cash flow and to strengthen their balance sheets. They commenced workforce reductions and cost saving measures, sold certain interests and assets, and engaged in discussions with the CRTC and the Federal government on issues of concern.

9 Economic conditions did not improve nor did the financial circumstances of the CMI Entities. They experienced significant tightening of credit from critical suppliers and trade creditors, a further reduction of advertising commitments, demands for reduced credit terms by newsprint and printing suppliers, and restrictions on or cancellation of credit cards for certain employees.

10 In February, 2009, CMI breached certain of the financial covenants in its secured credit facility. It subsequently received waivers of the borrowing conditions on six occasions. On March 15, 2009, it failed to make an interest payment of US\$30.4 million due on 8% senior subordinated



notes. CMI entered into negotiations with an ad hoc committee of the 8% senior subordinated noteholders holding approximately 72% of the notes (the "Ad Hoc Committee"). An agreement was reached wherein CMI and its subsidiary CTLP agreed to issue US\$105 million in 12% secured notes to members of the Ad Hoc Committee. At the same time, CMI entered into an agreement with CIT Business Credit Canada Inc. ("CIT") in which CIT agreed to provide a senior secured revolving asset based loan facility of up to \$75 million. CMI used the funds generated for operations and to repay amounts owing on the senior credit facility with a syndicate of lenders of which the Bank of Nova Scotia was the administrative agent. These funds were also used to settle related swap obligations.

11 Canwest Global reports its financial results on a consolidated basis. As at May 31, 2009, it had total consolidated assets with a net book value of \$4.855 billion and total consolidated liabilities of \$5.846 billion. The subsidiaries of Canwest Global that are not applicants or partnerships in this proceeding had short and long term debt totalling \$2.742 billion as at May 31, 2009 and the CMI Entities had indebtedness of approximately \$954 million. For the 9 months ended May 31, 2009, Canwest Global's consolidated revenues decreased by \$272 million or 11% compared to the same period in 2008. In addition, operating income before amortization decreased by \$253 million or 47%. It reported a consolidated net loss of \$1.578 billion compared to \$22 million for the same period in 2008. CMI reported that revenues for the Canadian television operations decreased by \$8 million or 4% in the third quarter of 2009 and operating profit was \$21 million compared to \$39 million in the same period in 2008.

12 The board of directors of Canwest Global struck a special committee of the board ("the Special Committee") with a mandate to explore and consider strategic alternatives in order to maximize value. That committee appointed Thomas Strike, who is the President, Corporate Development and Strategy Implementation of Canwest Global, as Recapitalization Officer and retained Hap Stephen, who is the Chairman and CEO of Stonecrest Capital Inc., as a Restructuring Advisor ("CRA").

13 On September 15, 2009, CMI failed to pay US\$30.4 million in interest payments due on the 8% senior subordinated notes.

14 On September 22, 2009, the board of directors of Canwest Global authorized the sale of all of the shares of Ten Network Holdings Limited (Australia) ("Ten Holdings") held by its subsidiary, Canwest Mediaworks Ireland Holdings ("CMIH"). Prior to the sale, the CMI Entities had consolidated indebtedness totalling US\$939.9 million pursuant to three facilities. CMI had issued 8% unsecured notes in an aggregate principal amount of US\$761,054,211. They were guaranteed by all of the CMI Entities except Canwest Global, and 30109, LLC. CMI had also issued 12% secured notes in an aggregate principal amount of US\$94 million. They were guaranteed by the CMI Entities. Amongst others, Canwest's subsidiary, CMIH, was a guarantor of both of these facilities. The 12% notes were secured by first ranking charges against all of the property of CMI, CTLP and the guarantors. In addition, pursuant to a credit agreement dated May 22, 2009 and subsequently

amended, CMI has a senior secured revolving asset-based loan facility in the maximum amount of \$75 million with CIT Business Credit Canada Inc. ("CIT"). Prior to the sale, the debt amounted to \$23.4 million not including certain letters of credit. The facility is guaranteed by CTLP, CMIH and others and secured by first ranking charges against all of the property of CMI, CTLP, CMIH and other guarantors. Significant terms of the credit agreement are described in paragraph 37 of the proposed Monitor's report. Upon a CCAA filing by CMI and commencement of proceedings under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, the CIT facility converts into a DIP financing arrangement and increases to a maximum of \$100 million.

15 Consents from a majority of the 8% senior subordinated noteholders were necessary to allow the sale of the Ten Holdings shares. A Use of Cash Collateral and Consent Agreement was entered into by CMI, CMIH, certain consenting noteholders and others wherein CMIH was allowed to lend the proceeds of sale to CMI.

16 The sale of CMIH's interest in Ten Holdings was settled on October 1, 2009. Gross proceeds of approximately \$634 million were realized. The proceeds were applied to fund general liquidity and operating costs of CMI, pay all amounts owing under the 12% secured notes and all amounts outstanding under the CIT facility except for certain letters of credit in an aggregate face amount of \$10.7 million. In addition, a portion of the proceeds was used to reduce the amount outstanding with respect to the 8% senior subordinated notes leaving an outstanding indebtedness thereunder of US\$393.25 million.

17 In consideration for the loan provided by CMIH to CMI, CMI issued a secured intercompany note in favour of CMIH in the principal amount of \$187.3 million and an unsecured promissory note in the principal amount of \$430.6 million. The secured note is subordinated to the CIT facility and is secured by a first ranking charge on the property of CMI and the guarantors. The payment of all amounts owing under the unsecured promissory note are subordinated and postponed in favour of amounts owing under the CIT facility. Canwest Global, CTLP and others have guaranteed the notes. It is contemplated that the debt that is the subject matter of the unsecured note will be compromised.

18 Without the funds advanced under the intercompany notes, the CMI Entities would be unable to meet their liabilities as they come due. The consent of the noteholders to the use of the Ten Holdings proceeds was predicated on the CMI Entities making this application for an Initial Order under the CCAA. Failure to do so and to take certain other steps constitute an event of default under the Use of Cash Collateral and Consent Agreement, the CIT facility and other agreements. The CMI Entities have insufficient funds to satisfy their obligations including those under the intercompany notes and the 8% senior subordinated notes.

19 The stay of proceedings under the CCAA is sought so as to allow the CMI Entities to proceed to develop a plan of arrangement or compromise to implement a consensual "pre-packaged" recapitalization transaction. The CMI Entities and the Ad Hoc Committee of noteholders have

agreed on the terms of a going concern recapitalization transaction which is intended to form the basis of the plan. The terms are reflected in a support agreement and term sheet. The recapitalization transaction contemplates amongst other things, a significant reduction of debt and a debt for equity restructuring. The applicants anticipate that a substantial number of the businesses operated by the CMI Entities will continue as going concerns thereby preserving enterprise value for stakeholders and maintaining employment for as many as possible. As mentioned, certain steps designed to implement the recapitalization transaction have already been taken prior to the commencement of these proceedings.

**20** CMI has agreed to maintain not more than \$2.5 million as cash collateral in a deposit account with the Bank of Nova Scotia to secure cash management obligations owed to BNS. BNS holds first ranking security against those funds and no court ordered charge attaches to the funds in the account.

**21** The CMI Entities maintain eleven defined benefit pension plans and four defined contribution pension plans. There is an aggregate solvency deficiency of \$13.3 million as at the last valuation date and a wind up deficiency of \$32.8 million. There are twelve television collective agreements eleven of which are negotiated with the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada. The Canadian Union of Public Employees negotiated the twelfth television collective agreement. It expires on December 31, 2010. The other collective agreements are in expired status. None of the approximately 250 employees of the National Post Company are unionized. The CMI Entities propose to honour their payroll obligations to their employees, including all pre-filing wages and employee benefits outstanding as at the date of the commencement of the CCAA proceedings and payments in connection with their pension obligations.

#### Proposed Monitor

**22** The applicants propose that FTI Consulting Canada Inc. serve as the Monitor in these proceedings. It is clearly qualified to act and has provided the Court with its consent to act. Neither FTI nor any of its representatives have served in any of the capacities prohibited by section of the amendments to the CCAA.

#### Proposed Order

**23** I have reviewed in some detail the history that preceded this application. It culminated in the presentation of the within application and proposed order. Having reviewed the materials and heard submissions, I was satisfied that the relief requested should be granted.

**24** This case involves a consideration of the amendments to the CCAA that were proclaimed in force on September 18, 2009. While these were long awaited, in many instances they reflect practices and principles that have been adopted by insolvency practitioners and developed in the jurisprudence and academic writings on the subject of the CCAA. In no way do the amendments change or detract from the underlying purpose of the CCAA, namely to provide debtor companies

with the opportunity to extract themselves from financial difficulties notwithstanding insolvency and to reorganize their affairs for the benefit of stakeholders. In my view, the amendments should be interpreted and applied with that objective in mind.

(a) Threshold Issues

25 Firstly, the applicants qualify as debtor companies under the CCAA. Their chief place of business is in Ontario. The applicants are affiliated debtor companies with total claims against them exceeding \$5 million. The CMI Entities are in default of their obligations. CMI does not have the necessary liquidity to make an interest payment in the amount of US\$30.4 million that was due on September 15, 2009 and none of the other CMI Entities who are all guarantors are able to make such a payment either. The assets of the CMI Entities are insufficient to discharge all of the liabilities. The CMI Entities are unable to satisfy their debts as they come due and they are insolvent. They are insolvent both under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*<sup>3</sup> definition and under the more expansive definition of insolvency used in *Re Stelco*<sup>4</sup>. Absent these CCAA proceedings, the applicants would lack liquidity and would be unable to continue as going concerns. The CMI Entities have acknowledged their insolvency in the affidavit filed in support of the application.

26 Secondly, the required statement of projected cash-flow and other financial documents required under section 11(2) of the CCAA have been filed.

(b) Stay of Proceedings

27 Under section 11 of the CCAA, the Court has broad jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings and to give a debtor company a chance to develop a plan of compromise or arrangement. In my view, given the facts outlined, a stay is necessary to create stability and to allow the CMI Entities to pursue their restructuring.

(b) Partnerships and Foreign Subsidiaries

28 The applicants seek to extend the stay of proceedings and other relief to the aforementioned partnerships. The partnerships are intertwined with the applicants' ongoing operations. They own the National Post daily newspaper and Canadian free-to-air television assets and certain of its specialty television channels and some other television assets. These businesses constitute a significant portion of the overall enterprise value of the CMI Entities. The partnerships are also guarantors of the 8% senior subordinated notes.

29 While the CCAA definition of a company does not include a partnership or limited partnership, courts have repeatedly exercised their inherent jurisdiction to extend the scope of CCAA proceedings to encompass them. See for example *Re Lehndorff General Partners Ltd.*<sup>5</sup>; *Re Smurfit-Stone Container Canada Inc.*<sup>6</sup>; and *Re Calpine Canada Energy Ltd.*<sup>7</sup>. In this case, the partnerships carry on operations that are integral and closely interrelated to the business of the applicants. The operations and obligations of the partnerships are so intertwined with those of the

applicants that irreparable harm would ensue if the requested stay were not granted. In my view, it is just and convenient to grant the relief requested with respect to the partnerships.

**30** Certain applicants are foreign subsidiaries of CMI. Each is a guarantor under the 8% senior subordinated notes, the CIT credit agreement (and therefore the DIP facility), the intercompany notes and is party to the support agreement and the Use of Cash Collateral and Consent Agreement. If the stay of proceedings was not extended to these entities, creditors could seek to enforce their guarantees. I am persuaded that the foreign subsidiary applicants as that term is defined in the affidavit filed are debtor companies within the meaning of section 2 of the CCAA and that I have jurisdiction and ought to grant the order requested as it relates to them. In this regard, I note that they are insolvent and each holds assets in Ontario in that they each maintain funds on deposit at the Bank of Nova Scotia in Toronto. See in this regard *Re Cadillac Fairview*<sup>8</sup> and *Re Global Light Telecommunications Ltd.*<sup>9</sup>

(c) DIP Financing

**31** Turning to the DIP financing, the premise underlying approval of DIP financing is that it is a benefit to all stakeholders as it allows the debtors to protect going-concern value while they attempt to devise a plan acceptable to creditors. While in the past, courts relied on inherent jurisdiction to approve the terms of a DIP financing charge, the September 18, 2009 amendments to the CCAA now expressly provide jurisdiction to grant a DIP financing charge. Section 11.2 of the Act states:

- (1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, a court may make an order declaring that all or part of the company's property is subject to a security or charge -- in an amount that the court considers appropriate -- in favour of a person specified in the order who agrees to lend to the company an amount approved by the court as being required by the company, having regard to its cash-flow statement. The security or charge may not secure an obligation that exists before the order is made.
- (2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.
- (3) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over any security or charge arising from a previous order made under subsection (1) only with the consent of the person in whose favour the previous order was made.
- (4) In deciding whether to make an order, the court is to consider, among other things,

(aa) the period during which the company is expected to be subject to proceedings under this Act;

(b) how the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;

(c) whether the company's management has the confidence of its major creditors;

(d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company;

(e) the nature and value of the company's property;

(f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and

(g) the monitor's report referred to in paragraph 23(1)(b), if any.

**32** In light of the language of section 11.2(1), the first issue to consider is whether notice has been given to secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge. Paragraph 57 of the proposed order affords priority to the DIP charge, the administration charge, the Directors' and Officers' charge and the KERP charge with the following exception: "any validly perfected purchase money security interest in favour of a secured creditor or any statutory encumbrance existing on the date of this order in favour of any person which is a "secured creditor" as defined in the CCAA in respect of any of source deductions from wages, employer health tax, workers compensation, GST/QST, PST payables, vacation pay and banked overtime for employees, and amounts under the Wage Earners' Protection Program that are subject to a super priority claim under the BIA". This provision coupled with the notice that was provided satisfied me that secured creditors either were served or are unaffected by the DIP charge. This approach is both consistent with the legislation and practical.

**33** Secondly, the Court must determine that the amount of the DIP is appropriate and required having regard to the debtors' cash-flow statement. The DIP charge is for up to \$100 million. Prior to entering into the CIT facility, the CMI Entities sought proposals from other third party lenders for a credit facility that would convert to a DIP facility should the CMI Entities be required to file for protection under the CCAA. The CIT facility was the best proposal submitted. In this case, it is contemplated that implementation of the plan will occur no later than April 15, 2010. The total amount of cash on hand is expected to be down to approximately \$10 million by late December, 2009 based on the cash flow forecast. The applicants state that this is an insufficient cushion for an enterprise of this magnitude. The cash-flow statements project the need for the liquidity provided by

the DIP facility for the recapitalization transaction to be finalized. The facility is to accommodate additional liquidity requirements during the CCAA proceedings. It will enable the CMI Entities to operate as going concerns while pursuing the implementation and completion of a viable plan and will provide creditors with assurances of same. I also note that the proposed facility is simply a conversion of the pre-existing CIT facility and as such, it is expected that there would be no material prejudice to any of the creditors of the CMI Entities that arises from the granting of the DIP charge. I am persuaded that the amount is appropriate and required.

34 Thirdly, the DIP charge must not and does not secure an obligation that existed before the order was made. The only amount outstanding on the CIT facility is \$10.7 in outstanding letters of credit. These letters of credit are secured by existing security and it is proposed that that security rank ahead of the DIP charge.

35 Lastly, I must consider amongst others, the enumerated factors in paragraph 11.2(4) of the Act. I have already addressed some of them. The Management Directors of the applicants as that term is used in the materials filed will continue to manage the CMI Entities during the CCAA proceedings. It would appear that management has the confidence of its major creditors. The CMI Entities have appointed a CRA and a Restructuring Officer to negotiate and implement the recapitalization transaction and the aforementioned directors will continue to manage the CMI Entities during the CCAA proceedings. The DIP facility will enhance the prospects of a completed restructuring. CIT has stated that it will not convert the CIT facility into a DIP facility if the DIP charge is not approved. In its report, the proposed Monitor observes that the ability to borrow funds from a court approved DIP facility secured by the DIP charge is crucial to retain the confidence of the CMI Entities' creditors, employees and suppliers and would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made. The proposed Monitor is supportive of the DIP facility and charge.

36 For all of these reasons, I was prepared to approve the DIP facility and charge.

(d) Administration Charge

37 While an administration charge was customarily granted by courts to secure the fees and disbursements of the professional advisors who guided a debtor company through the CCAA process, as a result of the amendments to the CCAA, there is now statutory authority to grant such a charge. Section 11.52 of the CCAA states:

- (1) On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of a debtor company is subject to a security or charge -- in an amount that the court considers appropriate -- in respect of the fees and expenses of

(a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or

other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;

(b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and

(c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.

(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

38 I must therefore be convinced that (1) notice has been given to the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; (2) the amount is appropriate; and (3) the charge should extend to all of the proposed beneficiaries.

39 As with the DIP charge, the issue relating to notice to affected secured creditors has been addressed appropriately by the applicants. The amount requested is up to \$15 million. The beneficiaries of the charge are: the Monitor and its counsel; counsel to the CMI Entities; the financial advisor to the Special Committee and its counsel; counsel to the Management Directors; the CRA; the financial advisor to the Ad Hoc Committee; and RBC Capital Markets and its counsel. The proposed Monitor supports the aforementioned charge and considers it to be required and reasonable in the circumstances in order to preserve the going concern operations of the CMI Entities. The applicants submit that the above-note professionals who have played a necessary and integral role in the restructuring activities to date are necessary to implement the recapitalization transaction.

40 Estimating quantum is an inexact exercise but I am prepared to accept the amount as being appropriate. There has obviously been extensive negotiation by stakeholders and the restructuring is of considerable magnitude and complexity. I was prepared to accept the submissions relating to the administration charge. I have not included any requirement that all of these professionals be required to have their accounts scrutinized and approved by the Court but they should not preclude this possibility.

(e) Critical Suppliers

41 The next issue to consider is the applicants' request for authorization to pay pre-filing amounts owed to critical suppliers. In recognition that one of the purposes of the CCAA is to permit an insolvent corporation to remain in business, typically courts exercised their inherent jurisdiction to



grant such authorization and a charge with respect to the provision of essential goods and services. In the recent amendments, Parliament codified the practice of permitting the payment of pre-filing amounts to critical suppliers and the provision of a charge. Specifically, section 11.4 provides:

- (1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring a person to be a critical supplier to the company if the court is satisfied that the person is a supplier of goods or services to the company and that the goods or services that are supplied are critical to the company's continued operation.
- (2) If the court declares a person to be a critical supplier, the court may make an order requiring the person to supply any goods or services specified by the court to the company on any terms and conditions that are consistent with the supply relationship or that the court considers appropriate.
- (3) If the court makes an order under subsection (2), the court shall, in the order, declare that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge in favour of the person declared to be a critical supplier, in an amount equal to the value of the goods or services supplied under the terms of the order.
- (4) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

42 Under these provisions, the Court must be satisfied that there has been notice to creditors likely to be affected by the charge, the person is a supplier of goods or services to the company, and that the goods or services that are supplied are critical to the company's continued operation. While one might interpret section 11.4 (3) as requiring a charge any time a person is declared to be a critical supplier, in my view, this provision only applies when a court is compelling a person to supply. The charge then provides protection to the unwilling supplier.

43 In this case, no charge is requested and no additional notice is therefore required. Indeed, there is an issue as to whether in the absence of a request for a charge, section 11.4 is even applicable and the Court is left to rely on inherent jurisdiction. The section seems to be primarily directed to the conditions surrounding the granting of a charge to secure critical suppliers. That said, even if it is applicable, I am satisfied that the applicants have met the requirements. The CMI Entities seek authorization to make certain payments to third parties that provide goods and services integral to their business. These include television programming suppliers given the need for continuous and undisturbed flow of programming, newsprint suppliers given the dependency of the National Post on a continuous and uninterrupted supply of newsprint to enable it to publish and on newspaper distributors, and the American Express Corporate Card Program and Central Billed Accounts that are required for CMI Entity employees to perform their job functions. No payment would be made without the consent of the Monitor. I accept that these suppliers are critical in nature. The CMI Entities also seek more general authorization allowing them to pay other suppliers if in the opinion of the CMI Entities, the supplier is critical. Again, no payment would be made without the consent

of the Monitor. In addition, again no charge securing any payments is sought. This is not contrary to the language of section 11.4 (1) or to its purpose. The CMI Entities seek the ability to pay other suppliers if in their opinion the supplier is critical to their business and ongoing operations. The order requested is facilitative and practical in nature. The proposed Monitor supports the applicants' request and states that it will work to ensure that payments to suppliers in respect of pre-filing liabilities are minimized. The Monitor is of course an officer of the Court and is always able to seek direction from the Court if necessary. In addition, it will report on any such additional payments when it files its reports for Court approval. In the circumstances outlined, I am prepared to grant the relief requested in this regard.

(f) Directors' and Officers' Charge

44 The applicants also seek a directors' and officers' ("D &O") charge in the amount of \$20 million. The proposed charge would rank after the administration charge, the existing CIT security, and the DIP charge. It would rank *pari passu* with the KERP charge discussed subsequently in this endorsement but postponed in right of payment to the extent of the first \$85 million payable under the secured intercompany note.

45 Again, the recent amendments to the CCAA allow for such a charge. Section 11.51 provides that:

- (1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge -- in an amount that the court considers appropriate -- in favour of any director or officer of the company to indemnify the director or officer against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as a director or officer of the company
- (2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.
- (3) The court may not make the order if in its opinion the company could obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director or officer at a reasonable cost.
- (4) The court shall make an order declaring that the security or charge does not apply in respect of a specific obligation or liability incurred by a director or officer if in its opinion the obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct or, in Quebec, the director's or officer's gross or intentional fault.

46 I have already addressed the issue of notice to affected secured creditors. I must also be satisfied with the amount and that the charge is for obligations and liabilities the directors and officers may incur after the commencement of proceedings. It is not to extend to coverage of wilful

misconduct or gross negligence and no order should be granted if adequate insurance at a reasonable cost could be obtained.

47 The proposed Monitor reports that the amount of \$20 million was estimated taking into consideration the existing D&O insurance and the potential liabilities which may attach including certain employee related and tax related obligations. The amount was negotiated with the DIP lender and the Ad Hoc Committee. The order proposed speaks of indemnification relating to the failure of any of the CMI Entities, after the date of the order, to make certain payments. It also excludes gross negligence and wilful misconduct. The D&O insurance provides for \$30 million in coverage and \$10 million in excess coverage for a total of \$40 million. It will expire in a matter of weeks and Canwest Global has been unable to obtain additional or replacement coverage. I am advised that it also extends to others in the Canwest enterprise and not just to the CMI Entities. The directors and senior management are described as highly experienced, fully functional and qualified. The directors have indicated that they cannot continue in the restructuring effort unless the order includes the requested directors' charge.

48 The purpose of such a charge is to keep the directors and officers in place during the restructuring by providing them with protection against liabilities they could incur during the restructuring: *Re General Publishing Co.*<sup>10</sup> Retaining the current directors and officers of the applicants would avoid destabilization and would assist in the restructuring. The proposed charge would enable the applicants to keep the experienced board of directors supported by experienced senior management. The proposed Monitor believes that the charge is required and is reasonable in the circumstances and also observes that it will not cover all of the directors' and officers' liabilities in the worst case scenario. In all of these circumstances, I approved the request.

(g) Key Employee Retention Plans

49 Approval of a KERP and a KERP charge are matters of discretion. In this case, the CMI Entities have developed KERPs that are designed to facilitate and encourage the continued participation of certain of the CMI Entities' senior executives and other key employees who are required to guide the CMI Entities through a successful restructuring with a view to preserving enterprise value. There are 20 KERP participants all of whom are described by the applicants as being critical to the successful restructuring of the CMI Entities. Details of the KERPs are outlined in the materials and the proposed Monitor's report. A charge of \$5.9 million is requested. The three Management Directors are seasoned executives with extensive experience in the broadcasting and publishing industries. They have played critical roles in the restructuring initiatives taken to date. The applicants state that it is probable that they would consider other employment opportunities if the KERPs were not secured by a KERP charge. The other proposed participants are also described as being crucial to the restructuring and it would be extremely difficult to find replacements for them.

50 Significantly in my view, the Monitor who has scrutinized the proposed KERPs and charge is

supportive. Furthermore, they have been approved by the Board, the Special Committee, the Human Resources Committee of Canwest Global and the Ad Hoc Committee. The factors enumerated in *Re Grant Forest*<sup>11</sup> have all been met and I am persuaded that the relief in this regard should be granted.

51 The applicants ask that the Confidential Supplement containing unredacted copies of the KERPs that reveal individually identifiable information and compensation information be sealed. Generally speaking, judges are most reluctant to grant sealing orders. An open court and public access are fundamental to our system of justice. Section 137(2) of the *Courts of Justice Act* provides authority to grant a sealing order and the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*<sup>12</sup> provides guidance on the appropriate legal principles to be applied. Firstly, the Court must be satisfied that the order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk. Secondly, the salutary effects of the order should outweigh its deleterious effects including the effects on the right to free expression which includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

52 In this case, the unredacted KERPs reveal individually identifiable information including compensation information. Protection of sensitive personal and compensation information the disclosure of which could cause harm to the individuals and to the CMI Entities is an important commercial interest that should be protected. The KERP participants have a reasonable expectation that their personal information would be kept confidential. As to the second branch of the test, the aggregate amount of the KERPs has been disclosed and the individual personal information adds nothing. It seems to me that this second branch of the test has been met. The relief requested is granted.

#### Annual Meeting

53 The CMI Entities seek an order postponing the annual general meeting of shareholders of Canwest Global. Pursuant to section 133 (1)(b) of the CBCA, a corporation is required to call an annual meeting by no later than February 28, 2010, being six months after the end of its preceding financial year which ended on August 31, 2009. Pursuant to section 133 (3), despite subsection (1), the corporation may apply to the court for an order extending the time for calling an annual meeting.

54 CCAA courts have commonly granted extensions of time for the calling of an annual general meeting. In this case, the CMI Entities including Canwest Global are devoting their time to stabilizing business and implementing a plan. Time and resources would be diverted if the time was not extended as requested and the preparation for and the holding of the annual meeting would likely impede the timely and desirable restructuring of the CMI Entities. Under section 106(6) of the CBCA, if directors of a corporation are not elected, the incumbent directors continue. Financial and other information will be available on the proposed Monitor's website. An extension is properly granted.

Other

**55** The applicants request authorization to commence Chapter 15 proceedings in the U.S. Continued timely supply of U.S. network and other programming is necessary to preserve going concern value. Commencement of Chapter 15 proceedings to have the CCAA proceedings recognized as "foreign main proceedings" is a prerequisite to the conversion of the CIT facility into the DIP facility. Authorization is granted.

**56** Canwest's various corporate and other entities share certain business services. They are seeking to continue to provide and receive inter-company services in the ordinary course during the CCAA proceedings. This is supported by the proposed Monitor and FTI will monitor and report to the Court on matters pertaining to the provision of inter-company services.

**57** Section 23 of the amended CCAA now addresses certain duties and functions of the Monitor including the provision of notice of an Initial Order although the Court may order otherwise. Here the financial threshold for notice to creditors has been increased from \$1000 to \$5000 so as to reduce the burden and cost of such a process. The proceedings will be widely published in the media and the Initial Order is to be posted on the Monitor's website. Other meritorious adjustments were also made to the notice provisions.

**58** This is a "pre-packaged" restructuring and as such, stakeholders have negotiated and agreed on the terms of the requested order. That said, not every stakeholder was before me. For this reason, interested parties are reminded that the order includes the usual come back provision. The return date of any motion to vary, rescind or affect the provisions relating to the CIT credit agreement or the CMI DIP must be no later than November 5, 2009.

**59** I have obviously not addressed every provision in the order but have attempted to address some key provisions. In support of the requested relief, the applicants filed a factum and the proposed Monitor filed a report. These were most helpful. A factum is required under Rule 38.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Both a factum and a proposed Monitor's report should customarily be filed with a request for an Initial Order under the CCAA.

Conclusion

**60** Weak economic conditions and a high debt load do not a happy couple make but clearly many of the stakeholders have been working hard to produce as desirable an outcome as possible in the circumstances. Hopefully the cooperation will persist.

S.E. PEPALL J.

cp/e/qlafr/qljxr/qljxh/qlaxr/qlaxw/qlcal/qlced

1 *R.S.C. 1985, c. C. 36, as amended*

2 R.S.C. 1985, c.C.44.

3 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as amended.

4 (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299; leave to appeal refused, [2004] O.J. No. 1903, 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (C.A.).

5 (1993), 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275.

6 [2009] O.J. No. 349.

7 (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 187.

8 (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29.

9 (2004), 33 B.C.L.R. (4th) 155.

10 (2003), 39 C.B.R. (4th) 216.

11 [2009] O.J. No. 3344. That said, given the nature of the relationship between a board of directors and senior management, it may not always be appropriate to give undue consideration to the principle of business judgment.

12 [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522.

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**Tab 4**



*Case Name:*

**Valente v. Fancsy Estate**

**IN THE MATTER OF the Bankruptcy of Peter Valente, of the  
City of Windsor, in the County of Essex, in the Province of  
Ontario  
Between  
Peter Valente, (appellant), and  
Gabriel J. Courey, Executor of the Estate of Stephen Fancsy,  
(respondent)**

[2004] O.J. No. 635

70 O.R. (3d) 31

183 O.A.C. 191

47 C.B.R. (4th) 317

129 A.C.W.S. (3d) 453

2004 CarswellOnt 681

Docket No. C39206

Ontario Court of Appeal  
Toronto, Ontario

**Laskin, Feldman and Sharpe JJ.A.**

Heard: October 1, 2003.

Judgment: February 19, 2004.

(24 paras.)

*Bankruptcy -- Receiving order -- Application or petition into bankruptcy -- Requirement of more than one debt due, exceptions -- Setting aside (incl. annulment or rescission) -- Grounds.*

Appeal by Valente from a receiving order. Prior to his death, Fancsy advanced \$900,000 to Valente.

The debt was secured by a promissory note. The parties also entered into a share purchase agreement to secure the debt. The agreement provided that it was the sole recourse of the creditor in the event of a default on the promissory note. Valente never paid any money. The Fancsy Estate obtained summary judgment against Valente for \$1.13 million. It subsequently obtained the receiving order. An act of bankruptcy could consist of failure to pay after repeated demands were made over a six-month period. The judge considered the judgment to be a continuing demand for payment, and therefore, the judgment qualified as a special circumstance required for a single debt to constitute an act of bankruptcy.

HELD: Appeal allowed. The order was set aside. One judgment debt did not necessarily constitute special circumstances in every case. The judge failed to consider whether, in all of the circumstances, the Estate had proved that Valente did not meet his liabilities generally as they fell due.

**Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:**

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, ss. 42(1)(e), 42(1)(j), 42(2), 43(1), 43(2), 43(6), 43(7).

**Appeal From:**

On appeal from a judgment of Justice Johanne N. Morissette of the Superior Court of Justice dated October 2, 2002.

**Counsel:**

David Swift, for the appellant.  
Rodney Godard, for the respondent.

---

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

**1 FELDMAN J.A.:**-- This appeal concerns a disputed petition for a receiving order. For the following reasons, I would allow the appeal, set aside the receiving order, allow the respondent to amend the petition and send the matter back to the bankruptcy judge.

**FACTS AND FINDINGS**

**2** The petitioning creditor is the estate of Stephen Fancsy. Before he died, Mr. Fancsy advanced \$900,000 to the debtor, Peter Valente, evidenced by a promissory note dated September 12, 1997. The note provided that interest would be at a rate of ten per cent and that the full amount was

payable on September 15, 1998. The parties also entered into a share pledge agreement to secure the debt. The agreement provided that it was the sole recourse of the creditor in the event of default on the promissory note. The debtor held the shares in trust for his son, and represented in the share pledge agreement that he had obtained the authorization of the beneficial owner of the shares to pledge them pursuant to the agreement.

3 The debtor never paid any monies under the note. The creditor's estate obtained summary judgment on the note on May 10, 2000, in the amount of \$1,139,178.07 plus costs. No amount was ever paid on the judgment. The creditor conducted a judgment debtor examination on November 21, 2000, at which the debtor acknowledged that at that date there was another outstanding judgment against him for \$800,000.

4 The petition for a receiving order relied on the one debt, the judgment on the promissory note, and recited that the creditor held no security on the debtor's property for payment on the debt. In his notice disputing the petition, the debtor denied that he had failed to meet his liabilities generally as they became due, acknowledged the petitioner's debt and that it had not been paid, but stated that following the judgment representatives of the creditor estate had agreed to take steps to realize on the pledged shares but had not attempted to do so.

5 The two issues for the bankruptcy judge were: (1) whether the one judgment debt over \$1000 constituted the act of bankruptcy defined in s. 42(1)(j) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, ceasing to meet liabilities generally as they become due; and (2) whether the creditor held security for the debt which it did not disclose in the petition.

6 The bankruptcy judge granted the petition. She held: (1) based on this court's decision in *Platt v. Malmstrom* (2001), 53 O.R. (3d) 502, the judgment automatically qualified as a special circumstance required for a single debt to constitute the act of bankruptcy under s. 42(1)(j); and (2) because the creditor had obtained judgment on the promissory note in the face of the provision in the share pledge agreement that made it the sole recourse for default under the note, the judgment on the note must be taken as a denial of the validity or effectiveness of the share pledge agreement and was *res judicata* on that issue. Consequently, the petitioning creditor was not a secured creditor and the affidavit to that effect did not constitute non-disclosure.

#### ISSUES ON APPEAL

- (1) Did the bankruptcy judge err in holding that the single debt owed to the petitioning creditor qualified under s. 42(1)(j) of the B.I.A. as "ceas[ing] to meet ... liabilities generally as they become due"?
- (2) Did the bankruptcy judge err in finding that the petitioning creditor was not a secured creditor and therefore not obliged to value its security in the petition for the receiving order?

#### ANALYSIS

Issue One

7 The relevant sections of the B.I.A. are 43(1) and 42(1)(j). Section 43(1) sets out when a creditor may petition a debtor into bankruptcy. The section provides:

43(1) Subject to this section, one or more creditors may file in court a petition for a receiving order against a debtor if, and if it is alleged in the petition that,

- (a) the debt or debts owing to the petitioning creditor or creditors amount to one thousand dollars; and
- (b) the debtor has committed an act of bankruptcy within six months next preceding the filing of the petition.

Section 42(1)(j) provides:

- A debtor commits an act of bankruptcy ... if he ceases to meet his liabilities generally as they become due.

8 It is now well-settled in the case law that the failure to pay a single creditor can constitute an act of bankruptcy under s. 42(1)(j) when there are special circumstances, which have been recognized in three categories: (a) where repeated demands for payment have been made within the six-month period; (b) where the debt is significantly large and there is fraud or suspicious circumstances in the way the debtor has handled its assets which require that the processes of the B.I.A. be set in motion; and (c) prior to the filing of the petition, the debtor has admitted its inability to pay creditors generally without identifying the creditors: *Re Holmes* (1976), 9 O.R. (2d) 240 (Sup. Ct.); see also Houlden and Morawetz, *The 2004 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Toronto: Carswell, 2003) at 147 D s. 10(3).

9 The bankruptcy judge held that there was no evidence establishing criteria (b) or (c). In this case, the debt has been pursued to judgment. The petitioning creditor does not state that repeated demands were made for payment of the judgment debt. Rather, the petitioning creditor relied on the case of *Platt*, *supra*, for the proposition that a judgment constitutes a continuing demand for payment and the failure to satisfy the judgment is a continuing refusal by the judgment debtor. The bankruptcy judge applied *Platt* and found that the one judgment satisfied the first test from *Holmes* and constituted an act of bankruptcy under s. 42(1)(j).

10 In *Platt* the issue before the court was whether the act of bankruptcy had occurred within the six months prior to the petition. The concern in *Platt* was that there was no demand within the six months prior to the petition. The court noted that the theory behind the six-month limit is to ensure that a bankruptcy petitioner does not rely on stale-dated debts; however, it has been accepted that continued demands for payment following the debt and within the six-month period can have the effect of reviving the original debt, thus making the debt once again current: *Re Harrap of Milton*

Inc. (1979), 22 O.R. (2d) 239 (Ont. S.C.). The court also referred to a line of cases that has recognized that no demand is necessary within the six months if there is evidence of a continuing default. See, e.g. *Re Aarvi Construction Co. Ltd.* (1978), 29 C.B.R. (N.S.) 265 (Ont. S.C.). The court held that a judgment debt is a continuing demand for payment and in that context, is able to satisfy the statutory time requirement, that is, it can be considered as one of the debts that forms part of an act of bankruptcy within the six-month period prior to the petition. The court stated at para. 18: "It is inappropriate to require a creditor who has proceeded properly through legal channels and become a judgment creditor to make frequent demands for payment to the judgment debtor, *only for the purpose of ensuring that the statutory time limitations are complied with.*" (emphasis added).

11 The petition in *Platt* relied on six debts, four of which were taken to judgment. Each of the debts predated the petition by more than six months. The court was satisfied based on the number of debts and the continuing failure to pay them, that an act of bankruptcy had been committed within the six-month limit.

12 However, that may not be the case where, for example, a single creditor obtains a judgment and either shortly thereafter petitions the debtor into bankruptcy based on the judgment and the implicit demands, or does nothing for an extended period, then petitions on the basis that the judgment constitutes a continuing demand. In neither case would the judgment be evidence of failure to meet obligations generally, as contemplated by the special circumstances doctrine.

13 Henry J. explained the philosophy behind allowing a single debt to be sufficient evidence of failing to meet liabilities generally as they become due in *Re Holmes*, supra, at 243:

Because this Court has in some of the recent decisions referred to, such as *Dixie Market [(Nurseries) Ltd.* (1971), 14 C.B.R. (N.S.) 281 (Ont. S.C.)], *Polyco [Distributors Ltd.* (1971), 14 C.B.R. (N.S.) 285 (Ont. S.C.)] and *King Petroleum [Ltd.,* (1973), 2 O.R. (2d) 192 (Ont. S.C.)], made a receiving order on proof of failure to meet a liability to a single creditor, it is not to be taken to have established a new principle that a petitioning creditor need only prove default with respect to the debt owing to him. Those decisions in my judgment do not lay down such a principle; they are as I see it, merely the application to particular facts of the general rule (exemplified by the decision in *Re Elkind*, [ (1966), 9 C.B.R. (N.S.) 274 (Ont. S.C.)]), that when relying on an act of bankruptcy described in s. 24(1)(j) the petitioning creditor must strictly establish that, in the words of the statute, the debtor "ceases to meet his liabilities generally as they become due"; in all of them the Court was influenced either by the existence of other creditors, or of one of the special circumstances I have set out above. In the non-exceptional case, as in the case at bar, that situation cannot be ordinarily proved by having regard to the experience of one creditor only, even though he may be a major creditor. Resort to the statutory machinery of the Bankruptcy Act, rather than to the remedies to enforce a debt or claim in the ordinary Courts,

is intended by Parliament to be for the benefit of the creditors of a debtor as a class, and the act of bankruptcy described in s. 24(1)(j) is in my judgment, an act that singles out the conduct of the debtor in relation to the class, rather than to the individual (as is the case under s. 24(1)(e)). It is for this reason that the Court must be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence from which an inference of fact can fairly be drawn that creditors generally are not being paid. This requires as a minimum some evidence that liabilities other than those incurred towards the petitioning creditor, have ceased to be met. The Court ought not to be asked to draw inferences with respect to the class on the basis of one creditor's experience where evidence of the debtor's conduct towards other members of the class could, with reasonable diligence, be discovered and produced. The Court's intuition is no substitute for the diligence of the petitioning creditor.

**14** The question for this court is whether the concept that a judgment constitutes a continuing demand will render every debt that has been pursued to judgment a special circumstance making that one debt evidence of an act of bankruptcy.

**15** Based on Platt, once a debt has been pursued to judgment, because that judgment constitutes a continuing demand for payment, it can form the basis for a finding that it constitutes an act of bankruptcy based on special circumstances. However, one judgment debt will not necessarily constitute special circumstances in every case. Ultimately the issue for the bankruptcy court on a petition for a receiving order is whether the creditor has proved that the debtor committed the act of bankruptcy alleged in the petition. Sections 43(6) and (7) provide:

43(6) At the hearing of the petition, the court shall require proof of the facts alleged in the petition and of the service of the petition, and, if satisfied with the proof, may make a receiving order.

(7) Where the court is not satisfied with the proof of the facts alleged in the petition or of the service of the petition, or is satisfied by the debtor that he is able to pay his debts, or that for other sufficient cause no order ought to be made, it shall dismiss the petition.

**16** Before the court can be satisfied that the failure to pay one judgment debt is tantamount to failing to meet liabilities generally as they become due, the court must examine and consider all of the circumstances including:

- \* the size of the judgment - a small unpaid judgment is less likely to indicate an act of bankruptcy than a very large one;
- \* how long the judgment has been outstanding - there may be reasons why a recently obtained judgment has not been paid as yet, including a potential appeal, the need to arrange for the marshalling of funds, the intent to make

- arrangements for payment over time or in the case of a default judgment, knowledge of the judgment;
- \* if a judgment has been outstanding for a long time, it may be that the debtor believes that the creditor is willing to wait for payment, and is paying his or her other debts as they fall due;
  - \* whether the judgment creditor has conducted a judgment debtor examination and the results of that examination - if the judgment creditor can collect without invoking the mechanism of the bankruptcy process, a petition ought not to be granted;
  - \* what steps the judgment creditor has taken to determine whether the debtor has other creditors and the results of those inquiries.

**17** In this case, the bankruptcy court judge appeared to conclude that the one judgment automatically constituted special circumstances and an act of bankruptcy, without considering whether, in all of the circumstances, the petitioning creditor had proved that the debtor was not meeting his liabilities generally as they fell due.

**18** The creditor had conducted a judgment debtor examination, the main thrust of which appeared to have been directed to the issue of the pledged shares. The record does not disclose whether other assets were pursued or whether the sheriff was sent to attempt to levy execution. (A report that there are no assets upon which to levy, itself constitutes an act of bankruptcy under s. 42(1)(e)).

**19** In this case, the only other potentially relevant evidence is the existence of another large judgment debt of \$800,000 in favour of the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce which was outstanding at the date of Mr. Valente's judgment debtor examination, November 2000, more than six months before the petition. The petition did not rely on this debt. Nor did the bankruptcy judge consider this evidence an acknowledgement by the debtor that he was failing to meet his liabilities generally as they became due. The petitioning creditor provided no proof that that judgment remained outstanding at the time of the petition. The debtor filed an unsworn Notice of Cause Against the Petition which states that he is able to meet his obligations as they come due and denies committing an act of bankruptcy. Although the debtor could have provided proof that he had paid the Bank of Commerce debt, the onus is on the petitioning creditor to prove the act of bankruptcy: *Re Roy* (1982), 44 C.B.R. (NS) 86 (Ont. S.C.). The creditor could have called the bank as a witness on the petition or filed an execution certificate showing the continued existence of the debt.

**20** As the bankruptcy judge treated the judgment as automatically constituting an act of bankruptcy without considering the factors identified at para. 16 of these reasons, I would set aside the receiving order, but remit the matter to the bankruptcy judge for further consideration.

## Issue 2

**21** It appears from the record that it is not disputed that the creditor does retain the security of the pledged shares, whether or not the terms of the share pledge agreement were ignored in obtaining

judgment on the note. It is therefore unnecessary to comment on the issue of res judicata referenced by the bankruptcy judge.

**22** In those circumstances, the creditor may either value the pledged shares for the purpose of the petition, deducting that value from the debt, or disclaim the pledged shares in the context of the bankruptcy: s. 43(2). Once that is done, the bankruptcy court will be in a position to assess whether the single judgment at issue constitutes an act of bankruptcy.

#### CONCLUSION

**23** Both at trial and on this appeal the creditor requested as alternative relief that it be allowed to amend the petition to value or disclaim the security under s. 43(2). In my view, in the circumstances it is appropriate that the creditor be allowed to amend its petition as advised (including in respect of other debts, if they exist) and the matter be referred back to the bankruptcy court in Windsor to consider the amended petition and any response by the debtor.

**24** The costs of the appeal are fixed at \$3,000 inclusive of G.S.T. and disbursements and shall be payable in the cause of the petition.

FELDMAN J.A.

LASKIN J.A. -- I agree.

SHARPE J.A. -- I agree.

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**Tab 5**

1992 CarswellSask 32, 15 C.B.R. (3d) 100

1992 CarswellSask 32, 15 C.B.R. (3d) 100

Canada (Attorney General) v. Gordon (Trustee of)

Re Bankruptcy of ROXEY LINNETT GORDON; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA (on behalf of R. IN RIGHT OF CANADA) v. DELOITTE & TOUCHE INC. (Trustee in Bankruptcy for Estate of ROXEY LINNETT GORDON, Bankrupt) and ROXEY LINNETT GORDON

Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench

Geatros J.

Judgment: September 30, 1992  
Docket: Doc. Regina 1454; O.R. 016712

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Counsel: *M.L. Senko*, for applicant.

*T. Sandbeck*, for respondent trustee in bankruptcy.

*D.J. Maddigan*, for respondent Gordon.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Bankruptcy --- Assignments in bankruptcy

Bankruptcy --- Discharge of bankrupt — Conditional discharge — Student loans

Assignments — Annulment — Attorney General applying for annulment of assignment where bankrupt having only one creditor — Application being dismissed — Assignment based on only one debt not being regarded as abuse of bankruptcy process.

Discharge of bankrupt — Conditional discharge — Bankrupt's only debt being Canada Student Loans totalling in excess of \$11,000 — Bankrupt having prospect of being able to repay some part of loan — Conditional discharge granted.

1992 CarswellSask 32, 15 C.B.R. (3d) 100

In 1983-84, the bankrupt obtained three student loans totalling \$3,900 so that she could enrol in a forest technology course. She completed the first year of the course but did not have high enough marks to make it into the second year. The bankrupt worked for her brother-in-law for a while and managed to make student loan payments and reduce the principal owing to \$3,470.80. In 1985, she applied for a two-year course in agricultural production and obtained two student loans totalling \$7,140. After graduation in 1987, the bankrupt was unable to find employment in the field for which she was trained, but still managed to make some student loan payments when she was able. When the bankrupt made an assignment in bankruptcy, Canada Student Loans was her only creditor.

The bankrupt applied for an absolute discharge. The applicant applied for an annulment of the assignment on the basis that the bankrupt did not qualify as an "insolvent person" because she had only one creditor. The applicant also applied for an order requiring the bankrupt to pay a judgment in favour of the trustee for 75 per cent of the outstanding student loan.

**Held:**

A conditional discharge was granted.

The use of the phrase "liabilities of creditors" in s. 2 of the *Bankruptcy Act* does not mean that someone in financial difficulty with only one creditor cannot take advantage of the bankruptcy system. An assignment based on only one debt is not an abuse of the bankruptcy process.

The bankrupt was single and had no dependants. While she was not gainfully employed in her chosen field at the time of the application, there was no reason to assume that she would never be so employed. The bankrupt would likely earn a good living when economic conditions improved and, as she had no other debts, there was a good prospect of the bankrupt being able to repay at least part of the student loan. There was no evidence of misconduct or improper motive on the bankrupt's part. She was entitled to a fresh start, but given her future prospects, there was no reason to grant an absolute discharge. The bankrupt was discharged on the condition that she consent to pay \$3,000 plus the trustee's fees and costs of \$300 to the Canada Student Loans Program at a rate of \$75 per month.

**Cases considered:**

*Cook, Re* (1991), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 245, 92 Sask. R. 181 (Q.B.) [affirmed as to *Bruce* (1992), 14 C.B.R. (3d) 245, 93 D.L.R. (4th) 557, 100 Sask. R. 68, 18 W.A.C. 68 (C.A.) and reversed as to *Boehmer* (1992), 14 C.B.R. (3d) 248, (sub nom. *Re Boehmer*) 100 Sask. R. 209, 18 W.A.C. 209 (C.A.)] — *applied*

**Statutes considered:**

Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 —

s. 2 "insolvent person"

1992 CarswellSask 32, 15 C.B.R. (3d) 100

s. 172

Application by bankrupt for absolute discharge; APPLICATION by creditor for annulment of assignment in bankruptcy.

*Geatros J.:*

1 The applicant seeks an order annulling the respondent Gordon's assignment in bankruptcy on the ground that:

The assignment is an abuse of process as the bankrupt was not insolvent within the meaning of s. 2 of the *Bankruptcy Act*, [R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3] as only one creditor was listed in her statement of affairs.

2 I am not persuaded that the bankrupt is not an individual to which the *Bankruptcy Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 was intended to apply. The fact that "insolvent person" defined in s. 2 of the Act alludes to "liabilities of *creditors*" (my emphasis) is not, as contended, determinative of the proposition that the framers of the legislation had in mind the need for more than one creditor. Applying the principles of statutory interpretation, one creditor will suffice; otherwise, he or she who has incurred but a single debt in excess of \$1,000 would be encouraged to take on a second debt so as to enable that person to make an assignment. As well, one who is able to disclose a debt of \$10,000, and no more, would be precluded from availing him or her self of the benefit of the Act, where one who has incurred two debts, each for somewhat more than \$500, would be able to do so. There has to be a construction of the Act that makes sense. Aside from that, an assignment based on only one debt cannot be regarded for that reason alone as an abuse of the bankruptcy process. I now turn to the kind of relief that should be granted under s. 172 of the Act.

3 When she made her assignment the bankrupt had a monthly income of about \$600. She is 28 years of age, single with no dependants. Her assets comprise household furniture and effects, which are exempt, an automobile valued at \$700 and a share in a yearling and a calf valued at \$500.

4 The bankrupt now discloses income of \$330 per month. She is employed as a commission salesperson for Schneider's Popcorn Parties Inc. Her only debt is the balance due under the Canada student loan in the sum of \$11,124.75.

5 The Canada Student Loans Program, the applicant, seeks an order requiring the bankrupt to pay a judgment in favour of the trustee for 75 per cent of the outstanding student loan. The bankrupt says that she is entitled to an absolute discharge.

6 The facts may be distilled from the affidavits submitted. During 1983-84 the bankrupt obtained three separate student loans totalling \$3,900 so that she could enrol in a forest technology course at the Northern Alberta Institute of Technology. Her marks were not high enough to make it into the second year of the course. It seems that only 40 out of 75 students successfully completed the first year. The bankrupt decided to find another career choice. In the meantime interest was accruing on the loan. The bankrupt worked for a time for her brother-in-law at his farm near Strasbourg, Saskatchewan. Payments were made on the loan reducing the principal balance to \$3,470.80.

1992 CarswellSask 32, 15 C.B.R. (3d) 100

7 Then in 1985 the bankrupt applied for a two-year course in agricultural production at Olds College, Alberta. She applied for and obtained two student loans totalling \$7,140. She graduated from Olds College in 1987. She attempted to get on with several feed companies, but without success.

8 From 1987 and into 1989, the bankrupt was unable to obtain employment in the field she had trained for at Olds College. For the most part her jobs were of a temporary kind. In the meantime she made payments on her student loans "as and when I was able to". Since 1989 she has been employed on a haphazard basis. She is now living on her sister's farm, "helping with farm chores and selling popcorn on a commission basis".

9 I need look no further than the judgment of Wimmer J. in *Re Cook* (1991), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 245, 92 Sask. R. 181 (Q.B.) in determining what should be done in the present case. Before him were several applications for discharge from bankruptcy that included outstanding student loans among the liabilities. I find the passage in his judgment, at p. 183 [Sask. R.], to be instructive as regards the purpose of the *Bankruptcy Act* and the treatment to be given to student loans in bankruptcy proceedings; indeed, I am in agreement with his views:

A person is insolvent when, for any reason, financial obligations cannot be, or are not being, met as they become due, or when the total value of a person's property is not sufficient to enable payment of those obligations. The reality of insolvency is that legitimate creditors usually go unpaid. The purpose of the *Bankruptcy Act* is to provide a means for honest but insolvent persons to be relieved of some or all of their debts with a view to having a fresh start, without being impoverished, and without being burdened with conditions which may or may not be able to be met. It has been said that in seeking this end the court must balance the interests of creditors in having their claims paid, the interests of debtors in obtaining debt relief, and the integrity of the bankruptcy process. *Re Sceptre Hardware Co.* (1922), 3 C.B.R. 734. I take the reference to the integrity of the process as meaning that it should not be perceived to be abused.

Over the past several years, perhaps beginning with the judgment in *Re Provost*, [1974] 2 W.W.R. 611, there seems to have developed a notion that outstanding student loans have a special status in bankruptcy proceedings. In some cases the argument is made that a person who gains a post-secondary education obtains an asset capable of generating an income greater than could otherwise be realized. When this is achieved through the direct advance of public funds it is argued that repayment of the loans should not readily be forgiven. In *Provost*, the obligation to repay student loans was ranked '... on a moral level as high as a debt for necessities or alimony, a liability under a maintenance or affiliation order ... in short, those classes of debts and liabilities ... which an order for discharge does not ... release the bankrupt ...' Other cases can be found where student loans have been likened to a debt for necessities and, on that account, the usual considerations on applications for discharge put aside and special conditions imposed. While all of this bears a degree of logic (based upon the need to maintain an optimum level of resources available to students) it must be remembered that Parliament, in the exercise of its bankruptcy jurisdiction, does not say that student loans cannot be extinguished upon discharge. Accordingly, I think it is important for the court to resist any temptation to classify student loans in this way.

10 Then after reading certain cases referred to him, Wimmer J. said this, at pp. 183-184:

1992 CarswellSask 32, 15 C.B.R. (3d) 100

These judgments all deal with bankrupts having outstanding student loans. However, my view is that no one of them, including *Provost*, should be taken as establishing a principle of bankruptcy law that student loan agencies are in some different position than other preferred creditors. If any principle is to be derived from the judgments it is that every application for discharge should be decided according to its own facts and in a manner consistent with the objects of the Act.

and later, at p. 184:

The integrity of the process appears to have been a primary consideration in the decisions.

Of course, there are also examples where people with outstanding student loans have been discharged absolutely. If there is any commonality in the cases it is this: bankruptcy is not to be used as an expeditious means of avoiding the repayment of loans which could, with reasonable diligence, be paid, either in whole or in part.

I propose to have regard to the foregoing discussion as I rule upon the present motion.

11 As Wimmer J. aptly pointed out [at p. 183], "It cannot reasonably be expected that every loan will be repaid. Many students will fail, either in school or in life." In the present case, the bankrupt did not fail in school. She graduated in agriculture production. As well, at age 28 years, still single with no dependants, she should have a productive life ahead of her. To that end, it is apparent that she should be relieved, if not of all of it, then of the greater part of the burden imposed upon her by the student loan. It is not an abuse of the bankruptcy process for that to be done. That is so because I find that no misconduct or improper motive can be attributed to the bankrupt. She is an honest person, in the sense that she has made payments "as and when" she has been able to, in a significant total amount.

12 The bankrupt is entitled to have a fresh start under conditions that she should be able to meet, but I am not persuaded that to that end she must be discharged absolutely. Although her degree from Olds College may well not earn her a substantial income, it should hold her in good stead when economic conditions improve. It cannot be said that there is no prospect of her ever being unable to pay at least a part of the student loan. She has no other debts. She has no dependants.

13 The bankrupt will be discharged upon condition that she consent to judgment in favour of the trustee in the amount of \$3,000 plus the trustee's fees and costs of \$300, which are payable to the Canada Student Loans Program to be paid at the rate of \$75 per month with the payments to commence on November 1, 1992. The judgment will not bear interest except in respect of any arrears of payments.

*Conditional discharge granted.*

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**Tab 6**



HMANALY D§11

Houlden and Morawetz Bankruptcy and Insolvency Analysis

L.W. Houlden and Geoffrey B. Morawetz

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Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act  
Bankruptcy Orders and Assignments (ss. 42-45)  
D§11 — Particular Acts of Bankruptcy

**D§11 — Particular Acts of Bankruptcy**

See ss. 42-45

(a) A debtor commits an act of bankruptcy, if, in Canada or elsewhere, he or she makes an assignment of his or her property to a trustee for the benefit of his or her creditors generally: s. 42(1)(a). See D§14 "Conflict Between Assignment and Application for a Bankruptcy Order".

To qualify as an assignment, the act must be voluntary, must be made by the debtor or his or her legal representative for the benefit of creditors, must transfer control over the debtor's property in order that it may be distributed among creditors, and as a result of the transfer, the debtor must be unable to carry on his or her business. A voluntary decision by the legal representative of a deceased's estate to declare bankruptcy in a foreign jurisdiction meets these requirements and hence constitutes an assignment under s. 43(1)(a): *Re Kaussen Estate*, 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 97, [1986] R.J.Q. 2683, 25 E.T.R. 99 (C.S. Qué); affirmed (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 81, 12 O.A.C. 39, (sub nom. *Kaussen Estate (Bankrupt) v. Bayerische Hypotheken-Und Wechsel-Bank Aktiengesellschaft*) 47 D.L.R. (4th) 626 (C.A.).

In the case of *Re Brown* (1932), 13 C.B.R. 416 (Ont. C.A.), creditors entered into an arrangement with the debtor under which all the debtor's property was transferred to the debtor's solicitors for liquidation by them and distribution of the proceeds to creditors. It was held that the arrangement constituted an act of bankruptcy under s. 42(1)(a), and under s. 42(2) the assignment was void. It was held also that the fact that the applicant creditor was a party to the arrangement did not preclude it from filing an application.

The making of a bulk sale is not an assignment for the benefit of creditors: *Morton v. C.C.M.A.*, 10 C.B.R. 442, 63 O.L.R. 334, [1929] F.D.L.R. 911 (C.A.).

Where all ordinary creditors were being paid and the obligation to the applicant creditor was not yet due, the court held that no act of bankruptcy under s. 42(1)(j) had been committed: *T.D. Bank v. Langille* (1983), 45 C.B.R. (N.S.) 49, 114 A.P.R. 629, 55 N.S.R. (2d) 629 (C.A.). Similarly, if the applicant creditor has waived the default in payment of its debt, it cannot obtain a bankruptcy order: *Re Ont. Dennison Tile Co.* (1932), 13 C.B.R. 442 (Ont. S.C.).

A debtor company's public announcements regarding informal restructuring efforts, including workforce reductions, possible inability to repay notes and the need to find financing, will not amount to a notice of a suspension or an intention to suspend payment of its debts under s. 42(1)(h) of the *BIA* where it can be inferred from such announcements that the debtor company is continuing to carry on business: *Re Inex Pharmaceuticals Corp.* (2006), 2006 CarswellBC 615, 2006 BCCA 108, 20 C.B.R. (5th) 256 (B.C.C.A.).

The mere existence of executions filed after the date of the application with no evidence about the nature of the liabilities and the circumstances of non-payment is insufficient to establish that the debtor has ceased to meet liabilities generally as they become due: *Re Int. Automotive Trading Ltd.* (1986), 60 C.B.R. (N.S.) 292 (Ont. S.C.). Likewise, where there was evidence that executions were on file in the sheriff's office but no evidence concerning the state of the accounts at the date of the filing of the petition, it was held that the applicant creditor had not proved that the debtor had ceased to meet liabilities generally: *Re Arrive Car & Truck Rentals Ltd.* (1989), 76 C.B.R. (N.S.) 68 (Ont. S.C.).

A debtor who owned considerable property but had defaulted in payment of certain small debts was held not to have ceased to meet liabilities generally as they became due: *Re Benoit* (1930), 12 C.B.R. 58 (Ont. S.C.).

### (3) — Failure to Pay One Creditor

Whether or not the failure to pay a single creditor can constitute an act of bankruptcy under s. 42(1)(j) has given rise to a considerable body of jurisprudence, but the law seems to be now well settled that a debt to a single creditor is sufficient if there are special circumstances: *Re Puetter* (1998), 6 C.B.R. (4th) 279, 1998 CarswellBC 2565 (B.C. S.C.); *Re Valente* (2004), 47 C.B.R. (4th) 317, 183 O.A.C. 191, 2004 CarswellOnt 681 (Ont. C.A.); reversing (2002), 47 C.B.R. (4th) 313, 2002 CarswellOnt 5759 (Ont. S.C.J.). The Nova Scotia Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy order may be granted on the basis of a default to one creditor if one of the following special circumstances is proven: (i) the creditor is the only creditor of the debtor and the debtor has failed to meet repeated demands of the creditor; (ii) the creditor is a significant creditor and there are special circumstances, such as fraud on the part of the debtor, that make it imperative that the *BIA* be used for the protection of the whole class of creditors; or (iii) the debtor admits that it is unable to pay its creditors generally although they and the obligations are not identified. The court further held that if the debt on which the bankruptcy application is premised is the subject of a *bona fide* dispute between the debtor and creditor, then the bankruptcy application will be stayed pending the outcome of such dispute: *Re Atlantic Ova Pro Ltd.* (2006), 2006 CarswellNS 76, 2006 NSSC 61, 18 C.B.R. (5th) 101 (N.S. S.C.).

A debt to a single creditor is sufficient to grant a bankruptcy application if the applicant creditor's claim is either the only claim or is so large that the claims of other creditors are of no significance so that, in effect, there is only one creditor. Another aspect is whether there is proof of fraud or other suspicious circumstances in the way in which the debtor has dealt with assets. Here, the debtor failed to put forward any evidence that it was able to meet its obligations generally as they fell due: *Re Real Time Fibre Supply Ltd.* (2007), 2007 CarswellBC 580, 32 C.B.R. (5th) 57, 2007

BCSC 371 (B.C. S.C.).

There are cases that have held that the failure to pay a single creditor is not sufficient to ground an application for a bankruptcy order: Re Ko-Da Trading Co. (1992), 9 C.B.R. (3d) 141, 1992 CarswellBC 544 (B.C. Master); Canada (Attorney General) v. MacDonald Estate (2001), 27 C.B.R. (4th) 16, 2001 BCSC 1022, 2001 CarswellBC 1751 (B.C.S.C.). The need for special circumstances has no application where debts are owing to a number of creditors; it is only relevant where an application is being presented by a single creditor who does not rely upon proof of indebtedness and non-payment of accounts of other creditors: Re Pro-Lam Industries (1986) Ltd. (1989), 75 C.B.R. (N.S.) 239 (B.C. S.C.); Re Fred Walls & Son Holdings Ltd. (1999), 13 C.B.R. (4th) 60, 1999 CarswellBC 1873; additional reasons at (1999), 14 C.B.R. (4th) 189, 1999 CarswellBC 2643 (B.C.S.C.). In Re Smith (1992), 13 C.B.R. (3d) 47, 1992 CarswellMan 22 (Man. Q.B.), Kroft J. of the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench held that a single creditor could petition and that there was no need to show special circumstances; to the same effect, see also Agrifoods International Cooperative Ltd. v. Welwood (1996), 42 C.B.R. (3d) 273, (sub nom. Welwood (Bankrupt), Re) 111 Man. R. (2d) 181 (Q.B.); Stancroft Trust Ltd. v. Asiamerica Capital Ltd. (1992), 72 B.C.L.R. (2d) 353, 1992 CarswellBC 522, 15 C.B.R. (3d) 175, 19 B.C.A.C. 5, 34 W.A.C. 5 (C.A.); Re Lee (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 202 (B.C.S.C.); affirmed (2000), 16 C.B.R. (4th) 96 (B.C.C.A.); Banque Nationale de Paris (Canada) v. Opiola (1998), 6 C.B.R. (4th) 184, 231 A.R. 398, 1998 CarswellAlta 1076 (Q.B.); Re Fundy Supplies Ltd. (1971), 3 N.B.R. (2d) 723, 20 D.L.R. (3d) 615, 1971 CarswellNB 47 (N.B. C.A.); Royal Bank v. Belliveau (2002), 34 C.B.R. (4th) 99, 2002 CarswellNB 158, 2002 NBQB 129 (N.B.Q.B.).

The following have been held to constitute special circumstances. Frequently two or more special circumstances will be found to exist in a particular case:

- The applicant creditor's claim is either the only claim or is so large that the claims of other creditors are of no real significance, so that in effect there is only one creditor. If, in these circumstances, the creditor were unable to file an application, it would be denied the benefits of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*: Re Global Franchise Marketing Ltd. (1982), 40 C.B.R. (N.S.) 269 (Ont. S.C.); Re Dixie Market (Nurseries) Ltd. (1971), 14 C.B.R. (N.S.) 281 (Ont. S.C.); Re Polycy Distributors Ltd. (1971), 14 C.B.R. (N.S.) 285 (Ont. S.C.); Re King Petroleum Ltd. (1973), 19 C.B.R. (N.S.) 16, 2 O.R. (2d) 192, 42 D.L.R. (3d) 332 (H.C.); Re K. & W. Stores Ltd. (1973), 18 C.B.R. (N.S.) 197 (Man. Q.B.); Re Fundy Supplies Ltd. (1971), 3 N.B.R. (2d) 723, 20 D.L.R. (3d) 615 (N.B. C.A.); Re Dew's of Red Lake Ltd. (1977), 25 C.B.R. (N.S.) 250 (Ont. S.C.); Re 518494 Ontario Ltd. (Petrochem) (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 203 (Ont. S.C.); Re Burns (1986), 59 C.B.R. (N.S.) 295 (Ont. S.C.); Re U-First Sales Ltd. (1997), 47 C.B.R. (3d) 113, 1997 CarswellNS 238 (N.S. S.C. [In Chambers]); Re Real Time Fibre Supply Ltd. (2007), 2007 CarswellBC 580, 32 C.B.R. (5th) 57 (B.C. S.C.). When an applicant creditor relies on this special circumstance, it must show that it made repeated demands for payment in the six months preceding the filing of the application: Re Raitblat (1925), 5 C.B.R. 714; affirmed 5 C.B.R. 765 (Ont. S.C.); Re Fundy Supplies Ltd., *supra*; Re 518494 Ontario Ltd. (Petrochem), *supra*; Re Burns, *supra*; Re Quik Stop Inc. (1989), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 102 (N.B. Q.B.); Re Omni-Stone Corp. (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 636, 1991 CarswellOnt 698 (Gen. Div.); Re Giusto (1994), 25 C.B.R. (3d) 227, 1997 CarswellOnt 276 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Re Chauvco Resources International Ltd. (1999), 9 C.B.R. (4th) 235, 1999 CarswellAlta 61 (Alta. Q.B.). If there have been no repeated demands for payment, a bankruptcy order will not be granted: Datamatics Ltd. v. Parax Development International Inc. (2003), 40 C.B.R. (4th) 43, 2003 CarswellSask 52, 2003 SKQB 27, [2003] 4 W.W.R. 439, 229 Sask. R. 79 (Sask. Q.B.).

HMANALY B§25

Houlden and Morawetz Bankruptcy and Insolvency Analysis

L.W. Houlden and Geoffrey B. Morawetz

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Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act  
Interpretation (ss. 2-2.2)  
B§25 — "Insolvent Person"

**B§25 — "Insolvent Person"**

See ss. 2, 2.1, 2.2

For a discussion of the meaning of insolvency, see F§206 "Insolvency of Debtor", *post*.

The phrase "insolvent person" is used in the *Act* to refer to a person who is not bankrupt. Section 49 provides for the making of assignments by insolvent persons and reference should be made to notes to s. 49 as to who may make an assignment. Section 50 provides for the making of a proposal by an insolvent person. In connection with the making of proposals by insolvent persons, reference should be made to the notes to ss. 50-66.

Although the definition of insolvent person in s. 2(1) of the *BIA* refers to "liabilities to creditors", a debt to one creditor amounting to \$1,000 is sufficient: *Canada (Attorney General) v. Gordon (Trustee of)* (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 100, 1992 CarswellSask 32 (Sask. Q.B.).

Where a statement of affairs showed that the bankrupt's assets exceeded liabilities but the trustee's subsequent review found that liabilities exceeded assets, the court held that the bankrupt had been insolvent within the meaning of the *BIA* and refused to annul the bankruptcy, finding that the *BIA* provided an appropriate context for resolving the competing claims: *Re Fantasy Construction Ltd.* (2005), 2005 Carswell-Alta 129, 2005 ABQB 63, 8 C.B.R. (5th) 216 (Alta. Q.B.).

Unlike the *BIA*, the *CCAA* does not define "insolvent" or "insolvency". Although it is common practice to refer to the definition of "insolvent person" in the *BIA* in referring to insolvency in the context of the *CCAA*, the test for insolvency under the *CCAA* differs from that under the *BIA* in order to meet the special circumstances and objectives of the *CCAA*: *Re Stelco Inc.* (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 1211, 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); leave to

appeal to C.A. refused (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (C.A.), where Farley J. held that "insolvent" should be given an expanded meaning under the *CCAA* in order to give effect to the rehabilitative goal of the *Act* and that a court should determine whether there is a reasonably foreseeable expectation at the time of filing that there is a looming liquidity condition or crisis that will result in the applicant running out of money to pay its debts as they generally become due in the future without the benefit of the stay and ancillary protection.

See, Vern W. DaRe, "Is 'Insolvency' Still a Prerequisite to Restructuring?" (2004) 48 C.B.R. (4th) 163.

A trust that was created under article 1260 ff. of the *Québec Civil Code* was found not to be an insolvent person within the meaning of the *BIA* such that it could avail itself of the s. 50(1) *BIA* proposal provisions, as the trust was not a "person". The court held that although the trust constitutes autonomous patrimony, it was never given legal personality by the legislature: Re Fiducie Côté Poirier (2007), EYB 2007-125448, 2007 CarswellQue 9938, 38 C.B.R. (5th) 19 (Que. S.C.).

END OF DOCUMENT

**Tab 7**

*Case Name:*  
**Nortel Networks Corp. (Re)**

**RE:IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act,  
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended  
AND IN THE MATTER OF a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of  
Nortel Networks Corporation, Nortel Networks Limited, Nortel  
Networks Global Corporation, Nortel Networks International  
Corporation and Nortel Networks Technology Corporation,  
Applicants  
APPLICATION UNDER the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act,  
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended**

[2009] O.J. No. 3169

55 C.B.R. (5th) 229

2009 CanLII 39492

2009 CarswellOnt 4467

Court File No. 09-CL-7950

Ontario Superior Court of Justice  
Commercial List

**G.B. Morawetz J.**

Heard: June 29, 2009.

Judgment: June 29, 2009.

Released: July 23, 2009.

(59 paras.)

*Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) matters --  
Application of Act -- Debtor company -- Motion by applicants for approval of bidding procedure  
and Sale Agreement allowed -- Applicants had been granted CCAA protection and were involved in  
insolvency procedures in four other countries -- Bidding procedures set deadline for entry and  
involved auction -- Sale Agreement was for some of applicants' business units -- Neither proposal*

*involved formal plan of compromise with creditors or vote, but CCAA was flexible and could be broadly interpreted to ensure objective of preserving business was met -- Proposal was warranted, beneficial and there was no viable alternative.*

Motion by the applicants for the approval of their proposed bidding process and Sale Agreement. The applicants had been granted CCAA protection and were involved in insolvency proceedings in four other countries. The Monitor approved of the proposal. The bidding process set a deadline for bids and involved an auction. The Sale Agreement was for some of the applicants' business units. The applicants argued the proposal was the best way to preserve jobs and company value. The purchaser was to assume both assets and liabilities. There was no formal plan for compromise with creditors or vote planned.

HELD: Motion allowed. The CCAA was flexible and could be broadly interpreted to ensure that its objectives of preserving the business were achieved. The proposal was warranted and beneficial and there was no viable alternative. A sealing order was also made with respect to Appendix B, which contained commercially sensitive documents.

**Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:**

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11(4)

**Counsel:**

Derrick Tay and Jennifer Stam, for Nortel Networks Corporation, et al.

Lyndon Barnes and Adam Hirsh, for the Board of Directors of Nortel Networks Corporation and Nortel Networks Limited.

J. Carfagnini and J. Pasquariello, for Ernst & Young Inc., Monitor.

M. Starnino, for the Superintendent of Financial Services and Administrator of PBGF.

S. Philpott, for the Former Employees:

K. Zych, for Noteholders.

Pamela Huff and Craig Thorburn, for MatlinPatterson Global Advisors LLC, MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners III L.P. and Matlin Patterson Opportunities Partners (Cayman) III L.P.

David Ward, for UK Pension Protection Fund.

Leanne Williams, for Flextronics Inc.



Alex MacFarlane, for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.

Arthur O. Jacques and Tom McRae, for Felske and Sylvain (de facto Continuing Employees' Committee).

Robin B. Schwill and Matthew P. Gottlieb, for Nortel Networks UK Limited.

A. Kauffman, for Export Development Canada.

D. Ullman, for Verizon Communications Inc.

G. Benchetrit, for IBM.

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**ENDORSEMENT**

G.B. MORAWETZ J.:--

**INTRODUCTION**

1 On June 29, 2009, I granted the motion of the Applicants and approved the bidding procedures (the "Bidding Procedures") described in the affidavit of Mr. Riedel sworn June 23, 2009 (the "Riedel Affidavit") and the Fourteenth Report of Ernst & Young, Inc., in its capacity as Monitor (the "Monitor") (the "Fourteenth Report"). The order was granted immediately after His Honour Judge Gross of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "U.S. Court") approved the Bidding Procedures in the Chapter 11 proceedings.

2 I also approved the Asset Sale Agreement dated as of June 19, 2009 (the "Sale Agreement") among Nokia Siemens Networks B.V. ("Nokia Siemens Networks" or the "Purchaser"), as buyer, and Nortel Networks Corporation ("NNC"), Nortel Networks Limited ("NNL"), Nortel Networks, Inc. ("NNI") and certain of their affiliates, as vendors (collectively the "Sellers") in the form attached as Appendix "A" to the Fourteenth Report and I also approved and accepted the Sale Agreement for the purposes of conducting the "stalking horse" bidding process in accordance with the Bidding Procedures including, the Break-Up Fee and the Expense Reimbursement (as both terms are defined in the Sale Agreement).

3 An order was also granted sealing confidential Appendix "B" to the Fourteenth Report containing the schedules and exhibits to the Sale Agreement pending further order of this court.

4 The following are my reasons for granting these orders.

5 The hearing on June 29, 2009 (the "Joint Hearing") was conducted by way of video conference with a similar motion being heard by the U.S. Court. His Honor Judge Gross presided over the hearing in the U.S. Court. The Joint Hearing was conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Cross-Border Protocol, which had previously been approved by both the U.S. Court and this court.

6 The Sale Agreement relates to the Code Division Multiple Access ("CMDA") business Long-Term Evolution ("LTE") Access assets.

7 The Sale Agreement is not insignificant. The Monitor reports that revenues from CDMA comprised over 21% of Nortel's 2008 revenue. The CDMA business employs approximately 3,100 people (approximately 500 in Canada) and the LTE business employs approximately 1,000 people (approximately 500 in Canada). The purchase price under the Sale Agreement is \$650 million.

## **BACKGROUND**

8 The Applicants were granted CCAA protection on January 14, 2009. Insolvency proceedings have also been commenced in the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel and France.

9 At the time the proceedings were commenced, Nortel's business operated through 143 subsidiaries, with approximately 30,000 employees globally. As of January 2009, Nortel employed approximately 6,000 people in Canada alone.

10 The stated purpose of Nortel's filing under the CCAA was to stabilize the Nortel business to maximize the chances of preserving all or a portion of the enterprise. The Monitor reported that a thorough strategic review of the company's assets and operations would have to be undertaken in consultation with various stakeholder groups.

11 In April 2009, the Monitor updated the court and noted that various restructuring alternatives were being considered.

12 On June 19, 2009, Nortel announced that it had entered into the Sale Agreement with respect to its assets in its CMDA business and LTE Access assets (collectively, the "Business") and that it was pursuing the sale of its other business units. Mr. Riedel in his affidavit states that Nortel has spent many months considering various restructuring alternatives before determining in its business judgment to pursue "going concern" sales for Nortel's various business units.

13 In deciding to pursue specific sales processes, Mr. Riedel also stated that Nortel's management considered:

- (a) the impact of the filings on Nortel's various businesses, including deterioration in sales; and
- (b) the best way to maximize the value of its operations, to preserve jobs and to continue businesses in Canada and the U.S.

14 Mr. Riedel notes that while the Business possesses significant value, Nortel was faced with the reality that:

- (a) the Business operates in a highly competitive environment;
- (b) full value cannot be realized by continuing to operate the Business through a restructuring; and
- (c) in the absence of continued investment, the long-term viability of the Business would be put into jeopardy.

15 Mr. Riedel concluded that the proposed process for the sale of the Business pursuant to an auction process provided the best way to preserve the Business as a going concern and to maximize value and preserve the jobs of Nortel employees.

16 In addition to the assets covered by the Sale Agreement, certain liabilities are to be assumed by the Purchaser. This issue is covered in a comprehensive manner at paragraph 34 of the Fourteenth Report. Certain liabilities to employees are included on this list. The assumption of these liabilities is consistent with the provisions of the Sale Agreement that requires the Purchaser to extend written offers of employment to at least 2,500 employees in the Business.

17 The Monitor also reports that given that certain of the U.S. Debtors are parties to the Sale Agreement and given the desire to maximize value for the benefit of stakeholders, Nortel determined and it has agreed with the Purchaser that the Sale Agreement is subject to higher or better offers being obtained pursuant to a sale process under s. 363 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and that the Sale Agreement shall serve as a "stalking horse" bid pursuant to that process.

18 The Bidding Procedures provide that all bids must be received by the Seller by no later than July 21, 2009 and that the Sellers will conduct an auction of the purchased assets on July 24, 2009. It is anticipated that Nortel will ultimately seek a final sales order from the U.S. Court on or about July 28, 2009 and an approval and vesting order from this court in respect of the Sale Agreement and purchased assets on or about July 30, 2009.

19 The Monitor recognizes the expeditious nature of the sale process but the Monitor has been advised that given the nature of the Business and the consolidation occurring in the global market, there are likely to be a limited number of parties interested in acquiring the Business.

20 The Monitor also reports that Nortel has consulted with, among others, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the "UCC") and the bondholder group regarding the Bidding Procedures and is of the view that both are supportive of the timing of this sale process. (It is noted that the UCC did file a limited objection to the motion relating to certain aspects of the Bidding Procedures.)

21 Given the sale efforts made to date by Nortel, the Monitor supports the sale process outlined in the Fourteenth Report and more particularly described in the Bidding Procedures.

22 Objections to the motion were filed in the U.S. Court and this court by MatlinPatterson Global Advisors LLC, MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners III L.P. and Matlin Patterson Opportunities Partners (Cayman) III L.P. (collectively, "MatlinPatterson") as well the UCC.

23 The objections were considered in the hearing before Judge Gross and, with certain limited exceptions, the objections were overruled.

## ISSUES AND DISCUSSION

24 The threshold issue being raised on this motion by the Applicants is whether the CCAA affords this court the jurisdiction to approve a sales process in the absence of a formal plan of compromise or arrangement and a creditor vote. If the question is answered in the affirmative, the secondary issue is whether this sale should authorize the Applicants to sell the Business.

25 The Applicants submit that it is well established in the jurisprudence that this court has the jurisdiction under the CCAA to approve the sales process and that the requested order should be granted in these circumstances.

26 Counsel to the Applicants submitted a detailed factum which covered both issues.

27 Counsel to the Applicants submits that one of the purposes of the CCAA is to preserve the going concern value of debtors companies and that the court's jurisdiction extends to authorizing sale of the debtor's business, even in the absence of a plan or creditor vote.

28 The CCAA is a flexible statute and it is particularly useful in complex insolvency cases in which the court is required to balance numerous constituents and a myriad of interests.

29 The CCAA has been described as "skeletal in nature". It has also been described as a "sketch, an outline, a supporting framework for the resolution of corporate insolvencies in the public interest". *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 44, 61, leave to appeal refused, [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 337. ("ATB Financial").

30 The jurisprudence has identified as sources of the court's discretionary jurisdiction, *inter alia*:

- (a) the power of the court to impose terms and conditions on the granting of a stay under s. 11(4) of the CCAA;
- (b) the specific provision of s. 11(4) of the CCAA which provides that the court may make an order "on such terms as it may impose"; and
- (c) the inherent jurisdiction of the court to "fill in the gaps" of the CCAA in order to give effect to its objects. *Re Canadian Red Cross Society* (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 43; *Re PSINet Ltd.* (2001), 28 C.B.R. (4th) 95 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 5, *ATB Financial, supra*, at paras.

43-52.

31 However, counsel to the Applicants acknowledges that the discretionary authority of the court under s. 11 must be informed by the purpose of the CCAA.

Its exercise must be guided by the scheme and object of the Act and by the legal principles that govern corporate law issues. *Re Stelco Inc.* (2005), 9 C.B.R. (5th) 135 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 44.

32 In support of the court's jurisdiction to grant the order sought in this case, counsel to the Applicants submits that Nortel seeks to invoke the "overarching policy" of the CCAA, namely, to preserve the going concern. *Re Residential Warranty Co. of Canada Inc.* (2006), 21 C.B.R. (5th) 57 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 78.

33 Counsel to the Applicants further submits that CCAA courts have repeatedly noted that the purpose of the CCAA is to preserve the benefit of a going concern business for all stakeholders, or "the whole economic community":

The purpose of the CCAA is to facilitate arrangements that might avoid liquidation of the company and allow it to continue in business to the benefit of the whole economic community, including the shareholders, the creditors (both secured and unsecured) and the employees. *Citibank Canada v. Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada* (1991), 5 C.B.R. (3rd) 165 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 29. *Re Consumers Packaging Inc.* (2001) 27 C.B.R. (4th) 197 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 5.

34 Counsel to the Applicants further submits that the CCAA should be given a broad and liberal interpretation to facilitate its underlying purpose, including the preservation of the going concern for the benefit of all stakeholders and further that it should not matter whether the business continues as a going concern under the debtor's stewardship or under new ownership, for as long as the business continues as a going concern, a primary goal of the CCAA will be met.

35 Counsel to the Applicants makes reference to a number of cases where courts in Ontario, in appropriate cases, have exercised their jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets, even in the absence of a plan of arrangement being tendered to stakeholders for a vote. In doing so, counsel to the Applicants submits that the courts have repeatedly recognized that they have jurisdiction under the CCAA to approve asset sales in the absence of a plan of arrangement, where such sale is in the best interests of stakeholders generally. *Re Canadian Red Cross Society, supra, Re PSINet, supra, Re Consumers Packaging, supra, Re Stelco Inc.* (2004), 6 C.B.R. (5th) 316 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 1, *Re Tiger Brand Knitting Co.* (2005) 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315, *Re Caterpillar Financial Services Ltd. v. Hardrock Paving Co.* (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 87 and *Re Lehndorff General Partner Ltd.* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3rd) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

**36** In *Re Consumers Packaging, supra*, the Court of Appeal for Ontario specifically held that a sale of a business as a going concern during a CCAA proceeding is consistent with the purposes of the CCAA:

The sale of Consumers' Canadian glass operations as a going concern pursuant to the Owens-Illinois bid allows the preservation of Consumers' business (albeit under new ownership), and is therefore consistent with the purposes of the CCAA.

... we cannot refrain from commenting that Farley J.'s decision to approve the Owens-Illinois bid is consistent with previous decisions in Ontario and elsewhere that have emphasized the broad remedial purpose of flexibility of the CCAA and have approved the sale and disposition of assets during CCAA proceedings prior to a formal plan being tendered. *Re Consumers Packaging, supra, at paras. 5, 9.*

**37** Similarly, in *Re Canadian Red Cross Society, supra*, Blair J. (as he then was) expressly affirmed the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets in the course of a CCAA proceeding before a plan of arrangement had been approved by creditors. *Re Canadian Red Cross Society, supra, at paras. 43, 45.*

**38** Similarly, in *PSINet Limited, supra*, the court approved a going concern sale in a CCAA proceeding where no plan was presented to creditors and a substantial portion of the debtor's Canadian assets were to be sold. Farley J. noted as follows:

[If the sale was not approved,] there would be a liquidation scenario ensuing which would realize far less than this going concern sale (which appears to me to have involved a transparent process with appropriate exposure designed to maximize the proceeds), thus impacting upon the rest of the creditors, especially as to the unsecured, together with the material enlarging of the unsecured claims by the disruption claims of approximately 8,600 customers (who will be materially disadvantaged by an interrupted transition) plus the job losses for approximately 200 employees. *Re PSINet Limited, supra, at para. 3.*

**39** In *Re Stelco Inc., supra*, in 2004, Farley J. again addressed the issue of the feasibility of selling the operations as a going concern:

I would observe that usually it is the creditor side which wishes to terminate CCAA proceedings and that when the creditors threaten to take action, there is a realization that a liquidation scenario will not only have a negative effect upon a CCAA applicant, but also upon its workforce. Hence, the CCAA may be employed to provide stability during a period of necessary financial and operational restructuring - and if a restructuring of the "old company" is not

- . feasible, then there is the exploration of the feasibility of the sale of the operations/enterprise as a going concern (with continued employment) in whole or in part. *Re Stelco Inc, supra*, at para. 1.

40 I accept these submissions as being general statements of the law in Ontario. The value of equity in an insolvent debtor is dubious, at best, and, in my view, it follows that the determining factor should not be whether the business continues under the debtor's stewardship or under a structure that recognizes a new equity structure. An equally important factor to consider is whether the case can be made to continue the business as a going concern.

41 Counsel to the Applicants also referred to decisions from the courts in Quebec, Manitoba and Alberta which have similarly recognized the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets during the course of a CCAA proceeding. *Re Boutique San Francisco Inc.* (2004), 7 C.B.R. (5th) 189 (Quebec S. C.), *Re Winnipeg Motor Express Inc.* (2008), 49 C.B.R. (5th) 302 (Man. Q.B.) at paras. 41, 44, and *Re Calpine Canada Energy Limited* (2007), 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1, (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 75.

42 Counsel to the Applicants also directed the court's attention to a recent decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal which questioned whether the court should authorize the sale of substantially all of the debtor's assets where the debtor's plan "will simply propose that the net proceeds from the sale ... be distributed to its creditors". In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. v. Fisgard Capital Corp.* (2008), 46 C.B.R. (5th) 7 (B.C.C.A.) ("*Cliffs Over Maple Bay*"), the court was faced with a debtor who had no active business but who nonetheless sought to stave off its secured creditor indefinitely. The case did not involve any type of sale transaction but the Court of Appeal questioned whether a court should authorize the sale under the CCAA without requiring the matter to be voted upon by creditors.

43 In addressing this matter, it appears to me that the British Columbia Court of Appeal focussed on whether the court should grant the requested relief and not on the question of whether a CCAA court has the jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.

44 I do not disagree with the decision in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*. However, it involved a situation where the debtor had no active business and did not have the support of its stakeholders. That is not the case with these Applicants.

45 The *Cliffs Over Maple Bay* decision has recently been the subject of further comment by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in *Asset Engineering L.P. v. Forest and Marine Financial Limited Partnership*, 2009 BCCA 319.

46 At paragraphs 24-26 of the *Forest and Marine* decision, Newbury J.A. stated:

- 24. . In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*, the debtor company was a real estate developer whose one project had failed. The company had been dormant for some time. It applied for CCAA protection but described its proposal for restructuring in vague terms

that amounted essentially to a plan to "secure sufficient funds" to complete the stalled project (Para. 34). This court, per Tysoe J.A., ruled that although the Act can apply to single-project companies, its purposes are unlikely to be engaged in such instances, since mortgage priorities are fully straight forward and there will be little incentive for senior secured creditors to compromise their interests (Para. 36). Further, the Court stated, the granting of a stay under s. 11 is "not a free standing remedy that the court may grant whenever an insolvent company wishes to undertake a "restructuring" ... Rather, s. 11 is ancillary to the fundamental purpose of the CCAA, and a stay of proceedings freezing the rights of creditors should only be granted in furtherance of the CCAA's fundamental purpose". That purpose has been described in *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank* (1984) 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576 (Alta. Q.B.):

The legislation is intended to have wide scope and allow a judge to make orders which will effectively maintain the status quo for a period while the insolvent company attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for a proposed arrangement which will enable the company to remain in operation for what is, hopefully, the future benefit of both the company and its creditors. [at 580]

25. The Court was not satisfied in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay* that the "restructuring" contemplated by the debtor would do anything other than distribute the net proceeds from the sale, winding up or liquidation of its business. The debtor had no intention of proposing a plan of arrangement, and its business would not continue following the execution of its proposal - thus it could not be said the purposes of the statute would be engaged ...
26. In my view, however, the case at bar is quite different from *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*. Here, the main debtor, the Partnership, is at the centre of a complicated corporate group and carries on an active financing business that it hopes to save notwithstanding the current economic cycle. (The business itself which fills a "niche" in the market, has been carried on in one form or another since 1983.) The CCAA is appropriate for situations such as this where it is unknown whether the "restructuring" will ultimately take the form of a refinancing or will involve a reorganization of the corporate entity or entities and a true compromise of the rights of one or more parties. The "fundamental purpose" of the Act - to preserve the *status quo* while the debtor prepares a plan that will enable it to remain in business to the benefit of all concerned - will be furthered by granting a stay so that the means contemplated by the Act - a compromise or arrangement - can be developed, negotiated and voted on if necessary ...



47 It seems to me that the foregoing views expressed in *Forest and Marine* are not inconsistent with the views previously expressed by the courts in Ontario. The CCAA is intended to be flexible and must be given a broad and liberal interpretation to achieve its objectives and a sale by the debtor which preserves its business as a going concern is, in my view, consistent with those objectives.

48 I therefore conclude that the court does have the jurisdiction to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan.

49 I now turn to a consideration of whether it is appropriate, in this case, to approve this sales process. Counsel to the Applicants submits that the court should consider the following factors in determining whether to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan:

- (a) is a sale transaction warranted at this time?
- (b) will the sale benefit the whole "economic community"?
- (c) do any of the debtors' creditors have a *bona fide* reason to object to a sale of the business?
- (d) is there a better viable alternative?

I accept this submission.

50 It is the position of the Applicants that Nortel's proposed sale of the Business should be approved as this decision is to the benefit of stakeholders and no creditor is prejudiced. Further, counsel submits that in the absence of a sale, the prospects for the Business are a loss of competitiveness, a loss of value and a loss of jobs.

51 Counsel to the Applicants summarized the facts in support of the argument that the Sale Transaction should be approved, namely:

- (a) Nortel has been working diligently for many months on a plan to reorganize its business;
- (b) in the exercise of its business judgment, Nortel has concluded that it cannot continue to operate the Business successfully within the CCAA framework;
- (c) unless a sale is undertaken at this time, the long-term viability of the Business will be in jeopardy;
- (d) the Sale Agreement continues the Business as a going concern, will save at least 2,500 jobs and constitutes the best and most valuable proposal for the Business;
- (e) the auction process will serve to ensure Nortel receives the highest possible value for the Business;
- (f) the sale of the Business at this time is in the best interests of Nortel and its stakeholders; and

(g) the value of the Business is likely to decline over time.

52 The objections of MatlinPatterson and the UCC have been considered. I am satisfied that the issues raised in these objections have been addressed in a satisfactory manner by the ruling of Judge Gross and no useful purpose would be served by adding additional comment.

53 Counsel to the Applicants also emphasize that Nortel will return to court to seek approval of the most favourable transaction to emerge from the auction process and will aim to satisfy the elements established by the court for approval as set out in *Royal Bank v. Soundair* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3rd) 1 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 16.

### **DISPOSITION**

54 The Applicants are part of a complicated corporate group. They carry on an active international business. I have accepted that an important factor to consider in a CCAA process is whether the case can be made to continue the business as a going concern. I am satisfied having considered the factors referenced at [49], as well as the facts summarized at [51], that the Applicants have met this test. I am therefore satisfied that this motion should be granted.

55 Accordingly, I approve the Bidding Procedures as described in the Riedel Affidavit and the Fourteenth Report of the Monitor, which procedures have been approved by the U.S. Court.

56 I am also satisfied that the Sale Agreement should be approved and further that the Sale Agreement be approved and accepted for the purposes of conducting the "stalking horse" bidding process in accordance with the Bidding Procedures including, without limitation the Break-Up Fee and the Expense Reimbursement (as both terms are defined in the Sale Agreement).

57 Further, I have also been satisfied that Appendix B to the Fourteenth Report contains information which is commercially sensitive, the dissemination of which could be detrimental to the stakeholders and, accordingly, I order that this document be sealed, pending further order of the court.

58 In approving the Bidding Procedures, I have also taken into account that the auction will be conducted prior to the sale approval motion. This process is consistent with the practice of this court.

59 Finally, it is the expectation of this court that the Monitor will continue to review ongoing issues in respect of the Bidding Procedures. The Bidding Procedures permit the Applicants to waive certain components of qualified bids without the consent of the UCC, the bondholder group and the Monitor. However, it is the expectation of this court that, if this situation arises, the Applicants will provide advance notice to the Monitor of its intention to do so.

G.B. MORAWETZ J.

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---- End of Request ----

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**Tab 8**

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Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re

Re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36; Re Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43; Re plan of compromise in respect of LEHNDORFF GENERAL PARTNER LTD. (in its own capacity and in its capacity as general partner of LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA), LEHNDORFF PROPERTIES (CANADA) and LEHNDORFF PROPERTIES (CANADA) II) and in respect of certain of their nominees LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA) LTD., LEHNDORFF CANADIAN HOLDINGS LTD., LEHNDORFF CANADIAN HOLDINGS II LTD., BAYTEMP PROPERTIES LIMITED and 102 BLOOR STREET WEST LIMITED and in respect of THG LEHNDORFF VERMÖGENSVERWALTUNG GmbH (in its capacity as limited partner of LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA))

Ontario Court of Justice (General Division — Commercial List)

Farley J.

Heard: December 24, 1992

Judgment: January 6, 1993

Docket: Doc. B366/92

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Counsel: *Alfred Apps, Robert Harrison and Melissa J. Kennedy*, for applicants.

*L. Crozier*, for Royal Bank of Canada.

*R.C. Heintzman*, for Bank of Montreal.

*J. Hodgson, Susan Lundy and James Hilton*, for Canada Trustco Mortgage Corporation.

*Jay Schwartz*, for Citibank Canada.

*Stephen Golick*, for Peat Marwick Thorne[FN\*] Inc., proposed monitor.

*John Teolis*, for Fuji Bank Canada.

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*Robert Thorton*, for certain of the advisory boards.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act — Arrangements — Effect of arrangement — Stay of proceedings

Corporations — Arrangements and compromises — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Stay of proceedings — Stay being granted even where it would affect non-applicants that were not companies within meaning of Act — Business operations of applicants and non-applicants being so intertwined as to make stay appropriate.

The applicant companies were involved in property development and management and sought the protection of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") in order that they could present a plan of compromise. They also sought a stay of all proceedings against the individual company applicants either in their own capacities or because of their interest in a larger group of companies. Each of the applicant companies was insolvent and had outstanding debentures issued under trust deeds. They proposed a plan of compromise among themselves and the holders of the debentures as well as those others of their secured and unsecured creditors deemed appropriate in the circumstances.

A question arose as to whether the court had the power to grant a stay of proceedings against non-applicants that were not companies and, therefore, not within the express provisions of the CCAA.

**Held:**

The application was allowed.

It was appropriate, given the significant financial intertwining of the applicant companies, that a consolidated plan be approved. Further, each of the applicant companies had a realistic possibility of being able to continue operating even though each was currently unable to meet all of its expenses. This was precisely the sort of situation in which all of the creditors would likely benefit from the application of the CCAA and in which it was appropriate to grant an order staying proceedings.

The inherent power of the court to grant stays can be used to supplement s. 11 of the CCAA when it is just and reasonable to do so. Clearly, the court had the jurisdiction to grant a stay in respect of any of the applicants that were companies fitting the criteria in the CCAA. However, the stay requested also involved limited partnerships where (1) the applicant companies acted on behalf of the limited partnerships, or (2) the stay would be effective against any proceedings taken by any party against the property assets and undertakings of the limited partnerships in which they held a direct interest. The business operations of the applicant companies were so intertwined with the limited partnerships that it would be impossible for a stay to be granted to the applicant companies that would affect their business without affecting the undivided interest of the limited partnerships in the business. As a result, it was just and reasonable to supplement s. 11 and grant the stay.

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While the provisions of the CCAA allow for a cramdown of a creditor's claim, as well as the interest of any other person, anyone wishing to start or continue proceedings against the applicant companies could use the comeback clause in the order to persuade the court that it would not be just and reasonable to maintain the stay. In such a motion, the onus would be on the applicant companies to show that it was appropriate in the circumstances to continue the stay.

**Cases considered:**

*Amirault Fish Co., Re*, 32 C.B.R. 186, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 203 (N.S. T.D.) — referred to

*Associated Investors of Canada Ltd., Re*, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237, Alta. L.R. (2d) 259, [1988] 2 W.W.R. 211, 38 B.L.R. 148, (sub nom. *Re First Investors Corp.*) 46 D.L.R. (4th) 669 (Q.B.), reversed (1988), 71 C.B.R. 71, 60 Alta. L.R. (2d) 242, 89 A.R. 344 (C.A.) — referred to

*Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd.* (1992), 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

*Canada Systems Group (EST) v. Allen-Dale Mutual Insurance Co.* (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 287 (Ont. H.C.) [affirmed (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 135, 33 C.P.C. 210, 145 D.L.R. (3d) 266 (C.A.)] — referred to

*Empire-Universal Films Ltd. v. Rank*, [1947] O.R. 775 [H.C.] — referred to

*Feifer v. Frame Manufacturing Corp., Re*, 28 C.B.R. 124, [1947] Que. K.B. 348 (C.A.) — referred to

*Fine's Flowers Ltd. v. Fine's Flowers (Creditors of)* (1992), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 87, 4 B.L.R. (2d) 293, 87 D.L.R. (4th) 391, 7 O.R. (3d) 193 (Gen. Div.) — referred to

*Gaz Métropolitain v. Wynden Canada Inc.* (1982), 44 C.B.R. (N.S.) 285 (Que. S.C.) [affirmed (1982), 45 C.B.R. (N.S.) 11 (Que. C.A.)] — referred to

*Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136 (C.A.) — referred to

*Inducon Development Corp. Re* (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

*International Donut Corp. v. 050863 N.B. Ltd.* (1992), 127 N.B.R. (2d) 290, 319 A.P.R. 290 (Q.B.) — considered

*Keppoch Development Ltd., Re* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 95 (N.S. T.D.) — referred to

*Langley's Ltd., Re*, [1938] O.R. 123, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 230 (C.A.) — referred to

*McCordic v. Bosanquet* (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 (H.C.) — referred to



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*Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank*, 52 C.B.R. (N.S.) 109, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215, 32 Alta. L.R. (2d) 150, 53 A.R. 39, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576 (Q.B.) — referred to

*Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361, 92 A.R. 1 (Q.B.) — referred to

*Northland Properties Ltd., Re* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 141 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

*Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) 41 O.A.C. 282, 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.) — referred to

*Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 303, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.), affirming (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 291, 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 164 (note), 55 B.C.L.R. (2d) xxxiii (note), 135 N.R. 317 (note) — referred to

*Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada)*, [1934] S.C.R. 659, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75 — referred to

*Seven Mile Dam Contractors v. R.* (1979), 13 B.C.L.R. 137, 104 D.L.R. (3d) 274 (S.C.), affirmed (1980), 25 B.C.L.R. 183 (C.A.) — referred to

*Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

*Slavik, Re* (1992), 12 C.B.R. (3d) 157 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

*Stephanie's Fashions Ltd., Re* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

*Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of)* (1990), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 151, (sub nom. *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Gammon*) 1 O.R. (3d) 321 (Gen. Div.) — referred to

*United Maritime Fishermen Co-operative, Re* (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44, 84 N.B.R. (2d) 415, 214 A.P.R. 415 (Q.B.), varied on reconsideration (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 170, 87 N.B.R. (2d) 333, 221 A.P.R. 333 (Q.B.), reversed (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161, 88 N.B.R. (2d) 253, 224 A.P.R. 253, (sub nom. *Cdn. Co-op. Leasing Services v. United Maritime Fishermen Co-op.*) 51 D.L.R. (4th) 618 (C.A.) — referred to

#### Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 —

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s. 85

s. 142

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 — preamble

s. 2

s. 3

s. 4

s. 5

s. 6

s. 7

s. 8

s. 11

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43.

Judicature Act, The, R.S.O. 1937, c. 100.

Limited Partnerships Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.16 —

s. 2(2)

s. 3(1)

s. 8

s. 9

s. 11

s. 12(1)

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s. 13

s. 15(2)

s. 24

Partnership Act, R.S.A. 1980, c.P-2 — Pt. 2

s. 75

**Rules considered:**

Ontario, Rules of Civil Procedure —

r. 8.01

r. 8.02

Application under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to file consolidated plan of compromise and for stay of proceedings.

***Farley J.:***

1 These are my written reasons relating to the relief granted the applicants on December 24, 1992 pursuant to their application under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA") and the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 ("CJA"). The relief sought was as follows:

- (a) short service of the notice of application;
- (b) a declaration that the applicants were companies to which the CCAA applies;
- (c) authorization for the applicants to file a consolidated plan of compromise;
- (d) authorization for the applicants to call meetings of their secured and unsecured creditors to approve the consolidated plan of compromise;
- (e) a stay of all proceedings taken or that might be taken either in respect of the applicants in their own capacity or on account of their interest in Lehndorff United Properties (Canada) ("LUPC"), Lehndorff Properties (Canada) ("LPC") and Lehndorff Properties (Canada) II ("LPC II") and collectively (the "Limited Partnerships") whether as

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limited partner, as general partner or as registered titleholder to certain of their assets as bare trustee and nominee; and

(f) certain other ancillary relief.

2 The applicants are a number of companies within the larger Lehndorff group ("Group") which operates in Canada and elsewhere. The group appears to have suffered in the same way that a number of other property developers and managers which have also sought protection under the CCAA in recent years. The applicants are insolvent; they each have outstanding debentures issues under trust deeds; and they propose a plan of compromise among themselves and the holders of these debentures as well as those others of their secured and unsecured creditors as they deemed appropriate in the circumstances. Each applicant except THG Lehndorff Vermögensverwaltung GmbH ("GmbH") is an Ontario corporation. GmbH is a company incorporated under the laws of Germany. Each of the applicants has assets or does business in Canada. Therefore each is a "company" within the definition of s. 2 of the CCAA. The applicant Lehndorff General Partner Ltd. ("General Partner Company") is the sole general partner of the Limited Partnerships. The General Partner Company has sole control over the property and businesses of the Limited Partnerships. All major decisions concerning the applicants (and the Limited Partnerships) are made by management operating out of the Lehndorff Toronto Office. The applicants aside from the General Partner Company have as their sole purpose the holding of title to properties as bare trustee or nominee on behalf of the Limited Partnerships. LUPC is a limited partnership registered under the *Limited Partnership Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.16 ("Ontario LPA"). LPC and LPC II are limited partnerships registered under Part 2 of the *Partnership Act*, R.S.A. 1980, c. P-2 ("Alberta PA") and each is registered in Ontario as an extra provincial limited partnership. LUPC has over 2,000 beneficial limited partners, LPC over 500 and LPC II over 250, most of whom are residents of Germany. As at March 31, 1992 LUPC had outstanding indebtedness of approximately \$370 million, LPC \$45 million and LPC II \$7 million. Not all of the members of the Group are making an application under the CCAA. Taken together the Group's indebtedness as to Canadian matters (including that of the applicants) was approximately \$543 million. In the summer of 1992 various creditors (Canada Trustco Mortgage Company, Bank of Montreal, Royal Bank of Canada, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and the Bank of Tokyo Canada) made demands for repayment of their loans. On November 6, 1992 Funtanua Investments Limited, a minor secured lender also made a demand. An interim standstill agreement was worked out following a meeting of July 7, 1992. In conjunction with Peat Marwick Thorne Inc. which has been acting as an informal monitor to date and Fasken Campbell Godfrey the applicants have held multiple meetings with their senior secured creditors over the past half year and worked on a restructuring plan. The business affairs of the applicants (and the Limited Partnerships) are significantly intertwined as there are multiple instances of intercorporate debt, cross-default provisions and guarantees and they operated a centralized cash management system.

3 This process has now evolved to a point where management has developed a consolidated restructuring plan which plan addresses the following issues:

(a) The compromise of existing conventional, term and operating indebtedness, both secured and unsecured.

(b) The restructuring of existing project financing commitments.

(c) New financing, by way of equity or subordinated debt.

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- (d) Elimination or reduction of certain overhead.
- (e) Viability of existing businesses of entities in the Lehndorff Group.
- (f) Restructuring of income flows from the limited partnerships.
- (g) Disposition of further real property assets aside from those disposed of earlier in the process.
- (h) Consolidation of entities in the Group; and
- (i) Rationalization of the existing debt and security structure in the continuing entities in the Group.

Formal meetings of the beneficial limited partners of the Limited Partnerships are scheduled for January 20 and 21, 1993 in Germany and an information circular has been prepared and at the time of hearing was being translated into German. This application was brought on for hearing at this time for two general reasons: (a) it had now ripened to the stage of proceeding with what had been distilled out of the strategic and consultative meetings; and (b) there were creditors other than senior secured lenders who were in a position to enforce their rights against assets of some of the applicants (and Limited Partnerships) which if such enforcement did take place would result in an undermining of the overall plan. Notice of this hearing was given to various creditors: Barclays Bank of Canada, Barclays Bank PLC, Bank of Montreal, Citibank Canada, Canada Trustco Mortgage Corporation, Royal Trust Corporation of Canada, Royal Bank of Canada, the Bank of Tokyo Canada, Funtauna Investments Limited, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Fuji Bank Canada and First City Trust Company. In this respect the applicants have recognized that although the initial application under the CCAA may be made on an ex parte basis (s. 11 of the CCAA; *Re Langley's Ltd.*, [1938] O.R. 123, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 230 (C.A.) ; *Re Keppoch Development Ltd.* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 95 (N.S. T.D.) . The court will be concerned when major creditors have not been alerted even in the most minimal fashion (*Re Inducon Development Corp.* (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 310). The application was either supported or not opposed.

4 "Instant" debentures are now well recognized and respected by the courts: see *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-operative* (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44 (N.B. Q.B.) , at pp. 55-56, varied on reconsideration (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 170 (N.B. Q.B.) , reversed on different grounds (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161 (N.B. C.A.) , at pp. 165-166; *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248 (B.C. S.C.) at pp. 250-251; *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101 (C.A.) per Doherty J.A., dissenting on another point, at pp. 306-310 (O.R.); *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of)* (sub nom. *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Gammon*) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 321 (Gen. Div.) at p. 327. The applicants would appear to me to have met the technical hurdle of s. 3 and as defined s. 2) of the CCAA in that they are debtor companies since they are insolvent, they have outstanding an issue of debentures under a trust deed and the compromise or arrangement that is proposed includes that compromise between the applicants and the holders of those trust deed debentures. I am also satisfied that because of the significant intertwining of the applicants it would be appropriate to have a consolidated plan. I would also understand that this court (Ontario Court of Justice (General Division)) is the appropriate court to hear this application since all the applicants except GmbH have their head office or their chief place of

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business in Ontario and GmbH, although it does not have a place of business within Canada, does have assets located within Ontario.

5 The CCAA is intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors as an alternative to bankruptcy and, as such, is remedial legislation entitled to a liberal interpretation. It seems to me that the purpose of the statute is to enable insolvent companies to carry on business in the ordinary course or otherwise deal with their assets so as to enable plan of compromise or arrangement to be prepared, filed and considered by their creditors and the court. In the interim, a judge has great discretion under the CCAA to make order so as to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors. See the preamble to and sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11 of the CCAA; *Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, [1934] S.C.R. 659 at p. 661, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75; *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank*, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215 (Alta. Q.B.) at pp. 219-220; *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleum Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361 (Q.B.), at pp. 12-13 (C.B.R.); *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (B.C. C.A.), at pp. 310-311, affirming (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 291, 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 164 (S.C.C.); *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)*, supra, at p. 307 (O.R.); *Fine's Flowers v. Fine's Flowers (Creditors of)* (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 193 (Gen. Div.), at p. 199 and "Reorganizations Under The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act", Stanley E. Edwards (1947) 25 Can. Bar Rev. 587 at p. 592.

6 The CCAA is intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both. Where a debtor company realistically plans to continue operating or to otherwise deal with its assets but it requires the protection of the court in order to do so and it is otherwise too early for the court to determine whether the debtor company will succeed, relief should be granted under the CCAA. see *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)*, supra at pp. 297 and 316; *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.*, supra, at pp. 251-252 and *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of)*, supra, at p. 328 and p. 330. It has been held that the intention of the CCAA is to prevent any manoeuvres for positioning among the creditors during the period required to develop a plan and obtain approval of creditors. Such manoeuvres could give an aggressive creditor an advantage to the prejudice of others who are less aggressive and would undermine the company's financial position making it even less likely that the plan will succeed: see *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank*, supra, at p. 220 (W.W.R.). The possibility that one or more creditors may be prejudiced should not affect the court's exercise of its authority to grant a stay of proceedings under the CCAA because this affect is offset by the benefit to all creditors and to the company of facilitating a reorganization. The court's primary concerns under the CCAA must be for the debtor and all of the creditors: see *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, supra, at pp. 108-110; *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84 (C.A.), at pp. 315-318 (C.B.R.) and *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.*, supra, at pp. 251-252.

7 One of the purposes of the CCAA is to facilitate ongoing operations of a business where its assets have a greater value as part of an integrated system than individually. The CCAA facilitates reorganization of a company where the alternative, sale of the property piecemeal, is likely to yield far less satisfaction to the creditors. Unlike the *Bankruptcy Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, before the amendments effective November 30, 1992 to transform it into the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ("BIA"), it is possible under the CCAA to bind secured creditors it has been generally speculated that the CCAA will be resorted to by companies that are generally larger and have a more complicated capital structure and

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that those companies which make an application under the BIA will be generally smaller and have a less complicated structure. Reorganization may include partial liquidation where it is intended as part of the process of a return to long term viability and profitability. See *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*, supra, at p. 318 and *Re Associated Investors of Canada Ltd.* (1987), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Alta. Q.B.) at pp. 245, reversed on other grounds at (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 71 (Alta. C.A.). It appears to me that the purpose of the CCAA is also to protect the interests of creditors and to enable an orderly distribution of the debtor company's affairs. This may involve a winding-up or liquidation of a company or simply a substantial downsizing of its business operations, provided the same is proposed in the best interests of the creditors generally. See *Re Associated Investors of Canada Ltd.*, supra, at p. 318; *Re Amirault Fish Co.*, 32 C.B.R. 186, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 203 (N.S. T.D.) at pp. 187-188 (C.B.R.).

8 It strikes me that each of the applicants in this case has a realistic possibility of being able to continue operating, although each is currently unable to meet all of its expenses albeit on a reduced scale. This is precisely the sort of circumstance in which all of the creditors are likely to benefit from the application of the CCAA and in which it is appropriate to grant an order staying proceedings so as to allow the applicant to finalize preparation of and file a plan of compromise and arrangement.

9 Let me now review the aspect of the stay of proceedings. Section 11 of the CCAA provides as follows:

11. Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, whenever an application has been made under this Act in respect of any company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit,

(a) make an order staying, until such time as the court may prescribe or until any further order, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy Act* and the *Winding-up Act* or either of them;

(b) restrain further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company on such terms as the court sees fit; and

(c) make an order that no suit, action or other proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except with the leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court imposes.

10 The power to grant a stay of proceeding should be construed broadly in order to permit the CCAA to accomplish its legislative purpose and in particular to enable continuance of the company seeking CCAA protection. The power to grant a stay therefore extends to a stay which affected the position not only of the company's secured and unsecured creditors, but also all non-creditors and other parties who could potentially jeopardize the success of the plan and thereby the continuance of the company. See *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.*, supra, at pp. 12-17 (C.B.R.) and *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, supra, at pp. 296-298 (B.C. S.C.) and pp. 312-314 (B.C. C.A.) and *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank*, supra, at pp. 219 ff. Further the court has the power to order a stay that is effective in respect of the rights arising in favour of secured creditors under all forms of commercial security: see *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*, supra, at p. 320 where Gibbs J.A. for the court stated:

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The trend which emerges from this sampling will be given effect here by holding that where the word "security" occurs in the C.C.A.A., it includes s. 178 security and, where the word creditor occurs, it includes a bank holding s. 178 security. To the extent that there may be conflict between the two statutes, therefore, the broad scope of the C.C.A.A. prevails.

11 The power to grant a stay may also extend to preventing persons seeking to terminate or cancel executory contracts, including, without limitation agreements with the applying companies for the supply of goods or services, from doing so: see *Gaz Métropolitain v. Wynden Canada Inc.* (1982), 44 C.B.R. (N.S.) 285 (Que. S.C.) at pp. 290-291 and *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, supra, at pp. 311-312 (B.C. C.A.). The stay may also extend to prevent a mortgagee from proceeding with foreclosure proceedings (see *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 141 (B.C. S.C.) or to prevent landlords from terminating leases, or otherwise enforcing their rights thereunder (see *Feifer v. Frame Manufacturing Corp.* (1947), 28 C.B.R. 124 (Que. C.A.)). Amounts owing to landlords in respect of arrears of rent or unpaid rent for the unexpired portion of lease terms are properly dealt with in a plan of compromise or arrangement: see *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.) especially at p. 318. The jurisdiction of the court to make orders under the CCAA in the interest of protecting the debtor company so as to enable it to prepare and file a plan is effective notwithstanding the terms of any contract or instrument to which the debtor company is a party. Section 8 of the CCAA provides:

8. This Act extends and does not limit the provisions of any instrument now or hereafter existing that governs the rights of creditors or any class of them and has full force and effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in that instrument.

The power to grant a stay may also extend to prevent persons from exercising any right of set off in respect of the amounts owed by such a person to the debtor company, irrespective of whether the debtor company has commenced any action in respect of which the defense of set off might be formally asserted: see *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, supra, at pp. 312-314 (B.C.C.A.).

12 It was submitted by the applicants that the power to grant a stay of proceedings may also extend to a stay of proceedings against non-applicants who are not companies and accordingly do not come within the express provisions of the CCAA. In support thereof they cited a CCAA order which was granted staying proceedings against individuals who guaranteed the obligations of a debtor-applicant which was a qualifying company under the terms of the CCAA: see *Re Slavik*, unreported, [1992] B.C.J. No. 341 [now reported at 12 C.B.R. (3d) 157 (B.C. S.C.)]. However in the *Slavik* situation the individual guarantors were officers and shareholders of two companies which had sought and obtained CCAA protection. Vickers J. in that case indicated that the facts of that case included the following unexplained and unamplified fact [at p. 159]:

5. The order provided further that all creditors of Norvik Timber Inc. be enjoined from making demand for payment upon that firm or upon any guarantor of an obligation of the firm until further order of the court.

The CCAA reorganization plan involved an assignment of the claims of the creditors to "Newco" in exchange for cash and shares. However the basis of the stay order originally granted was not set forth in this decision.



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13 It appears to me that Dickson J. in *International Donut Corp. v. 050863 N.D. Ltd.*, unreported, [1992] N.B.J. No. 339 (N.B. Q.B.) [now reported at 127 N.B.R. (2d) 290, 319 A.P.R. 290] was focusing only on the stay arrangements of the CCAA when concerning a limited partnership situation he indicated [at p. 295 N.B.R.]:

In August 1991 the limited partnership, through its general partner the plaintiff, applied to the Court under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C., c. C-36 for an order delaying the assertion of claims by creditors until an opportunity could be gained to work out with the numerous and sizable creditors a compromise of their claims. An order was obtained but it in due course expired without success having been achieved in arranging with creditors a compromise. *That effort may have been wasted, because it seems questionable that the federal Act could have any application to a limited partnership in circumstances such as these.* (Emphasis added.)

14 I am not persuaded that the words of s. 11 which are quite specific as relating as to a *company* can be enlarged to encompass something other than that. However it appears to me that Blair J. was clearly in the right channel in his analysis in *Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd.* unreported, [1992] O.J. No. 1946 [now reported at 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. Gen. Div.)] at pp. 4-7 [at pp. 308-310 C.B.R.].

### **The Power to Stay**

The court has always had an inherent jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings whenever it is just and convenient to do so, in order to control its process or prevent an abuse of that process: see *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Co.* (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 287 (Ont. H.C.), and cases referred to therein. In the civil context, this general power is also embodied in the very broad terms of s. 106 of the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, which provides as follows:

106. A court, on its own initiative or on motion by any person, whether or not a party, may stay any proceeding in the court on such terms as are considered just.

Recently, Mr. Justice O'Connell has observed that this discretionary power is "highly dependent on the facts of each particular case": *Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim* (unreported) [(June 25, 1992), Doc. 24127/88 (Ont. Gen. Div.)], [1992] O.J. No. 1330.

Apart from this inherent and general jurisdiction to stay proceedings, there are many instances where the court is specifically granted the power to stay in a particular context, by virtue of statute or under the *Rules of Civil Procedure*. The authority to prevent multiplicity of proceedings in the same court, under r. 6.01(1), is an example of the latter. The power to stay judicial and extra-judicial proceedings under s. 11 of the C.C.A.A., is an example of the former. Section 11 of the C.C.A.A. provides as follows.

### **The Power to Stay in the Context of C.C.A.A. Proceedings**

By its formal title the C.C.A.A. is known as "An Act to facilitate compromises and arrangements between

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companies and their creditors". To ensure the effective nature of such a "facilitative" process it is essential that the debtor company be afforded a respite from the litigious and other rights being exercised by creditors, while it attempts to carry on as a going concern and to negotiate an acceptable corporate restructuring arrangement with such creditors.

In this respect it has been observed that the C.C.A.A. is "to be used as a practical and effective way of restructuring corporate indebtedness.": see the case comment following the report of *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleum Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361, 92 A.R. 81 (Q.B.), and the approval of that remark as "a perceptive observation about the attitude of the courts" by Gibbs J.A. in *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.) at p. 113 [B.C.L.R.].

Gibbs J.A. continued with this comment:

To the extent that a general principle can be extracted from the few cases directly on point, and the others in which there is persuasive obiter, it would appear to be that the courts have concluded that under s. 11 there is *a discretionary power to restrain judicial or extra-judicial conduct against the debtor company the effect of which is, or would be, seriously to impair the ability of the debtor company to continue in business during the compromise or arrangement negotiating period.*

(emphasis added)

I agree with those sentiments and would simply add that, in my view, the restraining power extends as well to conduct which could seriously impair the debtor's ability to focus and concentrate its efforts on the business purpose of negotiating the compromise or arrangement. [In this respect, see also *Sairex GmbH v. Prudential Steel Ltd.* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 62 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 77.]

I must have regard to these foregoing factors while I consider, as well, the general principles which have historically governed the court's exercise of its power to stay proceedings. These principles were reviewed by Mr. Justice Montgomery in *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance*, supra (a "Mississauga Derailment" case), at pp. 65-66 [C.P.C.]. The balance of convenience must weigh significantly in favour of granting the stay, as a party's right to have access to the courts must not be lightly interfered with. The court must be satisfied that a continuance of the proceeding would serve as an injustice to the party seeking the stay, in the sense that it would be oppressive or vexatious or an abuse of the process of the court in some other way. The stay must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff.

It is quite clear from *Empire-Universal Films Limited v. Rank*, [1947] O.R. 775 (H.C.) that McRuer C.J.H.C. considered that *The Judicature Act* [R.S.O. 1937, c. 100] then [and now the CJA] merely confirmed a statutory right that previously had been considered inherent in the jurisdiction of the court with respect to its authority to grant a stay of proceedings. See also *McCordic v. Bosanquet* (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 (H.C.) and *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allen-Dale Mutual Insurance Co.* (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60 (H.C.) at pp. 65-66.

15 Montgomery J. in *Canada Systems*, supra, at pp. 65-66 indicated:

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Goodman J. (as he then was) in *McCordic v. Bosanquet* (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 in granting a stay reviewed the authorities and concluded that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to grant a stay of proceedings may be made whenever it is just and reasonable to do so. "This court has ample jurisdiction to grant a stay whenever it is just and reasonable to do so." (Per Lord Denning M.R. in *Edmeades v. Thames Board Mills Ltd.*, [1969] 2 Q.B. 67 at 71, [1969] 2 All E.R. 127 (C.A.)). Lord Denning's decision in *Edmeades* was approved by Lord Justice Davies in *Lane v. Willis; Lane v. Beach (Executor of Estate of George William Willis)*, [1972] 1 All E.R. 430, (sub nom. *Lane v. Willis; Lane v. Beach*) [1972] 1 W.L.R. 326 (C.A.).

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In *Weight Watchers Int. Inc. v. Weight Watchers of Ont. Ltd.* (1972), 25 D.L.R. (3d) 419, 5 C.P.R. (2d) 122, appeal allowed by consent without costs (sub nom. *Weight Watchers of Ont. Ltd. v. Weight Watchers Inc. Inc.*) 42 D.L.R. (3d) 320n, 10 C.P.R. (2d) 96n (Fed. C.A.), Mr. Justice Heald on an application for stay said at p. 426 [25 D.L.R.]:

The principles which must govern in these matters are clearly stated in the case of *Empire Universal Films Ltd. et al. v. Rank et al.*, [1947] O.R. 775 at p. 779, as follows [quoting *St. Pierre et al. v. South American Stores (Gath & Chaves), Ltd. et al.*, [1936] 1 K.B. 382 at p. 398]:

(1.) A mere balance of convenience is not a sufficient ground for depriving a plaintiff of the advantages of prosecuting his action in an English Court if it is otherwise properly brought. The right of access to the King's Court must not be lightly refused. (2.) In order to justify a stay two conditions must be satisfied, one positive and the other negative: (a) the defendant must satisfy the Court that the continuance of the action would work an injustice because it would be oppressive or vexatious to him or would be an abuse of the process of the Court in some other way; and (b) the stay must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff. On both the burden of proof is on the defendant.

16 Thus it appears to me that the inherent power of this court to grant stays can be used to supplement s. 11 of the CCAA when it is just and reasonable to do so. Is it appropriate to do so in the circumstances? Clearly there is jurisdiction under s. 11 of the CCAA to grant a stay in respect of any of the applicants which are all companies which fit the criteria of the CCAA. However the stay requested also involved the limited partnerships to some degree either (i) with respect to the applicants acting on behalf of the Limited Partnerships or (ii) the stays being effective vis-à-vis any proceedings taken by any party against the property assets and undertaking of the Limited Partnerships in respect of which they hold a direct interest (collectively the "Property") as set out in the terms of the stay provisions of the order paragraphs 4 through 18 inclusive attached as an appendix to these reasons. [Appendix omitted.] I believe that an analysis of the operations of a limited partnership in this context would be beneficial to an understanding of how there is a close inter-relationship to the applicants involved in this CCAA proceedings and how the Limited Partnerships and their Property are an integral part of the operations previously conducted and the proposed restructuring.

17 A limited partnership is a creation of statute, consisting of one or more general partners and one or more limited partners. The limited partnership is an investment vehicle for passive investment by limited partners. It in essence

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combines the flow through concept of tax depreciation or credits available to "ordinary" partners under general partnership law with limited liability available to shareholders under corporate law. See Ontario LPA sections 2(2) and 3(1) and Lyle R. Hepburn, *Limited Partnerships*, (Toronto: De Boo, 1991), at p. 1-2 and p. 1-12. I would note here that the limited partnership provisions of the Alberta PA are roughly equivalent to those found in the Ontario LPA with the interesting side aspect that the Alberta legislation in s. 75 does allow for judgment against a limited partner to be charged against the limited partner's interest in the limited partnership. A general partner has all the rights and powers and is subject to all the restrictions and liabilities of a partner in a partnership. In particular a general partner is fully liable to each creditor of the business of the limited partnership. The general partner has sole control over the property and business of the limited partnership: see Ontario LPA ss. 8 and 13. Limited partners have no liability to the creditors of the limited partnership's business; the limited partners' financial exposure is limited to their contribution. The limited partners do not have any "independent" ownership rights in the property of the limited partnership. The entitlement of the limited partners is limited to their contribution plus any profits thereon, after satisfaction of claims of the creditors. See Ontario LPA sections 9, 11, 12(1), 13, 15(2) and 24. The process of debtor and creditor relationships associated with the limited partnership's business are between the general partner and the creditors of the business. In the event of the creditors collecting on debt and enforcing security, the creditors can only look to the assets of the limited partnership together with the assets of the general partner including the general partner's interest in the limited partnership. This relationship is recognized under the *Bankruptcy Act* (now the BIA) sections 85 and 142.

18 A general partner is responsible to defend proceedings against the limited partnership in the firm name, so in procedural law and in practical effect, a proceeding against a limited partnership is a proceeding against the general partner. See Ontario *Rules of Civil Procedure*, O. Reg. 560/84, Rules 8.01 and 8.02.

19 It appears that the preponderance of case law supports the contention that a partnership including a limited partnership is not a separate legal entity. See *Lindley on Partnership*, 15th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984), at pp. 33-35; *Seven Mile Dam Contractors v. R.* (1979), 13 B.C.L.R. 137 (S.C.), affirmed (1980), 25 B.C.L.R. 183 (C.A.) and "Extra-Provincial Liability of the Limited Partner", Brad A. Milne, (1985) 23 Alta. L. Rev. 345, at pp. 350-351. Milne in that article made the following observations:

The preponderance of case law therefore supports the contention that a limited partnership is not a separate legal entity. It appears, nevertheless, that the distinction made in *Re Thorne* between partnerships and trade unions could not be applied to limited partnerships which, like trade unions, must rely on statute for their validity. The mere fact that limited partnerships owe their existence to the statutory provision is probably not sufficient to endow the limited partnership with the attribute of legal personality as suggested in *Ruzicks* unless it appeared that the Legislature clearly intended that the limited partnership should have a separate legal existence. A review of the various provincial statutes does not reveal any procedural advantages, rights or powers that are fundamentally different from those advantages enjoyed by ordinary partnerships. The legislation does not contain any provision resembling section 15 of the *Canada Business Corporation Act* [S.C. 1974-75, c. 33, as am.] which expressly states that a corporation has the capacity, both in and outside of Canada, of a natural person. It is therefore difficult to imagine that the Legislature intended to create a new category of legal entity.

20 It appears to me that the operations of a limited partnership in the ordinary course are that the limited partners take a completely passive role (they must or they will otherwise lose their limited liability protection which would

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have been their sole reason for choosing a limited partnership vehicle as opposed to an "ordinary" partnership vehicle). For a lively discussion of the question of "control" in a limited partnership as contrasted with shareholders in a corporation, see R. Flannigan, "The Control Test of Investor Liability in Limited Partnerships" (1983) 21 Alta. L. Rev. 303; E. Apps, "Limited Partnerships and the 'Control' Prohibition: Assessing the Liability of Limited Partners" (1991) 70 Can. Bar Rev. 611; R. Flannigan, "Limited Partner Liability: A Response" (1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev. 552. The limited partners leave the running of the business to the general partner and in that respect the care, custody and the maintenance of the property, assets and undertaking of the limited partnership in which the limited partners and the general partner hold an interest. The ownership of this limited partnership property, assets and undertaking is an undivided interest which cannot be segregated for the purpose of legal process. It seems to me that there must be afforded a protection of the whole since the applicants' individual interest therein cannot be segregated without in effect dissolving the partnership arrangement. The limited partners have two courses of action to take if they are dissatisfied with the general partner or the operation of the limited partnership as carried on by the general partner — the limited partners can vote to (a) remove the general partner and replace it with another or (b) dissolve the limited partnership. However Flannigan strongly argues that an unfettered right to remove the general partner would attach general liability for the limited partners (and especially as to the question of continued enjoyment of favourable tax deductions) so that it is prudent to provide this as a conditional right: *Control Test*, (1992), supra, at pp. 524-525. Since the applicants are being afforded the protection of a stay of proceedings in respect to allowing them time to advance a reorganization plan and complete it if the plan finds favour, there should be a stay of proceedings (vis-à-vis any action which the limited partners may wish to take as to replacement or dissolution) through the period of allowing the limited partners to vote on the reorganization plan itself.

21 It seems to me that using the inherent jurisdiction of this court to supplement the statutory stay provisions of s. 11 of the CCAA would be appropriate in the circumstances; it would be just and reasonable to do so. The business operations of the applicants are so intertwined with the limited partnerships that it would be impossible for relief as to a stay to be granted to the applicants which would affect their business without at the same time extending that stay to the undivided interests of the limited partners in such. It also appears that the applicants are well on their way to presenting a reorganization plan for consideration and a vote; this is scheduled to happen within the month so there would not appear to be any significant time inconvenience to any person interested in pursuing proceedings. While it is true that the provisions of the CCAA allow for a cramdown of a creditor's claim (as well as an interest of any other person), those who wish to be able to initiate or continue proceedings against the applicants may utilize the comeback clause in the order to persuade the court that it would not be just and reasonable to maintain that particular stay. It seems to me that in such a comeback motion the onus would be upon the applicants to show that in the circumstances it was appropriate to continue the stay.

22 The order is therefore granted as to the relief requested including the proposed stay provisions.

*Application allowed.*

FN\* As amended by the court.

END OF DOCUMENT

1993 CarswellOnt 183, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 37 A.C.W.S. (3d) 847

**TAB 9**

**In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act,  
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended and in the Matter of a  
Proposed Plan of Compromise or Arrangement with respect to  
Stelco Inc., and other Applicants listed in Schedule "A"  
Application under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act,  
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as amended**

[Indexed as: Stelco Inc. (Re )]

[\* Editor's note: Schedule "A" was not attached to  
the copy received from the Court and therefore is not  
included in the judgment.]

75 O.R. (3d) 5

[2005] O.J. No. 1171

Docket: M32289

Court of Appeal for Ontario,

**Goudge, Feldman and Blair JJ.A.**

March 31, 2005

*Corporations -- Directors -- Removal of directors -- Jurisdiction of court to remove directors -- Restructuring supervised by court under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Supervising judge erring in removing directors based on apprehension that directors would not act in best interests of corporation -- In context of restructuring, court not having inherent jurisdiction to remove directors -- Removal of directors governed by normal principles of corporate law and not by court's authority under s. 11 of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to supervise restructuring -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11.*

*Debtor and creditor -- Arrangements -- Removal of directors -- Jurisdiction of court to remove directors -- Restructuring supervised by court under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Supervising judge erring in removing directors based on apprehension that directors would not act in best interests of corporation - In context of restructuring, court not having inherent jurisdiction to remove directors -- Removal of directors governed by normal principles of corporate law and not by court's authority under s. 11 of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to supervise*



*restructuring -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11.*

On January 29, 2004, Stelco Inc. ("Stelco") obtained protection from creditors under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA"). Subsequently, while a restructuring under the CCAA was under way, Clearwater Capital Management Inc. ("Clearwater") and Equilibrium Capital Management Inc. ("Equilibrium") acquired a 20 per cent holding in the outstanding publicly traded common shares of Stelco. Michael Woolcombe and Roland Keiper, who were associated with Clearwater and Equilibrium, asked to be appointed to the Stelco board of directors, which had been depleted as a result of resignations. Their request was supported by other shareholders who, together with Clearwater and Equilibrium, represented about 40 per cent of the common shareholders. On February 18, 2005, the Board acceded to the request and Woolcombe and Keiper were appointed to the Board. On the same day as their appointments, the board of directors began consideration of competing bids that had been received as a result of a court-approved capital raising process that had become the focus of the CCAA restructuring.

The appointment of Woolcombe and Keiper to the Board incensed the employees of Stelco. They applied to the court to have the appointments set aside. The employees argued that there was a reasonable apprehension that Woolcombe [page6] and Keiper would not be able to act in the best interests of Stelco as opposed to their own best interests as shareholders. Purporting to rely on the court's inherent jurisdiction and the discretion provided by the CCAA, on February 25, 2005, Farley J. ordered Woolcombe and Keiper removed from the Board.

Woolcombe and Keiper applied for leave to appeal the order of Farley J. and if leave be granted, that the order be set aside on the grounds that (a) Farley J. did not have the jurisdiction to make the order under the provisions of the CCAA, (b) even if he did have jurisdiction, the reasonable apprehension of bias test had no application to the removal of directors, (c) he had erred in interfering with the exercise by the Board of its business judgment in filling the vacancies on the Board, and (d) in any event, the facts did not meet any test that would justify the removal of directors by a court.

Held, leave to appeal should be granted, and the appeal should be allowed.

The appeal involved the scope of a judge's discretion under s. 11 of the CCAA, in the context of corporate governance decisions made during the course of the plan negotiating and approval process of the CCAA. In particular, it involved the court's power, if any, to make an order removing directors under s. 11 of the CCAA. The order to remove directors could not be founded on inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction is a power derived from the very nature of the court as a superior court of law, and it permits the court to maintain its authority and to prevent its process from being obstructed and abused. However, inherent jurisdiction does not operate where Parliament or the legislature has acted and, in the CCAA context, the discretion given by s. 11 to stay proceedings against the debtor corporation and the discretion given by s. 6 to approve a plan which appears to be reasonable and fair supplanted the need to resort to inherent jurisdiction. A judge is general ly

exercising the court's statutory discretion under s. 11 of the Act when supervising a CCAA proceeding. The order in this case could not be founded on inherent jurisdiction because it was designed to supervise the company's process, not the court's process.

The issue then was the nature of the court's power under s. 11 of the CCAA. The s. 11 discretion is not open-ended and unfettered. Its exercise was guided by the scheme and object of the Act and by the legal principles that govern corporate law issues. What the court does under s. 11 is establish the boundaries of the playing field and act as a referee in the process. The company's role in the restructuring, and that of its stakeholders, is to work out a plan or compromise that a sufficient percentage of creditors will accept and the court will approve and sanction. In the course of acting as referee, the court has authority to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors. The court is not entitled to usurp the role of the directors and management in conducting what are in substance the company's restructuring efforts. The corporate activities that take place in the course of the workout are governed by the legislation and legal principles that normally apply to such activities. The court is not catapulted into the shoes of the board of directors or into the seat of the chair of the board when acting in its supervisory role in the restructuring.

The matters relating to the removal of directors did not fall within the court's discretion under s. 11. The fact that s. 11 did not itself provide the authority for a CCAA judge to order the removal of directors, however, did not mean that the supervising judge was powerless to make such an order. Section 20 of the CCAA offered a gateway to the oppression remedy and other provisions of the Canada [page7] Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 ("CBCA") and similar provincial statutes. The powers of a judge under s. 11 of the CCAA may be applied together with the provisions of the CBCA, including the oppression remedy provisions of that statute.

Court removal of directors is an exceptional remedy and one that is rarely exercised in corporate law. In determining whether directors have fallen foul of their obligations, more than some risk of anticipated misconduct is required before the court can impose the extraordinary remedy of removing a director from his or her duly elected or appointed office. The evidence in this case was far from reaching the standard for removal, and the record would not support a finding of oppression, even if one had been sought. The record did not support a finding that there was a sufficient risk of misconduct to warrant a conclusion of oppression. Further, Farley J.'s borrowing the administrative law notion of apprehension of bias was foreign to the principles that govern the election, appointment and removal of directors and to corporate governance considerations in general. There was nothing in the CBCA or other corporate legislation that envisaged the screening of directors in advance for their ability to act neutrally, in the best interests of the corporation, as a prerequisite for appointment. The issue to be determined was not whether there was a connection between a director and other shareholders or stakeholders, but rather whether there was some conduct on the part of the director that would justify the imposition of a corrective sanction. An apprehension of bias approach did not fit this sort of analysis.

For these reasons, Farley J. erred in declaring the appointment of Woolcombe and Keiper as directors of Stelco of no force and effect, and the appeal should be allowed.

#### Cases referred to

Alberta Pacific Terminals Ltd. (Re), [1991] B.C.J. No. 1065, 8 C.B.R. (3d) 99 (S.C.); Algoma Steel Inc. (Re), [2001] O.J. No. 1943, 147 O.A.C. 291, 25 C.B.R. (4th) 194 (C.A.); Algoma Steel Inc. v. Union Gas Ltd. (2003), 63 O.R. (3d) 78, [2003] O.J. No. 71, 39 C.B.R. (4th) 5 (C.A.), revg in part [2001] O.J. No. 5046, 30 C.B.R. (4th) 163 (S.C.J.); Babcock & Wilcox Canada Ltd. (Re) [2000] O.J. No. 786, 18 C.B.R. (4th) 157, 5 B.L.R. (3d) 75 (S.C.J.); Baxter Student Housing Ltd. v. College Housing Co-operative Ltd., [1976] 2 S.C.R. 475, 57 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 5 N.R. 515, [1976] 1 W.W.R. 1, 20 C.B.R. (N.S.) 240; Blair v. Consolidated Enfield Corp., [1995] 4 S.C.R. 5, [1995] S.C.J. No. 29, 25 O.R. (3d) 480n, 128 D.L.R. (4th) 73, 187 N.R. 241, 24 B.L.R. (2d) 161; Brant Investments Ltd. v. KeepRite Inc. (1991), 3 O.R. (3d) 289, [1991] O.J. No. 683, 45 O.A.C. 320, 80 D.L.R. (4th) 161, 1 B.L.R. (2d) 225 (C.A.); Catalyst Fund General Partner I Inc. v. Hollinger Inc., [2004] O.J. No. 4722, 1 B.L.R. (4th) 186 (S.C.J.); Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hongkong Bank of Canada, [1990] B.C.J. No. 2384, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136, 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (C.A.); Clear Creek Contracting Ltd. v. Skeena Cellulose Inc. [2003] B.C.J. No. 1335, 43 C.B.R. (4th) 187, 2003 BCCA 344, 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 236 (C.A.); Country Style Foods Services Inc. (Re), [2002] O.J. No. 1377, 158 O.A.C. 30 (C.A.); Dylex Ltd. (Re), [1995] O.J. No. 595, 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Gen. Div.); Ivaco Inc. (Re), [2004] O.J. No. 2483, 3 C.B.R. (5th) 33 (S.C.J.); Lehndorff General Partner Ltd. (Re), [1993] O.J. No. 14, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Gen. Div.); London Finance Corp. Ltd. v. Banking Service Corp. Ltd., [1922] O.J. No. 378, 23 O.W.N. 138 (H.C.); Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Re) (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 500, [1993] O.J. No. 545, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Gen. Div.) (sub nom. Olympia & York Dev. v. Royal Trust Co.); Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, [2004] S.C.J. No. 64, 244 D.L.R. (4th) 564, 2004 SCC 68, 49 B.L.R. (3d) 165, 4 C.B.R. (5th) 215; R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, [2001] [page8] S.C.J. No. 3, 88 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1, 194 D.L.R. (4th) 1, [2001] 6 W.W.R. 1, 86 C.R.R. (2d) 1, 150 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 39 C.R. (5th) 72, [2001] SCC 2; Richtree Inc. (Re) (2005), 74 O.R. (3d) 174, [2005] O.J. No. 251, 7 C.B.R. (5th) 294 (S.C.J.); Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, [1998] S.C.J. No. 2, 36 O.R. (3d) 418n, 154 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 221 N.R. 241, 50 C.B.R. (3d) 163, 33 C.C.E.L. (2d) 173, 98 CLLC 210-006 (sub nom. Ontario Ministry of Labour v. Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., Adrien v. Ontario Ministry of Labour); Royal Oak Mines Inc. (Re), [1999] O.J. No. 864, 7 C.B.R. (4th) 293, 96 O.T.C. 279 (Gen. Div.); Sammi Atlas Inc. (Re), [1998] O.J. No. 1089, 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Gen. Div.); Stephenson v. Vokes (1896), 27 O.R. 691, [1896] O.J. No. 191 (H.C.J.); Westar Mining Ltd. (Re), [1992] B.C.J. No. 1360, 14 C.B.R. (3d) 88, 70 B.C.L.R. (2d) 6, [1992] 6 W.W.R. 331 (S.C.)

#### Statutes referred to

Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, ss. 2 [as am.], 102 [as am.], 106(3) [as

am], 109(1) [as am.], 111 [as am.], 122(1) [as am.], 145 [as am.], 241 [as am.]

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, ss. 11 [as am.], 20 [as am.]

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APPLICATION for leave to appeal and, if leave is granted, an appeal from the order of Farley J., reported at [2005] O.J. No. 729, 7 C.B.R. (5th) 307 (S.C.J.), removing two directors from the board of directors of Stelco Inc.

Jeffrey S. Leon and Richard B. Swan, for appellants Michael Woollcombe and Roland Keiper.

Kenneth T. Rosenberg and Robert A. Centa, for respondent United Steelworkers of America.

Murray Gold and Andrew J. Hatnay, for respondent Retired Salaried Beneficiaries of Stelco Inc., CHT Steel Company Inc., Stelpipe Ltd., Stelwire Ltd. And Welland Pipe Ltd.

Michael C.P. McCreary and Carrie L. Clynick, for USWA Locals 5328 and 8782.

John R. Varley, for Active Salaried Employee Representative.

Michael Barrack, for Stelco Inc.

Peter Griffin, for Board of Directors of Stelco Inc.

K. Mahar, for Monitor.

David R. Byers, for CIT Business Credit, Agent for DIP Lender. [page9]

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The judgment of the court was delivered by

**BLAIR J.A.:** --

Part I -- Introduction

[1] Stelco Inc. and four of its wholly-owned subsidiaries obtained protection from their creditors under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (the "CCAA")<sup>1</sup> at the end of the document] on January 29, 2004. Since that time, the Stelco Group has been engaged in a high profile, and sometimes controversial, process of economic restructuring. Since October 2004, the restructuring has revolved around a court-approved capital raising process which, by February 2005, had generated a number of competitive bids for the Stelco Group.

[2] Farley J., an experienced judge of the Superior Court Commercial List in Toronto, has been supervising the CCAA process from the outset.

[3] The appellants, Michael Woolcombe and Roland Keiper, are associated with two companies -- Clearwater Capital Management Inc. and Equilibrium Capital Management Inc. -- which, respectively, hold approximately 20 per cent of the outstanding publicly traded common shares of Stelco. Most of these shares have been acquired while the CCAA process has been ongoing, and Messrs. Woolcombe and Keiper have made it clear publicly that they believe there is good shareholder value in Stelco in spite of the restructuring. The reason they are able to take this position is that there has been a solid turn around in worldwide steel markets, as a result of which Stelco, although remaining in insolvency protection, is earning annual operating profits.

[4] The Stelco board of directors (the "Board") has been depleted as a result of resignations, and in January of this year Messrs. Woolcombe and Keiper expressed an interest in being appointed to the Board. They were supported in this request by other shareholders who, together with Clearwater and Equilibrium, represent about 40 per cent of the Stelco common shareholders. On February 18, 2005, the Board appointed the appellants directors. In announcing the appointments publicly, Stelco said in a press release:

After careful consideration, and given potential recoveries at the end of the company's restructuring process, the Board responded favourably to the requests by making the appointments announced today.

Richard Drouin, Chairman of Stelco's Board of Directors, said: "I'm pleased to welcome Roland Keiper and Michael Woolcombe to the Board. Their [page10] experience and their perspective will assist the Board as it strives to serve the best interests of all our stakeholders. We look forward to their positive contribution."

[5] On the same day, the Board began its consideration of the various competing bids that had

been received through the capital raising process.

[6] The appointments of the appellants to the Board incensed the employee stakeholders of Stelco (the "Employees"), represented by the respondent Retired Salaried Beneficiaries of Stelco and the respondent United Steelworkers of America ("USWA"). Outstanding pension liabilities to current and retired employees are said to be Stelco's largest long-term liability -- exceeding several billion dollars. The Employees perceive they do not have the same, or very much, economic leverage in what has sometimes been referred to as "the bare knuckled arena" of the restructuring process. At the same time, they are amongst the most financially vulnerable stakeholders in the piece. They see the appointments of Messrs. Woolcombe and Keiper to the Board as a threat to their well being in the restructuring process because the appointments provide the appellants, and the shareholders they represent, with direct access to sensitive information relating to the competing bids to which other stakeholders (including themselves) are not privy.

[7] The Employees fear that the participation of the two major shareholder representatives will tilt the bid process in favour of maximizing shareholder value at the expense of bids that might be more favourable to the interests of the Employees. They sought and obtained an order from Farley J. removing Messrs. Woolcombe and Keiper from their short-lived position of directors, essentially on the basis of that apprehension.

[8] The Employees argue that there is a reasonable apprehension the appellants would not be able to act in the best interests of the corporation -- as opposed to their own best interests as shareholders -- in considering the bids. They say this is so because of prior public statements by the appellants about enhancing shareholder value in Stelco, because of the appellants' linkage to such a large shareholder group, because of their earlier failed bid in the restructuring, and because of their opposition to a capital proposal made in the proceeding by Deutsche Bank (known as the "Stalking Horse Bid"). They submit further that the appointments have poisoned the atmosphere of the restructuring process, and that the Board made the appointments under threat of facing a potential shareholders' meeting where the members of the Board would be replaced en masse. [page 11]

[9] On the other hand, Messrs. Woolcombe and Keiper seek to set aside the order of Farley J. on the grounds that (a) he did not have the jurisdiction to make the order under the provisions of the CCAA, (b) even if he did have jurisdiction, the reasonable apprehension of bias test applied by the motion judge has no application to the removal of directors, (c) the motion judge erred in interfering with the exercise by the Board of its business judgment in filling the vacancies on the Board, and (d) the facts do not meet any test that would justify the removal of directors by a court in any event.

[10] For the reasons that follow, I would grant leave to appeal, allow the appeal and order the reinstatement of the applicants to the Board.

## Part II -- Additional Facts

[11] Before the initial CCAA order on January 29, 2004, the shareholders of Stelco had last met

at their annual general meeting on April 29, 2003. At that meeting they elected 11 directors to the Board. By the date of the initial order, three of those directors had resigned, and on November 30, 2004, a fourth did as well, leaving the company with only seven directors.

[12] Stelco's articles provide for the Board to be made up of a minimum of ten and a maximum of 20 directors. Consequently, after the last resignation, the company's corporate governance committee began to take steps to search for new directors. They had not succeeded in finding any prior to the approach by the appellants in January 2005.

[13] Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper had been accumulating shares in Stelco and had been participating in the CCAA proceedings for some time before their request to be appointed to the Board, through their companies, Clearwater and Equilibrium. Clearwater and Equilibrium are privately held, Ontario-based investment management firms. Mr. Keiper is the president of Equilibrium and associated with Clearwater. Mr. Woollcombe is a consultant to Clearwater. The motion judge found that they "come as a package".

[14] In October 2004, Stelco sought court approval of its proposed method of raising capital. On October 19, 2004, Farley J. issued what has been referred to as the Initial Capital Process Order. This order set out a process by which Stelco, under the direction of the Board, would solicit bids, discuss the bids with stakeholders, evaluate the bids and report on the bids to the court.

[15] On November 9, 2004, Clearwater and Equilibrium announced they had formed an investor group and had made a [page12] capital proposal to Stelco. The proposal involved the raising of \$125 million through a rights offering. Mr. Keiper stated at the time that he believed "the value of Stelco's equity would have the opportunity to increase substantially if Stelco emerged from CCAA while minimizing dilution of its shareholders." The Clearwater proposal was not accepted.

[16] A few days later, on November 14, 2004, Stelco approved the Stalking Horse Bid. Clearwater and Equilibrium opposed the Deutsche Bank proposal. Mr. Keiper criticized it for not providing sufficient value to existing shareholders. However, on November 29, 2004, Farley J. approved the Stalking Horse Bid and amended the Initial Capital Process Order accordingly. The order set out the various channels of communication between Stelco, the monitor, potential bidders and the stakeholders. It provided that members of the Board were to see the details of the different bids before the Board selected one or more of the offers.

[17] Subsequently, over a period of two and a half months, the shareholding position of Clearwater and Equilibrium increased from approximately five per cent as at November 19, to 14.9 per cent as at January 25, 2005, and finally to approximately 20 per cent on a fully diluted basis as at January 31, 2005. On January 25, Clearwater and Equilibrium announced that they had reached an understanding jointly to pursue efforts to maximize shareholder value at Stelco. A press release stated:

Such efforts will include seeking to ensure that the interests of Stelco's equity holders

are appropriately protected by its board of directors and, ultimately, that Stelco's equity holders have an appropriate say, by vote or otherwise, in determining the future course of Stelco.

[18] On February 1, 2005, Messrs. Keiper and Woollcombe and other representatives of Clearwater and Equilibrium met with Mr. Drouin and other Board members to discuss their views of Stelco and a fair outcome for all stakeholders in the proceedings. Mr. Keiper made a detailed presentation, as Mr. Drouin testified, "encouraging the Board to examine how Stelco might improve its value through enhanced disclosure and other steps". Mr. Keiper expressed confidence that "there was value to the equity of Stelco", and added that he had backed this view up by investing millions of dollars of his own money in Stelco shares. At that meeting, Clearwater and Equilibrium requested that Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper be added to the Board and to Stelco's restructuring committee. In this respect, they were supported by other shareholders holding about another 20 per cent of the company's common shares. [page13]

[19] At paras. 17 and 18 of his affidavit, Mr. Drouin, summarized his appraisal of the situation:

17. It was my assessment that each of Mr. Keiper and Mr. Woollcombe had personal qualities which would allow them to make a significant contribution to the Board in terms of their backgrounds and their knowledge of the steel industry generally and Stelco in particular. In addition I was aware that their appointment to the Board was supported by approximately 40 per cent of the shareholders. In the event that these shareholders successfully requisitioned a shareholders meeting they were in a position to determine the composition of the entire Board.
18. I considered it essential that there be continuity of the Board through the CCAA process. I formed the view that the combination of existing Board members and these additional members would provide Stelco with the most appropriate board composition in the circumstances. The other members of the Board also shared my views.

[20] In order to ensure that the appellants understood their duties as potential Board members and, particularly that "they would no longer be able to consider only the interests of shareholders alone but would have fiduciary responsibilities as a Board member to the corporation as a whole", Mr. Drouin and others held several further meetings with Mr. Woollcombe and Mr. Keiper. These discussions "included areas of independence, standards, fiduciary duties, the role of the Board Restructuring Committee and confidentiality matters". Mr. Woollcombe and Mr. Keiper gave their assurances that they fully understood the nature and extent of their prospective duties, and would abide by them. In addition, they agreed and confirmed that:

- (a) Mr. Woollcombe would no longer be an advisor to Clearwater and Equilibrium with respect to Stelco;
- (b) Clearwater and Equilibrium would no longer be represented by counsel in the CCAA proceedings; and



- (c) Clearwater and Equilibrium then had no involvement in, and would have no future involvement, in any bid for Stelco.

[21] On the basis of the foregoing -- and satisfied "that Messrs. Keiper and Woollcombe would make a positive contribution to the various issues before the Board both in [the] restructuring and the ongoing operation of the business" -- the Board made the appointments on February 18, 2005.

[22] Seven days later, the motion judge found it "appropriate, just, necessary and reasonable to declare" those appointments "to be of no force and effect" and to remove Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper from the Board. He did so not on the basis of any actual conduct on the part of the appellants as directors of Stelco but [page14] because there was some risk of anticipated conduct in the future. The gist of the motion judge's rationale is found in the following passage from his reasons (at para. 23):

In these particular circumstances and aside from the Board feeling coerced into the appointments for the sake of continuing stability, I am not of the view that it would be appropriate to wait and see if there was any explicit action on behalf of K and W while conducting themselves as Board members which would demonstrate that they had not lived up to their obligations to be "neutral". They may well conduct themselves beyond reproach. But if they did not, the fallout would be very detrimental to Stelco and its ability to successfully emerge. What would happen to the bids in such a dogfight? I fear that it would be trying to put Humpty Dumpty back together again. The same situation would prevail even if K and W conducted themselves beyond reproach but with the Board continuing to be concerned that they not do anything seemingly offensive to the bloc. The risk to the process and to Stelco in its emergence is simply too great to risk the wait and see approach.

### Part III -- Leave to Appeal

[23] Because of the "real time" dynamic of this restructuring project, Laskin J.A. granted an order on March 4, 2005, expediting the appellants' motion for leave to appeal, directing that it be heard orally and, if leave be granted, directing that the appeal be heard at the same time. The leave motion and the appeal were argued together, by order of the panel, on March 18, 2005.

[24] This court has said that it will only sparingly grant leave to appeal in the context of a CCAA proceeding and will only do so where there are "serious and arguable grounds that are of real and significant interest to the parties": *Country Style Food Services Inc. (Re)*, [2002] O.J. No. 1377, 158 O.A.C. 30 (C.A.), at para. 15. This criterion is determined in accordance with a four-pronged test, namely,

- (a) whether the point on appeal is of significance to the practice;
- (b) whether the point is of significance to the action;
- (c) whether the appeal is prima facie meritorious or frivolous;

(d) whether the appeal will unduly hinder the progress of the action.

[25] Counsel agree that (d) above is not relevant to this proceeding, given the expedited nature of the hearing. In my view, the tests set out in (a) - (c) are met in the circumstances, and as such, leave should be granted. The issue of the court's jurisdiction to intervene in corporate governance issues during a CCAA restructuring, and the scope of its discretion in doing so, are questions of considerable importance to the practice and on [page15] which there is little appellate jurisprudence. While Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper are pursuing their remedies in their own right, and the company and its directors did not take an active role in the proceedings in this court, the Board and the company did stand by their decision to appoint the new directors at the hearing before the motion judge and in this court, and the question of who is to be involved in the Board's decision-making process continues to be of importance to the CCAA proceedings. From the reasons that follow it will be evident that in my view the appeal has merit.

[26] Leave to appeal is therefore granted.

#### Part IV -- The Appeal

##### The Positions of the Parties

[27] The appellants submit that,

- (a) in exercising its discretion under the CCAA, the court is not exercising its "inherent jurisdiction" as a superior court;
- (b) there is no jurisdiction under the CCAA to remove duly elected or appointed directors, notwithstanding the broad discretion provided by s. 11 of that Act; and that,
- (c) even if there is jurisdiction, the motion judge erred:
  - (i) by relying upon the administrative law test for reasonable apprehension of bias in determining that the directors should be removed;
  - (ii) by rejecting the application of the "business judgment" rule to the unanimous decision of the Board to appoint two new directors; and,
  - (iii) by concluding that Clearwater and Equilibrium, the shareholders with whom the appellants are associated, were focussed solely on a short-term investment horizon, without any evidence to that effect, and therefore concluding that there was a tangible risk that the appellants would not be neutral and act in the best interests of Stelco and all stakeholders in carrying out their duties as directors.

[28] The respondents' arguments are rooted in fairness and process. They say, first, that the appointment of the appellants as directors has poisoned the atmosphere of the CCAA proceedings

and, second, that it threatens to undermine the even-handedness and integrity of the capital raising process, thus jeopardizing the [page16] ability of the court at the end of the day to approve any compromise or arrangement emerging from that process. The respondents contend that Farley J. had jurisdiction to ensure the integrity of the CCAA process, including the capital raising process Stelco had asked him to approve, and that this court should not interfere with his decision that it was necessary to remove Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper from the Board in order to ensure the integrity of that process. A judge exercising a supervisory function during a CCAA proceeding is owed considerable deference: *Re Algoma Steel Inc.*, [2001] O.J. No. 1943, 25 C.B.R. (4th) 194 (C.A.), at para. 8.

[29] The crux of the respondents' concern is well-articulated in the following excerpt from para. 72 of the factum of the Retired Salaried Beneficiaries:

The appointments of Keiper and Woollcombe violated every tenet of fairness in the restructuring process that is supposed to lead to a plan of arrangement. One stakeholder group -- particular investment funds that have acquired Stelco shares during the CCAA itself -- have been provided with privileged access to the capital raising process, and voting seats on the Corporation's Board of Directors and Restructuring Committee. No other stakeholder has been treated in remotely the same way. To the contrary, the salaried retirees have been completely excluded from the capital raising process and have no say whatsoever in the Corporation's decision-making process.

[30] The respondents submit that fairness, and the perception of fairness, underpin the CCAA process, and depend upon effective judicial supervision: see *Re Olympia & York Development Ltd.* (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 500, [1993] O.J. No. 545 (Gen. Div.); *Re Ivaco Inc.*, [2004] O.J. No. 2483, 3 C.B.R. (5th) 33 (S.C.J.), at paras. 15-16. The motion judge reasonably decided to remove the appellants as directors in the circumstances, they say, and this court should not interfere.

#### Jurisdiction

[31] The motion judge concluded that he had the power to rescind the appointments of the two directors on the basis of his "inherent jurisdiction" and "the discretion given to the court pursuant to the CCAA". He was not asked to, nor did he attempt to rest his jurisdiction on other statutory powers imported into the CCAA.

[32] The CCAA is remedial legislation and is to be given a liberal interpretation to facilitate its objectives: *Babcock & Wilcox Canada Ltd. (Re)*, [2000] O.J. No. 786, 5 B.L.R. (3d) 75 (S.C.J.), at para. 11. See also, *Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hong Kong Bank of Canada*, [1990] B.C.J. No. 2384, 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (C.A.), at p. 320 C.B.R.; *Re Lehndorff General Partners Ltd.*, [1993] O.J. No. 14, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Gen. Div.). [page17] Courts have adopted this approach in the past to rely on inherent jurisdiction, or alternatively on the broad jurisdiction under s. 11 of the CCAA, as the source of judicial power in a CCAA proceeding to "fill in the gaps" or to "put flesh on the bones" of that Act: see *Re Dylex Ltd.*, [1995] O.J. No. 595, 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Gen. Div. (Commercial

List)), *Royal Oak Mines Inc. (Re)*, [1999] O.J. No. 864, 7 C.B.R. (4th) 293 (Gen. Div. (Commercial List)); and *Westar Mining Ltd. (Re)*, [1992] B.C.J. No. 1360, 70 B.C.L.R. (2d) 6 (S.C.).

[33] It is not necessary, for purposes of this appeal, to determine whether inherent jurisdiction is excluded for all supervisory purposes under the CCAA, by reason of the existence of the statutory discretionary regime provided in that Act. In my opinion, however, the better view is that in carrying out his or her supervisory functions under the legislation, the judge is not exercising inherent jurisdiction but rather the statutory discretion provided by s. 11 of the CCAA and supplemented by other statutory powers that may be imported into the exercise of the s. 11 discretion from other statutes through s. 20 of the CCAA.

### Inherent jurisdiction

[34] Inherent jurisdiction is a power derived "from the very nature of the court as a superior court of law", permitting the court "to maintain its authority and to prevent its process being obstructed and abused". It embodies the authority of the judiciary to control its own process and the lawyers and other officials connected with the court and its process, in order "to uphold, to protect and to fulfill the judicial function of administering justice according to law in a regular, orderly and effective manner". See I.H. Jacob, "The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court" (1970) 23 *Current Legal Problems* 27-28. In *Halsbury's Laws of England*, 4th ed. (London: LexisNexis UK, 1973 -- ), vol. 37, at para. 14, the concept is described as follows:

In sum, it may be said that the inherent jurisdiction of the court is a virile and viable doctrine, and has been defined as being the reserve or fund of powers, a residual source of powers, which the court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, in particular to ensure the observation of the due process of law, to prevent improper vexation or oppression, to do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial between them.

[35] In spite of the expansive nature of this power, inherent jurisdiction does not operate where Parliament or the legislature has acted. As Farley J. noted in *Royal Oak Mines*, *supra*, inherent jurisdiction is "not limitless; if the legislative body has not left a functional gap or vacuum, then inherent jurisdiction should [page18] not be brought into play" (para. 4). See also, *Baxter Student Housing Ltd. v. College Housing Co-operative Ltd.*, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 475, 57 D.L.R. (3d) 1, at p. 480 S.C.R.; *Richtree Inc. (Re)* (2005), 74 O.R. (3d) 174, [2005] O.J. No. 251 (S.C.J.).

[36] In the CCAA context, Parliament has provided a statutory framework to extend protection to a company while it holds its creditors at bay and attempts to negotiate a compromised plan of arrangement that will enable it to emerge and continue as a viable economic entity, thus benefiting society and the company in the long run, along with the company's creditors, shareholders, employees and other stakeholders. The s. 11 discretion is the engine that drives this broad and flexible statutory scheme, and that for the most part supplants the need to resort to inherent jurisdiction. In that regard, I agree with the comment of Newbury J.A. in *Clear Creek Contracting*

Ltd. v. Skeena Cellulose Inc., [2003] B.C.J. No. 1335, 43 C.B.R. (4th) 187 (C.A.), at para. 46, that:

... the court is not exercising a power that arises from its nature as a superior court of law, but is exercising the discretion given to it by the CCAA. ... This is the discretion, given by s. 11, to stay proceedings against the debtor corporation and the discretion, given by s. 6, to approve a plan which appears to be reasonable and fair, to be in accord with the requirements and objects of the statute, and to make possible the continuation of the corporation as a viable entity. It is these considerations the courts have been concerned with in the cases discussed above<sup>2</sup> at the end of the document], rather than the integrity of their own process.

[37] As Jacob observes, in his article "The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court", supra, at p. 25:

The inherent jurisdiction of the court is a concept which must be distinguished from the exercise of judicial discretion. These two concepts resemble each other, particularly in their operation, and they often appear to overlap, and are therefore sometimes confused the one with the other. There is nevertheless a vital juridical distinction between jurisdiction and discretion, which must always be observed.

[38] I do not mean to suggest that inherent jurisdiction can never apply in a CCAA context. The court retains the ability to control its own process, should the need arise. There is a distinction, however -- difficult as it may be to draw -- between the court's process with respect to the restructuring, on the one hand, and the course of action involving the negotiations and corporate actions accompanying them, which are the company's process, on the other hand. The court simply supervises the latter [page 19] process through its ability to stay, restrain or prohibit proceedings against the company during the plan negotiation period "on such terms as it may impose"<sup>3</sup> at the end of the document]. Hence the better view is that a judge is generally exercising the court's statutory discretion under s. 11 of the Act when supervising a CCAA proceeding. The order in this case could not be founded on inherent jurisdiction because it is designed to supervise the company's process, not the court's process.

#### The section 11 discretion

[39] This appeal involves the scope of a supervisory judge's discretion under s. 11 of the CCAA, in the context of corporate governance decisions made during the course of the plan negotiating and approval process and, in particular, whether that discretion extends to the removal of directors in that environment. In my view, the s. 11 discretion -- in spite of its considerable breadth and flexibility -- does not permit the exercise of such a power in and of itself. There may be situations where a judge in a CCAA proceeding would be justified in ordering the removal of directors pursuant to the oppression remedy provisions found in s. 241 of the Canada Business Corporation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 ("CBCA"), and imported into the exercise of the s. 11 discretion through s. 20 of the CCAA. However, this was not argued in the present case, and the facts before the court would not justify the removal of Messrs. Woolcombe and Keiper on oppression remedy grounds.

[40] The pertinent portions of s. 11 of the CCAA provide as follows:

Powers of court

11(1) Notwithstanding anything in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act or the Winding-up Act, where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make an order under this section.

.....

Initial application court orders

(3) A court may, on an initial application in respect of a company, make an order on such terms as it may impose, effective for such period as the court deems necessary not exceeding thirty days.

- (a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (1); [page20]
- (b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and
- (c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.

Other than initial application court orders

(4) A court may, on an application in respect of a company other than an initial application, make an order on such terms as it may impose,

- (a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for such period as the court deems necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (1);
- (b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and
- (c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.

.....

### Burden of proof on application

(6) The court shall not make an order under subsection (3) or (4) unless

- (a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make such an order appropriate; and
- (b) in the case of an order under subsection (4), the applicant also satisfied the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

[41] The rule of statutory interpretation that has now been accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada, in such cases as *R. v. Sharpe*, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, at para. 33, and *Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re)*, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, [1998] S.C.J. No. 2, at para. 21, is articulated in E.A. Driedger, *The Construction of Statutes*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) as follows:

Today, there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

See also Ruth Sullivan, *Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes*, 4th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 2002), at p. 262.

[42] The interpretation of s. 11 advanced above is true to these principles. It is consistent with the purpose and scheme of the CCAA, as articulated in para. 38 above, and with the fact that corporate governance matters are dealt with in other statutes. In addition, it honours the historical reluctance of courts to intervene in such matters, or to second-guess the business decisions [page21 ]made by directors and officers in the course of managing the business and affairs of the corporation.

[43] Mr. Leon and Mr. Swan argue that matters relating to the removal of directors do not fall within the court's discretion under s. 11 because they fall outside of the parameters of the court's role in the restructuring process, in contrast to the company's role in the restructuring process. The court's role is defined by the "on such terms as may be imposed" jurisdiction under subparas. 11(3)(a) -- (c) and 11(4)(a) -- (c) of the CCAA to stay, or restrain, or prohibit proceedings against the company during the "breathing space" period for negotiations and a plan. I agree.

[44] What the court does under s. 11 is to establish the boundaries of the playing field and act as a referee in the process. The company's role in the restructuring, and that of its stakeholders, is to work out a plan or compromise that a sufficient percentage of creditors will accept and the court will approve and sanction. The corporate activities that take place in the course of the workout are

governed by the legislation and legal principles that normally apply to such activities. In the course of acting as referee, the court has great leeway, as Farley J. observed in *Lehndorff*, supra, at para. 5, "to make order[s] so as to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors". But the s. 11 discretion is not open-ended and unfettered. Its exercise must be guided by the scheme and object of the Act and by the legal principles that govern corporate law issues. Moreover, the court is not entitled to usurp the role of the directors and management in conducting what are in substance the company's restructuring efforts.

[45] With these principles in mind, I turn to an analysis of the various factors underlying the interpretation of the s. 11 discretion.

[46] I start with the proposition that at common law directors could not be removed from office during the term for which they were elected or appointed: *London Finance Corp. Ltd. v. Banking Service Corp. Ltd.*, [1922] O.J. No. 378, 23 O.W.N. 138 (H.C.); *Stephenson v. Vokes*, [1896] O.J. No. 191, 27 O.R. 691 (H.C.J.). The authority to remove must therefore be found in statute law.

[47] In Canada, the CBCA and its provincial equivalents govern the election, appointment and removal of directors, as well as providing for their duties and responsibilities. Shareholders elect directors, but the directors may fill vacancies that occur on the board of directors pending a further shareholders meeting: [page22] CBCA, ss. 106(3) and 111<sup>4</sup> at the end of the document]. The specific power to remove directors is vested in the shareholders by s. 109(1) of the CBCA. However, s. 241 empowers the court -- where it finds that oppression as therein defined exists -- to "make any interim or final order it thinks fit", including (s. 241(3)(e)) "an order appointing directors in place of or in addition to all or any of the directors then in office". This power has been utilized to remove directors, but in very rare cases, and only in circumstances where there has been actual conduct rising to the level of misconduct required to trigger oppression remedy relief: see, for example, *Catalyst Fund General Partner I Inc. v. Hollinger Inc.*, [2004] O.J. No. 4722, 1 B.L.R. (4th) 186 (S.C.J.).

[48] There is therefore a statutory scheme under the CBCA (and similar provincial corporate legislation) providing for the election, appointment and removal of directors. Where another applicable statute confers jurisdiction with respect to a matter, a broad and undefined discretion provided in one statute cannot be used to supplant or override the other applicable statute. There is no legislative "gap" to fill. See *Baxter Student Housing Ltd. v. College Housing Cooperative Ltd.*, supra, at p. 480 S.C.R.; *Royal Oak Mines Inc. (Re)*, supra; and *Richtree Inc. (Re)*, supra.

[49] At para. 7 of his reasons, the motion judge said:

The board is charged with the standard duty of "manage[ing], [sic] or supervising the management, of the business and affairs of the corporation": s. 102(1) CBCA.

Ordinarily the Court will not interfere with the composition of the board of directors.



However, if there is good and sufficient valid reason to do so, then the Court must not hesitate to do so to correct a problem. The directors should not be required to constantly look over their shoulders for this would be the sure recipe for board paralysis which would be so detrimental to a restructuring process; thus interested parties should only initiate a motion where it is reasonably obvious that there is a problem, actual or poised to become actual.

(Emphasis added)

[50] Respectfully, I see no authority in s. 11 of the CCAA for the court to interfere with the composition of a board of directors on such a basis.

[51] Court removal of directors is an exceptional remedy, and one that is rarely exercised in corporate law. This reluctance is rooted in the historical unwillingness of courts to interfere with the internal management of corporate affairs and in the court's well-established deference to decisions made by directors and officers in [page23] the exercise of their business judgment when managing the business and affairs of the corporation. These factors also bolster the view that where the CCAA is silent on the issue, the court should not read into the s. 11 discretion an extraordinary power -- which the courts are disinclined to exercise in any event -- except to the extent that that power may be introduced through the application of other legislation, and on the same principles that apply to the application of the provisions of the other legislation.

The oppression remedy gateway

[52] The fact that s. 11 does not itself provide the authority for a CCAA judge to order the removal of directors does not mean that the supervising judge is powerless to make such an order, however. Section 20 of the CCAA offers a gateway to the oppression remedy and other provisions of the CBCA and similar provincial statutes. Section 20 states:

20. The provisions of this Act may be applied together with the provisions of any Act of Parliament or of the legislature of any province that authorizes or makes provision for the sanction of compromises or arrangements between a company and its shareholders or any class of them.

[53] The CBCA is legislation that "makes provision for the sanction of compromises or arrangements between a company and its shareholders or any class of them". Accordingly, the powers of a judge under s. 11 of the CCAA may be applied together with the provisions of the CBCA, including the oppression remedy provisions of that statute. I do not read s. 20 as limiting the application of outside legislation to the provisions of such legislation dealing specifically with the sanctioning of compromises and arrangements between the company and its shareholders. The grammatical structure of s. 20 mandates a broader interpretation and the oppression remedy is, therefore, available to a supervising judge in appropriate circumstances.

[54] I do not accept the respondents' argument that the motion judge had the authority to order the removal of the appellants by virtue of the power contained in s. 145(2)(b) of the CBCA to make an order "declaring the result of the disputed election or appointment" of directors. In my view, s. 145 relates to the procedures underlying disputed elections or appointments, and not to disputes over the composition of the board of directors itself. Here, it is conceded that the appointment of Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper as directors complied with all relevant statutory requirements. Farley J. quite properly did not seek to base his jurisdiction on any such authority. [page24 ]

The level of conduct required

[55] Colin Campbell J. recently invoked the oppression remedy to remove directors, without appointing anyone in their place, in *Catalyst Fund General Partner I Inc. v. Hollinger Inc.*, supra. The bar is high. In reviewing the applicable law, C. Campbell J. said (para. 68):

Director removal is an extraordinary remedy and certainly should be imposed most sparingly. As a starting point, I accept the basic proposition set out in Peterson, "Shareholder Remedies in Canada".<sup>5</sup> at the end of the document]

SS. 18.172 Removing and appointing directors to the board is an extreme form of judicial intervention. The board of directors is elected by the shareholders, vested with the power to manage the corporation, and appoints the officers of the company who undertake to conduct the day-to-day affairs of the corporation. [Footnote omitted.] It is clear that the board of directors has control over policymaking and management of the corporation. By tampering with a board, a court directly affects the management of the corporation. If a reasonable balance between protection of corporate stakeholders and the freedom of management to conduct the affairs of the business in an efficient manner is desired, altering the board of directors should be a measure of last resort. The order could be suitable where the continuing presence of the incumbent directors is harmful to both the company and the interests of corporate stakeholders, and where the appointment of a new director or directors would remedy the oppressive conduct without a receiver or receiver-manager.

(Emphasis added)

[56] C. Campbell J. found that the continued involvement of the Ravelston directors in the Hollinger situation would "significantly impede" the interests of the public shareholders and that those directors were "motivated by putting their interests first, not those of the company" (paras. 82-83). The evidence in this case is far from reaching any such benchmark, however, and the record would not support a finding of oppression, even if one had been sought.

[57] Everyone accepts that there is no evidence the appellants have conducted themselves, as

directors -- in which capacity they participated over two days in the bid consideration exercise -- in anything but a neutral fashion, having regard to the best interests of Stelco and all of the stakeholders. The motion judge acknowledged that the appellants "may well conduct themselves beyond reproach". However, he simply decided there was a risk -- a reasonable apprehension -- that Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper would not live up to their obligations to be neutral in the future. [page25]

[58] The risk or apprehension appears to have been founded essentially on three things: (1) the earlier public statements made by Mr. Keiper about "maximizing shareholder value"; (2) the conduct of Clearwater and Equilibrium in criticizing and opposing the Stalking Horse Bid; and (3) the motion judge's opinion that Clearwater and Equilibrium -- the shareholders represented by the appellants on the Board -- had a "vision" that "usually does not encompass any significant concern for the long-term competitiveness and viability of an emerging corporation", as a result of which the appellants would approach their directors' duties looking to liquidate their shares on the basis of a "short-term hold" rather than with the best interests of Stelco in mind. The motion judge transposed these concerns into anticipated predisposed conduct on the part of the appellants as directors, despite their apparent understanding of their duties as directors and their assurances that they would act in the best interests of Stelco. He therefore concluded that "the risk to the process and to Stelco in its emergence [was] simply too great to risk the wait and see approach".

[59] Directors have obligations under s. 122(1) of the CBCA (a) to act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interest of the corporation (the "statutory fiduciary duty" obligation), and (b) to exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances (the "duty of care" obligation). They are also subject to control under the oppression remedy provisions of s. 241. The general nature of these duties does not change when the company approaches, or finds itself in, insolvency: Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, [2004] S.C.J. No. 64, at paras. 42-49.

[60] In Peoples the Supreme Court noted that "the interests of the corporation are not to be confused with the interests of the creditors or those of any other stakeholders" (para. 43), but also accepted "as an accurate statement of the law that in determining whether [directors] are acting with a view to the best interests of the corporation it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a given case, for the board of directors to consider, inter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment" (para. 42). Importantly as well -- in the context of "the shifting interest and incentives of shareholders and creditors" -- the court stated (para. 47):

In resolving these competing interests, it is incumbent upon the directors to act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation. In using their skills for the benefit of the corporation when it is in troubled waters financially, the directors must be careful to attempt to act in [page26] its best interests by creating a "better" corporation, and not to favour the interests of any one group of stakeholders.

[61] In determining whether directors have fallen foul of those obligations, however, more than some risk of anticipated misconduct is required before the court can impose the extraordinary remedy of removing a director from his or her duly elected or appointed office. Although the motion judge concluded that there was a risk of harm to the Stelco process if Messrs. Woolcombe and Keiper remained as directors, he did not assess the level of that risk. The record does not support a finding that there was a sufficient risk of sufficient misconduct to warrant a conclusion of oppression. The motion judge was not asked to make such a finding, and he did not do so.

[62] The respondents argue that this court should not interfere with the decision of the motion judge on grounds of deference. They point out that the motion judge has been case-managing the restructuring of Stelco under the CCAA for over 14 months and is intimately familiar with the circumstances of Stelco as it seeks to restructure itself and emerge from court protection.

[63] There is no question that the decisions of judges acting in a supervisory role under the CCAA, and particularly those of experienced commercial list judges, are entitled to great deference: see *Algoma Steel Inc. v. Union Gas Ltd.* (2003), 63 O.R. (3d) 78, [2003] O.J. No. 71 (C.A.), at para. 16. The discretion must be exercised judicially and in accordance with the principles governing its operation. Here, respectfully, the motion judge misconstrued his authority, and made an order that he was not empowered to make in the circumstances.

[64] The appellants argued that the motion judge made a number of findings without any evidence to support them. Given my decision with respect to jurisdiction, it is not necessary for me to address that issue.

#### The business judgment rule

[65] The appellants argue as well that the motion judge erred in failing to defer to the unanimous decision of the Stelco directors in deciding to appoint them to the Stelco Board. It is well-established that judges supervising restructuring proceedings -- and courts in general -- will be very hesitant to second-guess the business decisions of directors and management. As the Supreme Court of Canada said in *Peoples*, supra, at para. 67:

Courts are ill-suited and should be reluctant to second-guess the application of business expertise to the considerations that are involved in corporate decision making ...  
[page27]

[66] In *Brant Investments Ltd. v. KeepRite Inc.* (1991), 3 O.R. (3d) 289, [1991] O.J. No. 683 (C.A.), at p. 320 O.R., this court adopted the following statement by the trial judge, Anderson J.:

Business decisions, honestly made, should not be subjected to microscopic examination. There should be no interference simply because a decision is unpopular with the minority.<sup>6</sup> at the end of the document]

[67] McKinlay J.A. then went on to say [at p. 320 O.R.]:

There can be no doubt that on an application under s. 234<sup>7</sup> at the end of the document] the trial judge is required to consider the nature of the impugned acts and the method in which they were carried out. That does not mean that the trial judge should substitute his own business judgment for that of managers, directors, or a committee such as the one involved in assessing this transaction. Indeed, it would generally be impossible for him to do so, regardless of the amount of evidence before him. He is dealing with the matter at a different time and place; it is unlikely that he will have the background knowledge and expertise of the individuals involved; he could have little or no knowledge of the background and skills of the persons who would be carrying out any proposed plan; and it is unlikely that he would have any knowledge of the specialized market in which the corporation operated. In short, he does not know enough to make the business decision required.

[68] Although a judge supervising a CCAA proceeding develops a certain "feel" for the corporate dynamics and a certain sense of direction for the restructuring, this caution is worth keeping in mind. See also *Clear Creek Contracting Ltd. v. Skeena Cellulose Inc.*, supra; *Sammi Atlas Inc. (Re)*, [1998] O.J. No. 1089, 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Gen. Div.); *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Re)*, supra; *Re Alberta Pacific Terminals Ltd.*, [1991] B.C.J. No. 1065, 8 C.B.R. (4th) 99 (S.C.). The court is not catapulted into the shoes of the board of directors, or into the seat of the chair of the board, when acting in its supervisory role in the restructuring.

[69] Here, the motion judge was alive to the "business judgment" dimension in the situation he faced. He distinguished the application of the rule from the circumstances, however, stating at para. 18 of his reasons:

With respect I do not see the present situation as involving the "management of the business and affairs of the corporation", but rather as a quasi-constitutional aspect of the corporation entrusted albeit to the Board pursuant to s. 111(1) of the CBCA. I agree that where a board is actually engaged in the business of a judgment situation, the board should be given appropriate deference. However, to the contrary in this situation, I do not see it as a [page28] situation calling for (as asserted) more deference, but rather considerably less than that. With regard to this decision of the Board having impact upon the capital raising process, as I conclude it would, then similarly deference ought not to be given.

[70] I do not see the distinction between the directors' role in "the management of the business and affairs of the corporation" (CBCA, s. 102) -- which describes the directors' overall responsibilities -- and their role with respect to a "quasi-constitutional aspect of the corporation" (i.e., in filling out the composition of the board of directors in the event of a vacancy). The "affairs"

of the corporation are defined in s. 2 of the CBCA as meaning "the relationships among a corporation, its affiliates and the shareholders, directors and officers of such bodies corporate but does not include the business carried on by such bodies corporate". Corporate governance decisions relate directly to such relationships and are at the heart of the Board's business decision-making role regarding the corporation's business and affairs. The dynamics of such decisions, and the intricate balancing of competing interests and other corporate-related factors that goes into making them, are no more within the purview of the court's knowledge and expertise than other business decisions, and they deserve the same deferential approach. Respectfully, the motion judge erred in declining to give effect to the business judgment rule in the circumstances of this case.

[71] This is not to say that the conduct of the Board in appointing the appellants as directors may never come under review by the supervising judge. The court must ultimately approve and sanction the plan of compromise or arrangement as finally negotiated and accepted by the company and its creditors and stakeholders. The plan must be found to be fair and reasonable before it can be sanctioned. If the Board's decision to appoint the appellants has somehow so tainted the capital raising process that those criteria are not met, any eventual plan that is put forward will fail.

[72] The respondents submit that it makes no sense for the court to have jurisdiction to declare the process flawed only after the process has run its course. Such an approach to the restructuring process would be inefficient and a waste of resources. While there is some merit in this argument, the court cannot grant itself jurisdiction where it does not exist. Moreover, there are a plethora of checks and balances in the negotiating process itself that moderate the risk of the process becoming irretrievably tainted in this fashion -- not the least of which is the restraining effect of the prospect of such a consequence. I do not think that this argument can prevail. In addition, the court at all times retains its broad and [page29] flexible supervisory jurisdiction -- a jurisdiction which feeds the creativity that makes the CCAA work so well -- in order to address fairness and process concerns along the way. This case relates only to the court's exceptional power to order the removal of directors.

#### The reasonable apprehension of bias analogy

[73] In exercising what he saw as his discretion to remove the appellants as directors, the motion judge thought it would be useful to "borrow the concept of reasonable apprehension of bias ... with suitable adjustments for the nature of the decision making involved" (para. 8). He stressed that "there was absolutely no allegation against [Mr. Woollcombe and Mr. Keiper] of any actual bias or its equivalent" (para. 8). He acknowledged that neither was alleged to have done anything wrong since their appointments as directors, and that at the time of their appointments the appellants had confirmed to the Board that they understood and would abide by their duties and responsibilities as directors, including the responsibility to act in the best interests of the corporation and not in their own interests as shareholders. In the end, however, he concluded that because of their prior public statements that they intended to "pursue efforts to maximize shareholder value at Stelco", and because of the nature of their business and the way in which they had been accumulating their

shareholding position during the restructuring, and because of their linkage to 40 per cent of the common shareholders, there was a risk that the appellants would not conduct themselves in a neutral fashion in the best interests of the corporation as directors.

[74] In my view, the administrative law notion of apprehension of bias is foreign to the principles that govern the election, appointment and removal of directors, and to corporate governance considerations in general. Apprehension of bias is a concept that ordinarily applies to those who preside over judicial or quasi-judicial decision-making bodies, such as courts, administrative tribunals or arbitration boards. Its application is inapposite in the business decision-making context of corporate law. There is nothing in the CBCA or other corporate legislation that envisages the screening of directors in advance for their ability to act neutrally, in the best interests of the corporation, as a prerequisite for appointment.

[75] Instead, the conduct of directors is governed by their common law and statutory obligations to act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation, and to exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably [page30 ]prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances (CBCA, s. 122(1)(a) and (b)). The directors also have fiduciary obligations to the corporation, and they are liable to oppression remedy proceedings in appropriate circumstances. These remedies are available to aggrieved complainants -- including the respondents in this case -- but they depend for their applicability on the director having engaged in conduct justifying the imposition of a remedy.

[76] If the respondents are correct, and reasonable apprehension that directors may not act neutrally because they are aligned with a particular group of shareholders or stakeholders is sufficient for removal, all nominee directors in Canadian corporations, and all management directors, would automatically be disqualified from serving. No one suggests this should be the case. Moreover, as Iacobucci J. noted in *Blair v. Consolidated Enfield Corp.*, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 5, [1995] S.C.J. No. 29, at para. 35, "persons are assumed to act in good faith unless proven otherwise". With respect, the motion judge approached the circumstances before him from exactly the opposite direction. It is commonplace in corporate/commercial affairs that there are connections between directors and various stakeholders and that conflicts will exist from time to time. Even where there are conflicts of interest, however, directors are not removed from the board of directors; they are simply obliged to disclose the conflict and, in appropriate cases, to abstain from voting. The issue to be determined is not whether there is a connection between a director and other shareholders or stakeholders, but rather whether there has been some conduct on the part of the director that will justify the imposition of a corrective sanction. An apprehension of bias approach does not fit this sort of analysis.

#### Part V -- Disposition

[77] For the foregoing reasons, then, I am satisfied that the motion judge erred in declaring the appointment of Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper as directors of Stelco of no force and effect.

[78] I would grant leave to appeal, allow the appeal and set aside the order of Farley J. dated February 25, 2005.

[79] Counsel have agreed that there shall be no costs of the appeal.

Order accordingly.

[page31]

#### Notes

Note 1: R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended.

Note 2: The reference is to the decisions in Dyle, Royal Oak Mines and Westar, cited above.

Note 3: See para. 43, *infra*, where I elaborate on this decision.

Note 4: It is the latter authority that the directors of Stelco exercised when appointing the appellants to the Stelco Board.

Note 5: Dennis H. Peterson, *Shareholder Remedies in Canada*, looseleaf (Markham: LexisNexis -- Butterworths, 1989), at 18-47.

Note 6: Or, I would add, unpopular with other stakeholders.

Note 7: Now s. 241.



---- End of Request ----

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**Tab 10**

**\*\* Preliminary Version \*\***

*Case Name:*

**Century Services Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)**

**Century Services Inc., Appellant;**

**v.**

**Attorney General of Canada on behalf of Her Majesty The Queen  
in Right of Canada, Respondent.**

[2010] S.C.J. No. 60

[2010] A.C.S. no 60

2010 SCC 60

[2010] 3 S.C.R. 379

[2010] 3 R.C.S. 379

2011 D.T.C. 5006

409 N.R. 201

296 B.C.A.C. 1

12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1

2010 CarswellBC 3419

326 D.L.R. (4th) 577

EYB 2010-183759

2011EXP-9

J.E. 2011-5

2011 G.T.C. 2006

[2011] 2 W.W.R. 383

72 C.B.R. (5th) 170

[2010] G.S.T.C. 186

File No.: 33239.

Supreme Court of Canada

Heard: May 11, 2010;

Judgment: December 16, 2010.

**Present: McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish,  
Abella, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ.**

(136 paras.)

**Appeal From:**

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA

*Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) matters -- Application of Act -- Compromises and arrangements -- Where Crown affected -- Effect of related legislation -- Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act -- Appeal by Century Services Inc. from judgment of British Columbia Court of Appeal reversing a judgment dismissing a Crown application for payment of unremitted GST monies allowed -- Section 222(3) of the Excise Tax Act evinced no explicit intention of Parliament to repeal s. 18.3 of CCAA -- Parliament's intent with respect to GST deemed trusts was to be found in the CCAA -- Judge had the discretion under the CCAA to continue the stay of the Crown's claim for enforcement of the GST deemed trust while otherwise lifting it to permit debtor company to make an assignment in bankruptcy.*

Appeal by Century Services Inc. from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal reversing a judgment dismissing a Crown application for payment of unremitted GST monies. The debtor company commenced proceedings under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA), obtaining a stay of proceedings with a view to reorganizing its financial affairs. Among the debts owed by the debtor company at the commencement of the reorganization was an amount of GST collected but unremitted to the Crown. The Excise Tax Act (ETA) created a deemed trust in favour of the Crown for amounts collected in respect of GST. The ETA provided that the deemed trust operated despite any other enactment of Canada except the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA). However, the CCAA also provided that subject to certain exceptions, none of which

mentioned GST, deemed trusts in favour of the Crown did not operate under the CCAA. In the context of the CCAA proceedings, a chambers judge approved a payment not exceeding \$5 million to the debtor company's major secured creditor, Century Services. The judge agreed to the debtor company's proposal to hold back an amount equal to the GST monies collected but unremitted to the Crown and place it in the Monitor's trust account until the outcome of the reorganization was known. After concluding that reorganization was not possible, the debtor company sought leave to partially lift the stay of proceedings so it could make an assignment in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA). The Crown sought an order that the GST monies held by the Monitor be paid to the Receiver General of Canada. The judge denied the Crown's motion, and allowed the assignment in bankruptcy. The Court of Appeal found two independent bases for allowing the Crown's appeal. First, the court's authority under s. 11 of the CCAA was held not to extend to staying the Crown's application for immediate payment of the GST funds subject to the deemed trust after it was clear that reorganization efforts had failed and that bankruptcy was inevitable. As restructuring was no longer a possibility, staying the Crown's claim to the GST funds no longer served a purpose under the CCAA and the court was bound under the priority scheme provided by the ETA to allow payment to the Crown. Second, the Court of Appeal concluded that by ordering the GST funds segregated in the Monitor's trust account, the judge had created an express trust in favour of the Crown from which the monies in question could not be diverted for any other purposes.

HELD: Appeal allowed. Section 222(3) of the ETA evinced no explicit intention of Parliament to repeal CCAA s. 18.3. Had Parliament sought to give the Crown a priority for GST claims, it could have done so explicitly, as it did for source deductions. There was no express statutory basis for concluding that GST claims enjoyed a preferred treatment under the CCAA or the BIA. Parliament's intent with respect to GST deemed trusts was to be found in the CCAA. With respect to the scope of a court's discretion when supervising reorganization, the broad discretionary jurisdiction conferred on the supervising judge had to be interpreted having regard to the remedial nature of the CCAA and insolvency legislation generally. The question was whether the order advanced the underlying purpose of the CCAA. The judge's order staying Crown enforcement of the GST claim ensured that creditors would not be disadvantaged by the attempted reorganization under the CCAA. The effect of his order was to blunt any impulse of creditors to interfere in an orderly liquidation. His order was thus in furtherance of the CCAA's objectives to the extent that it allowed a bridge between the CCAA and BIA proceedings. The order fostered a harmonious transition between reorganization and liquidation while meeting the objective of a single collective proceeding that was common to both statutes. The breadth of the court's discretion under the CCAA was sufficient to lift the stay to allow entry into liquidation. No express trust was created by the judge's order because there was no certainty of object inferable from his order. Further, no deemed trust was created.

#### **Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:**

An Act to establish the Wage Earner Protection Program Act, to amend the Bankruptcy and

Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 69, s. 128, s. 131

Bank Act, S.C. 1991, c. 46,

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-, s. 67, s. 86

Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8, s. 23

Cities and Towns Act, R.S.Q., c. C-19,

Civil Code of QuÉbec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 2930

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11, s. 11.4, s. 18.3, s. 18.4, s. 20, s. 21

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1933, S.C. 1932-33, c. 36,

Employment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, c. 23, s. 86(2), s. 86(2.1)

Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15, s. 222

Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), s. 227(4), s. 227(4.1)

Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 2, s. 44(f)

Personal Property Security Act, S.A. 1988, c. P-4.05,

Winding-up and Restructuring Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11,

### **Subsequent History:**

NOTE: This document is subject to editorial revision before its reproduction in final form in the Canada Supreme Court Reports.

### **Court Catchwords:**

*Bankruptcy and Insolvency -- Priorities -- Crown applying on eve of bankruptcy of debtor company to have GST monies held in trust paid to Receiver General of Canada -- Whether deemed trust in favour of Crown under Excise Tax Act prevails over provisions of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act purporting to nullify deemed trusts in favour of Crown -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 18.3(1) -- Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15, s. 222(3).*

*Bankruptcy and insolvency -- Procedure -- Whether chambers judge had authority to make order*

*partially lifting stay of proceedings to allow debtor company to make assignment in bankruptcy and to stay Crown's right to enforce GST deemed trust -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11.*

*Trusts -- Express trusts -- GST collected but unremitted to Crown -- Judge ordering that GST be held by Monitor in trust account -- Whether segregation of Crown's GST claim in Monitor's account created an express trust in favour of Crown.*

### **Court Summary:**

The debtor company commenced proceedings under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA"), obtaining a stay of proceedings to allow it time to reorganize its financial affairs. One of the debtor company's outstanding debts at the commencement of the reorganization was an amount of unremitted Goods and Services Tax ("GST") payable to the Crown. Section 222(3) of the *Excise Tax Act* ("ETA") created a deemed trust over unremitted GST, which operated despite any other enactment of Canada except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ("BIA"). However, s. 18.3(1) of the CCAA provided that any statutory deemed trusts in favour of the Crown did not operate under the CCAA, subject to certain exceptions, none of which mentioned GST.

Pursuant to an order of the CCAA chambers judge, a payment not exceeding \$5 million was approved to the debtor company's major secured creditor, Century Services. However, the chambers judge also ordered the debtor company to hold back and segregate in the Monitor's trust account an amount equal to the unremitted GST pending the outcome of the reorganization. On concluding that reorganization was not possible, the debtor company sought leave of the court to partially lift the stay of proceedings so it could make an assignment in bankruptcy under the BIA. The Crown moved for immediate payment of unremitted GST to the Receiver General. The chambers judge denied the Crown's motion, and allowed the assignment in bankruptcy. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on two grounds. First, it reasoned that once reorganization efforts had failed, the chambers judge was bound under the priority scheme provided by the ETA to allow payment of unremitted GST to the Crown and had no discretion under s. 11 of the CCAA to continue the stay against the Crown's claim. Second, the Court of Appeal concluded that by ordering the GST funds segregated in the Monitor's trust account, the chambers judge had created an express trust in favour of the Crown.

*Held* (Abella J. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed.

*Per* McLachlin C.J., Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ.: The apparent conflict between s. 222(3) of the ETA and s. 18.3(1) of the CCAA can be resolved through an interpretation that properly recognizes the history of the CCAA, its function amidst the body of insolvency legislation enacted by Parliament and the principles for interpreting the CCAA that have been recognized in the jurisprudence. The history of the CCAA distinguishes it from the BIA because although these statutes share the same remedial purpose of avoiding the social and economic costs of liquidating a debtor's assets, the CCAA offers more flexibility and greater judicial

discretion than the rules-based mechanism under the *BIA*, making the former more responsive to complex reorganizations. Because the *CCAA* is silent on what happens if reorganization fails, the *BIA* scheme of liquidation and distribution necessarily provides the backdrop against which creditors assess their priority in the event of bankruptcy. The contemporary thrust of legislative reform has been towards harmonizing aspects of insolvency law common to the *CCAA* and the *BIA*, and one of its important features has been a cutback in Crown priorities. Accordingly, the *CCAA* and the *BIA* both contain provisions nullifying statutory deemed trusts in favour of the Crown, and both contain explicit exceptions exempting source deductions deemed trusts from this general rule. Meanwhile, both Acts are harmonious in treating other Crown claims as unsecured. No such clear and express language exists in those Acts carving out an exception for GST claims.

When faced with the apparent conflict between s. 222(3) of the *ETA* and s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA*, courts have been inclined to follow *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)* and resolve the conflict in favour of the *ETA*. *Ottawa Senators* should not be followed. Rather, the *CCAA* provides the rule. Section 222(3) of the *ETA* evinces no explicit intention of Parliament to repeal *CCAA* s. 18.3. Where Parliament has sought to protect certain Crown claims through statutory deemed trusts and intended that these deemed trusts continue in insolvency, it has legislated so expressly and elaborately. Meanwhile, there is no express statutory basis for concluding that GST claims enjoy a preferred treatment under the *CCAA* or the *BIA*. The internal logic of the *CCAA* appears to subject a GST deemed trust to the waiver by Parliament of its priority. A strange asymmetry would result if differing treatments of GST deemed trusts under the *CCAA* and the *BIA* were found to exist, as this would encourage statute shopping, undermine the *CCAA*'s remedial purpose and invite the very social ills that the statute was enacted to avert. The later in time enactment of the more general s. 222(3) of the *ETA* does not require application of the doctrine of implied repeal to the earlier and more specific s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* in the circumstances of this case. In any event, recent amendments to the *CCAA* in 2005 resulted in s. 18.3 of the Act being renumbered and reformulated, making it the later in time provision. This confirms that Parliament's intent with respect to GST deemed trusts is to be found in the *CCAA*. The conflict between the *ETA* and the *CCAA* is more apparent than real.

The exercise of judicial discretion has allowed the *CCAA* to adapt and evolve to meet contemporary business and social needs. As reorganizations become increasingly complex, *CCAA* courts have been called upon to innovate. In determining their jurisdiction to sanction measures in a *CCAA* proceeding, courts should first interpret the provisions of the *CCAA* before turning to their inherent or equitable jurisdiction. Noteworthy in this regard is the expansive interpretation the language of the *CCAA* is capable of supporting. The general language of the *CCAA* should not be read as being restricted by the availability of more specific orders. The requirements of appropriateness, good faith and due diligence are baseline considerations that a court should always bear in mind when exercising *CCAA* authority. The question is whether the order will usefully further efforts to avoid the social and economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company, which extends to both the purpose of the order and the means it employs. Here, the chambers judge's order staying the Crown's GST claim was in furtherance of the *CCAA*'s objectives because it blunted the impulse



of creditors to interfere in an orderly liquidation and fostered a harmonious transition from the *CCAA* to the *BIA*, meeting the objective of a single proceeding that is common to both statutes. The transition from the *CCAA* to the *BIA* may require the partial lifting of a stay of proceedings under the *CCAA* to allow commencement of *BIA* proceedings, but no gap exists between the two statutes because they operate in tandem and creditors in both cases look to the *BIA* scheme of distribution to foreshadow how they will fare if the reorganization is unsuccessful. The breadth of the court's discretion under the *CCAA* is sufficient to construct a bridge to liquidation under the *BIA*. Hence, the chambers judge's order was authorized.

No express trust was created by the chambers judge's order in this case because there is no certainty of object inferable from his order. Creation of an express trust requires certainty of intention, subject matter and object. At the time the chambers judge accepted the proposal to segregate the monies in the Monitor's trust account there was no certainty that the Crown would be the beneficiary, or object, of the trust because exactly who might take the money in the final result was in doubt. In any event, no dispute over the money would even arise under the interpretation of s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* established above, because the Crown's deemed trust priority over GST claims would be lost under the *CCAA* and the Crown would rank as an unsecured creditor for this amount.

*Per Fish J.:* The GST monies collected by the debtor are not subject to a deemed trust or priority in favour of the Crown. In recent years, Parliament has given detailed consideration to the Canadian insolvency scheme but has declined to amend the provisions at issue in this case, a deliberate exercise of legislative discretion. On the other hand, in upholding deemed trusts created by the *ETA* notwithstanding insolvency proceedings, courts have been unduly protective of Crown interests which Parliament itself has chosen to subordinate to competing prioritized claims. In the context of the Canadian insolvency regime, deemed trusts exist only where there is a statutory provision *creating* the trust and a *CCAA* or *BIA* provision explicitly *confirming* its effective operation. The *Income Tax Act*, the *Canada Pension Plan Act* and the *Employment Insurance Act* all contain deemed trust provisions that are strikingly similar to that in s. 222 of the *ETA* but they are all also confirmed in s. 37 of the *CCAA* and in s. 67(3) of the *BIA* in clear and unmistakable terms. The same is not true of the deemed trust created under the *ETA*. Although Parliament created a deemed trust in favour of the Crown to hold unremitted GST monies, and although it purports to maintain this trust notwithstanding any contrary federal or provincial legislation, it did not *confirm* the continued operation of the trust in either the *BIA* or the *CCAA*, reflecting Parliament's intention to allow the deemed trust to lapse with the commencement of insolvency proceedings.

*Per Abella J (dissenting):* Section 222(3) of the *ETA* gives priority during *CCAA* proceedings to the Crown's deemed trust in unremitted GST. This provision unequivocally defines its boundaries in the clearest possible terms and excludes only the *BIA* from its legislative grasp. The language used reflects a clear legislative intention that s. 222(3) would prevail if in conflict with any other law except the *BIA*. This is borne out by the fact that following the enactment of s. 222(3), amendments to the *CCAA* were introduced, and despite requests from various constituencies, s. 18.3(1) was not amended to make the priorities in the *CCAA* consistent with those in the *BIA*. This indicates a

deliberate legislative choice to protect the deemed trust in s. 222(3) from the reach of s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA*.

The application of other principles of interpretation reinforces this conclusion. An earlier, specific provision may be overruled by a subsequent general statute if the legislature indicates, through its language, an intention that the general provision prevails. Section 222(3) achieves this through the use of language stating that it prevails despite any law of Canada, of a province, or "any other law" *other than the BIA*. Section 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* is thereby rendered inoperative for purposes of s. 222(3). By operation of s. 44(f) of the *Interpretation Act*, the transformation of s. 18(3) into s. 37(1) after the enactment of s. 222(3) of the *ETA* has no effect on the interpretive queue, and s. 222(3) of the *ETA* remains the "later in time" provision. This means that the deemed trust provision in s. 222(3) of the *ETA* takes precedence over s. 18.3(1) during *CCAA* proceedings. While s. 11 gives a court discretion to make orders notwithstanding the *BIA* and the *Winding-up Act*, that discretion is not liberated from the operation of any other federal statute. Any exercise of discretion is therefore circumscribed by whatever limits are imposed by statutes *other than the BIA* and the *Winding-up Act*. That includes the *ETA*. The chambers judge in this case was, therefore, required to respect the priority regime set out in s. 222(3) of the *ETA*. Neither s. 18.3(1) nor s. 11 of the *CCAA* gave him the authority to ignore it. He could not, as a result, deny the Crown's request for payment of the GST funds during the *CCAA* proceedings.

### Cases Cited

By Deschamps J.

**Overruled:** *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)* (2005), 73 O.R. (3d) 737; **distinguished:** *Doré v. Verdun (City)*, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862; **referred to:** *Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, [1934] S.C.R. 659; *Quebec (Revenue) v. Caisse populaire Desjardins de Montmagny*, 2009 SCC 49, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 286; *Deputy Minister of Revenue v. Rainville*, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 35; *Gauntlet Energy Corp., Re*, 2003 ABQB 894, 30 Alta. L.R. (4) 192; *Komunik Corp. (Arrangement relatif à)*, 2009 QCCS 6332 (CanLII), leave to appeal granted, 2010 QCCA 183 (CanLII); *Royal Bank of Canada v. Sparrow Electric Corp.*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 411; *First Vancouver Finance v. M.N.R.*, 2002 SCC 49, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 720; *Solid Resources Ltd., Re* (2002), 40 C.B.R. (4) 219; *Metcalf & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (Re)*, 2008 ONCA 587, 92 O.R. (3d) 513; *Dylex Ltd., Re* (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106; *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey* (1990), 41 O.A.C. 282; *Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hongkong Bank of Can.* (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84; *Pacific National Lease Holding Corp, Re* (1992), 19 B.C.A.C. 134; *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, 2000 ABQB 442, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9; *Air Canada, Re* (2003), 42 C.B.R. (4) 173; *Air Canada, Re*, 2003 CanLII 49366; *Canadian Red Cross Society/Société Canadienne de la Croix Rouge, Re* (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4) 158; *Skydome Corp., Re* (1998), 16 C.B.R. (4) 118; *United Used Auto & Truck Parts Ltd., Re*, 2000 BCCA 146, 135 B.C.A.C. 96, affg (1999), 12 C.B.R. (4) 144; *Skeena Cellulose Inc., Re*, 2003 BCCA 344, 13 B.C.L.R. (4) 236; *Stelco Inc. (Re)* (2005), 75 O.R. (3d) 5; *Philip's Manufacturing Ltd., Re* (1992), 9 C.B.R. (3d) 25; *Ivaco Inc. (Re)* (2006), 83 O.R. (3d) 108.

By Fish J.

**Referred to:** *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)* (2005), 73 O.R. (3d) 737.

By Abella J. (dissenting)

*Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)* (2005), 73 O.R. (3d) 737; *Tele-Mobile Co. v. Ontario*, 2008 SCC 12, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 305; *Doré v. Verdun (City)*, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862; *Attorney General of Canada v. Public Service Staff Relations Board*, [1977] 2 F.C. 663.

### **Statutes and Regulations Cited**

*An Act to establish the Wage Earner Protection Program Act, to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts*, S.C. 2005, c. 47, ss. 69, 128, 131.

*Bank Act*, S.C. 1991, c. 46.

*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, ss. 67, 86 [am. 2005, c. 47, s. 69].

*Canada Pension Plan*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8, s. 23.

*Cities and Towns Act*, R.S.Q., c. C-19.

*Civil Code of Québec*, S.Q. 1991, c. 64.

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, ss. 11, 11.4, 18.3, 18.4, 20 [am. 2005, c. 47, ss. 128, 131], 21 [am. 1997, c. 12, s. 126].

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1933*, S.C. 1932-33, c. 36 [am. 1952-53, c. 3].

*Employment Insurance Act*, S.C. 1996, c. 23, ss. 86(2), (2.1).

*Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15, s. 222.

*Income Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5 Supp.), ss. 227(4), (4.1).

*Interpretation Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, ss. 2, 44(f).

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### **History and Disposition:**

APPEAL from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal (Newbury, Tysoe and Smith JJ.A.), 2009 BCCA 205, 98 B.C.L.R. (4) 242, 270 B.C.A.C. 167, 454 W.A.C. 167, [2009] 12 W.W.R. 684, [2009] G.S.T.C. 79, [2009] B.C.J. No. 918 (QL), 2009 CarswellBC 1195, reversing a judgment of Brenner C.J.S.C., 2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221, [2008] B.C.J. No. 2611 (QL), 2008 CarswellBC 2895, dismissing a Crown application for payment of GST monies. Appeal allowed, Abella J. dissenting.

### **Counsel:**

*Mary I.A. Buttery, Owen J. James and Matthew J.G. Curtis*, for the appellant.

*Gordon Bourgard, David Jacyk and Michael J. Lema*, for the respondent.

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The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ. was delivered by

**1 DESCHAMPS J.:**-- For the first time this Court is called upon to directly interpret the provisions of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("*CCAA*"). In that respect, two questions are raised. The first requires reconciliation of provisions of the *CCAA* and the *Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 ("*ETA*"), which lower courts have held to be in conflict with one another. The second concerns the scope of a court's discretion when supervising reorganization. The relevant statutory provisions are reproduced in the Appendix. On the first question, having considered the evolution of Crown priorities in the context of insolvency and the wording of the various statutes creating Crown priorities, I conclude that it is the *CCAA* and not the *ETA* that provides the rule. On the second question, I conclude that the broad discretionary jurisdiction conferred on the supervising judge must be interpreted having regard to the remedial nature of the *CCAA* and insolvency legislation generally. Consequently, the court had the discretion to partially lift a stay of proceedings to allow the debtor to make an assignment under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("*BIA*"). I would allow the appeal.

1. Facts and Decisions of the Courts Below

**2** Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd. ("LeRoy Trucking") commenced proceedings under the *CCAA* in the Supreme Court of British Columbia on December 13, 2007, obtaining a stay of proceedings with a view to reorganizing its financial affairs. LeRoy Trucking sold certain redundant assets as authorized by the order.

**3** Amongst the debts owed by LeRoy Trucking was an amount for Goods and Services Tax ("*GST*") collected but unremitted to the Crown. The *ETA* creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown for amounts collected in respect of *GST*. The deemed trust extends to any property or proceeds held by the person collecting *GST* and any property of that person held by a secured creditor, requiring that property to be paid to the Crown in priority to all security interests. The *ETA* provides that the deemed trust operates despite any other enactment of Canada except the *BIA*. However, the *CCAA* also provides that subject to certain exceptions, none of which mentions *GST*, deemed trusts in favour of the Crown do not operate under the *CCAA*. Accordingly, under the *CCAA* the Crown ranks as an unsecured creditor in respect of *GST*. Nonetheless, at the time LeRoy Trucking commenced *CCAA* proceedings the leading line of jurisprudence held that the *ETA* took precedence over the *CCAA* such that the Crown enjoyed priority for *GST* claims under the *CCAA*, even though it would have lost that same priority under the *BIA*. The *CCAA* underwent substantial amendments in 2005 in which some of the provisions at issue in this appeal were renumbered and reformulated (S.C. 2005, c. 47). However, these amendments only came into force on September 18, 2009. I will refer to the amended provisions only where relevant.

**4** On April 29, 2008, Brenner C.J.S.C., in the context of the *CCAA* proceedings, approved a payment not exceeding \$5 million, the proceeds of redundant asset sales, to Century Services, the debtor's major secured creditor. LeRoy Trucking proposed to hold back an amount equal to the *GST* monies collected but unremitted to the Crown and place it in the Monitor's trust account until the outcome of the reorganization was known. In order to maintain the *status quo* while the success of

the reorganization was uncertain, Brenner C.J.S.C. agreed to the proposal and ordered that an amount of \$305,202.30 be held by the Monitor in its trust account.

5 On September 3, 2008, having concluded that reorganization was not possible, LeRoy Trucking sought leave to make an assignment in bankruptcy under the *BIA*. The Crown sought an order that the GST monies held by the Monitor be paid to the Receiver General of Canada. Brenner C.J.S.C. dismissed the latter application. Reasoning that the purpose of segregating the funds with the Monitor was "to facilitate an ultimate payment of the GST monies which were owed pre-filing, but only if a viable plan emerged", the failure of such a reorganization, followed by an assignment in bankruptcy, meant the Crown would lose priority under the *BIA* (2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221).

6 The Crown's appeal was allowed by the British Columbia Court of Appeal (2009 BCCA 205, 270 B.C.A.C. 167). Tysoe J.A. for a unanimous court found two independent bases for allowing the Crown's appeal.

7 First, the court's authority under s. 11 of the *CCAA* was held not to extend to staying the Crown's application for immediate payment of the GST funds subject to the deemed trust after it was clear that reorganization efforts had failed and that bankruptcy was inevitable. As restructuring was no longer a possibility, staying the Crown's claim to the GST funds no longer served a purpose under the *CCAA* and the court was bound under the priority scheme provided by the *ETA* to allow payment to the Crown. In so holding, Tysoe J.A. adopted the reasoning in *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)* (2005), 73 O.R. (3d) 737 (C.A.), which found that the *ETA* deemed trust for GST established Crown priority over secured creditors under the *CCAA*.

8 Second, Tysoe J.A. concluded that by ordering the GST funds segregated in the Monitor's trust account on April 29, 2008, the judge had created an express trust in favour of the Crown from which the monies in question could not be diverted for any other purposes. The Court of Appeal therefore ordered that the money held by the Monitor in trust be paid to the Receiver General.

## 2. Issues

9 This appeal raises three broad issues which are addressed in turn:

- (1) Did s. 222(3) of the *ETA* displace s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* and give priority to the Crown's *ETA* deemed trust during *CCAA* proceedings as held in *Ottawa Senators*?
- (2) Did the court exceed its *CCAA* authority by lifting the stay to allow the debtor to make an assignment in bankruptcy?
- (3) Did the court's order of April 29, 2008 requiring segregation of the Crown's GST claim in the Monitor's trust account create an express trust in favour of the Crown in respect of those funds?

### 3. Analysis

10 The first issue concerns Crown priorities in the context of insolvency. As will be seen, the *ETA* provides for a deemed trust in favour of the Crown in respect of GST owed by a debtor "[d]espite ... any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*)" (s. 222(3)), while the *CCAA* stated at the relevant time that "notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be [so] regarded" (s. 18.3(1)). It is difficult to imagine two statutory provisions more apparently in conflict. However, as is often the case, the apparent conflict can be resolved through interpretation.

11 In order to properly interpret the provisions, it is necessary to examine the history of the *CCAA*, its function amidst the body of insolvency legislation enacted by Parliament, and the principles that have been recognized in the jurisprudence. It will be seen that Crown priorities in the insolvency context have been significantly pared down. The resolution of the second issue is also rooted in the context of the *CCAA*, but its purpose and the manner in which it has been interpreted in the case law are also key. After examining the first two issues in this case, I will address Tysoe J.A.'s conclusion that an express trust in favour of the Crown was created by the court's order of April 29, 2008.

#### 3.1 *Purpose and Scope of Insolvency Law*

12 Insolvency is the factual situation that arises when a debtor is unable to pay creditors (see generally, R. J. Wood, *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law* (2009), at p. 16). Certain legal proceedings become available upon insolvency, which typically allow a debtor to obtain a court order staying its creditors' enforcement actions and attempt to obtain a binding compromise with creditors to adjust the payment conditions to something more realistic. Alternatively, the debtor's assets may be liquidated and debts paid from the proceeds according to statutory priority rules. The former is usually referred to as reorganization or restructuring while the latter is termed liquidation.

13 Canadian commercial insolvency law is not codified in one exhaustive statute. Instead, Parliament has enacted multiple insolvency statutes, the main one being the *BIA*. The *BIA* offers a self-contained legal regime providing for both reorganization and liquidation. Although bankruptcy legislation has a long history, the *BIA* itself is a fairly recent statute -- it was enacted in 1992. It is characterized by a rules-based approach to proceedings. The *BIA* is available to insolvent debtors owing \$1000 or more, regardless of whether they are natural or legal persons. It contains mechanisms for debtors to make proposals to their creditors for the adjustment of debts. If a proposal fails, the *BIA* contains a bridge to bankruptcy whereby the debtor's assets are liquidated and the proceeds paid to creditors in accordance with the statutory scheme of distribution.

14 Access to the *CCAA* is more restrictive. A debtor must be a company with liabilities in excess of \$5 million. Unlike the *BIA*, the *CCAA* contains no provisions for liquidation of a debtor's assets if reorganization fails. There are three ways of exiting *CCAA* proceedings. The best outcome is



achieved when the stay of proceedings provides the debtor with some breathing space during which solvency is restored and the *CCAA* process terminates without reorganization being needed. The second most desirable outcome occurs when the debtor's compromise or arrangement is accepted by its creditors and the reorganized company emerges from the *CCAA* proceedings as a going concern. Lastly, if the compromise or arrangement fails, either the company or its creditors usually seek to have the debtor's assets liquidated under the applicable provisions of the *BIA* or to place the debtor into receivership. As discussed in greater detail below, the key difference between the reorganization regimes under the *BIA* and the *CCAA* is that the latter offers a more flexible mechanism with greater judicial discretion, making it more responsive to complex reorganizations.

**15** As I will discuss at greater length below, the purpose of the *CCAA* -- Canada's first reorganization statute -- is to permit the debtor to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic costs of liquidating its assets. Proposals to creditors under the *BIA* serve the same remedial purpose, though this is achieved through a rules-based mechanism that offers less flexibility. Where reorganization is impossible, the *BIA* may be employed to provide an orderly mechanism for the distribution of a debtor's assets to satisfy creditor claims according to predetermined priority rules.

**16** Prior to the enactment of the *CCAA* in 1933 (S.C. 1932-33, c. 36), practice under existing commercial insolvency legislation tended heavily towards the liquidation of a debtor company (J. Sarra, *Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations* (2003), at p. 12). The battering visited upon Canadian businesses by the Great Depression and the absence of an effective mechanism for reaching a compromise between debtors and creditors to avoid liquidation required a legislative response. The *CCAA* was innovative as it allowed the insolvent debtor to attempt reorganization under judicial supervision outside the existing insolvency legislation which, once engaged, almost invariably resulted in liquidation (*Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, [1934] S.C.R. 659, at pp. 660-61; Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 12-13).

**17** Parliament understood when adopting the *CCAA* that liquidation of an insolvent company was harmful for most of those it affected -- notably creditors and employees -- and that a workout which allowed the company to survive was optimal (Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 13-15).

**18** Early commentary and jurisprudence also endorsed the *CCAA*'s remedial objectives. It recognized that companies retain more value as going concerns while underscoring that intangible losses, such as the evaporation of the companies' goodwill, result from liquidation (S. E. Edwards, "Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1947), 25 *Can. Bar Rev.* 587, at p. 592). Reorganization serves the public interest by facilitating the survival of companies supplying goods or services crucial to the health of the economy or saving large numbers of jobs (*ibid.*, at p. 593). Insolvency could be so widely felt as to impact stakeholders other than creditors and employees. Variants of these views resonate today, with reorganization justified in terms of rehabilitating companies that are key elements in a complex web of interdependent economic relationships in order to avoid the negative consequences of liquidation.

19 The *CCAA* fell into disuse during the next several decades, likely because amendments to the Act in 1953 restricted its use to companies issuing bonds (S.C. 1952-53, c. 3). During the economic downturn of the early 1980s, insolvency lawyers and courts adapting to the resulting wave of insolvencies resurrected the statute and deployed it in response to new economic challenges. Participants in insolvency proceedings grew to recognize and appreciate the statute's distinguishing feature: a grant of broad and flexible authority to the supervising court to make the orders necessary to facilitate the reorganization of the debtor and achieve the *CCAA*'s objectives. The manner in which courts have used *CCAA* jurisdiction in increasingly creative and flexible ways is explored in greater detail below.

20 Efforts to evolve insolvency law were not restricted to the courts during this period. In 1970, a government-commissioned panel produced an extensive study recommending sweeping reform but Parliament failed to act (see *Bankruptcy and Insolvency: Report of the Study Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency Legislation* (1970)). Another panel of experts produced more limited recommendations in 1986 which eventually resulted in enactment of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* of 1992 (S.C. 1992, c. 27) (see *Proposed Bankruptcy Act Amendments: Report of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency* (1986)). Broader provisions for reorganizing insolvent debtors were then included in Canada's bankruptcy statute. Although the 1970 and 1986 reports made no specific recommendations with respect to the *CCAA*, the House of Commons committee studying the *BIA*'s predecessor bill, C-22, seemed to accept expert testimony that the *BIA*'s new reorganization scheme would shortly supplant the *CCAA*, which could then be repealed, with commercial insolvency and bankruptcy being governed by a single statute (*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Consumer and Corporate Affairs and Government Operations*, Issue No. 15, October 3, 1991, at pp. 15:15-15:16).

21 In retrospect, this conclusion by the House of Commons committee was out of step with reality. It overlooked the renewed vitality the *CCAA* enjoyed in contemporary practice and the advantage that a flexible judicially supervised reorganization process presented in the face of increasingly complex reorganizations, when compared to the stricter rules-based scheme contained in the *BIA*. The "flexibility of the *CCAA* [was seen as] a great benefit, allowing for creative and effective decisions" (Industry Canada, Marketplace Framework Policy Branch, *Report on the Operation and Administration of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2002), at p. 41). Over the past three decades, resurrection of the *CCAA* has thus been the mainspring of a process through which, one author concludes, "the legal setting for Canadian insolvency restructuring has evolved from a rather blunt instrument to one of the most sophisticated systems in the developed world" (R. B. Jones, "The Evolution of Canadian Restructuring: Challenges for the Rule of Law", in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2005* (2006), 481, at p. 481).

22 While insolvency proceedings may be governed by different statutory schemes, they share some commonalities. The most prominent of these is the single proceeding model. The nature and purpose of the single proceeding model are described by Professor Wood in *Bankruptcy and*

*Insolvency Law:*

They all provide a collective proceeding that supersedes the usual civil process available to creditors to enforce their claims. The creditors' remedies are collectivized in order to prevent the free-for-all that would otherwise prevail if creditors were permitted to exercise their remedies. In the absence of a collective process, each creditor is armed with the knowledge that if they do not strike hard and swift to seize the debtor's assets, they will be beat out by other creditors. [pp. 2-3]

The single proceeding model avoids the inefficiency and chaos that would attend insolvency if each creditor initiated proceedings to recover its debt. Grouping all possible actions against the debtor into a single proceeding controlled in a single forum facilitates negotiation with creditors because it places them all on an equal footing, rather than exposing them to the risk that a more aggressive creditor will realize its claims against the debtor's limited assets while the other creditors attempt a compromise. With a view to achieving that purpose, both the *CCAA* and the *BIA* allow a court to order all actions against a debtor to be stayed while a compromise is sought.

23 Another point of convergence of the *CCAA* and the *BIA* relates to priorities. Because the *CCAA* is silent about what happens if reorganization fails, the *BIA* scheme of liquidation and distribution necessarily supplies the backdrop for what will happen if a *CCAA* reorganization is ultimately unsuccessful. In addition, one of the important features of legislative reform of both statutes since the enactment of the *BIA* in 1992 has been a cutback in Crown priorities (S.C. 1992, c. 27, s. 39; S.C. 1997, c. 12, ss. 73 and 125; S.C. 2000, c. 30, s. 148; S.C. 2005, c. 47, ss. 69 and 131; S.C. 2009, c. 33, ss. 25 and 29; see also *Quebec (Revenue) v. Caisse populaire Desjardins de Montmagny*, 2009 SCC 49, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 286; *Deputy Minister of Revenue v. Rainville*, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 35; *Proposed Bankruptcy Act Amendments: Report of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency* (1986)).

24 With parallel *CCAA* and *BIA* restructuring schemes now an accepted feature of the insolvency law landscape, the contemporary thrust of legislative reform has been towards harmonizing aspects of insolvency law common to the two statutory schemes to the extent possible and encouraging reorganization over liquidation (see *An Act to establish the Wage Earner Protection Program Act, to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts*, S.C. 2005, c. 47; *Gauntlet Energy Corp., Re*, 2003 ABQB 894, 30 Alta. L.R. (4th) 192, at para. 19).

25 Mindful of the historical background of the *CCAA* and *BIA*, I now turn to the first question at issue.

### 3.2 GST Deemed Trust Under the *CCAA*

26 The Court of Appeal proceeded on the basis that the *ETA* precluded the court from staying the

Crown's enforcement of the GST deemed trust when partially lifting the stay to allow the debtor to enter bankruptcy. In so doing, it adopted the reasoning in a line of cases culminating in *Ottawa Senators*, which held that an *ETA* deemed trust remains enforceable during *CCAA* reorganization despite language in the *CCAA* that suggests otherwise.

27 The Crown relies heavily on the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in *Ottawa Senators* and argues that the later in time provision of the *ETA* creating the GST deemed trust trumps the provision of the *CCAA* purporting to nullify most statutory deemed trusts. The Court of Appeal in this case accepted this reasoning but not all provincial courts follow it (see, e.g., *Komunik Corp. (Arrangement relatif à)*, 2009 QCCS 6332 (CanLII), leave to appeal granted, 2010 QCCA 183 (CanLII)). Century Services relied, in its written submissions to this Court, on the argument that the court had authority under the *CCAA* to continue the stay against the Crown's claim for unremitted GST. In oral argument, the question of whether *Ottawa Senators* was correctly decided nonetheless arose. After the hearing, the parties were asked to make further written submissions on this point. As appears evident from the reasons of my colleague Abella J., this issue has become prominent before this Court. In those circumstances, this Court needs to determine the correctness of the reasoning in *Ottawa Senators*.

28 The policy backdrop to this question involves the Crown's priority as a creditor in insolvency situations which, as I mentioned above, has evolved considerably. Prior to the 1990s, Crown claims largely enjoyed priority in insolvency. This was widely seen as unsatisfactory as shown by both the 1970 and 1986 insolvency reform proposals, which recommended that Crown claims receive no preferential treatment. A closely related matter was whether the *CCAA* was binding at all upon the Crown. Amendments to the *CCAA* in 1997 confirmed that it did indeed bind the Crown (see *CCAA*, s. 21, as am. by S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 126).

29 Claims of priority by the state in insolvency situations receive different treatment across jurisdictions worldwide. For example, in Germany and Australia, the state is given no priority at all, while the state enjoys wide priority in the United States and France (see B. K. Morgan, "Should the Sovereign be Paid First? A Comparative International Analysis of the Priority for Tax Claims in Bankruptcy" (2000), 74 *Am. Bank. L.J.* 461, at p. 500). Canada adopted a middle course through legislative reform of Crown priority initiated in 1992. The Crown retained priority for source deductions of income tax, Employment Insurance ("EI") and Canada Pension Plan ("CPP") premiums, but ranks as an ordinary unsecured creditor for most other claims.

30 Parliament has frequently enacted statutory mechanisms to secure Crown claims and permit their enforcement. The two most common are statutory deemed trusts and powers to garnish funds third parties owe the debtor (see F. L. Lamer, *Priority of Crown Claims in Insolvency* (loose-leaf), at s. 2).

31 With respect to GST collected, Parliament has enacted a deemed trust. The *ETA* states that every person who collects an amount on account of GST is deemed to hold that amount in trust for

the Crown (s. 222(1)). The deemed trust extends to other property of the person collecting the tax equal in value to the amount deemed to be in trust if that amount has not been remitted in accordance with the *ETA*. The deemed trust also extends to property held by a secured creditor that, but for the security interest, would be property of the person collecting the tax (s. 222(3)).

32 Parliament has created similar deemed trusts using almost identical language in respect of source deductions of income tax, EI premiums and CPP premiums (see s. 227(4) of the *Income Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) ("*ITA*"), ss. 86(2) and (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act*, S.C. 1996, c. 23, and ss. 23(3) and (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8). I will refer to income tax, EI and CPP deductions as "source deductions".

33 In *Royal Bank of Canada v. Sparrow Electric Corp.*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 411, this Court addressed a priority dispute between a deemed trust for source deductions under the *ITA* and security interests taken under both the *Bank Act*, S.C. 1991, c. 46, and the *Alberta Personal Property Security Act*, S.A. 1988, c. P-4.05 ("*PPSA*"). As then worded, an *ITA* deemed trust over the debtor's property equivalent to the amount owing in respect of income tax became effective at the time of liquidation, receivership, or assignment in bankruptcy. *Sparrow Electric* held that the *ITA* deemed trust could not prevail over the security interests because, being fixed charges, the latter attached as soon as the debtor acquired rights in the property such that the *ITA* deemed trust had no property on which to attach when it subsequently arose. Later, in *First Vancouver Finance v. M.N.R.*, 2002 SCC 49, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 720, this Court observed that Parliament had legislated to strengthen the statutory deemed trust in the *ITA* by deeming it to operate from the moment the deductions were not paid to the Crown as required by the *ITA*, and by granting the Crown priority over all security interests (paras. 27-29) (the "*Sparrow Electric* amendment").

34 The amended text of s. 227(4.1) of the *ITA* and concordant source deductions deemed trusts in the *Canada Pension Plan* and the *Employment Insurance Act* state that the deemed trust operates notwithstanding any other enactment of Canada, except ss. 81.1 and 81.2 of the *BIA*. The *ETA* deemed trust at issue in this case is similarly worded, but it excepts the *BIA* in its entirety. The provision reads as follows:

222.... .

...

(3) Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed ... .

**35** The Crown submits that the *Sparrow Electric* amendment, added by Parliament to the *ETA* in 2000, was intended to preserve the Crown's priority over collected GST under the *CCAA* while subordinating the Crown to the status of an unsecured creditor in respect of GST only under the *BIA*. This is because the *ETA* provides that the GST deemed trust is effective "despite" any other enactment except the *BIA*.

**36** The language used in the *ETA* for the GST deemed trust creates an apparent conflict with the *CCAA*, which provides that subject to certain exceptions, property deemed by statute to be held in trust for the Crown shall not be so regarded.

**37** Through a 1997 amendment to the *CCAA* (S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 125), Parliament appears to have, subject to specific exceptions, nullified deemed trusts in favour of the Crown once reorganization proceedings are commenced under the Act. The relevant provision reads:

**18.3** (1) Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

This nullification of deemed trusts was continued in further amendments to the *CCAA* (S.C. 2005, c. 47), where s. 18.3(1) was renumbered and reformulated as s. 37(1):

**37.** (1) Subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

**38** An analogous provision exists in the *BIA*, which, subject to the same specific exceptions, nullifies statutory deemed trusts and makes property of the bankrupt that would otherwise be subject to a deemed trust part of the debtor's estate and available to creditors (S.C. 1992, c. 27, s. 39; S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 73; *BIA*, s. 67(2)). It is noteworthy that in both the *CCAA* and the *BIA*, the exceptions concern source deductions (*CCAA*, s. 18.3(2); *BIA*, s. 67(3)). The relevant provision of the *CCAA* reads:

**18.3** ...

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act*...

Thus, the Crown's deemed trust and corresponding priority in source deductions remain effective both in reorganization and in bankruptcy.

39 Meanwhile, in both s. 18.4(1) of the *CCAA* and s. 86(1) of the *BIA*, other Crown claims are treated as unsecured. These provisions, establishing the Crown's status as an unsecured creditor, explicitly exempt statutory deemed trusts in source deductions (*CCAA*, s. 18.4(3); *BIA*, s. 86(3)). The *CCAA* provision reads as follows:

18.4 ...

...

(3) Subsection (1) [Crown ranking as unsecured creditor] does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution ... .

Therefore, not only does the *CCAA* provide that Crown claims do not enjoy priority over the claims of other creditors (s. 18.3(1)), but the exceptions to this rule (i.e., that Crown priority is maintained for source deductions) are repeatedly stated in the statute.

40 The apparent conflict in this case is whether the rule in the *CCAA* first enacted as s. 18.3 in 1997, which provides that subject to certain explicit exceptions, statutory deemed trusts are ineffective under the *CCAA*, is overridden by the one in the *ETA* enacted in 2000 stating that GST deemed trusts operate despite any enactment of Canada except the *BIA*. With respect for my colleague Fish J., I do not think the apparent conflict can be resolved by denying it and creating a rule requiring both a statutory provision enacting the deemed trust, and a second statutory provision confirming it. Such a rule is unknown to the law. Courts must recognize conflicts, apparent or real, and resolve them when possible.

41 A line of jurisprudence across Canada has resolved the apparent conflict in favour of the *ETA*, thereby maintaining GST deemed trusts under the *CCAA*. *Ottawa Senators*, the leading case, decided the matter by invoking the doctrine of implied repeal to hold that the later in time provision of the *ETA* should take precedence over the *CCAA* (see also *Solid Resources Ltd., Re* (2002), 40 C.B.R. (4th) 219 (Alta. Q.B.); *Gauntlet*).

42 The Ontario Court of Appeal in *Ottawa Senators* rested its conclusion on two considerations.

First, it was persuaded that by explicitly mentioning the *BIA* in *ETA* s. 222(3), but not the *CCAA*, Parliament made a deliberate choice. In the words of MacPherson J.A.:

The *BIA* and the *CCAA* are closely related federal statutes. I cannot conceive that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception, but accidentally fail to consider the *CCAA* as a possible second exception. In my view, the omission of the *CCAA* from s. 222(3) of the *ETA* was almost certainly a considered omission. [para. 43]

43 Second, the Ontario Court of Appeal compared the conflict between the *ETA* and the *CCAA* to that before this Court in *Doré v. Verdun (City)*, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862, and found them to be "identical" (para. 46). It therefore considered *Doré* binding (para. 49). In *Doré*, a limitations provision in the more general and recently enacted *Civil Code of Québec*, S.Q. 1991, c. 64 ("*C.C.Q.*"), was held to have repealed a more specific provision of the earlier Quebec *Cities and Towns Act*, R.S.Q., c. C-19, with which it conflicted. By analogy, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the later in time and more general provision, s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, impliedly repealed the more specific and earlier in time provision, s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* (paras. 47-49).

44 Viewing this issue in its entire context, several considerations lead me to conclude that neither the reasoning nor the result in *Ottawa Senators* can stand. While a conflict may exist at the level of the statutes' wording, a purposive and contextual analysis to determine Parliament's true intent yields the conclusion that Parliament could not have intended to restore the Crown's deemed trust priority in GST claims under the *CCAA* when it amended the *ETA* in 2000 with the *Sparrow Electric* amendment.

45 I begin by recalling that Parliament has shown its willingness to move away from asserting priority for Crown claims in insolvency law. Section 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* (subject to the s. 18.3(2) exceptions) provides that the Crown's deemed trusts have no effect under the *CCAA*. Where Parliament has sought to protect certain Crown claims through statutory deemed trusts and intended that these deemed trusts continue in insolvency, it has legislated so explicitly and elaborately. For example, s. 18.3(2) of the *CCAA* and s. 67(3) of the *BIA* expressly provide that deemed trusts for source deductions remain effective in insolvency. Parliament has, therefore, clearly carved out exceptions from the general rule that deemed trusts are ineffective in insolvency. The *CCAA* and *BIA* are in harmony, preserving deemed trusts and asserting Crown priority only in respect of source deductions. Meanwhile, there is no express statutory basis for concluding that GST claims enjoy a preferred treatment under the *CCAA* or the *BIA*. Unlike source deductions, which are clearly and expressly dealt with under both these insolvency statutes, no such clear and express language exists in those Acts carving out an exception for GST claims.

46 The internal logic of the *CCAA* also militates against upholding the *ETA* deemed trust for GST. The *CCAA* imposes limits on a suspension by the court of the Crown's rights in respect of source deductions but does not mention the *ETA* (s. 11.4). Since source deductions deemed trusts



are granted explicit protection under the *CCAA*, it would be inconsistent to afford a better protection to the *ETA* deemed trust absent explicit language in the *CCAA*. Thus, the logic of the *CCAA* appears to subject the *ETA* deemed trust to the waiver by Parliament of its priority (s. 18.4).

47 Moreover, a strange asymmetry would arise if the interpretation giving the *ETA* priority over the *CCAA* urged by the Crown is adopted here: the Crown would retain priority over GST claims during *CCAA* proceedings but not in bankruptcy. As courts have reflected, this can only encourage statute shopping by secured creditors in cases such as this one where the debtor's assets cannot satisfy both the secured creditors' and the Crown's claims (*Gauntlet*, at para. 21). If creditors' claims were better protected by liquidation under the *BIA*, creditors' incentives would lie overwhelmingly with avoiding proceedings under the *CCAA* and not risking a failed reorganization. Giving a key player in any insolvency such skewed incentives against reorganizing under the *CCAA* can only undermine that statute's remedial objectives and risk inviting the very social ills that it was enacted to avert.

48 Arguably, the effect of *Ottawa Senators* is mitigated if restructuring is attempted under the *BIA* instead of the *CCAA*, but it is not cured. If *Ottawa Senators* were to be followed, Crown priority over GST would differ depending on whether restructuring took place under the *CCAA* or the *BIA*. The anomaly of this result is made manifest by the fact that it would deprive companies of the option to restructure under the more flexible and responsive *CCAA* regime, which has been the statute of choice for complex reorganizations.

49 Evidence that Parliament intended different treatments for GST claims in reorganization and bankruptcy is scant, if it exists at all. Section 222(3) of the *ETA* was enacted as part of a wide-ranging budget implementation bill in 2000. The summary accompanying that bill does not indicate that Parliament intended to elevate Crown priority over GST claims under the *CCAA* to the same or a higher level than source deductions claims. Indeed, the summary for deemed trusts states only that amendments to existing provisions are aimed at "ensuring that employment insurance premiums and Canada Pension Plan contributions that are required to be remitted by an employer are fully recoverable by the Crown in the case of the bankruptcy of the employer" (Summary to S.C. 2000, c. 30, at p. 4a). The wording of GST deemed trusts resembles that of statutory deemed trusts for source deductions and incorporates the same overriding language and reference to the *BIA*. However, as noted above, Parliament's express intent is that only source deductions deemed trusts remain operative. An exception for the *BIA* in the statutory language establishing the source deductions deemed trusts accomplishes very little, because the explicit language of the *BIA* itself (and the *CCAA*) carves out these source deductions deemed trusts and maintains their effect. It is however noteworthy that no equivalent language maintaining GST deemed trusts exists under either the *BIA* or the *CCAA*.

50 It seems more likely that by adopting the same language for creating GST deemed trusts in the *ETA* as it did for deemed trusts for source deductions, and by overlooking the inclusion of an exception for the *CCAA* alongside the *BIA* in s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, Parliament may have

inadvertently succumbed to a drafting anomaly. Because of a statutory lacuna in the *ETA*, the GST deemed trust could be seen as remaining effective in the *CCAA*, while ceasing to have any effect under the *BIA*, thus creating an apparent conflict with the wording of the *CCAA*. However, it should be seen for what it is: a facial conflict only, capable of resolution by looking at the broader approach taken to Crown priorities and by giving precedence to the statutory language of s. 18.3 of the *CCAA* in a manner that does not produce an anomalous outcome.

51 Section 222(3) of the *ETA* evinces no explicit intention of Parliament to repeal *CCAA* s. 18.3. It merely creates an apparent conflict that must be resolved by statutory interpretation. Parliament's intent when it enacted *ETA* s. 222(3) was therefore far from unambiguous. Had it sought to give the Crown a priority for GST claims, it could have done so explicitly as it did for source deductions. Instead, one is left to infer from the language of *ETA* s. 222(3) that the GST deemed trust was intended to be effective under the *CCAA*.

52 I am not persuaded that the reasoning in *Doré* requires the application of the doctrine of implied repeal in the circumstances of this case. The main issue in *Doré* concerned the impact of the adoption of the *C.C.Q.* on the administrative law rules with respect to municipalities. While Gonthier J. concluded in that case that the limitation provision in art. 2930 *C.C.Q.* had repealed by implication a limitation provision in the *Cities and Towns Act*, he did so on the basis of more than a textual analysis. The conclusion in *Doré* was reached after thorough contextual analysis of both pieces of legislation, including an extensive review of the relevant legislative history (paras. 31-41). Consequently, the circumstances before this Court in *Doré* are far from "identical" to those in the present case, in terms of text, context and legislative history. Accordingly, *Doré* cannot be said to require the automatic application of the rule of repeal by implication.

53 A noteworthy indicator of Parliament's overall intent is the fact that in subsequent amendments it has not displaced the rule set out in the *CCAA*. Indeed, as indicated above, the recent amendments to the *CCAA* in 2005 resulted in the rule previously found in s. 18.3 being renumbered and reformulated as s. 37. Thus, to the extent the interpretation allowing the GST deemed trust to remain effective under the *CCAA* depends on *ETA* s. 222(3) having impliedly repealed *CCAA* s. 18.3(1) because it is later in time, we have come full circle. Parliament has renumbered and reformulated the provision of the *CCAA* stating that, subject to exceptions for source deductions, deemed trusts do not survive the *CCAA* proceedings and thus the *CCAA* is now the later in time statute. This confirms that Parliament's intent with respect to GST deemed trusts is to be found in the *CCAA*.

54 I do not agree with my colleague Abella J. that s. 44(f) of the *Interpretation Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, can be used to interpret the 2005 amendments as having no effect. The new statute can hardly be said to be a mere re-enactment of the former statute. Indeed, the *CCAA* underwent a substantial review in 2005. Notably, acting consistently with its goal of treating both the *BIA* and the *CCAA* as sharing the same approach to insolvency, Parliament made parallel amendments to both statutes with respect to corporate proposals. In addition, new provisions were introduced

regarding the treatment of contracts, collective agreements, interim financing and governance agreements. The appointment and role of the Monitor was also clarified. Noteworthy are the limits imposed by *CCAA* s. 11.09 on the court's discretion to make an order staying the Crown's source deductions deemed trusts, which were formerly found in s. 11.4. No mention whatsoever is made of GST deemed trusts (see Summary to S.C. 2005, c. 47). The review went as far as looking at the very expression used to describe the statutory override of deemed trusts. The comments cited by my colleague only emphasize the clear intent of Parliament to maintain its policy that only source deductions deemed trusts survive in *CCAA* proceedings.

**55** In the case at bar, the legislative context informs the determination of Parliament's legislative intent and supports the conclusion that *ETA* s. 222(3) was not intended to narrow the scope of the *CCAA*'s override provision. Viewed in its entire context, the conflict between the *ETA* and the *CCAA* is more apparent than real. I would therefore not follow the reasoning in *Ottawa Senators* and affirm that *CCAA* s. 18.3 remained effective.

**56** My conclusion is reinforced by the purpose of the *CCAA* as part of Canadian remedial insolvency legislation. As this aspect is particularly relevant to the second issue, I will now discuss how courts have interpreted the scope of their discretionary powers in supervising a *CCAA* reorganization and how Parliament has largely endorsed this interpretation. Indeed, the interpretation courts have given to the *CCAA* helps in understanding how the *CCAA* grew to occupy such a prominent role in Canadian insolvency law.

### *3.3 Discretionary Power of a Court Supervising a CCAA Reorganization*

**57** Courts frequently observe that "[t]he *CCAA* is skeletal in nature" and does not "contain a comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred" (*Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (Re)*, 2008 ONCA 587, 92 O.R. (3d) 513, at para. 44, *per* Blair J.A.). Accordingly, "[t]he history of *CCAA* law has been an evolution of judicial interpretation" (*Dylex Ltd., Re* (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)), at para. 10, *per* Farley J.).

**58** *CCAA* decisions are often based on discretionary grants of jurisdiction. The incremental exercise of judicial discretion in commercial courts under conditions one practitioner aptly describes as "the hothouse of real-time litigation" has been the primary method by which the *CCAA* has been adapted and has evolved to meet contemporary business and social needs (see Jones, at p. 484).

**59** Judicial discretion must of course be exercised in furtherance of the *CCAA*'s purposes. The remedial purpose I referred to in the historical overview of the Act is recognized over and over again in the jurisprudence. To cite one early example:

The legislation is remedial in the purest sense in that it provides a means whereby the devastating social and economic effects of bankruptcy or creditor initiated termination of ongoing business operations can be avoided while a

court-supervised attempt to reorganize the financial affairs of the debtor company is made.

(*Elan Corp. v. Comiskey* (1990), 41 O.A.C. 282  
, at para. 57, *per* Doherty J.A., dissenting)

**60** Judicial decision making under the *CCAA* takes many forms. A court must first of all provide the conditions under which the debtor can attempt to reorganize. This can be achieved by staying enforcement actions by creditors to allow the debtor's business to continue, preserving the *status quo* while the debtor plans the compromise or arrangement to be presented to creditors, and supervising the process and advancing it to the point where it can be determined whether it will succeed (see, e.g., *Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hongkong Bank of Can.* (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84 (C.A.), at pp. 88-89; *Pacific National Lease Holding Corp., Re* (1992), 19 B.C.A.C. 134, at para. 27). In doing so, the court must often be cognizant of the various interests at stake in the reorganization, which can extend beyond those of the debtor and creditors to include employees, directors, shareholders, and even other parties doing business with the insolvent company (see, e.g., *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, 2000 ABQB 442, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9, at para. 144, *per* Paperny J. (as she then was); *Air Canada, Re* (2003), 42 C.B.R. (4th) 173 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 3; *Air Canada, Re*, 2003 CanLII 49366 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 13, *per* Farley J.; Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 181-92 and 217-26). In addition, courts must recognize that on occasion the broader public interest will be engaged by aspects of the reorganization and may be a factor against which the decision of whether to allow a particular action will be weighed (see, e.g., *Canadian Red Cross Society/Société Canadienne de la Croix Rouge, Re* (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 158 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 2, *per* Blair J. (as he then was); Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 195-214).

**61** When large companies encounter difficulty, reorganizations become increasingly complex. *CCAA* courts have been called upon to innovate accordingly in exercising their jurisdiction beyond merely staying proceedings against the debtor to allow breathing room for reorganization. They have been asked to sanction measures for which there is no explicit authority in the *CCAA*. Without exhaustively cataloguing the various measures taken under the authority of the *CCAA*, it is useful to refer briefly to a few examples to illustrate the flexibility the statute affords supervising courts.

**62** Perhaps the most creative use of *CCAA* authority has been the increasing willingness of courts to authorize post-filing security for debtor in possession financing or super-priority charges on the debtor's assets when necessary for the continuation of the debtor's business during the reorganization (see, e.g., *Skydome Corp., Re* (1998), 16 C.B.R. (4th) 118 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)); *United Used Auto & Truck Parts Ltd., Re*, 2000 BCCA 146, 135 B.C.A.C. 96, affg (1999), 12 C.B.R. (4th) 144 (S.C.); and generally, J. P. Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2007), at pp. 93-115). The *CCAA* has also been used to release claims against third parties as part of approving a comprehensive plan of arrangement and compromise, even over the objections of some dissenting creditors (see *Metcalfe & Mansfield*). As well, the appointment of a Monitor to oversee the reorganization was originally a measure taken pursuant to the *CCAA*'s supervisory

authority; Parliament responded, making the mechanism mandatory by legislative amendment.

**63** Judicial innovation during *CCAA* proceedings has not been without controversy. At least two questions it raises are directly relevant to the case at bar: (1) what are the sources of a court's authority during *CCAA* proceedings? (2) what are the limits of this authority?

**64** The first question concerns the boundary between a court's statutory authority under the *CCAA* and a court's residual authority under its inherent and equitable jurisdiction when supervising a reorganization. In authorizing measures during *CCAA* proceedings, courts have on occasion purported to rely upon their equitable jurisdiction to advance the purposes of the Act or their inherent jurisdiction to fill gaps in the statute. Recent appellate decisions have counselled against purporting to rely on inherent jurisdiction, holding that the better view is that courts are in most cases simply construing the authority supplied by the *CCAA* itself (see, e.g., *Skeena Cellulose Inc., Re*, 2003 BCCA 344, 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 236, at paras. 45-47, *per* Newbury J.A.; *Stelco Inc. (Re)* (2005), 75 O.R. (3d) 5 (C.A.), paras. 31-33, *per* Blair J.A.).

**65** I agree with Justice Georgina R. Jackson and Professor Janis Sarra that the most appropriate approach is a hierarchical one in which courts rely first on an interpretation of the provisions of the *CCAA* text before turning to inherent or equitable jurisdiction to anchor measures taken in a *CCAA* proceeding (see G. R. Jackson and J. Sarra, "Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters", in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2007* (2008), 41, at p. 42). The authors conclude that when given an appropriately purposive and liberal interpretation, the *CCAA* will be sufficient in most instances to ground measures necessary to achieve its objectives (p. 94).

**66** Having examined the pertinent parts of the *CCAA* and the recent history of the legislation, I accept that in most instances the issuance of an order during *CCAA* proceedings should be considered an exercise in statutory interpretation. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the expansive interpretation the language of the statute at issue is capable of supporting.

**67** The initial grant of authority under the *CCAA* empowered a court "where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company ... on the application of any person interested in the matter ..., subject to this Act, [to] make an order under this section" (*CCAA*, s. 11(1)). The plain language of the statute was very broad.

**68** In this regard, though not strictly applicable to the case at bar, I note that Parliament has in recent amendments changed the wording contained in s. 11(1), making explicit the discretionary authority of the court under the *CCAA*. Thus in s. 11 of the *CCAA* as currently enacted, a court may, "subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, ... make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances" (S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 128). Parliament appears to have endorsed the broad reading of *CCAA* authority developed by the jurisprudence.

69 The *CCAA* also explicitly provides for certain orders. Both an order made on an initial application and an order on subsequent applications may stay, restrain, or prohibit existing or new proceedings against the debtor. The burden is on the applicant to satisfy the court that the order is appropriate in the circumstances and that the applicant has been acting in good faith and with due diligence (*CCAA*, ss. 11(3), (4) and (6)).

70 The general language of the *CCAA* should not be read as being restricted by the availability of more specific orders. However, the requirements of appropriateness, good faith, and due diligence are baseline considerations that a court should always bear in mind when exercising *CCAA* authority. Appropriateness under the *CCAA* is assessed by inquiring whether the order sought advances the policy objectives underlying the *CCAA*. The question is whether the order will usefully further efforts to achieve the remedial purpose of the *CCAA* -- avoiding the social and economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company. I would add that appropriateness extends not only to the purpose of the order, but also to the means it employs. Courts should be mindful that chances for successful reorganizations are enhanced where participants achieve common ground and all stakeholders are treated as advantageously and fairly as the circumstances permit.

71 It is well-established that efforts to reorganize under the *CCAA* can be terminated and the stay of proceedings against the debtor lifted if the reorganization is "doomed to failure" (see *Chef Ready*, at p. 88; *Philip's Manufacturing Ltd., Re* (1992), 9 C.B.R. (3d) 25 (B.C.C.A.), at paras. 6-7). However, when an order is sought that does realistically advance the *CCAA*'s purposes, the ability to make it is within the discretion of a *CCAA* court.

72 The preceding discussion assists in determining whether the court had authority under the *CCAA* to continue the stay of proceedings against the Crown once it was apparent that reorganization would fail and bankruptcy was the inevitable next step.

73 In the Court of Appeal, Tysoe J.A. held that no authority existed under the *CCAA* to continue staying the Crown's enforcement of the GST deemed trust once efforts at reorganization had come to an end. The appellant submits that in so holding, Tysoe J.A. failed to consider the underlying purpose of the *CCAA* and give the statute an appropriately purposive and liberal interpretation under which the order was permissible. The Crown submits that Tysoe J.A. correctly held that the mandatory language of the *ETA* gave the court no option but to permit enforcement of the GST deemed trust when lifting the *CCAA* stay to permit the debtor to make an assignment under the *BIA*. Whether the *ETA* has a mandatory effect in the context of a *CCAA* proceeding has already been discussed. I will now address the question of whether the order was authorized by the *CCAA*.

74 It is beyond dispute that the *CCAA* imposes no explicit temporal limitations upon proceedings commenced under the Act that would prohibit ordering a continuation of the stay of the Crown's GST claims while lifting the general stay of proceedings temporarily to allow the debtor to make an assignment in bankruptcy.

75 The question remains whether the order advanced the underlying purpose of the *CCAA*. The Court of Appeal held that it did not because the reorganization efforts had come to an end and the *CCAA* was accordingly spent. I disagree.

76 There is no doubt that had reorganization been commenced under the *BIA* instead of the *CCAA*, the Crown's deemed trust priority for the GST funds would have been lost. Similarly, the Crown does not dispute that under the scheme of distribution in bankruptcy under the *BIA*, the deemed trust for GST ceases to have effect. Thus, after reorganization under the *CCAA* failed, creditors would have had a strong incentive to seek immediate bankruptcy and distribution of the debtor's assets under the *BIA*. In order to conclude that the discretion does not extend to partially lifting the stay in order to allow for an assignment in bankruptcy, one would have to assume a gap between the *CCAA* and the *BIA* proceedings. Brenner C.J.S.C.'s order staying Crown enforcement of the GST claim ensured that creditors would not be disadvantaged by the attempted reorganization under the *CCAA*. The effect of his order was to blunt any impulse of creditors to interfere in an orderly liquidation. His order was thus in furtherance of the *CCAA*'s objectives to the extent that it allowed a bridge between the *CCAA* and *BIA* proceedings. This interpretation of the tribunal's discretionary power is buttressed by s. 20 of the *CCAA*. That section provides that the *CCAA* "may be applied together with the provisions of any Act of Parliament ... that authorizes or makes provision for the sanction of compromises or arrangements between a company and its shareholders or any class of them", such as the *BIA*. Section 20 clearly indicates the intention of Parliament for the *CCAA* to operate *in tandem* with other insolvency legislation, such as the *BIA*.

77 The *CCAA* creates conditions for preserving the *status quo* while attempts are made to find common ground amongst stakeholders for a reorganization that is fair to all. Because the alternative to reorganization is often bankruptcy, participants will measure the impact of a reorganization against the position they would enjoy in liquidation. In the case at bar, the order fostered a harmonious transition between reorganization and liquidation while meeting the objective of a single collective proceeding that is common to both statutes.

78 Tysoe J.A. therefore erred in my view by treating the *CCAA* and the *BIA* as distinct regimes subject to a temporal gap between the two, rather than as forming part of an integrated body of insolvency law. Parliament's decision to maintain two statutory schemes for reorganization, the *BIA* and the *CCAA*, reflects the reality that reorganizations of differing complexity require different legal mechanisms. By contrast, only one statutory scheme has been found to be needed to liquidate a bankrupt debtor's estate. The transition from the *CCAA* to the *BIA* may require the partial lifting of a stay of proceedings under the *CCAA* to allow commencement of the *BIA* proceedings. However, as Laskin J.A. for the Ontario Court of Appeal noted in a similar competition between secured creditors and the Ontario Superintendent of Financial Services seeking to enforce a deemed trust, "[t]he two statutes are related" and no "gap" exists between the two statutes which would allow the enforcement of property interests at the conclusion of *CCAA* proceedings that would be lost in bankruptcy (*Ivaco Inc. (Re)* (2006), 83 O.R. (3d) 108, at paras. 62-63).

79 The Crown's priority in claims pursuant to source deductions deemed trusts does not undermine this conclusion. Source deductions deemed trusts survive under both the *CCAA* and the *BIA*. Accordingly, creditors' incentives to prefer one Act over another will not be affected. While a court has a broad discretion to stay source deductions deemed trusts in the *CCAA* context, this discretion is nevertheless subject to specific limitations applicable only to source deductions deemed trusts (*CCAA*, s. 11.4). Thus, if *CCAA* reorganization fails (e.g., either the creditors or the court refuse a proposed reorganization), the Crown can immediately assert its claim in unremitted source deductions. But this should not be understood to affect a seamless transition into bankruptcy or create any "gap" between the *CCAA* and the *BIA* for the simple reason that, regardless of what statute the reorganization had been commenced under, creditors' claims in both instances would have been subject to the priority of the Crown's source deductions deemed trust.

80 Source deductions deemed trusts aside, the comprehensive and exhaustive mechanism under the *BIA* must control the distribution of the debtor's assets once liquidation is inevitable. Indeed, an orderly transition to liquidation is mandatory under the *BIA* where a proposal is rejected by creditors. The *CCAA* is silent on the transition into liquidation but the breadth of the court's discretion under the Act is sufficient to construct a bridge to liquidation under the *BIA*. The court must do so in a manner that does not subvert the scheme of distribution under the *BIA*. Transition to liquidation requires partially lifting the *CCAA* stay to commence proceedings under the *BIA*. This necessary partial lifting of the stay should not trigger a race to the courthouse in an effort to obtain priority unavailable under the *BIA*.

81 I therefore conclude that Brenner C.J.S.C. had the authority under the *CCAA* to lift the stay to allow entry into liquidation.

### 3.4 *Express Trust*

82 The last issue in this case is whether Brenner C.J.S.C. created an express trust in favour of the Crown when he ordered on April 29, 2008, that proceeds from the sale of LeRoy Trucking's assets equal to the amount of unremitted GST be held back in the Monitor's trust account until the results of the reorganization were known. Tysoe J.A. in the Court of Appeal concluded as an alternative ground for allowing the Crown's appeal that it was the beneficiary of an express trust. I disagree.

83 Creation of an express trust requires the presence of three certainties: intention, subject matter, and object. Express or "true trusts" arise from the acts and intentions of the settlor and are distinguishable from other trusts arising by operation of law (see D. W. M. Waters, M. R. Gillen and L. D. Smith, eds., *Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada* (3rd ed. 2005), at pp. 28-29 especially fn. 42).

84 Here, there is no certainty to the object (i.e. the beneficiary) inferrable from the court's order of April 29, 2008, sufficient to support an express trust.

85 At the time of the order, there was a dispute between Century Services and the Crown over



part of the proceeds from the sale of the debtor's assets. The court's solution was to accept LeRoy Trucking's proposal to segregate those monies until that dispute could be resolved. Thus there was no certainty that the Crown would actually be the beneficiary, or object, of the trust.

**86** The fact that the location chosen to segregate those monies was the Monitor's trust account has no independent effect such that it would overcome the lack of a clear beneficiary. In any event, under the interpretation of *CCAA* s. 18.3(1) established above, no such priority dispute would even arise because the Crown's deemed trust priority over GST claims would be lost under the *CCAA* and the Crown would rank as an unsecured creditor for this amount. However, Brenner C.J.S.C. may well have been proceeding on the basis that, in accordance with *Ottawa Senators*, the Crown's GST claim would remain effective if reorganization was successful, which would not be the case if transition to the liquidation process of the *BIA* was allowed. An amount equivalent to that claim would accordingly be set aside pending the outcome of reorganization.

**87** Thus, uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the *CCAA* restructuring eliminates the existence of any certainty to permanently vest in the Crown a beneficial interest in the funds. That much is clear from the oral reasons of Brenner C.J.S.C. on April 29, 2008, when he said: "Given the fact that [*CCAA* proceedings] are known to fail and filings in bankruptcy result, it seems to me that maintaining the status quo in the case at bar supports the proposal to have the monitor hold these funds in trust." Exactly who might take the money in the final result was therefore evidently in doubt. Brenner C.J.S.C.'s subsequent order of September 3, 2008, denying the Crown's application to enforce the trust once it was clear that bankruptcy was inevitable, confirms the absence of a clear beneficiary required to ground an express trust.

#### 4. Conclusion

**88** I conclude that Brenner C.J.S.C. had the discretion under the *CCAA* to continue the stay of the Crown's claim for enforcement of the GST deemed trust while otherwise lifting it to permit LeRoy Trucking to make an assignment in bankruptcy. My conclusion that s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* nullified the GST deemed trust while proceedings under that Act were pending confirms that the discretionary jurisdiction under s. 11 utilized by the court was not limited by the Crown's asserted GST priority, because there is no such priority under the *CCAA*.

**89** For these reasons, I would allow the appeal and declare that the \$305,202.30 collected by LeRoy Trucking in respect of GST but not yet remitted to the Receiver General of Canada is not subject to deemed trust or priority in favour of the Crown. Nor is this amount subject to an express trust. Costs are awarded for this appeal and the appeal in the court below.

The following are the reasons delivered by

FISH J.:--

90 I am in general agreement with the reasons of Justice Deschamps and would dispose of the appeal as she suggests.

91 More particularly, I share my colleague's interpretation of the scope of the judge's discretion under s. 11 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("*CCAA*"). And I share my colleague's conclusion that Brenner C.J.S.C. did not create an express trust in favour of the Crown when he segregated GST funds into the Monitor's trust account (2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221).

92 I nonetheless feel bound to add brief reasons of my own regarding the interaction between the *CCAA* and the *Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 ("*ETA*").

93 In upholding deemed trusts created by the *ETA* notwithstanding insolvency proceedings, *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)* (2005), 73 O.R. (3d) 737 (C.A.), and its progeny have been unduly protective of Crown interests which Parliament itself has chosen to subordinate to competing prioritized claims. In my respectful view, a clearly marked departure from that jurisprudential approach is warranted in this case.

94 Justice Deschamps develops important historical and policy reasons in support of this position and I have nothing to add in that regard. I do wish, however, to explain why a comparative analysis of related statutory provisions adds support to our shared conclusion.

95 Parliament has in recent years given detailed consideration to the Canadian insolvency scheme. It has declined to amend the provisions at issue in this case. Ours is not to wonder why, but rather to treat Parliament's preservation of the relevant provisions as a deliberate exercise of the legislative discretion that is Parliament's alone. With respect, I reject any suggestion that we should instead characterize the apparent conflict between s. 18.3(1) (now s. 37(1)) of the *CCAA* and s. 222 of the *ETA* as a drafting anomaly or statutory lacuna properly subject to judicial correction or repair.

## II

96 In the context of the Canadian insolvency regime, a deemed trust will be found to exist only where two complementary elements co-exist: first, a statutory provision *creating* the trust; and second, a *CCAA* or *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("*BIA*") provision *confirming* -- or explicitly preserving -- its effective operation.

97 This interpretation is reflected in three federal statutes. Each contains a deemed trust provision framed in terms strikingly similar to the wording of s. 222 of the *ETA*.

98 The first is the *Income Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) ("*ITA*") where s. 227(4) *creates* a deemed trust:

(4) Every person who deducts or withholds an amount under this Act is

deemed, notwithstanding any security interest (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) in the amount so deducted or withheld, to hold the amount separate and apart from the property of the person and from property held by any secured creditor (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) of that person that but for the security interest would be property of the person, in trust for Her Majesty and for payment to Her Majesty in the manner and at the time provided under this Act. [Here and below, the emphasis is of course my own.]

99 In the next subsection, Parliament has taken care to make clear that this trust is unaffected by federal or provincial legislation to the contrary:

(4.1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (except sections 81.1 and 81.2 of that Act), any other enactment of Canada, any enactment of a province or any other law, where at any time an amount deemed by subsection 227(4) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not paid to Her Majesty in the manner and at the time provided under this Act, property of the person ... equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust is deemed

(a) to be held, from the time the amount was deducted or withheld by the person, separate and apart from the property of the person, in trust for Her Majesty whether or not the property is subject to such a security interest, ...

...

... and the proceeds of such property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all such security interests.

100 The continued operation of this deemed trust is expressly *confirmed* in s. 18.3 of the *CCAA*:

18.3 (1) Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* ...

**101** The operation of the *ITA* deemed trust is also confirmed in s. 67 of the *BIA*:

(2) Subject to subsection (3), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a bankrupt shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty for the purpose of paragraph (1)(a) unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(3) Subsection (2) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* ... .

**102** Thus, Parliament has first *created* and then *confirmed the continued operation of* the Crown's *ITA* deemed trust under *both* the *CCAA* and the *BIA* regimes.

**103** The second federal statute for which this scheme holds true is the *Canada Pension Plan*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8 ("*CPP*"). At s. 23, Parliament creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown and specifies that it exists despite all contrary provisions in any other Canadian statute. Finally, and in almost identical terms, the *Employment Insurance Act*, S.C. 1996, c. 23 ("*EIA*"), creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown: see ss. 86(2) and (2.1).

**104** As we have seen, the survival of the deemed trusts created under these provisions of the *ITA*, the *CPP* and the *EIA* is confirmed in s. 18.3(2) the *CCAA* and in s. 67(3) the *BIA*. In all three cases, Parliament's intent to enforce the Crown's deemed trust through insolvency proceedings is expressed in clear and unmistakable terms.

**105** The same is not true with regard to the deemed trust created under the *ETA*. Although Parliament creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown to hold unremitted GST monies, and although it purports to maintain this trust notwithstanding any contrary federal or provincial legislation, it does not *confirm* the trust -- or expressly provide for its continued operation -- in either the *BIA* or the *CCAA*. The second of the two mandatory elements I have mentioned is thus absent reflecting Parliament's intention to allow the deemed trust to lapse with the commencement of insolvency proceedings.

**106** The language of the relevant *ETA* provisions is identical in substance to that of the *ITA*, *CPP*, and *EIA* provisions:

**222.** (1) Subject to subsection (1.1), every person who collects an amount as or on account of tax under Division II is deemed, for all purposes and despite any security interest in the amount, to hold the amount in trust for Her Majesty in right of Canada, separate and apart from the property of the person and from

property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, until the amount is remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn under subsection (2).

...

(3) Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed

(a) to be held, from the time the amount was collected by the person, in trust for Her Majesty, separate and apart from the property of the person, whether or not the property is subject to a security interest, ...

...

... and the proceeds of the property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all security interests.

**107** Yet no provision of the *CCAA* provides for the continuation of this deemed trust after the *CCAA* is brought into play.

**108** In short, Parliament has imposed *two* explicit conditions, or "building blocks", for survival under the *CCAA* of deemed trusts created by the *ITA*, *CPP*, and *EIA*. Had Parliament intended to likewise preserve under the *CCAA* deemed trusts created by the *ETA*, it would have included in the *CCAA* the sort of confirmatory provision that explicitly preserves other deemed trusts.

**109** With respect, unlike Tysoe J.A., I do not find it "inconceivable that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception when enacting the current version of s. 222(3) of the *ETA* without considering the *CCAA* as a possible second exception" (2009 BCCA 205, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 242, at para. 37). *All* of the deemed trust provisions excerpted above make explicit reference to the *BIA*. Section 222 of the *ETA* does not break the pattern. Given the near-identical wording of the four deemed trust provisions, it would have been surprising indeed had Parliament not addressed the *BIA* at all in the *ETA*.

**110** Parliament's evident intent was to render GST deemed trusts inoperative upon the institution of insolvency proceedings. Accordingly, s. 222 mentions the *BIA* so as to *exclude* it from its ambit

-- rather than to *include* it, as do the *ITA*, the *CPP*, and the *EIA*.

111 Conversely, I note that *none* of these statutes mentions the *CCAA* expressly. Their specific reference to the *BIA* has no bearing on their interaction with the *CCAA*. Again, it is the confirmatory provisions *in the insolvency statutes* that determine whether a given deemed trust will subsist during insolvency proceedings.

112 Finally, I believe that chambers judges should not segregate GST monies into the Monitor's trust account during *CCAA* proceedings, as was done in this case. The result of Justice Deschamps's reasoning is that GST claims become unsecured under the *CCAA*. Parliament has deliberately chosen to nullify certain Crown super-priorities during insolvency; this is one such instance.

### III

113 For these reasons, like Justice Deschamps, I would allow the appeal with costs in this Court and in the courts below and order that the \$305,202.30 collected by LeRoy Trucking in respect of GST but not yet remitted to the Receiver General of Canada be subject to no deemed trust or priority in favour of the Crown.

The following are the reasons delivered by

114 ABELLA J. (dissenting):-- The central issue in this appeal is whether s. 222 of the *Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 ("*ETA*"), and specifically s. 222(3), gives priority during *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("*CCAA*"), proceedings to the Crown's deemed trust in unremitted GST. I agree with Tysoe J.A. that it does. It follows, in my respectful view, that a court's discretion under s. 11 of the *CCAA* is circumscribed accordingly.

115 Section 11<sup>1</sup> of the *CCAA* stated:

11. (1) Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make an order under this section.

To decide the scope of the court's discretion under s. 11, it is necessary to first determine the priority issue. Section 222(3), the provision of the *ETA* at issue in this case, states:

(3) Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under

this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed

(a) to be held, from the time the amount was collected by the person, in trust for Her Majesty, separate and apart from the property of the person, whether or not the property is subject to a security interest, and

(b) to form no part of the estate or property of the person from the time the amount was collected, whether or not the property has in fact been kept separate and apart from the estate or property of the person and whether or not the property is subject to a security interest

and is property beneficially owned by Her Majesty in right of Canada despite any security interest in the property or in the proceeds thereof and the proceeds of the property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all security interests.

**116** Century Services argued that the *CCAA*'s general override provision, s. 18.3(1), prevailed, and that the deeming provisions in s. 222 of the *ETA* were, accordingly, inapplicable during *CCAA* proceedings. Section 18.3(1) states:

**18.3 (1) ... [N]otwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.**

**117** As MacPherson J.A. correctly observed in *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)* (2005), 73 O.R. (3d) 737 (C.A.), s. 222(3) of the *ETA* is in "clear conflict" with s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* (para. 31). Resolving the conflict between the two provisions is, essentially, what seems to me to be a relatively uncomplicated exercise in statutory interpretation: does the language reflect a clear legislative intention? In my view it does. The deemed trust provision, s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, has unambiguous language stating that it operates notwithstanding any law except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("*BIA*").

**118** By expressly excluding only one statute from its legislative grasp, and by unequivocally stating that it applies despite any other law anywhere in Canada *except* the *BIA*, s. 222(3) has defined its boundaries in the clearest possible terms. I am in complete agreement with the following comments of MacPherson J.A. in *Ottawa Senators*:

The legislative intent of s. 222(3) of the *ETA* is clear. If there is a conflict with "any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*", s. 222(3) prevails. In these words Parliament did two things: it decided that s. 222(3) should trump all other federal laws and, importantly, it addressed the topic of exceptions to its trumping decision and identified a single exception, the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*... . The *BIA* and the *CCAA* are closely related federal statutes. I cannot conceive that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception, but accidentally fail to consider the *CCAA* as a possible second exception. In my view, the omission of the *CCAA* from s. 222(3) of the *ETA* was almost certainly a considered omission. [para. 43]

**119** MacPherson J.A.'s view that the failure to exempt the *CCAA* from the operation of the *ETA* is a reflection of a clear legislative intention, is borne out by how the *CCAA* was subsequently changed after s. 18.3(1) was enacted in 1997. In 2000, when s. 222(3) of the *ETA* came into force, amendments were also introduced to the *CCAA*. Section 18.3(1) was not amended.

**120** The failure to amend s. 18.3(1) is notable because its effect was to protect the legislative *status quo*, notwithstanding repeated requests from various constituencies that s. 18.3(1) be amended to make the priorities in the *CCAA* consistent with those in the *BIA*. In 2002, for example, when Industry Canada conducted a review of the *BIA* and the *CCAA*, the Insolvency Institute of Canada and the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals recommended that the priority regime under the *BIA* be extended to the *CCAA* (Joint Task Force on Business Insolvency Law Reform, *Report* (March 15, 2002), Sch. B, proposal 71, at pp. 37-38). The same recommendations were made by the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce in its 2003 report, *Debtors and Creditors Sharing the Burden: A Review of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*; by the Legislative Review Task Force (Commercial) of the Insolvency Institute of Canada and the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals in its 2005 *Report on the Commercial Provisions of Bill C-55*; and in 2007 by the Insolvency Institute of Canada in a submission to the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce commenting on reforms then under consideration.

**121** Yet the *BIA* remains the only exempted statute under s. 222(3) of the *ETA*. Even after the 2005 decision in *Ottawa Senators* which confirmed that the *ETA* took precedence over the *CCAA*, there was no responsive legislative revision. I see this lack of response as relevant in this case, as it was in *Tele-Mobile Co. v. Ontario*, 2008 SCC 12, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 305, where this Court stated:

While it cannot be said that legislative silence is necessarily determinative of legislative intention, in this case the silence is Parliament's answer to the consistent urging of Telus and other affected businesses and organizations that there be express language in the legislation to ensure that businesses can be reimbursed for the reasonable costs of complying with evidence-gathering orders. I see the legislative history as reflecting Parliament's intention that



compensation not be paid for compliance with production orders. [para. 42]

122 All this leads to a clear inference of a deliberate legislative choice to protect the deemed trust in s. 222(3) from the reach of s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA*.

123 Nor do I see any "policy" justification for interfering, through interpretation, with this clarity of legislative intention. I can do no better by way of explaining why I think the policy argument cannot succeed in this case, than to repeat the words of Tysoe J.A. who said:

I do not dispute that there are valid policy reasons for encouraging insolvent companies to attempt to restructure their affairs so that their business can continue with as little disruption to employees and other stakeholders as possible. It is appropriate for the courts to take such policy considerations into account, but only if it is in connection with a matter that has not been considered by Parliament. Here, Parliament must be taken to have weighed policy considerations when it enacted the amendments to the *CCAA* and *ETA* described above. As Mr. Justice MacPherson observed at para. 43 of *Ottawa Senators*, it is inconceivable that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception when enacting the current version of s. 222(3) of the *ETA* without considering the *CCAA* as a possible second exception. I also make the observation that the 1992 set of amendments to the *BIA* enabled proposals to be binding on secured creditors and, while there is more flexibility under the *CCAA*, it is possible for an insolvent company to attempt to restructure under the auspices of the *BIA*. [para. 37]

124 Despite my view that the clarity of the language in s. 222(3) is dispositive, it is also my view that even the application of other principles of interpretation reinforces this conclusion. In their submissions, the parties raised the following as being particularly relevant: the Crown relied on the principle that the statute which is "later in time" prevails; and Century Services based its argument on the principle that the general provision gives way to the specific (*generalia specialibus non derogant*).

125 The "later in time" principle gives priority to a more recent statute, based on the theory that the legislature is presumed to be aware of the content of existing legislation. If a new enactment is inconsistent with a prior one, therefore, the legislature is presumed to have intended to derogate from the earlier provisions (Ruth Sullivan, *Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes* (5th ed. 2008), at pp. 346-47; Pierre-André Côté, *The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada* (3rd ed. 2000), at p. 358).

126 The exception to this presumptive displacement of pre-existing inconsistent legislation, is the *generalia specialibus non derogant* principle that "[a] more recent, general provision will not be construed as affecting an earlier, special provision" (Côté, at p. 359). Like a Russian Doll, there is also an exception within this exception, namely, that an earlier, specific provision may in fact be

"overruled" by a subsequent general statute if the legislature indicates, through its language, an intention that the general provision prevails (*Doré v. Verdun (City)*, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862).

**127** The primary purpose of these interpretive principles is to assist in the performance of the task of determining the intention of the legislature. This was confirmed by MacPherson J.A. in *Ottawa Senators*, at para. 42:

[T]he overarching rule of statutory interpretation is that statutory provisions should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the legislature in enacting the law. This primary rule takes precedence over all maxims or canons or aids relating to statutory interpretation, including the maxim that the specific prevails over the general (*generalia specialibus non derogant*). As expressed by Hudson J. in *Canada v. Williams*, [1944] S.C.R. 226, ... at p. 239 ... :

The maxim *generalia specialibus non derogant* is relied on as a rule which should dispose of the question, but the maxim is not a rule of law but a rule of construction and bows to the intention of the legislature, if such intention can reasonably be gathered from all of the relevant legislation.

(See also Côté, at p. 358, and Pierre-Andre Côté, with the collaboration of S. Beaulac and M. Devinat, *Interprétation des lois* (4th ed. 2009), at para. 1335.)

**128** I accept the Crown's argument that the "later in time" principle is conclusive in this case. Since s. 222(3) of the *ETA* was enacted in 2000 and s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* was introduced in 1997, s. 222(3) is, on its face, the later provision. This chronological victory can be displaced, as Century Services argues, if it is shown that the more recent provision, s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, is a general one, in which case the earlier, specific provision, s. 18.3(1), prevails (*generalia specialibus non derogant*). But, as previously explained, the prior specific provision does not take precedence if the subsequent general provision appears to "overrule" it. This, it seems to me, is precisely what s. 222(3) achieves through the use of language stating that it prevails despite any law of Canada, of a province, or "any other law" *other than the BIA*. Section 18.3(1) of the *CCAA*, is thereby rendered inoperative for purposes of s. 222(3).

**129** It is true that when the *CCAA* was amended in 2005,<sup>2</sup> s. 18.3(1) was re-enacted as s. 37(1) (S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 131). Deschamps J. suggests that this makes s. 37(1) the new, "later in time" provision. With respect, her observation is refuted by the operation of s. 44(f) of the *Interpretation Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, which expressly deals with the (non) effect of re-enacting, without significant substantive changes, a repealed provision (see *Attorney General of Canada v. Public Service Staff Relations Board*, [1977] 2 F.C. 663, dealing with the predecessor provision to s. 44(f)). It directs that new enactments not be construed as "new law" unless they differ in substance from the repealed provision:

44. Where an enactment, in this section called the "former enactment", is repealed and another enactment, in this section called the "new enactment", is substituted therefor,

...

(f) except to the extent that the provisions of the new enactment are not in substance the same as those of the former enactment, the new enactment shall not be held to operate as new law, but shall be construed and have effect as a consolidation and as declaratory of the law as contained in the former enactment;

Section 2 of the *Interpretation Act* defines an enactment as "an Act or regulation or any portion of an Act or regulation".

130 Section 37(1) of the current *CCAA* is almost identical to s. 18.3(1). These provisions are set out for ease of comparison, with the differences between them underlined:

37. (1) Subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

18.3 (1) Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

131 The application of s. 44(f) of the *Interpretation Act* simply confirms the government's clearly expressed intent, found in Industry Canada's clause-by-clause review of Bill C-55, where s. 37(1) was identified as "a technical amendment to re-order the provisions of this Act". During second reading, the Hon. Bill Rompkey, then the Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate, confirmed that s. 37(1) represented only a technical change:

On a technical note relating to the treatment of deemed trusts for taxes, the bill [*sic*] makes no changes to the underlying policy intent, despite the fact that in the case of a restructuring under the *CCAA*, sections of the act [*sic*] were repealed and substituted with renumbered versions due to the extensive reworking of the *CCAA*.

(*Debates of the Senate*, vol. 142, 1st Sess., 38th Parl., November 23, 2005, at p. 2147)

132 Had the substance of s. 18.3(1) altered in any material way when it was replaced by s. 37(1), I would share Deschamps J.'s view that it should be considered a new provision. But since s. 18.3(1) and s. 37(1) are the same in substance, the transformation of s. 18.3(1) into s. 37(1) has no effect on the interpretive queue, and s. 222(3) of the *ETA* remains the "later in time" provision (Sullivan, at p. 347).

133 This means that the deemed trust provision in s. 222(3) of the *ETA* takes precedence over s. 18.3(1) during *CCAA* proceedings. The question then is how that priority affects the discretion of a court under s. 11 of the *CCAA*.

134 While s. 11 gives a court discretion to make orders notwithstanding the *BIA* and the *Winding-up Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11, that discretion is not liberated from the operation of any other federal statute. Any exercise of discretion is therefore circumscribed by whatever limits are imposed by statutes *other* than the *BIA* and the *Winding-up Act*. That includes the *ETA*. The chambers judge in this case was, therefore, required to respect the priority regime set out in s. 222(3) of the *ETA*. Neither s. 18.3(1) nor s. 11 of the *CCAA* gave him the authority to ignore it. He could not, as a result, deny the Crown's request for payment of the GST funds during the *CCAA* proceedings.

135 Given this conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider whether there was an express trust.

136 I would dismiss the appeal.

*Appeal allowed with costs, ABELLA J. dissenting.*

\* \* \* \* \*

## APPENDIX

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (as at December 13, 2007)

11. (1) [Powers of court] Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make an order under this section.

...

(3) [Initial application court orders] A court may, on an initial application in respect of a company, make an order on such terms as it may impose, effective for such period as the court deems necessary not exceeding thirty days,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (1);

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.

(4) [Other than initial application court orders] A court may, on an application in respect of a company other than an initial application, make an order on such terms as it may impose,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for such period as the court deems necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (1);

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.

...

(6) [Burden of proof on application] The court shall not make an order under subsection (3) or (4) unless

(a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make such an order appropriate; and

(b) in the case of an order under subsection (4), the applicant also satisfies the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

**11.4 (1)** [Her Majesty affected] An order made under section 11 may provide that

(a) Her Majesty in right of Canada may not exercise rights under subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* or any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or

of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, in respect of the company if the company is a tax debtor under that subsection or provision, for such period as the court considers appropriate but ending not later than

- (i) the expiration of the order,
- (ii) the refusal of a proposed compromise by the creditors or the court,
- (iii) six months following the court sanction of a compromise or arrangement,
- (iv) the default by the company on any term of a compromise or arrangement,  
or
- (v) the performance of a compromise or arrangement in respect of the company; and

(b) Her Majesty in right of a province may not exercise rights under any provision of provincial legislation in respect of the company where the company is a debtor under that legislation and the provision has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

- (i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or
- (ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

for such period as the court considers appropriate but ending not later than the occurrence or time referred to in whichever of subparagraphs (a)(i) to (v) may apply.

(2) [When order ceases to be in effect] An order referred to in subsection (1) ceases to be in effect if

- (a) the company defaults on payment of any amount that becomes due to Her Majesty after the order is made and could be subject to a demand under

- (i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,
  - (ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or
  - (iii) under any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum
    - (A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or
    - (B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection; or
- (b) any other creditor is or becomes entitled to realize a security on any property that could be claimed by Her Majesty in exercising rights under
- (i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,
  - (ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or
  - (iii) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

- (A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or
- (B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection.

(3) [Operation of similar legislation] An order made under section 11, other than an order referred to in subsection (1) of this section, does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

- (i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or
- (ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (c), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.



**18.3** (1) [Deemed trusts] Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(2) [Exceptions] Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* (each of which is in this subsection referred to as a "federal provision") nor in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under any law of a province that creates a deemed trust the sole purpose of which is to ensure remittance to Her Majesty in right of the province of amounts deducted or withheld under a law of the province where

(a) that law of the province imposes a tax similar in nature to the tax imposed under the *Income Tax Act* and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as the amounts referred to in subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, or

(b) the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, that law of the province establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as amounts referred to in subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*,

and for the purpose of this subsection, any provision of a law of a province that creates a deemed trust is, notwithstanding any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as the corresponding federal provision.

**18.4** (1) [Status of Crown claims] In relation to a proceeding under this Act, all claims, including secured claims, of Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province or any body under an enactment respecting workers' compensation, in this section and in section 18.5 called a "workers' compensation body", rank as unsecured claims.

...

(3) [Operation of similar legislation] Subsection (1) does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

- (i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or
- (ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (c), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

**20.** [Act to be applied conjointly with other Acts] The provisions of this Act may be applied together with the provisions of any Act of Parliament or of the legislature of any province, that authorizes or makes provision for the sanction of compromises or arrangements between a company and its shareholders or any class of them.

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (as at September 18, 2009)

**11.** [General power of court] Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

**11.02** (1) [Stays, etc. -- initial application] A court may, on an initial application in respect of a debtor company, make an order on any terms that it may impose, effective for the period that the

court considers necessary, which period may not be more than 30 days,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*;

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

(2) [Stays, etc. -- other than initial application] A court may, on an application in respect of a debtor company other than an initial application, make an order, on any terms that it may impose,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for any period that the court considers necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in paragraph (1)(a);

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

(3) [Burden of proof on application] The court shall not make the order unless

- (a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make the order appropriate; and
- (b) in the case of an order under subsection (2), the applicant also satisfies the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

...

**11.09** (1) [Stay -- Her Majesty] An order made under section 11.02 may provide that

(a) Her Majesty in right of Canada may not exercise rights under subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* or any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the

*Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, in respect of the company if the company is a tax debtor under that subsection or provision, for the period that the court considers appropriate but ending not later than

- (i) the expiry of the order,
- (ii) the refusal of a proposed compromise by the creditors or the court,
- (iii) six months following the court sanction of a compromise or an arrangement,
- (iv) the default by the company on any term of a compromise or an arrangement, or
- (v) the performance of a compromise or an arrangement in respect of the company; and

(b) Her Majesty in right of a province may not exercise rights under any provision of provincial legislation in respect of the company if the company is a debtor under that legislation and the provision has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

- (i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or
- (ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

for the period that the court considers appropriate but ending not later than the occurrence or time referred to in whichever of subparagraphs (a)(i) to (v) that may apply.

(2) [When order ceases to be in effect] The portions of an order made under section 11.02 that affect the exercise of rights of Her Majesty referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b) cease to be in effect if

- (a) the company defaults on the payment of any amount that becomes due to Her Majesty after the order is made and could be subject to a demand under

- (i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,
  - (ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or
  - (iii) any provision of provincial legislation that has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum
    - (A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or
    - (B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection; or
- (b) any other creditor is or becomes entitled to realize a security on any property that could be claimed by Her Majesty in exercising rights under
- (i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,
  - (ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or
  - (iii) any provision of provincial legislation that has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum
    - (A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax

- imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or
- (B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection.

(3) [Operation of similar legislation] An order made under section 11.02, other than the portions of that order that affect the exercise of rights of Her Majesty referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), does not affect the operation of

- (a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,
- (b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or
- (c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum
- (i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or
- (ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (c), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

37. (1) [Deemed trusts] Subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in federal or

provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(2) [Exceptions] Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* (each of which is in this subsection referred to as a "federal provision"), nor does it apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under any law of a province that creates a deemed trust the sole purpose of which is to ensure remittance to Her Majesty in right of the province of amounts deducted or withheld under a law of the province if

(a) that law of the province imposes a tax similar in nature to the tax imposed under the *Income Tax Act* and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as the amounts referred to in subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, or

(b) the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, that law of the province establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as amounts referred to in subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*,

and for the purpose of this subsection, any provision of a law of a province that creates a deemed trust is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as the corresponding federal provision.

*Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 (as at December 13, 2007)

**222.** (1) [Trust for amounts collected] Subject to subsection (1.1), every person who collects an amount as or on account of tax under Division II is deemed, for all purposes and despite any security interest in the amount, to hold the amount in trust for Her Majesty in right of Canada, separate and apart from the property of the person and from property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, until the amount is remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn under subsection (2).

(1.1) [Amounts collected before bankruptcy] Subsection (1) does not apply, at or after the time a person becomes a bankrupt (within the meaning of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), to any amounts that, before that time, were collected or became collectible by the person as or on account of tax under Division II.

...

(3) [Extension of trust] Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed

(a) to be held, from the time the amount was collected by the person, in trust for Her Majesty, separate and apart from the property of the person, whether or not the property is subject to a security interest, and

(b) to form no part of the estate or property of the person from the time the amount was collected, whether or not the property has in fact been kept separate and apart from the estate or property of the person and whether or not the property is subject to a security interest

and is property beneficially owned by Her Majesty in right of Canada despite any security interest in the property or in the proceeds thereof and the proceeds of the property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all security interests.

*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (as at December 13, 2007)

67. (1) [Property of bankrupt] The property of a bankrupt divisible among his creditors shall not comprise

(a) property held by the bankrupt in trust for any other person,

(b) any property that as against the bankrupt is exempt from execution or seizure under any laws applicable in the province within which the property is situated and within which the bankrupt resides, or

(b.1) such goods and services tax credit payments and prescribed payments relating to the essential needs of an individual as are made in prescribed circumstances and are not property referred to in paragraph (a) or (b),

but it shall comprise

(c) all property wherever situated of the bankrupt at the date of his bankruptcy or



that may be acquired by or devolve on him before his discharge, and

(d) such powers in or over or in respect of the property as might have been exercised by the bankrupt for his own benefit.

(2) [Deemed trusts] Subject to subsection (3), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a bankrupt shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty for the purpose of paragraph (1)(a) unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(3) [Exceptions] Subsection (2) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* (each of which is in this subsection referred to as a "federal provision") nor in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under any law of a province that creates a deemed trust the sole purpose of which is to ensure remittance to Her Majesty in right of the province of amounts deducted or withheld under a law of the province where

(a) that law of the province imposes a tax similar in nature to the tax imposed under the *Income Tax Act* and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as the amounts referred to in subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, or

(b) the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, that law of the province establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as amounts referred to in subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*,

and for the purpose of this subsection, any provision of a law of a province that creates a deemed trust is, notwithstanding any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as the corresponding federal provision.

**86.** (1) [Status of Crown claims] In relation to a bankruptcy or proposal, all provable claims, including secured claims, of Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province or of any body under an Act respecting workers' compensation, in this section and in section 87 called a "workers' compensation body", rank as unsecured claims.

...

(3) [Exceptions] Subsection (1) does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*;

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts; or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

- (i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or
- (ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (c), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

**Solicitors:**

*Solicitors for the appellant: Fraser Milner Casgrain, Vancouver.*

*Solicitor for the respondent: Department of Justice, Vancouver.*

cp/e/ql ecl/qlcal/qlced/qljyw/qlhcs/qljyw/qlhcs/qlana/qlcas/qlcas

1 Section 11 was amended, effective September 18, 2009, and now states:

11. Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

2 The amendments did not come into force until September 18, 2009.

----- End of Request -----

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**Tab 11**

*Indexed as:*

**Diemaster Tool Inc. v. Skvortsoff (Trustee of)**

**Between**

**Diemaster Tool Incorporated, applicant, and  
Nick Zukov, George Skvortsoff and Natalie Skvortsoff,  
respondents**

[1991] O.J. No. 3465

3 C.B.R. (3d) 133

Doc. A193/90

Ontario Court of Justice (General Division)

**Loukidelis J.**

January 4, 1991.

*Creditors and debtors -- Debtors' relief legislation -- Companies' creditors arrangement legislation  
-- Arrangement, when available -- When arrangement would be useless.*

Diemaster Tool applied for an order under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act directing a meeting of all creditors, that all proceedings against it be stayed and directing that the court fix a date for filing a plan of arrangement. Diemaster was a manufacturing company which encountered financial difficulties. Its main secured creditor, the Bank of Nova Scotia decided to call its loan when Diemaster defaulted after having been given several extensions for purposes of finding alternate financing. Ultimately, Diemaster was able to find equity investors just prior to the Bank's appointment of a receiver. It issued a trust deed and two debentures to secure loans made by two individuals. Diemaster claimed that it was able to operate on a cash basis despite its insolvent state, and that it should be afforded more time in order to work on the existing contracts it had and attempt to keep the company as a going concern as well as to save the employment of 75 workers. The Bank opposed the application and indicated that even if a meeting of creditors were ordered, it, as the major creditor would oppose Diemaster's plan of arrangement and thereby put an end to the arrangement in any event.

HELD: Application dismissed. The Bank gave Diemaster a reasonable amount of time to find

alternate financing or investors. Its actions were not precipitous as claimed. The two new debentures issued to the investors were not a sham as argued by the Bank even if entered into for purposes of qualifying for relief under the Act. Diemaster did file a proposal which requested that the Bank capitalize the interest owing along with other conditions in order to assist Diemaster for a six-month period. However, to the extent that the Bank found the proposal unsatisfactory, and that it would vote against it at any creditors' meeting ordered, it was fruitless to make the order requested. Given the Bank's position as the main creditor, its position would mean that the proposal would be voted down. This was not a case in which the court should exercise its discretion in favour of granting the debtor's application.

**Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:**

Bank Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-1, s. 178(1).

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, ss. 3, 5, 6, 11.

**Counsel:**

J.M. Sereida and James Johnson, for the applicant.

F.J.C. Newbould, Q.C. and C.J. Heselmann, for the respondents.

---

**1 LOUKIDELIS J.:**-- These proceedings are brought pursuant to the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 for an order:

- (a) directing a meeting of all secured and unsecured creditors;
- (b) directing that all proceedings taken or that might be taken against the applicants be stayed pending further order of the court; and
- (c) directing that the court fix a date for filing a plan of compromise or arrangement by the applicant.

**2** Diemaster Tool Inc. (hereinafter called "Diemaster") was incorporated February 18, 1975. It is a manufacturing company primarily engaged in high-tech machining, stamping and tool and die making. At the present time, it employs some 75 people and has a total annual payroll of approximately \$2,400,000. In the last 2 years, the company has begun concentrating on the manufacture and supply of parts to the aircraft and aerospace industry. In particular, it has become a manufacturer and supplier of parts for military helicopters, military and commercial aircraft, as well as parts used in weapons systems and as well for companies engaged in the manufacture of commercial vehicles.

**3** This company was established by George Yui, who is the sole director and officer of the

company and who, together with his wife, and on behalf of his four children, control all the outstanding shares of the company.

4 In or about the year 1985, the Bank of Nova Scotia became the main lender to the company. It remains the largest secured creditor and is owed at December 7, 1990, by the company's estimate, the sum of approximately \$6,264,201.01. In order to secure its loans, the bank has taken a first charge over Diemaster's personal and real property. The bank estimates that, in total, it represents 99.8 per cent of the secured creditors of the company and 72 per cent of the aggregate of the secured and unsecured creditors of the company.

5 The security held by the bank consists of:

- (a) demand debenture containing a first fixed charge on all of the real and personal property of the company;
- (b) a general assignment of book debts covering all accounts receivable;
- (c) a chattel mortgage over equipment and security under s. 178(1) of the Bank Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-1 over Diemaster's materials and inventory.

6 In addition, the bank holds a guarantee of up to \$1 million from Ontario Development Corporation, which guarantee expired on March 18, 1990 but still covers part of the debt owing to the bank.

7 The bank became concerned about the financial position of Diemaster and the status of the loans which it held and retained Peat Marwick as consultants to examine the business. In March of 1989, that study was completed and Peat Marwick recommended that Diemaster would require a minimum capital infusion of \$2 million. That was not done by the shareholders of the company from their own funds and that money could not be obtained from the bank or any creditor. As a result of the report, the bank in July of 1989 advised Diemaster, in writing, of its concerns and notified Diemaster that it was in default under the terms of the credit with the bank, including the fact that working-capital, tangible net worth and accounts receivable were all less than those amounts required under the terms of the credit extended to Diemaster.

8 The president of the company, George Yui, has acknowledged that Diemaster was, and is, in default under the terms of the loan. Beginning in the latter part of 1989 and extending to early 1990, a lengthy exchange of correspondence and meetings ensued with the bank asking that either an infusion of capital be made and the defaults under the terms of the loan remedied or that the moneys be repaid. Diemaster made several requests for extensions which were granted.

9 On February 22, 1990, the bank made demand from Diemaster of all debts and liabilities owing to the bank. On that day, the balance owing was \$6,614,939.20 plus interest of \$82,433.49. Diemaster was unable or unwilling to repay the bank. After due notice was given, the bank, on December 10, 1990, appointed Ernst & Young as receiver. These various demands over the period of time leading up to December 10, 1990 resulted in efforts by Diemaster to obtain other financing



or the sale of a part interest in the company.

10 Diemaster, for its part, indicates that its decision in 1988 to change the focus of its operations from tooling to high-tech machining resulted in the expenditure of substantial sums of money in research and development in the sum of \$350,000. In addition, it had two substantial bad debt write-offs totalling one-half a million dollars involving two major customers. As well, there was a downturn in the tooling industry which decreased profits. However, the company states that the bank's conversion of a term loan into a demand loan resulted in additional interest payments of \$120,000 a year and helped to create the difficult financial condition of the company.

11 The company states that since the beginning of 1990, the company has had profitable periods. Indeed, if one takes the period from May 1, 1990 and ending November 30, 1990, Diemaster earned a profit during that period including a substantial profit of \$65,000 in the month of November. In addition, it has managed to reduce bank debt by \$335,000 in this period of time. It is able to operate on a cash basis and seeks time now to respond to the demand for payment either by finding new investors or new sources of money.

12 Diemaster acknowledges that it is insolvent and further acknowledges that the company would not, on its own, be able to obtain financing from any Canadian banking institution. As a result, Yui states that Diemaster retained the services of Sharwood & Company on an exclusive basis to secure an equity investor and arrange financing necessary to take out the indebtedness of the bank.

13 Sharwood's effort did not result in a successful search but various interested parties have made themselves known and have expressed an interest to acquire a controlling interest in Diemaster and the completion of any transaction that would facilitate the acquisition.

14 On December 6 and 7, 1990, in anticipation of the bank's appointment of a receiver and manager, Diemaster signed a trust deed and issued two debentures for \$10 each to Nick Zukov as trustee to secure loans made by the two persons named in the style of cause, George and Natalie Skvortsoff.

15 On December 10, 1990, following its appointment as receiver and manager of the undertaking, property and assets of Diemaster, a representative of Ernst & Young attended at the premises of the company to take all necessary action to secure the bank's position but was refused access to the premises.

16 On December 12, 1990, the notice of application was made returnable, on short notice, and came on before the Honourable Mr. Justice Lawson in Brampton. Following discussions between the parties, an undertaking was given and, on the basis of that undertaking, the following order was made by Lawson J.:

"Adjourned to 19/12/90 at Toronto.

Receiver Ernst & Young and the Bank of Nova Scotia are restrained by their undertaking from sending out any further notices to account debtors of applicant. Current payroll is to be paid out of receivables, paid to receiver or the Bank of Nova Scotia. Any excess of receivables received over and above the funds required to meet the current payroll is to be held in escrow by receiver or the Bank of Nova Scotia pending further order of the court."

17 The matter was returned to Brampton notwithstanding the adjournment of the matter to Toronto because the parties found that there was no possibility that the matter could be dealt with on December 19, 1990 in Toronto. The matter came on before me on December 19, 1990 and the hearing continued over the period of 2 days. Because a decision was reserved in this matter, the parties agreed that the decision be reserved on certain agreed terms and conditions.

18 This matter has proceeded before me for a stay of proceedings and for the direction that the court fix a date for filing a plan of compromise or arrangement. Diemaster seeks a period of 6 months so that it can conclude a transaction with one of the interested parties named in the materials with a view to the payment in full to the bank and a provision for payment of the unsecured creditors of the company. In examining the materials, it would appear that Diemaster seeks either new loans so that the company may be continued and the shares held by the same shareholders or that the company be sold or that a controlling interest in the company be sold with the present shareholders holding a minority interest in the company.

19 Diemaster recites that the move of the bank has been precipitous and that "reasonable time has not been provided to Diemaster to make arrangements necessary to pay the indebtedness of the bank." The company further states that the bank is well secured and that the statements in the report prepared by Ernst & Young dated February 15, 1990 show that the bank's security exceeded by almost \$2 million the indebtedness owing to it by Diemaster.

20 The company also states that it may well be in receipt of valuable contracts totalling \$3 million from a company called Avscom for the production of shafts for helicopter engines. These helicopters are now in use by the U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf.

21 One of the issues in dispute is whether George Yui's intention to invest a further \$500,000 into the company had been refused by the bank by letter dated February 16, 1990. In the reply from the manager of the bank branch with whom he did business, Yui was advised that the bank had no objection in him doing so but pointed out that the bank considered that the investment would not result in any material improvement in the bank's position in the light of the substantial additional moneys that would still be required to respond to the capital needs of the company.

22 The sum of \$500,000 reappears in a letter dated November 30, 1990 sent to Diemaster by the vice-president of Canadian Commercial Credit for the bank, in which one of the conditions required that Yui provide his personal guarantee of the company's obligations in the amount of \$500,000 and secured by cash collateral or other readily realizable collateral acceptable to the bank or a mortgage

of real property acceptable to the bank having a lending value as determined by the bank of not less than \$300,000. By letter dated December 6, 1990, the solicitors for the bank advised counsel for the applicant in these proceedings that the bank's letter dated November 30, 1990 contained a specific offer to enter into a stand-still agreement for approximately 3 months and that one of the conditions of that agreement was that Yui was to provide a personal guarantee limited to \$500,000 and secured by security having a lending value of not less than \$300,000. That same letter advised counsel that unless certain points in that letter were satisfied by December 7, 1990 at noon hour that the bank intended to take steps under its security. This Mr. Yui was unable or unwilling to do.

23 As a result of the increasing pressure by the bank in the latter part of November 1990 and early December 1990, two expressions of interest in the company came forward. One prospective investor sought the opportunity to investigate the company and indicated that it would require until the end of January to make a due-diligence analysis. In the event of a positive result, a transaction could close by February 15, 1991. A second interested group of investors entered into a letter of intent and offered to purchase subject to conditions and subject to expiry on December 20, 1990 which called for them to complete a due diligence examination of the operation and closing would follow "in weeks".

24 One of the issues raised in the affidavits and other materials filed is whether the bank had given a reasonable amount of time to Diemaster and its officers to find alternative financial sources or potential investors. On the evidence before me, it seems clear that the bank had expressed its disquietude from late 1989 through to the end of November 1990 with the financial position of the company. The bank indicated that it wished its money and gave dates throughout that period of time for compliance with various requests for payment or the supply of additional security or the injection of additional capital. There were various requests by Diemaster for additional time and what is clear in the correspondence is that the bank did give them the time that was requested on numerous occasions. The treatment of the borrower in giving them time to right their financial problems or to find investors cannot be faulted.

25 It is evident that the bank had lost confidence in the management abilities of Mr. Yui and had concluded that he could not live up to the many promises he made to the bank. It was evident to the bank that Diemaster was seriously under-capitalized and that a substantial minimum capital injection was required. They also questioned the financial statements of the company and their accuracy.

26 Rather than being satisfied that the security held more than covered the indebtedness to the bank, the bank had concerns that the security did not cover their indebtedness and there was a distinct possibility that their position would deteriorate further. Their present estimate is that the assets, if sold as a going concern or even on a liquidation basis, would just about cover the loan. The value of the real estate could well deteriorate in the face of the declining real estate values now current in the Toronto market. They have also been told by Diemaster's own solicitors by letter dated November 20, 1990 that liquidation would result in the return of far less than 50 per cent of

the outstanding indebtedness to the bank. In the bank's view, Diemaster has been operating at a loss and does not understand how the company could continue to lose money and continue to operate. Further, Diemaster has no operating line of credit and when one considers that the demand for payment was made on February 22, 1990, it cannot be said that the bank's action in moving on its security could be classified as precipitous. Further, in correspondence as early as April of 1990, Diemaster was advised that the failure to meet its commitments to the bank would result in the appointment of a receiver and manager of the undertakings, property and assets of the business.

27 The bank has indicated that it wishes to operate the company as a going concern using the services of Ernst & Young until the company can be sold. In the event that a buyer cannot be found immediately and they prove unable to continue the operation of the business, the assets of the company would be sold piecemeal.

28 If Diemaster could use a composition under the statute, it would allow the business to continue and to be refinanced or sold in an orderly way allowing the company to be continued, not only in order to protect the existing contracts that the company holds, but to protect the jobs of the 75 employees whose livelihood depends on the continuation of the company.

29 Another factor that is not covered in the affidavit material, but upon which representations were made, concerns the role of the military contracts filled by Diemaster and whose continuation is proving of more than passing concern to Revenue Canada and to the Canadian Commercial Corporation. Revenue Canada is owed a substantial amount of money in statutory deductions that have not been remitted. The company is now meeting those payments on a current monthly basis and promises to pick up the arrears through the continuation of the business. Counsel for Revenue Canada believes that the continuation of the company will allow the company to liquidate this obligation in an orderly manner.

30 In addition, the contracts that it holds for the supply of military parts is not with the U.S. government or any contractor of the U.S. government but with the Canadian Commercial Corporation. This is a statutory corporation of the government of Canada. That company enters into commercial contracts with foreign governments and finds Canadian companies to supply goods under those contracts. Diemaster is one of these suppliers. There was some concern expressed that in the event that a receiver and manager is appointed that the foreign government will take this as a default and the Canadian Commercial Corporation would be required to find another supplier and to seek its remedies for any losses that are suffered. At the same time, these contracts with the foreign governments were not produced and it cannot be said that the company's contracts would be cancelled in the event of a receiver-manager taking over. It seems, too, that the Canadian Commercial Corporation is anxious that the company continue and endorses a tie with one C.A. Bishop whose proposed participation in Diemaster would be either in the purchase of a controlling interest or in the management of the company. That letter undated was entered as an exhibit to the second affidavit of George Yui on December 18, 1990. This affidavit shows the possibility that Charles Bishop might be taking a controlling interest in the company or would be retained as a

senior executive in Diemaster. There is no evidence that Mr. Bishop, who is a former civil servant, has the means to become a holder of a controlling interest in Diemaster or that he has the backing to make such a bid. Further, he is proffered as a managing executive when his experience as an engineer has been in government. There is no evidence that he has any hands-on experience in the management of a company.

**31** There is another matter that has been raised here. In the affidavit of Louise Cannon, a senior vice-president with the Canadian Commercial Credit Department of the plaintiff bank, she deposes that the deposits to Diemaster's account in the months of October and November 1990 were \$450,000 and \$480,000 respectively. In the month of December, only \$177,000 Canadian have been deposited and these include the U.S. dollar deposits. The last deposit into that account was made on December 11, 1990. This was raised as a matter of concern in view of the endorsement of Lawson J. which, while not stating so specifically, intended that the receipts would be deposited so that the current payroll could be paid out of those receivables and the moneys could be held in escrow by the receiver or the bank pending further order of the Court. In an affidavit of George Yui undated but evidently sworn on December 20, 1990, Mr. Yui acknowledged that the company had received additional moneys totalling \$73,040.03. These cheques were held and not deposited. These cheques were turned over to counsel for the bank in Court to be deposited in one of the two accounts of the bank in accordance with terms of agreement entered into between counsel on December 20, 1990 when it became evident that this decision would be reserved.

**32** These proceedings were launched pursuant to s. 5 of the Companies Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (hereinafter referred to as "C.C.A.A."), which provides as follows:

"5. Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its secured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs."

**33** Once this summary application is made, the Court, in its discretion, may direct that a meeting of secured creditors be held to consider a proposed plan. Once that determination is made that a meeting be called, the creditors must be placed into classes for that meeting. The reason for that formation of classes can be seen by an examination of s. 6 of the Act which reads as follows:

"6. Where a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings thereof respectively held pursuant to sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court, and if so sanctioned is binding

- (a) on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for any such class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, and on the company; and
- (b) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a receiving order has been made under the Bankruptcy Act or is in the course of being wound up under the Winding-up Act, on the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator and contributories of the company."

**34** At that meeting, a plan of reorganization is presented for the approval of those creditors. Once approved, that plan is presented to the Court for approval. That approval is granted or withheld by the Court on the fulfilment of three criteria enunciated by Trainor J. in *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) at 182-183. These criteria are:

- "1. There must be strict compliance with all statutory requirements.
- 2. All material filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine if anything has been done or purported to be done which is not authorized by the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.
- 3. The plan must be fair and reasonable."

**35** Should a court exercise its discretion to allow a meeting of creditors to be called to consider a plan of reorganization, the court has wide powers to maintain the status quo as provided in s. 11 of the Act, which empowers the Court to make any interim orders as therein provided:

- "11. Notwithstanding anything in the Bankruptcy Act or the Winding-up Act, whenever an application has been made under this Act in respect of any company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit;
  - (a) make an order staying, until such time as the court may prescribe or until any further order, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the Bankruptcy Act and the Winding-up Act or either of them;
  - (b) restrain further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company on such terms as the court sees fit; and
  - (c) make an order that no suit, action or other proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except with the leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court imposes."

**36** While the remedies in the C.C.A.A. are broadly stated, they are not open to each and every insolvent company. Rather, only those companies that can bring themselves within the provisions of s. 3 are entitled to seek the relief outlined in that statute. Section 3 reads as follows:

"3. This Act does not apply in respect of a debtor company unless

- (a) the debtor company has outstanding an issue of secured or unsecured bonds of the debtor company or of a predecessor in title of the debtor company issued under a trust deed or other instrument running in favour of a trustee; and
- (b) the compromise or arrangement that is proposed under section 4 or 5 in respect of the debtor company includes a compromise or an arrangement between the debtor company and the holders of an issue referred to in paragraph (a)."

37 The purpose and aims of the C.C.A.A. have been outlined in a number of cases since the statute was first enacted in 1933. Thus, in *Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act; Attorney General for Canada v. Attorney General for Quebec*, [1934] S.C.R. 659, Duff C.J.C. stated the following:

"Furthermore, the aim of the Act is to deal with the existing condition of insolvency, in itself, to enable arrangements to be made, in view of the insolvent condition of the company, under judicial authority which, otherwise, might not be valid prior to the initiation of proceedings in bankruptcy. Ex facie it would appear that such a scheme in principle does not radically depart from the normal character of bankruptcy legislation. As Lord Cave impliedly states in *Royal Bank of Canada v. Larue* (1), 'the exclusive legislative authority to deal with all matters within the domain of bankruptcy and insolvency is vested in Parliament.' "

38 In *United Maritime Fishermen Co-op., Re* (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161, Hoyt J.A. of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal referred to the statute as having been designed to protect companies in financial hardship while they attempt to work their way out of their difficulty. He likened it to Chapter 11 proceedings in the United States.

39 Wachowich J. in *Meridian Developments Incorporated v. Toronto-Dominion Bank; Meridian Developments Inc. v. Nu-West Limited*, 52 C.B.R. (N.S.) 109, referred to its scope and purpose as follows:

"The legislation is intended to have wide scope and allows a judge to make orders which will effectively maintain the status quo for a period while the insolvent company attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for a proposed arrangement which will enable the company to remain in operation for what is, hopefully, the future benefit of both the company and its creditors."

40 Thus, it can be said to have a broad remedial purpose giving a debtor an opportunity to find a way out of financial difficulties short of bankruptcy, foreclosure or the seizure of assets through

receivership proceedings. It allows a debtor to find a plan that will enable him to meet the demands of his creditors through refinancing with new lending, equity financing or the sale of the business as a going concern. This alternative may well give the creditors of all classes a larger return and protect the jobs of the company's employees.

**41** The issues raised by the bank in its statement of fact and law include the following:

1. The company has not proposed any compromise or arrangement with its secured creditor.
2. Diemaster has lost the power to make an application under the C.C.A.A. as a result of the appointment by the bank of a receiver-manager of the assets and undertaking of the company.
3. The company does not qualify as a debtor company under s. 3 of the C.C.A.A. because the two \$10 debentures issued prior to the appointment of a receiver manager are not debentures within the meaning of the C.C.A.A. and are not bona fide. In the alternative, to allow these trust deeds to engage the protection of the Act would make the addition of s. 3 of no effect.
4. Should the company be found to come within the Act, the court is asked to exercise its discretion against granting any order.

**42** The company joins issue on each and every one of these points.

**43** Turning to the first issue, the company during the course of the 2-day hearing did, in fact, file a proposal. In effect, it proposed that the bank capitalize the interest owing; that it receive no payment in the months of January and February and beginning in March 1991, payments that did not quite meet the interest payments would be made for the duration of the stay period requested of 6 months. In my view, it cannot be said that on the facts here that the company has not proposed an arrangement with respect to the secured creditors. The real question is whether the arrangement proposed is a satisfactory one which ought to move the Court, in its consideration of whether the discretion of the Court should be exercised in favour of the company, to give it favourable consideration.

**44** As authority for this proposition, the bank relies on the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in *Nova Metal Products Incorporated v. Comiskey (Trustee of)*, 684/90, 685/90 decision November 2, 1990. Finlayson J.A., speaking for the majority, dealt with the issue whether the appointment of a receiver-manager could divest a company and its board of directors of the power to deal with property. It must be remembered that, in that particular case, the bank had appointed a receiver and manager of the undertaking, property and assets mortgaged and charged under their debenture. The company, 2 days later, issued a debenture for \$10,000 pursuant to a trust deed executed the same day. The Court held that the effect of the appointment was to divest the company and its board of directors of the power to deal with the property comprised in the appointment. In particular, the company did not have the power to create further indebtedness and to interfere with



the ability of the receiver to manage the two companies.

45 That, however, is not the situation here. The two debentures in which Nick Zukov is named as trustee were issued on December 6, 1990 and a receiver-manager was appointed under an appointment dated December 10, 1990. Thus, we have the converse situation here. Since the company does not have the power, acting through its board of directors, to enter into new debt because the receiver-manager's appointment divests him of the power to deal with the company's assets, the appointment of a receiver-manager subsequent to creation of the new debt cannot have a retrospective effect nor could it be said to limit the powers of the board of directors to act. In my view, the Nova case does not stand for that proposition.

46 The more difficult question refers to the third issue; that is, whether the creation of the two debentures, each in the sum of \$10, can bring the company within the provisions of the C.C.A.A. The company acknowledges that the debentures issued by the company under the trust indenture to Nick Zukov were issued for value and, more importantly, were issued for the purpose of qualifying the company under s. 3 of the Act. The cases referred to often speak of them as instant trust deeds or sham trust deeds. Counsel for the company frankly admitted that the sole purpose of issuing the debentures was to qualify the company as a debtor company within the meaning of s. 3 of the C.C.A.A. The majority in the Nova case did not pass on the efficacy of these instant trust deeds, refusing to address the issue until another case when the answers could be dispositive of an application under the C.C.A.A.

47 Doherty J.A. (dissenting) found this mechanism to be perfectly proper. At p. 13, he stated the following:

"In my view, it is inappropriate to refer to these transactions as 'shams'. They are neither false nor counterfeit, but rather are exactly what they appear to be, transactions made to meet jurisdictional requirements of the Act so as to permit an application for reorganization under the Act. Such transactions are apparently well known to the commercial Bar: B. O'Leary, 'A Review of the Companies Creditors Arrangements Act' (1987) 4 Nat. Insolvency Rev., 38, at p. 39; C. Ham, ' "Instant" Trust Deeds Under the C.C.A.A.' (1988), 2 Commercial Insolvency Reporter 25; G.B. Morawetz, 'Emerging Trends in the Use of the Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act' (1990) Proceedings, First Annual General Meeting and Conference of the Insolvency Institute of Canada."

48 At the same time, he was dealing with two \$10,000 debentures and two smaller ones rather than the nominal ones relied upon in this case. That matter was considered by Hoilett J. in *Ultracare Management Incorporated v. Gammon* (unreported) 2497/90 delivered December 18, 1990 at p. 12:

"I shall dispose of that jurisdictional issue very briefly. There was no serious suggestion that the issue of the debentures was a fraud or a sham, nor would the record support that argument. Paragraphs (11) to (15), inclusive, of Elizabeth

Hutton's affidavit speak to that issue and it was explicitly admitted that the sole purpose of the issue of the debentures was to bring the applicants within the purview of the CCAA. It appears from authorities that the issue of such 'instant' debentures with that specific purpose in mind is not unknown in the industry and, absent fraud, it appears to be countenanced."

**49** While I express some concern with this acceptance of these instant debentures to unlock the door leading into the C.C.A.A. and while it seems that this interpretation means that the remedies under C.C.A.A. are open, in every case, to any company, I am prepared to follow the conclusions of Hoilett J. on this issue.

**50** The real issue in this case is whether the Court should exercise its discretion in granting the remedies found in the statute.

**51** The company seeks the protection of the C.C.A.A. in order to preserve the company and continue it as a going concern. It is said that a reasonable period of time will enable the company to seek new loans or equity financing, thereby enabling the company to pay out the bank and continue in business. The company acknowledges that it is capital starved and hopes that this respite will permit it to find the necessary new financing. The company would be best able to ensure its continuation as a going concern until the financing was arranged, thereby protecting the 75 jobs of its employees.

**52** The continuation of the company in business would protect the performance of its existing contracts and probably assure new ones, including one for almost \$3 million. Notwithstanding the difficult business climate, many of the defence contracts relate to U.S. military needs and the unsettled state of the world gives some prospect for improved business.

**53** The contracts of the company are with the Canadian Commercial Corporation, the statutory emanation of the federal government, which is ultimately responsible for the performance of contracts with the United States government. To ensure that these contracts will be performed and to assure prospective customers, the company proposes to add to management, C.A. Bishop, who will provide not only management, but liaison with the Canadian and U.S. government officials and agencies. In addition, George Yui who is highly regarded for the quality of the work of Diemaster will continue in the manufacturing and plant management end. There is no doubt that the government and its agencies repose great confidence and trust in him.

**54** The company has proven it can operate on a cash flow basis even showing a profit at the payments of interest which were excluded from the calculation.

**55** The bank says that it is dealing with an intractable loan problem associated with a large non-performing loan. As at November 30, 1990, the company owed \$8,715,817 of which \$6,697,372 was owed to the bank. In the class of secured creditors, the bank holds 99.8 per cent of this debt and when one considers both secured and unsecured liabilities, the bank holds 72 per cent.

The company admits that it is insolvent and unable to arrange for new banking facilities. Whereas the report prepared for the bank in early 1990 calculated that the company's assets exceeded liabilities by approximately \$1.7 million, the letter of its counsel sent in recent weeks states that liquidation would result in the return of less than 50 per cent of the outstanding indebtedness to the bank.

**56** The bank acknowledges that the sale of the real estate at this time would bring a poor result because of the declining real estate market. It also acknowledges that their hope of a better price is to sell the company as a going concern and to that end, their receivers and managers will attempt to operate the company in order that such a sale will take place.

**57** As to the concern that the receivers and managers will lose contracts already in hand or potential defence contracts that are now being negotiated, the bank argues that the receivers have the requisite experience and, if required, to allay concerns, would retain the services of C.A. Bishop and George Yui.

**58** Further, a stay would be productive of little or no result. In any arrangement, the bank would ask to be in its own class of secured creditor. The bank would hardly vote for a result that would go against its own interests. Since it opposes any proposals or arrangement now, the bank would be expected to vote against it, thereby assuring rejection of any proposal by that class of secured creditor.

**59** The accuracy of the financial statements produced by the company have been questioned and are said to be inaccurate and unreliable. It questions that the company has made a profit in the last 6 months of operation. Delay raises the spectre that the bank's security is worsened.

**60** Turning to the question of the creation of classes, it seems to me that the bank's request that it be considered in a class of its own is a sound one that must be granted. There are a total of four secured creditors. This includes another bank that has an equipment leasing loan in the sum of \$8,000 and the two \$10 debentures issued under the trust deed. These two debenture holders do not have the same interests as the bank. For that matter, the equipment lessor does not have that same concurrency of interest described in the cases. In *Nova*, Finlayson J.A. pointed out that not only commercial self-interest, but differences in legal interests, ought to be considered in determining whether separate classes ought to be created. He relied on the decision of Lord Esher M.R. in *Sovereign Assurance v. Dodd*, [1892] 2 Q.B. 573 at 580:

"This, therefore, must be done: they must be divided into different classes. What is the reason for such a course? It is because the creditors composing the different classes have different interests; and, therefore, if we find a different state of facts existing among different creditors which may differently affect their minds and their judgment, they must be divided into different classes. Under the circumstances, I would have to conclude that the bank ought to be placed in a separate class."

**61** Having done this, this returns us to the argument of the bank that no plan of arrangement can succeed without its approval. That being the case, can any purpose be served in giving the company an opportunity to put a plan of arrangement to a meeting of creditors? At pp. 21 and 22, Finlayson J.A. stated:

"My assessment of these secured creditors is that the Bank should be in its own class. This being so, it is obvious that no plan of arrangement can succeed without its approval. There is no useful purpose to be served in putting a plan of arrangement to a meeting of creditors if it is known in advance that it cannot succeed. This is another cogent reason for the court declining to exercise its discretion in favour of the debtor companies."

**62** For this reason, I conclude that the discretion of the Court ought not to be exercised in favour of the company. The application under the C.C.A.A. must therefore be dismissed.

LOUKIDELIS J.

qp/s/bbd

---- End of Request ----

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**Tab 12**

1991 CarswellOnt 182, 5 C.B.R. (3d) 165, 2 P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 21, 4 B.L.R. (2d) 147

1991 CarswellOnt 182, 5 C.B.R. (3d) 165, 2 P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 21, 4 B.L.R. (2d) 147

Citibank Canada v. Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada

CITIBANK CANADA, as agent, CITIBANK CANADA, ABN AMRO BANK CANADA, HONGKONG BANK OF CANADA, PARIBAS BANK OF CANADA, TORONTO-DOMINION BANK, SWISS BANK CORPORATION (CANADA), BANK OF TOKYO CANADA, DAI-ICHI KANGYO BANK (CANADA), CREDIT LYONNAIS (CANADA), BANCA COMMERCIALE ITALIANA OF CANADA, MONTREAL TRUST COMPANY, BALL PACKAGING PRODUCTS, INC. through its receiver, ERNST & YOUNG INC., and BANCO CENTRALE OF CANADA v. CHASE MANHATTAN BANK OF CANADA, BALL PACKAGING PRODUCTS HOLDINGS INC., BALL CORPORATION, LA CAISSE CENTRALE DESJARDINS DU QUEBEC, and UNION BANK OF SWITZERLAND (CANADA)

Ontario Court of Justice (General Division)

Rosenberg J.

Judgment: June 12, 1991

Docket: Doc. 879/91Q

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Counsel: *Peter Howard* and *Sean Dunphy*, for receiver, Ernst & Young Inc., and applicants.

*Barbara Grossman*, for Ball Packaging Products Inc.

*Randy A. Pepper*, for Ball Corporation (a U.S. corporation).

*James H. Grout*, for La Caisse Desjardins.

*Dana B. Fuller* and *W.J. Demers*, for Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada and Union Bank of Switzerland.

*Charles F. Scott*, for Veriteck.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency; Property

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act — Application of Act

1991 CarswellOnt 182, 5 C.B.R. (3d) 165, 2 P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 21, 4 B.L.R. (2d) 147

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act

Debtors' relief legislation — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Jurisdiction of court under Act given large and liberal interpretation — Purpose of Act being remedial — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

Proposals — Effect of proposal — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Plan approved although ordinary creditors paid in full while secured creditors receiving only part payment — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

Proposals — Meeting of creditors — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Entitlement to vote — "Holder" including beneficial holders — "Creditor" including those with real economic interest in debt and security — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

The company "Ball Canada" manufactured cans and other packaging for food and beverages. Its economic position deteriorated to the point where it was not able to survive as an ongoing entity with its debt load and scope of operations.

Ball U.S. owned 50 per cent of Ball Canada. In the course of restructuring discussions, Ball U.S. offered to purchase the debt of the term secured creditors and the shares of Ball Canada held by the banks pursuant to a share pledge agreement. Negotiations took place between the agent for the lenders, Citibank Canada, and Ball U.S. to formulate an acceptable proposal. One of the secured creditors, Chase Manhattan, opposed the Ball U.S. offer.

Ball Canada applied for a declaration that it was a corporation to which the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") applied. The agent for the lenders brought a cross-application for the appointment of a receiver. The application was dismissed and the cross-application was granted. The fact that negotiations with Ball U.S. had not reached any finality was considered by the Judge in refusing to allow further time to attempt to finalize the deal.

After appointment of the receiver, Ball U.S. provided further offers. All term secured creditors except Chase were in favour of the Ball U.S. offer. According to the receiver, there was little or no prospect of a going-concern sale of Ball Canada to a party other than Ball U.S., and a liquidation of assets would provide far less to the secured creditors than the Ball U.S. offer. The agent for the lenders applied under the CCAA to have Ball Canada recognized as a corporation to which the CCAA applied and either waiving a meeting of secured creditors or ordering a meeting to vote on the term secured compromise.

**Held:**

The *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* applied to Ball Canada; a meeting of secured creditors was ordered; the compromise plan was approved and authorized.

The CCAA applied to Ball Canada, since it had an outstanding issue of secured bonds issued under a trust deed and the compromise or arrangement that was proposed included a compromise or arrangement between the debtor company and the holders of an issue of secured bonds. The CCAA authorized the court to order a meeting of any class of the company's secured creditors where a compromise or arrangement was proposed between the debtor company and such class of secured creditors. The term



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secured creditors and Chase, except as to amount, had an identical economic interest in the debtor company, justifying their classification as a single class of creditors, as the amounts owing to each were due under the same loan agreement and secured by the same debentures.

The banks participating in the loan by Chase to Ball Canada were secured "creditors" of Ball Canada. "Secured creditors", as defined in s. 2 of the CCAA, included a "holder" of certain securities. "Holder" must be given a liberal interpretation in keeping with the broad remedial nature of the CCAA and included beneficial holders of any bond or proprietary interest. "Creditors" was to be interpreted to include those with a real economic interest in the debtor company. Since the banks had an equitable proprietary interest in the property of Ball Canada as security for that company's indebtedness, they were entitled to vote on the proposed compromise. The proposal was, therefore, approved by the necessary percentage of voters in both number and value.

The jurisdiction of the Court under the CCAA should be given a large and liberal interpretation consistent with the remedial nature of the legislation. The purpose of the CCAA was to facilitate arrangements that might avoid liquidation of the company and allow it to continue in business to the benefit of the whole economic community, including shareholders, creditors and employees.

The compromise plan was approved, although it provided that ordinary creditors be paid in full while secured creditors received only part payment. The evidence demonstrated overwhelmingly that it was in the interest of all the creditors that the proposal be approved and the proposal received the support of all the creditors except Chase.

**Cases considered:**

*Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136 (C.A.) — *applied*

*Northland Properties Ltd., Re* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (B.C. S.C.), affirmed (*sub nom. Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada*) 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363 (C.A.) — *referred to*

*Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)*, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, 41 O.A.C. 282, 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.) — *followed*

*Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of)* (1990), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 151, (*sub nom. Ultracare Management Inc. v. Gammon*) 1 O.R. (3d) 321 (Gen. Div.) — *applied*

**Statutes considered:**

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 —

s. 2 "secured creditors"

s. 3

s. 5

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s. 6

s. 8

Personal Property Security Act, 1989, S.O. 1989, c. 16 —

Pt. V

s. 63(4)

s. 67

s. 70

**Words and phrases considered:**

holder — as used in s. 2 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, should be given a liberal interpretation in keeping with the broad remedial nature of the Act and, therefore, includes the beneficial holders of any bond or proprietary interest.

creditors — as used in the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, is to be interpreted so that the voice of the persons with the real economic interest in the debtor company is heard.

Application for a declaration that *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, applied to a corporation and for an order directing a meeting of secured creditors to vote on a compromise proposal.

***Rosenberg J.:***

**Preamble**

1 In the months of March and April 1991, I dealt with a number of urgent matters regarding Ball Packaging Products Canada Inc. In some cases the time restrictions were such that there was not time to give oral reasons for my decisions. In one case the matter was finalized within a few minutes of a 12 noon deadline, which will be explained in my reasons.

2 After finalizing the matters and now having finally discharged the receiver, counsel involved requested that I give reasons. I have determined that it is appropriate to do so in case the matter is taken further or in case there are other actions arising out of the various steps taken in the appointment of a receiver and the receivership proceedings. I also felt that it would be advisable to have my reasons recorded for whatever value they may have as a precedent for similar proceedings in the future.

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### Proceedings

3 In the first application heard on March 28, 1991, Ball Packaging Products Canada Inc. ("Ball Canada") asked for the following relief:

4 (a) A declaration that the applicant is a corporation to which the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the "CCAA") applies, notwithstanding the existence of a waiver dated December 9, 1988 excluding the CCAA;

5 (b) An order authorizing the applicant to file a formal plan of compromise or arrangement (the "reorganization plan");

6 (c) An order that the applicant call meetings of classes of its creditors and shareholders (the "meetings");

7 (d) An order that the applicant may file the reorganization plan and the notices of meetings by way of affidavit;

8 (e) An order staying all proceedings that have been or might be taken under the *Bankruptcy Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3;

9 (f) An order restraining other proceedings in existing actions;

10 (g) An order restraining future proceedings against the applicant;

11 (h) An order suspending and postponing the rights of any person, firm, corporation, company or other entity to realize upon or deal with any property of the applicant or security in respect of such property;

12 (i) An order enjoining creditors from making demand for payment on the applicant;

13 (j) An order preventing creditors from exercising any right of set-off against debts owed to the applicant;

14 (k) An order that all parties having agreements with the applicant for the supply of goods or services to the applicant be enjoined until further order of the Court from terminating, determining or cancelling such agreements and, in particular, that the applicant continue to be supplied goods, services and utilities so long as the applicant pays the prices or charges incurred in accordance with the terms negotiated by the applicant from time to time;

15 (l) An order that all parties having other agreements with the applicant be enjoined from terminating, determining or cancelling such agreements without the written consent of the applicant or the Court;

16 (m) An order that the respondents which are parties (or assignees of such parties) to the loan agreement dated November 16, 1988 be enjoined from reducing the credit originally made available to the applicant and that such respondents continue to extend such credit, as is required by the applicant, and as would be available if the applicant were not in default;

17 (n) An order permitting all obligations to unsecured creditors together with all obligations incurred by the applicant after

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this order to be paid or otherwise satisfied by the applicant;

18 (o) An order permitting the applicant to serve this notice of application, the supporting affidavit, the order requested, the reorganization plan, and notices of meetings by mailing copies thereof to each of the applicant's creditors;

19 (p) An order that the applicant shall render an affidavit to the Court verifying the action taken and decisions reached at the meetings;

20 (q) An order that the applicant shall remain in possession of its undertaking and shall continue to carry on its business and, upon approval, to implement the reorganization plan.

21 Ball Canada also asked for other provisions in the order sought that are not relevant to this decision.

22 The applicants referred to in the style of cause in these present reasons were the respondents in that application. Those respondents brought a cross-application for the appointment of a receiver. The application was dismissed and the cross-application for the appointment of a receiver was allowed. At that time I gave oral reasons for my decision, and there is no need to repeat those at this time except to note that it was clear from the affidavit material submitted on behalf of Ball Canada that:

Unless there is a restructuring and unless operating funds are made available to the applicant during the restructuring agreement, the applicant cannot continue to carry on business and will have to cease operations immediately. Given the magnitude of the applicant's operations across Canada, this would have a significant adverse effect on a large number of suppliers, customers and employees.

23 At that time the evidence indicated that Ball Corporation ("Ball U.S.") owned 50 per cent of the issued and outstanding common preferred shares of Ball Canada and that negotiations had been continuing with Ball U.S. to finance an arrangement with creditors and invest sufficient capital to allow Ball Canada to continue to operate. The fact that the negotiations had not reached any finality after many months of negotiating was considered by me in refusing to allow further time to attempt to finalize a deal with Ball U.S. The evidence of Ball Canada indicated that they could not carry on without the respondent financial institutions advancing more money, which they were not contractually obliged to do in view of Ball Canada's default. After the receiver took possession on April 10, 1991, I heard an application by Citibank, which applied amongst other things for:

24 (a) A declaration that the applicant Ball Packaging Products Canada, Inc. is a corporation to which the CCAA applies;

25 (b) An order waiving the requirement for a meeting approving the term secured compromise dated April 9, 1991, annexed hereto as Schedule "A" (the "term secured compromise") on the basis of the consents of the applicants who are term secured creditors filed;

26 (c) In the alternative to (b) above, an order that a meeting of the term secured creditors to vote on the term secured compromise pursuant to s. 5 of the CCAA take place forthwith in the courtroom at which meeting to be chaired by the agent,

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Citibank Canada, the principal value of term secured debt will be \$197,004,139.48 as at March 27, 1991, and the term secured creditors present in person or by proxy will be entitled to vote in the manner and proportionate percentage of value as herein-after set forth:

1. ABN Amro Bank of Canada	4.16%
2. Citibank Canada	22.90%
3. La Caisse Centrale Desjardins du Quebec	4.17%
4. Hongkong Bank of Canada	4.17%
5. Paribas Bank of Canada	4.17%
6. The Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada	12.50%
7. The Toronto-Dominion Bank	7.92%
8. Swiss Bank Corporation (Canada)	10.42%
9. Banco Centrale of Canada	2.50%
10. Bank of Tokyo Canada	2.08%
11. Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank (Canada)	4.17%
12. Credit Lyonnais (Canada)	4.17%
13. Banca Commerciale Italiana of Canada	4.17%
14. Union Bank of Switzerland (Canada)	6.25%
15. Montreal Trust Company	4.17%
16. Trust Generale du Canada (per La Caisse Centrale Desjardins du Quebec)	2.08%
	-----
	100%

27 At that time I endorsed the application record as follows:

Application for a meeting pursuant to CCAA ordered for 6:00 p.m. April 10th at the offices of Davies, Ward & Beck, 44th floor, First Canadian Place to consider a proposal as set out in the application or as modified at the meeting. Meeting to be chaired by Gregory Daniels of Citibank. A verbatim record of the meeting to be kept. A record shall be kept of how all participants vote but no determination of the tabulation of the vote or percentage in favour of any proposal shall be made until the matter is argued in court. Meeting results to be submitted to the court for consideration at 9:00 a.m. April 11th.

28 The CCAA applies to Ball Canada since it has an outstanding issue of secured bonds issued under a trustee and the compromise or arrangement that is proposed included a compromise or arrangement between the debtor company and the holders of an issue of secured bonds. (CCAA, ss. 2, 3.)

29 I also relied on CCAA s. 5, which provides that the Court can order a meeting of any class of the company's secured creditors where a compromise or arrangement is proposed between the debtor company and such class of secured creditors.

30 In determining that a meeting should be called, I considered the case of *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of)* (1990), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 151, (sub nom. *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Gammon*) 1 O.R. (3d) 321 (Gen. Div.), where it was held that when there is a reasonable chance that the debtor company can carry on its business as a going concern, the

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Court should order a meeting of creditors.

31 Further, the term secured creditors and Chase, except as to amount, have an identical economic interest in the debtor company, justifying their classification as a single class of creditors. The amounts owing to each are owing pursuant to the same loan agreement and the security for the obligations is that secured by the same debenture.

*Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, 41 O.A.C. 282, 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.).

*Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (B.C. S.C.) per Trainor J. at 191-192, affirmed (sub nom *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Exelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada*, 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363 (C.A.)).

32 The authority to abridge the time period for the calling of the meeting was exercised by me pursuant to ss. 67 and 70 of the *Personal Property Security Act, 1989*, S.O. 1989, c. 16 ("PPSA").

33 Pursuant to s. 67 of the PPSA, I relieved compliance with Pt. V of the PPSA since it was, in my view, just and reasonable for all concerned parties.

34 The position of the applicants is summarized in the affidavit of Gregory M. Daniels as follows:

As hereinafter described in greater detail, the Applicants and La Caisse Centrale Desjardins du Quebec and Trust Generale are 15 of the 16 Term Secured Creditors to Ball Canada holding \$172,382,104.29 or 87.5% of the total principal of Term Secured Debt of \$197,004,139.48 outstanding as at March 27, 1991. The balance is held by the lone dissenting Term Secured Creditor The Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada ('Chase'). An offer for the Term Secured Debt has been made by Ball Corporation ('Ball U.S.') in the amount of \$120,000,000.00. Ball U.S. is unwilling to allow any person other than itself to hold any of the Term Secured Debt and has made its offer conditional upon the acquisition by it of the Term Secured Debt or the elimination of the Term Secured Debt at a discount to the face amount thereof. *The offer is also conditional upon the acquisition by Ball U.S. of all of the shares of Ball Canada which are pledged to Citibank Canada as collateral for a guarantee of the Term Secured Debt given by Ball Packaging Product Holdings Inc. ('Ball Holdings')*. The Applicants want to accept the offer, Chase does not. This Application under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (the 'CCAA') is made to impose the Ball U.S. offer on Chase for the good of the Applicants, Ball Canada and its employees, suppliers, customers and others affected by the liquidation of Ball Canada. [Emphasis added.]

Ball Canada is a wholly owned subsidiary of Ball Holdings. To the best of my knowledge, Ball Holdings is owned 50% by Ball Corporation and 50% by Onex Corporation ('Onex').

Certain of the original term lenders, including the Agent and Chase, have sold interests in their loans from time to time. These sales have been effected by participation agreements under which certain of the lenders have agreed to share a beneficial interest in the right to receive payments from Ball Canada in respect of the Term Secured Debt and in effect, to share any risk of the failure of Ball Canada to repay the loan in full. At present, to the knowledge of the Agent, the Term Secured Debt is now beneficially held in the following percentages as follows:

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1. ABN Amro Bank of Canada	4.16%
2. Citibank Canada	22.90%
3. La Caisse Centrale Desjardins du Quebec	4.17%
4. Hongkong Bank of Canada	4.17%
5. Paribas Bank of Canada	4.17%
6. The Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada	12.50%
7. The Toronto-Dominion Bank	7.92%
8. Swiss Bank Corporation (Canada)	10.42%
9. Banco Centrale of Canada	2.50%
10. Bank of Tokyo Canada	2.08%
11. Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank (Canada)	4.17%
12. Credit Lyonnais (Canada)	4.17%
13. Banca Commerciale Italiana of Canada	4.17%
14. Union Bank of Switzerland (Canada)	6.25%
15. Montreal Trust Company	4.17%
16. Trust Generale	2.08%
	-----
	100%

(the 'Term Secured Creditors'). A list of the Term Secured Creditors as at March 29, 1991 and the percentages and dollar amounts held prepared by the Agent is appended hereto as Exhibit 'A' to this my affidavit.

All Term Secured Creditors have received notice of the several meetings to discuss the various offers of Ball Canada and Ball U.S. and have had the opportunity to participate fully and vote at such meetings.

Ball Canada makes cans and other packaging for food and beverages. For the reasons detailed by the President of Ball Canada, William A. Lincoln in his Affidavit dated March 26, 1991, the business of Ball Canada, has suffered considerably in the last few years to the point where it is clear that the capital structure of Ball Canada no longer makes sense. In the foreseeable future, under any reasonable assumptions, Ball Canada will not be capable of servicing the level of debt held by the Applicants and Chase. It was the recognition of this fact that led all parties to the course of negotiations that are described in the paragraphs that follow. The Affidavit of William A. Lincoln is appended hereto as Exhibit 'B' to this my Affidavit.

Beginning in or around the Summer of 1990, Ball Canada approached the Agent with a view towards restructuring its debt obligations in light of Ball Canada's changing circumstances. In June, 1990 Ball Canada became aware of the fact that it did not comply with certain of the financial covenants contained in the Loan Agreement. Discussions between Ball Canada and the Agent on behalf of all the lenders continued throughout the balance of 1990 and into 1991 on a periodic basis with no success. Without assigning any responsibility for the lack of success, it became clear that Ball U.S. and Onex had differing interests and priorities and similarly each of the Term Secured Creditors had their own interests, views of the appropriate type of restructuring and the value of Ball Canada.

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Throughout the course of all discussions and negotiations, Chase has consistently taken the position that it was not prepared to accept any compromise that was effectively a recognition that its loan participation as a Term Secured Creditor was significantly less valuable than the face amount of that participation or which did not permit it to participate in any possible future increase in the value of Ball Canada.

As the economic position of Ball Canada worsened throughout the Winter 1990 and into 1991, it became apparent that Ball Canada would not be able to survive as an on-going entity with its present debt load and scope of operations. Ball Canada began to sell assets and closed certain plants. However, the financial situation of Ball Canada was obviously such as to require a massive restructuring of the Term Secured Debt. In December, 1990 Ball Canada suspended its scheduled loan payment to the lenders. Beginning in early March 1991, the restructuring discussions took the form of an offer by Ball U.S. to purchase the debt of the Term Secured Creditors and the shares of Ball Canada held by the banks pursuant to the Share Pledge Agreement. Again there was a course of discussions throughout March between the Agent and Ball U.S. to attempt to formulate an acceptable proposal. In this respect, the position of Chase was again consistent and it continually took the position that the offers of Ball U.S. were unacceptable to it.

Throughout March, the operating position of Ball Canada continued to deteriorate to the extent that it became apparent that matters were coming to a head. The operating line of Ball Canada had been capped and cheques were being returned NSF. The projections of the company showed that it was in a substantial deficit position and unable to fund its operations through cashflow. After providing some operating advances, Ball U.S. and Onex refused to provide further operating funds.

On March 22, 1991, the Agent provided Notice of Default to Ball Canada in respect of the Term Secured Debt. Although the Operating Loan was in default and the Agent in a position to demand at any time, this five day notice apparently triggered the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Application brought by Ball Canada returnable on March 27, 1991.

On the morning of the court application the Agent had discussions with Ball U.S. setting forth the terms on which the Agent would be prepared to recommend a proposal by Ball U.S. to all the other Term Secured Creditors. No offer was forthcoming from Ball U.S. until after the court proceedings.

The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act application application by Ball Canada and the cross-motion by the Agent for the appointment of a Receiver were heard by the Honourable Mr. Justice Rosenberg on March 27 and 28, 1991. In the result, the application by Ball Canada was dismissed and Ernst & Young Inc. appointed as Receiver of Ball Canada. A copy of the endorsement and Order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Rosenberg is appended hereto as Exhibit 'C' to this my Affidavit.

After the appointment of the Receiver, Ball U.S. provided further offers. A copy of the last offer is appended hereto as Exhibit 'D' to this my Affidavit. The Agent convened a meeting of the Term Secured Creditors to consider the offer of Ball U.S. and invited Ball U.S. to make a presentation at the meeting. Eventually 15 of the 16 Term Secured Creditors determined that they were prepared to enter into the compromise suggested by Ball U.S. provided that there was no slippage in price and the terms of the agreement were made certain.

Following presentation of the offer to lenders, Chase and Ball U.S. entered into negotiations with a view to allowing Chase



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to maintain a debtor-creditor relationship with Ball Canada. On April 5, 1991, Citibank was advised that Ball U.S. had not entered into a deal with Chase and that negotiations were at an end.

Chase was asked to participate with the other Term Secured Creditors for the good of the majority, if not all of the Term Secured Creditors, but refused. On or about April 5, 1991, Chase confirmed that it was not prepared to accept the deal proposed by Ball U.S. The Agent advised Chase that it intended to proceed with an application under the CCAA if all the other Term Secured Creditors so instructed it and the deal with Ball U.S. could be made certain. Chase further confirmed that Ball U.S. had terminated negotiations.

La Caisse Centrale Desjardins du Quebec ('Caisse') has to date voted and participated on behalf of Trust Generale who has not attended the meetings. Caisse is a respondent in this application but has indicated that it will not contest the order being sought and will vote in favour of the Term Secured Compromise at any meeting to be held and sign the required Purchase Agreement if the Order is granted.

A meeting of the Term Secured Creditors was held on April 8, 1991. At that time all Term Secured Creditors, save and except Chase, indicated that they were in the process of obtaining the approvals necessary to accept the Ball U.S. offer subject to final documentation and to proceed with the Application. This Affidavit is provided prior to the receipt of these final approvals because of the urgency involved.

All the participants in the term debt have been advised by the Receiver on April 4 and again on April 8, 1991 of its estimation of the likely realization if there is no deal with Ball U.S. It is fair to say that the affairs and business of Ball Canada are interwoven and inter-dependent on Ball U.S. and that there is little or no prospect of a going concern sale of Ball Canada to a party other than Ball U.S. Ball U.S. of course is interested in the going concern and for that reason is prepared to make arrangements to continue Ball Canada in the ordinary course of business including allowing Ball Canada to meet its liabilities as they come due. I verily believe the information provided by the Receiver to be accurate and it played an important basis for the Agent and the other applicants seeking approval of the Term Secured Compromise.

For these reasons the Secured Creditors find themselves in the somewhat unusual position of accepting an offer which will see unsecured creditors being paid in full when the Term Secured Creditors are not being paid in full. Based on the estimates of the Receiver, and the realities of the situation, a liquidation of the assets will provide far less to secured creditors than the Ball U.S. offer. In addition, the Applicants are mindful of the benefit achieved by the maintenance of Ball Canada as a going concern to its employees, suppliers and customers.

Chase has indicated its adamant opposition to the Ball U.S. offer and its unwillingness to abide by the determination of the 15 other Term Secured Creditors. For this reason, an Application under the CCAA is the only means available to the Applicants.

#### **Personal Property Security Act, 1989**

Part of the Term Secured Compromise is the transfer of the shares of Ball Canada to Ball U.S. The Agent sent a notice pursuant to Section 63 of the PPSA on April 4, 1991. A copy of the said Notice and proof of service is appended hereto as Exhibit 'E' to this my Affidavit.

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Onex has taken the position that its consent is necessary to any transfer of the shares. I am informed by Ian Douglas, a partner of Stikeman, Elliott, counsel to the Agent and verily believe that he received letters dated April 3 and 4, 1991 from counsel to Onex to this effect. Appended hereto as Exhibit 'F' to this my Affidavit are copies of the said letters. I am further informed by Ian Douglas and verily believe that the position of Onex is completely untenable as against the Agent and a copy of his response by letter dated April 4, 1991 is appended hereto as Exhibit 'G' to this my Affidavit. As set out in the letter, Onex has indicated that it does not wish to redeem with Onex so the transfer to Ball U.S. will not have any impact on the issues as between Ball U.S. and Onex.

35 Accordingly, and pursuant to my order of April 10, a meeting was held and the hearing resumed on the morning of April 11. At that time the affidavit evidence disclosed that the offer of Ball U.S. was open for acceptance and court approval only until 12 noon on that date and the reasons for the urgency and the deadline were explained by further affidavit. At that time the further affidavit of William R. Beavers, a vice-president of Ernst & Young Inc. (the "receiver"), attested to the following:

Since its appointment pursuant to the receivership order, the Receiver has had to deal with a number of critical issues in order to ensure the integrity of the business with a view to maximizing the possibility of a sale of all or part of the business as a going concern. For the reasons expressed below, I am of the view that the passage of even a very short time in the absence of a resolution with Ball Canada's 50% parent, Ball Corporation of Muncie, Indiana ('Ball Corp.') will considerably diminish if not preclude the ability of the Receiver to maintain the going-concern value of Ball Canada.

The Receiver has had a number of problems ensuring the supply of raw materials necessary to the continuation of the business. Ball Canada's business is largely a seasonal one. At this phase of its annual business cycle, Ball Canada is primarily in the phase of building up inventories to fulfil sales contracts for delivery in the summer and early fall to the beverage industry and the food packing industry.

Two principal suppliers of Ball Canada have indicated a reluctance to continue supplying the raw materials necessary to continue production unless arrears for previously delivered material are settled. [...] was the primary supplier of aluminium [sic] to Ball Canada. [...] has taken steps to seize certain aluminium [sic] inventories stored in the United States as a result of the default by Ball Canada in paying for such inventories. Other supplies such as [...] have indicated that they are reviewing their commitments to Ball Canada.

In the medium to long term, unless arrangements can be made with [...] to continue the supply of these essential raw materials, the ability of Ball Canada to continue to produce sufficient product to meet sales obligations will be seriously jeopardized. While alternative sources of supply of these materials is possible, it would take time to make arrangements with such suppliers and the terms of supply may be more onerous than those previously enjoyed by Ball Canada.

In addition to supplier problems, the Receiver has had to deal with key customers of Ball Canada in order to reassure them as to the continuity of their supply. Five key customers of Ball Canada accounted for 58% of Ball Canada's 1990 sales. The loss of any one of these accounts would have a devastating effect upon the going concern value of the business of Ball Canada. Some customers account for such a significant portion of production from certain plants that a loss of the customer could result in an immediate plant closure. I have spoken with three of these customers. They have indicated to the Receiver that, unless they receive satisfactory assurances or guarantees of product supply in the next few days, they will have

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no alternative but to seek alternate sources of supply for their can requirements. In view of the lead time necessary to secure product for these accounts, customers such as [...] require assurances of supply as soon as possible for they may be otherwise unable to obtain product in time for the crucial summer selling season.

The case of [...] has become especially critical. [...] utilizes steel cans in Ontario, one of the few large markets for steel cans remaining in North America. I attach as Exhibit 'B' and 'C' respectively to this my affidavit letters which the Receiver has received from [...] dated April 2 and April 5, 1991. As appears from these letters [...] has been extremely nervous about the continuity of its supply. [...] has reluctantly extended its deadlines in order to hear from the Receiver and Ball Corp. as to whether Ball Corp's plans to purchase Ball Canada will be proceeding. Another key food industry customer of Ball Canada is taking a similar position.

36 The letter attached as Exhibit "C" contains the following statement:

In an effort to ensure that the [...] system does not experience any supply shortages, please be advised that we will consider the possibility of enacting an alternative supply contingency plan should a positive response from you or your parent corporation not be received by Monday, April 8th, 12 noon E.S.T.

William R. Beavers in his affidavit further stated:

Although I have attempted to assure these three customers that the Term Secured Compromise has received wide support and is progressing quickly, I have been advised by [...] Director of Purchasing at [...] and verily believe that [...] has determined that it must award its contract for supply of cans by April 10, 1991 or April 11 at the very latest and cannot delay any longer. If Ball Canada loses the [...] contract, its Ontario business would be devastated and plant closures would ensue, resulting in significant job losses and eliminating any chance of proceeding with the Term Secured Compromise.

Ball Canada currently owes approximately \$1.4 million to certain of its major customers in respect of volume discounts arising out of pre-receivership sales to such customers. In view of the current over-supply in the Canadian and North American can market, the Receiver will be required to honour this unsecured commitment in order to retain the business of these key customers.

The operations of Ball Canada are also largely dependent upon the cooperation of Ball Corp. The two businesses have become interconnected in the last two years. Some of the principal areas of dependency of Ball Canada upon Ball Corp. are as follows:

a. Ball Canada and Ball Corp. are parties to three agreements dated as of December 8, 1988 (the Joint Venture Management and Technical Services Agreement, the Proprietary Technology Licence Agreement and the Metal Container Product Technology Cross-Licence Agreement) pursuant to which Ball Corp. has provided senior management, technical personnel and technology to Ball Canada.

b. Ball Canada currently obtains supply as required of certain finished goods from Ball Corp. in order to meet its supply obligations to customers while production line conversion projects (described below) in Whitby, Ontario and

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Richmond, British Columbia are in progress. In addition, Ball Corp. supplies any surplus requirements of Molson that the Bay d'Urfe plant is not able to supply. The continuation of these conversion projects is also dependant [sic] upon Ball Corp. technical personnel.

c. Ball Corp. currently supplies all Information Systems used by Ball Canada to manage all of its accounting, purchasing, inventory control, invoicing and operating systems from Ball Corp.'s computer facilities in Indiana. I attach as Exhibit 'D' to this my affidavit a copy of a list which the Receiver has prepared outlining the Ball Canada information systems currently being run from Ball Corp.'s computers in Indiana. Continued access to these systems is critical to the continuation of the business of Ball Canada.

d. Ball Canada has been benefiting from volume discounts by joining with Ball Corp. for the purpose of procuring its requirements in aluminium [sic].

As mentioned above, the Whitby and Richmond plants are currently in the midst of line conversion projects designed to enhance the competitiveness of these two plants and the ability of Ball Canada to compete in the North American marketplace. At the Richmond plant, the line conversion project is designed to increase the line speed to North American standards while the Whitby project is designed to convert to 12 oz can production to meet market demands. Both of these projects are important to the restructuring of Ball Canada to ensure its ability to compete in the North American market which has been largely opened as a result of the Free Trade Agreement and will enhance the value of the business as a whole. In order to continue these projects in the receivership, the Receivership will have to negotiate terms with the contractors on the project who claim lien rights totalling approximately \$2 million for arrears of contract fees due but not paid. As previously indicated, the Receiver will also require the cooperation of Ball Corp. in the United States in order to continue to supply its customers while the conversion projects are completed.

The Receiver has been required to deal with a number of other suppliers of goods and services who have been seeking to assert lien claims or to obtain concessions regarding pre-receivership accounts as a condition of future dealing. A customs broker has been refusing to release certain goods imported by Ball Canada from a customs warehouse unless account arrears are settled.

The employees and unions dealing with Ball Canada are naturally extremely anxious about the receivership and the effect that it will have upon their future employment and on their statutory and collective agreement rights to severance and termination amounts. I enclose as Exhibit 'E' correspondence sent to the Receiver by various unions expressing their concerns. These unions are aware that Ball Corp. is endeavouring to acquire Ball Canada on terms which would permit Ball Canada to honour all of its obligations to employees.

We have also prepared preliminary cash flow projections for Ball Canada in receivership for the period ending on April 28, 1991. This cash flow projection and notes, which is attached and marked as Exhibit 'F' to this my affidavit, shows that the Receiver will be required to spend a total of \$27.54 million in respect of ongoing operation plus a further possible \$6.62 million in respect of arrears which may have to be paid in order to continue operations for a total of \$34.16 million. As a result of the receivership and the seasonal nature of the business, cash inflows for this same period are estimated to total \$15 million, resulting in a net funding requirement of up to \$19.16 million. The Receiver is currently only able to borrow up to \$20 million secured by Receiver's Certificates pursuant to the Order of March 28, 1991. The Receiver has arranged

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temporary funding up to that level, but this arrangement expires on April 30, 1991. In view of the risks and contingencies associated with continuing to run the business, there is considerable doubt as to the ability of the Receiver to access further funds from a bank even if permitted to do so by an amendment to the Order.

While the Receiver is making every effort to stabilize the business and mitigate the risks to the going concern value of the business posed by the difficulties and risk factors mentioned above, it is my view that the ability of the Receiver to maintain that value is uncertain and decreases daily. If the Receiver is not able to provide the marketplace with concrete assurances as to the future direction of Ball Canada, there is a serious risk that the value of the business will decline dramatically in the next few days or weeks.

### **Term Secured Compromise**

I have reviewed the Term Secured Compromise referred to in the Notice of Application under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (Canada). The Receiver has been asked to seek certain amendments to the March 28 receivership order in order to implement the Term Secured Compromise. The Receiver unreservedly and unequivocally believes this is the best possible deal in the present circumstances for the reasons outlined below.

The Receiver has reviewed the assets and business of Ball Canada for the purpose of preparing for a possible sale of Ball Canada. The Receiver has not as yet completed the preparation of an information package for potential purchasers of the business of Ball Canada for the purpose of preparing for a possible sale of Ball Canada. The Receiver has not as yet completed the preparation of an information package for potential purchasers of the business of Ball Canada or commenced any such negotiations. Based upon its review, the price of \$120 million for the term debt of Ball Canada proposed on the Term Secured Compromise represents *in excess of the high end* of the Receiver's estimates of the realizable value of the assets of Ball Canada in liquidation even if the Receiver is able successfully to maintain the going concern value of the business. It is the opinion of the Receiver that the business of Ball Canada has special value to Ball Corp. and that Ball Corp. is willing to make this offer for tax and other benefits that are unique to it. Since the Term Secured Compromise does not contemplate any other debt of Ball Canada being compromised, its economic value is far higher than \$120 million. In my view, recoveries upon the assets would be considerably lower if the business begins to decline as a result of the loss of significant customer accounts or in the event of production interruptions or other difficulties which may be experienced in the coming days and weeks in view of the risk factors outlined above.

The Term Secured Compromise provides a means for the Receiver to obtain a secure source of operating credit for Ball Canada. As indicated above, the ability of the Receiver to raise the operating funds required to maintain the stability of the business of Ball Canada for the time required to seek out buyers for the business is uncertain. The current financing which the Receiver has negotiated expires at the end of April, 1991.

In the opinion of the Receiver, the Term Secured Compromise is in the best interests of Ball Canada and all of its creditors. As indicated above, it is my opinion that the term secured creditors will receive more under the Term Secured Compromise than they would under a liquidation supervised by the Receiver. Furthermore, as a result of the Term Secured Compromise, Ball Canada will be able to come out of receivership. This will provide a means for the trade creditors, customers, suppliers and employees to be ensured that their claims will be satisfied by Ball Canada in the ordinary course of business. This is in the best interests of the communities in which Ball Canada carries on business and its 1700 employees. An example of

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these types of concerns, which the Receiver believes are something the Receiver should keep in mind, is articulately expressed in the letter of Bob Speller, the member of Parliament for Haldimand- Norfolk that I attach hereto as Exhibit 'G' to this my affidavit.

If the Term Secured Compromise is approved by this Honourable Court, the Receiver will be required to take the steps outlined below in the interim period between approval of the agreement and its completion expected before April 25, 1991. It is anticipated that Ball Corp. will move to have the Receiver discharged immediately following completion of the Term Secured Compromise and that Ball Canada will resume business in the ordinary course under the control and direction of Ball Corp. thereafter.

In order to implement the Term Secured Compromise, the order appointing the Receiver must be varied in several respects. Firstly, the authority of the Receiver to borrow funds pursuant to paragraph 18 of the Order is required to be increased from \$20 million to \$30 million. This is required pursuant to clause 9(b)(iii)(A) of the Purchase Agreement contemplated by the Term Secured Compromise in order to ensure that the Receiver and Ball Canada will have authority to access sufficient working capital until closing. As indicated above, the Receiver's current forecasts indicate that the full authorized financing will be utilized in the coming weeks with very little margin of error if no amendment is made. An additional level of borrowing will be required to fund the requirements of Ball Canada on closing of the Purchase Agreement as referred to in section 10 thereof.

A second required amendment is for this Court to direct and permit the Receiver (i) to permit Ball Corp. to manage Ball Canada and its business in accordance with the existing Joint Venture Management and Technical Services Agreement (the 'Management Agreement') dated December 8, 1988 (a copy of which I attach as Exhibit 'H') to this my affidavit); (ii) to cooperate with officers of Ball Canada to operate the business of Ball Canada in the ordinary course of business as an on-going business with a view to avoiding any material reduction in the value of the business; (iii) not to sell any asset of Ball Canada except in the ordinary course of the business of Ball Canada; and (iv) not to terminate voluntarily the employment of an employee of Ball Canada or any material contract of Ball Canada. This amendment has been required by Ball Corp. in order to provide them with some degree of comfort concerning and control over the occurrence of any material adverse change in the business between the date of the approval of the Term Secured Compromise and the closing of the Purchase Agreement contemplated thereby.

37 Since the hearing of April 11, the orders in accordance with the above two paragraphs were granted.

38 Although the affidavit evidence at the time of the preparation of the applications for April 10 and April 11 indicated that the only dissenting participant was Chase Manhattan, at the hearing there were some other participants who indicated that they were not prepared to approve the proposed plan. However, the necessary percentage in amount and number approved.

### Decision

39 The first issue to be determined in assessing the vote at the meeting on the night of April 10 is whether the banks participating in the loan by Chase to Ball Canada (the "participants"), are secured "creditors" of Ball Canada.

40 The CCAA authorizes the court to order a meeting of "unsecured creditors" or "secured creditors" or any class of them

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for the purpose of voting on a proposed compromise or arrangement between them and the debtor company (see ss. 5 and 6). "Secured creditors" is defined in s. 2 (in part) as meaning:

*a holder of a mortgage, hypothec, pledge, charge, lien or privilege on or against, or any assignment, cession or transfer of, all or any property of a debtor company as security for indebtedness of the debtor company, or a holder of any bond of a debtor company secured by a mortgage, hypothec, pledge, charge, lien or privilege on or against, or any assignment, cession or transfer of, or a trust in respect of, all or any property of the debtor company, whether the holder or beneficiary is resident or domiciled within or outside Canada, and a trustee under any trust deed or other instrument securing any of those bonds shall be deemed to be a secured creditor for all purposes of this Act except for the purpose of voting at a creditors' meeting in respect of any of those bonds.*

[Emphasis added.]

41 The participants are the beneficial "holders" of a proprietary interest in Ball Canada which secures the indebtedness of Ball Canada and which the participants have purchased pursuant to the terms of the master participation agreements.

42 The word "holder" as used in this definition should be given a liberal interpretation in keeping with the broad remedial nature of the CCAA and therefore includes the *beneficial* holders of any bond or proprietary interest. As with judicial interpretation relating to the determination of a "class of creditors", the statute's reference to "creditors" is to be interpreted so that the voice of the persons with the real economic interest in the debtor company is heard. The exception of the trustee under a trust deed from the class of creditors entitled to vote confirms this proposition. The fact that a trustee under a trust deed, although the holder of the legal title to the obligation under the bond and the security is not a secured creditor for the purpose of voting, favours the view that those with the beneficial or real economic interest in the debt and security are the creditors entitled to vote.

43 Section 4(b) of the master participation agreement recognizes that a participant is entitled to "its share" of any amounts received by Chase in a realization by it (or presumably its agent) of its collateral. The participant's share is its percentage ownership interest in the underlying loan obligation purchased. This provision recognizes that the participant has an equitable proprietary interest in the property of the borrower as security for that borrower's indebtedness, and is, therefore, a secured creditor of Ball Canada.

44 The relevant part of s. 4(b) reads:

*Further, the Participant shall not have any rights to or in any collateral, other property or right (including any right of set-off) which may be or becomes available for the payment of any Participated Loan, except that if any such right is exercised by the Bank ... and the amounts recovered thereby are applied on account of any amount in which the Participant is entitled to share as provided in Section 4(a), the Bank will promptly pay to the Participant its share thereof as provided therein.*

[Emphasis added.]

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45 That the participant pursuant to the terms of the master purchase agreement waives vis-à-vis Chase some of the rights that would normally accompany such an assignment (such as the right to give the debtor notice of the assignment) is not of significance in the CCAA proceedings. Section 8 of the CCAA provides that relief under the CCAA is available notwithstanding the terms of any agreement.

8. This Act extends and does not limit the provisions of any instrument now or hereafter existing that governs the rights of creditors of any class of them and has full force and effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in that instrument.

46 The Court's power to deal with the interests of the participants in the debt owed by Ball Canada is, therefore, unaffected by the master participation agreement or any other instrument.

47 Having accordingly ruled the vote was 86.67 per cent in favour in number and 80.85 per cent in favour on the basis of value and, accordingly, the proposal was approved by the necessary percentage in both number and value.

48 The jurisdiction of the Court under the CCAA should be given a large and liberal interpretation consistent with the remedial nature of the legislation. As recently stated by Doherty J.A. in the Ontario Court of Appeal in his dissenting reasons in the case of *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)*, supra, at p. 306 [O.R.]:

The legislation is remedial in its pure sense in that it provides a means whereby the devastating social and economic effects of bankruptcy or creditor-initiated termination of ongoing business operations can be avoided while a court-supervised attempt to reorganize the financial affairs of the debtor company is made.

In the same case Finlayson J.A., with whom Krever J.A. concurred, stated at p. 297 [O.R.]:

It is well established that the CCAA is intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both. Such a resolution can have significant benefits for the company, its shareholders and employees. For this reason the debtor companies ... are entitled to a broad and liberal interpretation of the jurisdiction of the court under the CCAA.

49 The purpose of the CCAA is to facilitate arrangements that might avoid liquidation of the company and allow it to continue in business to the benefit of the whole economic community, including the shareholders, the creditors (both secured and unsecured) and the employees. That this is its fundamental purpose is emphasized by the following passage from the reasons of Gibbs J.A. of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136 (C.A.) at p. 91:

The C.C.A.A. was enacted by Parliament in 1933 when the nation and the world were in the grip of an economic depression. When a company became insolvent liquidation followed because that was the consequence of the only insolvency legislation which then existed — the Bankruptcy Act and the Winding-up Act. Almost inevitably liquidation destroyed the shareholders' investment, yielded little by way of recovery to the creditors, and exacerbated the social evil of devastating levels of unemployment. The government of the day sought, through the C.C.A.A., to create a regime whereby the prin-



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cipals of the company and the creditors could be brought together under the supervision of the court to attempt a reorganization or compromise or arrangement under which the company could continue in business.

#### **The Position of Onex Inc.**

50 Onex Inc. held shares in a holding company with Ball U.S. that in effect gave it a 50 per cent interest in the shares of Ball Canada. These shares as previously stated were pledged as part of the loan agreement. Ball U.S.'s offer was conditional upon it obtaining 100 per cent of the shares of Ball Canada. Ordinarily, in an arrangement of this kind, the shares of the company making the arrangement have little or no value. In this case, however, other creditors were being paid in full and the business was to be carried on. It was understandable and appropriate that Ball U.S., in assuming all of the responsibilities and putting in the funds that it was obligated to do under its offer, would want to be in full control of the company. The rights of Onex as against Ball U.S. are not affected by my approving the compromise plan and ordering the shares to be transferred to Ball U.S., since any rights that Onex has under any agreements with Ball U.S. are not being altered, amended or considered as part of these proceedings. In order to comply with the terms of the proposal and the Ball U.S. offer, it was necessary to have the shares conveyed immediately and to implement this conveyance of the collateral security held, I made an order abridging the notice period provided in s. 63(4) of the PPSA. On the date of closing of the term secured compromise with respect to the transfer of the shares of Ball Canada held as security for the guarantee of Ball Holdings pursuant to s. 70 of the PPSA, and pursuant to s. 67 of the PPSA, I authorized and approved the transfer by Citibank Canada as agent of all the right, title to, and interest in the shares of Ball Canada to Ball Corp. pursuant to the term secured compromise. I also relieved the agent from further compliance with Pt. V of the PPSA.

51 I endorsed the record on April 11 as follows:

In my view the beneficial owners of the security are each entitled to vote their percentage interest. On that basis the vote in favour of the proposal has exceeded the necessary number and value required. Accordingly, the order is to issue in the form approved.

52 The evidence before me demonstrated overwhelmingly that it was in the interest of all of the creditors that the proposal be approved. While it was extraordinary that ordinary creditors be paid in full while secured creditors received only part payment, there was no alternative. This was confirmed by the overwhelming support of the proposal from the creditors, with the notable exception of Chase Manhattan. The evidence put before me with regard to the proposal and the fact that the proposal was in the best interests of all of the creditors was confirmed by the large number of representatives of financial institutions, officers and directors of same who attended the meeting and voted so overwhelmingly in favour of the compromise. The wishes of these sophisticated financiers should not lightly be discarded by the Court. Accordingly, the compromise plan was approved and implemented even under the most unusual circumstances and time constraints that existed.

*Order accordingly.*

END OF DOCUMENT

**Tab 13**

*Case Name:*

**Tamerlane Ventures Inc. (Re)**

**IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act,  
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended  
AND IN THE MATTER OF a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of  
Tamerlane Ventures Inc. and Pine Point Holding Corp.**

[2013] O.J. No. 3936

2013 ONSC 5461

Court File No. CV-13-10228-00CL

Ontario Superior Court of Justice  
Commercial List

**F.J.C. Newbould J.**

Heard: August 23, 2013.  
Judgment: August 28, 2013.

(34 paras.)

*Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act matters -- Application of the Act -- Compromises and arrangements -- With secured creditors -- Alteration or modification -- Applications -- Application by mining company and subsidiaries for protection under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Applicants and secured lender negotiated consensual CCAA filing -- Secured lender agreed to provide DIP financing, subject to fixed sunset date for CCAA proceeding beyond which receiver selected by lender would be appointed -- Applicants were insolvent -- It was appropriate to extend stay of proceedings to applicants' foreign subsidiaries -- Removal of court's discretion after sunset date was inappropriate -- Parties agree to add term that initial order was subject in all respects to court's discretion.*

Application by mining company and subsidiaries for protection under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act. The applicants had total consolidated assets with a net book value of \$24,814,433. The applicants were indebted to the secured lender for USD \$10,000,000. The applicants' unsecured creditors were principally trade creditors. As the applicant was in the

exploration stage with its assets, it did not generate cash flow from operations. Its only potential source of cash was from financing activities, which were been problematic in light of the market for junior mining companies. After the applicants failed to make regularly scheduled monthly interest payments in respect of the secured debt, the secured lender served a notice of intention to dispose of collateral. The parties negotiated a consensual CCAA filing, under which the secured lender agreed to provide DIP financing. The applicant's requested that the stay apply to its US and Peruvian subsidiaries, who were non-parties to the application. During the negotiations the secured lender firmly stated that as a key term of consenting to any CCAA initial order, it required a fixed "sunset date" for the CCAA proceeding beyond which stay extensions could not be sought without the its consent and the consent of the Monitor unless both the outstanding secured debt and the DIP loan had been repaid in full, and a provision in the initial order directing that a receiver selected by the secured lender would be appointed after that date.

HELD: Application allowed. There was no doubt that the applicants were insolvent and qualified for filing under the CCAA and obtaining a stay of proceedings. It was appropriate that the stay of proceedings extend to the US and Peruvian subsidiaries. Given the lack of alternate financing, any restructuring was not possible without DIP financing. It was apparent from looking at the history of the matter that the secured lender had every intention of exercising its rights under its security to apply to court to have a receiver appointed. It was understandable that the directors agreed to the terms required by the secured lender. What was unusual in the proposed initial order was that the discretion of the court to do what it considers appropriate after the sunset date was removed. Such an order was not appropriate. The initial order was approved with the modification agreed to by the parties that the order was subject in all respects to the discretion of the Court.

**Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:**

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11, s. 11.2(4)

PPSA, s. 63

**Counsel:**

S. Richard Orzy, Derek J. Bell and Sean H. Zweig, for the Applicants.

Robert J. Chadwick and Logan Willis, for Duff & Phelps Canada Restructuring Inc., the proposed Monitor.

Joseph Bellissimo, for Renvest Mercantile Bankcorp Inc.

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**1 F.J.C. NEWBOULD J.:**-- The applicants applied on August 23, 2013 for protection under the

CCAA, at which time an Initial Order was granted containing several provisions. These are my reasons for the granting of the order.

### **Tamerlane business**

2 At the time of the application, Tamerlane Ventures Inc. ("Tamerlane") was a publicly traded company whose shares were listed and posted for trading on the TSX Venture Exchange. Tamerlane and its subsidiaries (collectively, the "Tamerlane Group"), including Pine Point Holding Corp. ("Tamerlane Pine Point"), Tamerlane Ventures USA Inc. ("Tamerlane USA") and Tamerlane Ventures Peru SAC ("Tamerlane Peru") are engaged in the acquisition, exploration and development of base metal projects in Canada and Peru.

3 The applicants' flagship property is the Pine Point Property, a project located near Hay River in the South Slave Lake area of the Northwest Territories of Canada. It at one time was an operating mine. The applicants firmly believe that there is substantial value in the Pine Point Property and have completed a NI 43-101 Technical Report which shows 10.9 million tonnes of measured and indicated resources in the "R-190" zinc-lead deposit. The project has been determined to be feasible and licences have been obtained to put the first deposit into production. All of the expensive infrastructure, such as roads, power lines and railheads, are already in place, minimizing the capital cost necessary to commence operations. The applicants only need to raise the financing necessary to be able to exploit the value of the project, a task made more difficult by, among other things, the problems experienced generally in the mining sector thus far in 2013.

4 The Tamerlane Group's other significant assets are the Los Pinos mining concessions south of Lima in Peru, which host a historic copper resource. The Tamerlane Group acquired the Los Pinos assets in 2007 through one of its subsidiaries, Tamerlane Peru, and it currently holds the mining concessions through another of its subsidiaries, Tamerlane Minera.

5 The Los Pinos deposit is a 790 hectare porphyry (a type of igneous rock) copper deposit. Originally investigated in the 1990s when the price of copper was a quarter of its price today, Los Pinos has historically been viewed as a valuable property. With rising copper prices, it is now viewed as being even more valuable.

6 The exploration and development activities have been generally carried out by employees of Tamerlane USA. The applicants' management team consists of four individuals who are employees of Tamerlane USA, which provides management services by contract to the applicants.

7 As at March 31, 2013 the Tamerlane Group had total consolidated assets with a net book value of \$24,814,433. The assets included consolidated current assets of \$2,007,406, and consolidated non-current assets with a net book value of \$22,807,027. Non-current assets included primarily the investment in the Pine Point property of \$20,729,551 and the Los Pinos property of \$1,314,936.

8 Tamerlane has obtained valuations of Los Pinos and the Pine Point Property. The Los Pinos

valuation was completed in May 2013 and indicates a preliminary valuation of \$12 to \$15 million using a 0.3% copper cut-off grade, or \$17 to \$21 million using a 0.2% copper cut-off grade. The Pine Point valuation was completed in July 2013 and indicates a valuation of \$30 to \$56 million based on market comparables, with a value as high as \$229 million considering precedent transactions.

### **Secured and unsecured debt**

**9** Pursuant to a credit agreement between Tamerlane and Global Resource Fund, a fund managed by Renvest Mercantile Bancorp Inc. ("Global Resource Fund" or "secured lender") made as of December 16, 2010, as amended by a first amending agreement dated June 30, 2011 and a second amending agreement dated July 29, 2011, Tamerlane became indebted to the Secured Lender for USD \$10,000,000 . The secured indebtedness under the credit agreement is guaranteed by both Tamerlane Pine Point and Tamerlane USA, and each of Tamerlane, Tamerlane Pine Point and Tamerlane USA has executed a general security agreement in favour of the secured lender in respect of the secured debt.

**10** The only other secured creditors are the applicants' counsel, the Monitor and the Monitor's counsel in respect of the fees and disbursements owing to each.

**11** The applicants' unsecured creditors are principally trade creditors. Collectively, the applicants' accounts payable were approximately CAD \$850,000 as at August 13, 2013, in addition to accrued professional fees in connection with issues related to the secured debt and this proceeding.

### **Events leading to filing**

**12** Given that the Tamerlane Group is in the exploration stage with its assets, it does not yet generate cash flow from operations. Accordingly, its only potential source of cash is from financing activities, which have been problematic in light of the current market for junior mining companies.

**13** It was contemplated when the credit agreement with Global Resource Fund was entered into that the take-out financing would be in the form of construction financing for Pine Point. However Tamerlane was unsuccessful in arranging that. Tamerlane was successful in late 2012 in arranging a small flow-through financing from a director and in early 2013 a share issuance for \$1.7 million dollars. Negotiations with various parties for to raise more funds by debt or asset sales have so far been unsuccessful.

**14** As a result of liquidity constraints facing Tamerlane in the fall of 2012, it failed to make regularly scheduled monthly interest payments in respect of the secured debt beginning on September 25, 2012 and failed to repay the principal balance on the maturity date of October 16, 2012, each of which was an event of default under the credit agreement with the secured lender Global Resource Fund.

15 Tamerlane and Global Resource Fund then entered into a forbearance agreement made as of December 31, 2012 in which Tamerlane agreed to make certain payments to Global Resource Fund, including a \$1,500,000 principal repayment on March 31, 2013. As a result of liquidity constraints, Tamerlane was unable to make the March 31 payment, an event of default under the credit and forbearance agreements. On May 24, 2013, Tamerlane failed to make the May interest payment, and on May 29, 2013, the applicants received a letter from Global Resource Fund's counsel enclosing a NITES notice under the BIA and a notice of intention to dispose of collateral pursuant to section 63 of the PPSA. The total secured debt was \$11,631,948.90.

16 On June 10, 2013, Global Resource Fund and Tamerlane entered into an amendment to the forbearance agreement pursuant to which Global Resource Fund withdrew its statutory notices and agreed to capitalize the May interest payment in exchange for Tamerlane agreeing to pay certain fees to the Global Resource Fund that were capitalized and resuming making cash interest payments to the Secured Lender with the June 25, 2013 interest payment. Tamerlane was unable to make the July 25 payment, which resulted in an event of default under the credit and forbearance amendment agreements.

17 On July 26, 2013, Global Resource Fund served a new NITES notice and a notice of intention to dispose of collateral pursuant to section 63 the PPSA, at which time the total of the secured debt was \$12,100,254.26.

18 Thereafter the parties negotiated a consensual CCAA filing, under which Global Resource Fund has agreed to provide DIP financing and to forbear from exercising its rights until January 7, 2014. The terms of the stay of proceedings and DIP financing are unusual, to be discussed.

### **Discussion**

19 There is no doubt that the applicants are insolvent and qualify for filing under the CCAA and obtaining a stay of proceedings. I am satisfied from the record, including the report from the proposed Monitor, that an Initial Order and a stay under section 11 of the CCAA should be made.

20 The applicants request that the stay apply to Tamerlane USA and Tamerlane Peru, non-parties to this application. The business operations of the applicants, Tamerlane USA and Tamerlane Peru are intertwined, and the request to extend the stay of proceedings to Tamerlane USA and Tamerlane Peru is to maintain stability and value during the CCAA process.

21 Courts have an inherent jurisdiction to impose stays of proceedings against non-applicant third parties where it is important to the reorganization and restructuring process, and where it is just and reasonable to do so. See Farley J. in *Re Lehndorff* (1993), 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275 and Pepall J. (as she then was) in *Re Canwest Publishing Inc.* (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115. Recently Morawetz J. has made such orders in *Cinram International Inc. (Re.)*, 2012 ONSC 3767, *Sino-Forest Corporation (Re.)*, 2012 ONSC 2063 and *Skylink Aviation Inc. (Re.)*, 2013 ONSC 1500. I am satisfied that it is appropriate that the stay of proceedings extend to Tamerlane USA, which has guaranteed the

secured loans and to Tamerlane Peru, which holds the valuable Los Pinos assets in Peru.

**22** Under the Initial Order, PricewaterhouseCoopers Corporate Finance Inc. is to be appointed a financial advisor. PWC is under the oversight of the Monitor to implement a Sale and Solicitation Process, under which PWC will seek to identify one or more financiers or purchasers of, and/or investors in, the key entities that comprise the Tamerlane Group. The SISP will include broad marketing to all potential financiers, purchasers and investors and will consider offers for proposed financing to repay the secured debt, an investment in the applicants' business and/or a purchase of some or all of the applicants' assets. The proposed Monitor supports the SISP and is of the view that it is in the interests of the applicants' stakeholders. The SISP and its terms are appropriate and it is approved.

**23** The Initial Order contains provisions for an administration charge for the Monitor, its counsel and for counsel to the applicants in the amount of \$300,000, a financial advisor charge of \$300,000, a directors' charge of \$45,000 to the extent the directors are not covered under their D&O policy and a subordinated administration charge subordinated to the secured loans and the proposed DIP charge for expenses not covered by the administration and financial advisor charges. These charges appear reasonable and the proposed Monitor is of the same view. They are approved.

#### **DIP facility and charge**

**24** The applicants' principal use of cash during these proceedings will consist of the payment of ongoing, but minimized, day-to-day operational expenses, such as regular remuneration for those individuals providing services to the applicants, office related expenses, and professional fees and disbursements in connection with these CCAA proceedings. The applicants will require additional borrowing to do this. It is apparent that given the lack of alternate financing, any restructuring will not be possible without DIP financing.

**25** The DIP lender is Global Resource Fund, the secured lender to the applicants. The DIP loan is for a net \$1,017,500 with simple 12% interest. It is to mature on January 7, 2014, by which time it is anticipated that the SISP process will have resulted in a successful raising of funds to repay the secured loan and the DIP facility.

**26** Section 11.2(4) of the CCAA lists factors, among other things, that the court is to consider when a request for a DIP financing charge is made. A review of those factors in this case supports the DIP facility and charge. The facility is required to continue during the CCAA process, the assets are sufficient to support the charge, the secured lender supports the applicants' management remaining in possession of the business, albeit with PWC being engaged to run the SISP, the loan is a fraction of the applicants' total assets and the proposed Monitor is of the view that the DIP facility and charge are fair and reasonable. The one factor that gives me pause is the first listed in section 11.2(4), being the period during which the applicants are expected to be subject to the CCAA proceedings. That involves the sunset clause, to which I now turn.



### Sunset clause

27 During the negotiations leading to this consensual CCAA application, Global Resource Fund, the secured lender, expressed a willingness to negotiate with the applicants but firmly stated that as a key term of consenting to any CCAA initial order, it required (i) a fixed "sunset date" of January 7, 2014 for the CCAA proceeding beyond which stay extensions could not be sought without the its consent and the consent of the Monitor unless both the outstanding secured debt and the DIP loan had been repaid in full, and (ii) a provision in the initial order directing that a receiver selected by Global Resource Fund would be appointed after that date.

28 The Initial Order as drafted contains language preventing the applicants from seeking or obtaining any extension of the stay period beyond January 7, 2014 unless it has repaid the outstanding secured debt and the DIP loan or received the consent of Global Resource Fund and the Monitor, and that immediately following January 7, 2013 (i) the CCAA proceedings shall terminate, (ii) the Monitor shall be discharged, (iii) the Initial Order (with some exceptions) shall be of no force and effect and (iv) a receiver selected by Global Resource Fund shall be appointed.

29 Ms. Kent, the executive chair and CFO of Tamerlane, has sworn in her affidavit that Global Resource Fund insisted on these terms and that given the financial circumstances of the applicants, there were significant cost-savings and other benefits to them and all of the stakeholders for this proceeding to be consensual rather than contentious. Accordingly, the directors of the applicants exercised their business judgment to agree to the terms. The proposed Monitor states its understanding as well is that the consent of Global Resource Fund to these CCAA proceedings is conditional on these terms.

30 Section 11 of the CCAA authorizes a court to make any order "that it considers appropriate in the circumstances." In considering what may be appropriate, Deschamps J. stated in *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)*, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379:

70. ... Appropriateness under the *CCAA* is assessed by inquiring whether the order sought advances the policy objectives underlying the *CCAA*. The question is whether the order will usefully further efforts to achieve the remedial purpose of the *CCAA* -- avoiding the social and economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company. I would add that appropriateness extends not only to the purpose of the order, but also to the means it employs. Courts should be mindful that chances for successful reorganizations are enhanced where participants achieve common ground and all stakeholders are treated as advantageously and fairly as the circumstances permit.

31 There is no doubt that CCAA proceedings can be terminated when the prospects of a restructuring are at an end. In *Century Services*, Deschamps J. recognized this in stating:

71. It is well established that efforts to reorganize under the CCAA can be terminated

and the stay of proceedings against the debtor lifted if the reorganization is "doomed to failure" (see *Chef Ready*, at p. 88; *Philip's Manufacturing Ltd., Re* (1992), 9 C.B.R. (3d) 25 (B.C.C.A.), at paras. 6-7). However, when an order is sought that does realistically advance the CCAA's purposes, the ability to make it is within the discretion of a CCAA court.

32 The fact that the board of directors of the applicants exercised their business judgment in agreeing to the terms imposed by Global Resource Fund in order to achieve a consensual outcome is a factor I can and do take into account, with the caution that in the case of interim financing, the court must make an independent determination, and arrive at an appropriate order, having regard to the factors in s. 11.2(4). The court may consider, but not defer to or be fettered by, the recommendation of the board. See *Re Crystallex International Corp.* (2012), 91 C.B.R. (5th) 207 (Ont. C.A.) at para 85.

33 It is apparent from looking at the history of the matter that Global Resource Fund had every intention of exercising its rights under its security to apply to court to have a receiver appointed, and with the passage of time during which there were defaults, including defaults in forbearance agreements, the result would likely have been inevitable. See *Bank of Montreal v. Carnival National Leasing Ltd.* (2011), 74 C.B.R. (5th) 300 and the authorities therein discussed. Thus it is understandable that the directors agreed to the terms required by Global Resource Fund. If Global Resource Fund had refused to fund the DIP facility or had refused to agree to any further extension for payment of the secured loan, the prospects of financing the payout of Global Resource Fund through a SISP process would in all likelihood not been available to the applicants or its stakeholders.

34 What is unusual in the proposed Initial Order is that the discretion of the court on January 7, 2014 to do what it considers appropriate is removed. Counsel have been unable to provide any case in which such an order has been made. I did not think it appropriate for such an order to be made. At my direction, the parties agreed to add a clause that the order was subject in all respects to the discretion of the Court. With that change, I approved the Initial Order.

F.J.C. NEWBOULD J.

cp/e/qlqs/qlpmg

---- End of Request ----

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**Tab 14**

*Case Name:*  
**Timminco Ltd. (Re)**

**IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act,  
R.S.C. 1985 c. C-36, as amended  
RE: IN THE MATTER OF a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of  
Timminco Limited and Bécancour Silicon Inc., Applicants**

[2012] O.J. No. 472

2012 ONSC 506

95 C.C.P.B. 48

85 C.B.R. (5th) 169

2012 CarswellOnt 1263

Court File No. CV-12-9539-00CL

Ontario Superior Court of Justice  
Commercial List

**G.B. Morawetz J.**

Heard: January 12, 2012.

Judgment: January 16, 2012.

Released: February 2, 2012.

(79 paras.)

*Bankruptcy and Insolvency law -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) matters --  
Compromises and arrangements -- Claims -- Priority -- Motion by debtor companies for order  
suspending certain payments and granting super priority to certain charges allowed -- On initial  
motion, administration charge and directors' and officer charge were granted, but ranked in  
priority behind all but one secured interest -- Companies sponsored three pension plans, all of  
which had deficits and required significant contributions -- Appropriate to grant super priority to  
administration and directors and officers charges as proposed beneficiaries played critical role in  
restructuring and unlikely they would participate if charge not granted -- Pension payments*

*suspended as payments would frustrate companies' ability to restructure and avoid bankruptcy.*

Motion by the debtor companies for an order suspending its obligations to make special payments with respect to the pension plans, granting super priority certain charges, approving key employee retention plans ("KERPs") offered to certain employees who were deemed critical to successful restructuring and a charge to secure the obligations under the KERPS and a sealing order. The debtor companies sought protection from their creditors as they faced severe liquidity issues resulting from low profit margins, decrease in demand of certain products, failure to recoup capital expenditures of certain projects and the inability to secure additional funding. They had attempted to obtain debtor-in-possession financing, but were unsuccessful. Additional funding was required to avoid an interruption in operations. On the initial motion, the debtor companies requested an administration charge and a directors' and officers' charge, both of which were granted. In addition, both charges were given priority over the security interest of Investissement Quebec, but were ranked behind all other security interests. The debtor companies sponsored three pension plans. One of the plans had deficits and all required significant contributions. The affect of the requested order was the administration charge would rank first in priority to a maximum of \$1 million, followed by the KERP charge to a maximum of \$269,000, followed by the directors' and officers' charge to a maximum of \$40,000.

HELD: Motion allowed. This was an appropriate case in which to grant super priority to the administration and directors and officers charges as each of the proposed beneficiaries played a critical role in the debtor companies' restructuring and it was unlikely that they would participate in the CCAA proceedings and the restructuring of the business unless the charges were granted to secure their fees and disbursements. Pension payments were suspended as the payments would frustrate the debtor companies' ability to restructure and avoid bankruptcy given that the funds were required to liquidate the debtor companies. As the KERPs related to employees who were incentivized to remain in their current positions during the restructuring and the participation of those employees was necessary for restructuring, the KERPs were approved. A sealing order was granted as the disclosure of personal information at this time would compromise the commercial interests of the debtor companies and cause harm to the KERP participants.

**Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:**

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11.51, s. 11.52(1), s. 11.52(2)

Ontario Pension Benefit Act,

Quebec Supplemental Pensions Plans Act, s. 49

**Counsel:**

A.J. Taylor, M. Konyukhova and K. Esaw, for the Applicants.

D.W. Ellickson, for Communications, Energy and Paperworkers' Union of Canada.

C. Sinclair, for United Steelworkers' Union.

K. Peters, for AMG Advance Metallurgical Group NV.

M. Bailey, for Superintendent of Financial Services (Ontario).

S. Weisz, for FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

A. Kauffman, for Investissement Quebec.

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### **ENDORSEMENT**

**1 G.B. MORAWETZ J.:**-- This motion was heard on January 12, 2012. On January 16, 2012, the following endorsement was released:

Motion granted. Reasons will follow. Order to go subject to proviso that the Sealing Order is subject to modification, if necessary, after reasons provided.

**2** These are those reasons.

### **Background**

**3** On January 3, 2012, Timminco Limited ("Timminco") and Bécancour Silicon Inc. ("BSI") (collectively, the "Timminco Entities") applied for and obtained relief under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (the "CCAA").

**4** In my endorsement of January 3, 2012, (*Timminco Limited (Re)*, 2012 ONSC 106), I stated at [11]: "I am satisfied that the record establishes that the Timminco Entities are insolvent and are 'debtor companies' to which the CCAA applies".

**5** On the initial motion, the Applicants also requested an "Administration Charge" and a "Directors' and Officers' Charge" ("D&O Charge"), both of which were granted.

**6** The Timminco Entities requested that the Administration Charge rank ahead of the existing security interest of Investissement Quebec ("IQ") but behind all other security interests, trusts, liens, charges and encumbrances, claims of secured creditors, statutory or otherwise, including any deemed trust created under the *Ontario Pension Benefit Act* (the "PBA") or the *Quebec Supplemental Pensions Plans Act* (the "QSPPA") (collectively, the "Encumbrances") in favour of any persons that have not been served with this application.

7 IQ had been served and did not object to the Administration Charge and the D&O Charge.

8 At [35] of my endorsement, I noted that the Timminco Entities had indicated their intention to return to court to seek an order granting super priority ranking for both the Administration Charge and the D&O Charge ahead of the Encumbrances.

9 The Timminco Entities now bring this motion for an order:

- (a) suspending the Timminco Entities' obligations to make special payments with respect to the pension plans (as defined in the Notice of Motion);
- (b) granting super priority to the Administration Charge and the D&O Charge;
- (c) approving key employee retention plans (the "KERPs") offered by the Timminco Entities to certain employees deemed critical to a successful restructuring and a charge on the current and future assets, undertakings and properties of the Timminco Entities to secure the Timminco Entities' obligations under the KERPs (the "KERP Charge"); and
- (d) sealing the confidential supplement (the "Confidential Supplement") to the First Report of FTI Consulting Canada Inc. (the "Monitor").

10 If granted, the effect of the proposed Court-ordered charges in relation to each other would be:

- \* first, the Administration Charge to the maximum amount of \$1 million;
- \* second, the KERP Charge (in the maximum amount of \$269,000); and
- \* third, the D&O Charge (in the maximum amount of \$400,000).

11 The requested relief was recommended and supported by the Monitor. IQ also supported the requested relief. It was, however, opposed by the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers' Union of Canada ("CEP"). The position put forth by counsel to CEP was supported by counsel for the United Steelworkers' Union ("USW").

12 The motion materials were served on all personal property security registrants in Ontario and in Quebec: the members of the Pension Plan Committees for the Bécancour Union Pension Plan and the Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan; the Financial Services Commission of Ontario; the Regie de Rentes du Quebec; the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Works International Union; and La Section Locale 184 de Syndicat Canadien des Communications, De L'Energie et du Papier; and various government entities, including Ontario and Quebec environmental agencies and federal and provincial taxing authorities.

13 Counsel to the Applicants identified the issues on the motion as follows:

- (a) Should this court grant increased priority to the Administration Charge and the D&O Charge?
- (b) Should this court grant an order suspending the Timminco Entities'



- obligations to make the pension contributions with respect to the pension plans?
- (c) Should this court approve the KERPs and grant the KERPs Charge?
  - (d) Should this court seal the Confidential Supplement?

**14** It was not disputed that the court has the jurisdiction and discretion to order a super priority charge in the context of a CCAA proceeding. However, counsel to CEP submits that this is an extraordinary measure, and that the onus is on the party seeking such an order to satisfy the court that such an order ought to be awarded in the circumstances.

**15** The affidavit of Peter A.M. Kalins, sworn January 5, 2012, provides information relating to the request to suspend the payment of certain pension contributions. Paragraphs 14-28 read as follows:

- 14. The Timminco Entities sponsor the following three pension plans (collectively, the "**Pension Plans**"):
  - (a) the Retirement Pension Plan for The Haley Plant Hourly Employees of Timminco Metals, A Division of Timminco Limited (Ontario Registration Number 0589648) (the "**Haley Pension Plan**");
  - (b) the Régime de rentes pour les employés non syndiqués de Silicium Bécancour Inc. (Québec Registration Number 26042) (the "**Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan**"); and
  - (c) the Régime de rentes pour les employés syndiqués de Silicium Bécancour Inc. (Québec Registration Number 32063) (the "**Bécancour Union Pension Plan**").

*Haley Pension Plan*

- 15. The Haley Pension plan, sponsored and administered by Timminco, applies to former hourly employees at Timminco's magnesium facility in Haley, Ontario.
- 16. The Haley Pension Plan was terminated effective as of August 1, 2008 and accordingly, no normal cost contributions are payable in connection with the Haley Pension Plan. As required by the Ontario *Pension Benefits Act* (the "**PBA**"), a wind-up valuation in respect of the Haley Pension Plan was filed with the Financial Services Commission of Ontario ("**FSCO**") detailing the plan's funded status as of the wind-up date, and each year thereafter. As of August 1, 2008, the Haley Pension Plan was in a deficit position on a wind-up basis of \$5,606,700. The PBA requires that the wind-up deficit be paid down in equal annual installments payable annually in advance over a period of no more than

five years.

17. As of August 1, 2010, the date of the most recently filed valuation report, the Haley Pension Plan had a wind-up deficit of \$3,922,700. Contributions to the Haley Pension Plan are payable annually in advance every August 1. Contributions in respect of the period from August 1, 2008 to July 31, 2011 totalling \$4,712,400 were remitted to the plan. Contributions in respect of the period from August 1, 2011 to July 31, 2012 were estimated to be \$1,598,500 and have not been remitted to the plan.
18. According to preliminary estimates calculated by the Haley Pension Plan's actuaries, despite Timminco having made contributions of approximately \$4,712,400 during the period from August 1, 2008 to July 31, 2011, as of August 1, 2011, the deficit remaining in the Haley Pension Plan is \$3,102,900.

*Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan*

19. The Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan, sponsored by BSI, is an on-going pension plan with both defined benefit ("DB") and defined contribution provisions. The plan has four active members and 32 retired and deferred vested members (including surviving spouses).
20. The most recently filed actuarial valuation of the Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan performed for funding purposes was performed as of September 30, 2010. As of September 30, 2010, the solvency deficit in the Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan was \$3,239,600.
21. In 2011, normal cost contributions payable to this plan totaled approximately \$9,525 per month (or 16.8% of payroll). Amortization payments owing to this plan totaled approximately \$41,710 per month. All contributions in respect of the plan were paid when due in accordance with the Québec *Supplemental Pension Plans Act* (the "QSPPA") and regulations.

*Bécancour Union Pension Plan*

22. The BSI-sponsored Bécancour Union Pension Plan is an on-going DB pension plan with two active members and 98 retired and deferred vested members (including surviving spouses).
23. The most recently filed actuarial valuation performed for funding purposes was performed as of September 30, 2010. As of September 30, 2010, the solvency deficit in the Bécancour Union Pension Plan was \$7,939,500.
24. In 2011, normal cost contributions payable to the plan totaled approximately

- \$7,083 per month (or 14.7% of payroll). Amortization payments owing to this plan totaled approximately \$95,300 per month. All contributions in respect of the plan were paid when due in accordance with the QSPPA and regulations.
25. BSI unionized employees have the option to transfer their employment to QSLP, under the form of the existing collective bargaining agreement. In the event of such transfer, their pension membership in the Bécancour Union Pension Plan will be transferred to the Quebec Silicon Union Pension Plan (as defined and described in greater detail in the Initial Order Affidavit). Also, in the event that any BSI non-union employees transfer employment to QSLP, their pension membership in the Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan would be transferred to the Quebec Silicon Non-Union Pension Plan (as defined and described in greater detail in the Initial Order Affidavit). I am advised by Andrea Boctor of Stikeman Elliott LLP, counsel to the Timminco Entities, and do verily believe that if all of the active members of the Bécancour Union Pension Plan and the Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan transfer their employment to QSLP, the Régie des rentes du Québec would have the authority to order that the plans be wound up.

*Pension Plan Deficiencies and the Timminco Entities' CCAA Proceedings*

26. The assets of the Pension Plans have been severely impacted by market volatility and decreasing long-term interest rates in recent years, resulting in increased deficiencies in the Pension Plans. As a result, the special payments payable with respect to the Haley Plan also increased. As at 2010, total annual special payments for the final three years of the wind-up of the Haley Pension Plan were \$1,598,500 for 2010, \$1,397,000 for 2011 and \$1,162,000 for 2012, payable in advance annually every August 1. By contrast, in 2011 total annual special payments to the Haley Pension Plan for the remaining two years of the wind-up increased to \$1,728,700 for each of 2011 and 2012.

*Suspension of Certain Pension Contributions*

27. As is evident from the Cashflow Forecast, the Timminco Entities do not have the funds necessary to make any contributions to the Pension Plans other than (a) contributions in respect of normal cost, (b) contributions to the defined contribution provision of the BSI Non-Union Pension Plan, and (c) employee contributions deducted from pay (together, the "Normal Cost Contributions"). Timminco currently owes approximately \$1.6 million in respect of special payments to the Haley Pension Plan. In addition, assuming the Bécancour

Non-Union Pension Plan and the Bécancour Union Pension Plan are not terminated, as at January 31, 2012, the Timminco Entities will owe approximately \$140,000 in respect of amortization payments under those plans. If the Timminco Entities are required to make the pension contributions other than Normal Cost Contributions (the "**Pension Contributions**"), they will not have sufficient funds to continue operating and will be forced to cease operating to the detriment of their stakeholders, including their employees and pensioners.

28. The Timminco Entities intend to make all normal cost contributions when due. However, management of the Timminco Entities does not anticipate an improvement in their cashflows that would permit the making of Pension Contributions with respect to the Pension Plans during these CCAA proceedings.

### **The Position of CEP and USW**

16 Counsel to CEP submits that the super priority charge sought by the Timminco Entities would have the effect of subordinating the rights of, *inter alia*, the pension plans, including the statutory trusts that are created pursuant to the QSPPA. In considering this matter, I have proceeded on the basis that this submission extends to the PBA as well.

17 In order to grant a super priority charge, counsel to CEP, supported by USW, submits that the Timminco Entities must show that the application of provincial legislation "would frustrate the company's ability to restructure and avoid bankruptcy". (See *Indalex (Re)*, 2011 ONCA 265 at para. 181.)

18 Counsel to CEP takes the position that the evidence provided by the Timminco Entities falls short of showing the necessity of the super priority charge. Presently, counsel contends that the Applicants have not provided any plan for the purpose of restructuring the Timminco Entities and, absent a restructuring proposal, the affected creditors, including the pension plans, have no reason to believe that their interests will be protected through the issuance of the orders being sought.

19 Counsel to CEP takes the position that the Timminco Entities are requesting extraordinary relief without providing the necessary facts to justify same. Counsel further contends that the Timminco Entities must "wear two hats" and act both in their corporate interest and in the best interest of the pension plan and cannot simply ignore their obligations to the pension plans in favour of the corporation. (See *Indalex (Re)*, *supra*, at para. 129.)

20 Counsel to CEP goes on to submit that, where the "two hats" gives rise to a conflict of interest, if a corporation favours its corporate interest rather than its obligations to its fiduciaries, there will be consequences. In *Indalex (Re)*, *supra*, the court found that the corporation seeking CCAA protection had acted in a manner that revealed a conflict with the duties it owed the beneficiaries of pension plans and ordered the corporation to pay the special payments it owed the plans (See *Indalex (Re)*, *supra*, at paras. 140 and 207.)

21 In this case, counsel to CEP submits that, given the lack of evidentiary support for the super priority charge, the risk of conflicting interests and the importance of the Timminco Entities' fiduciary duties to the pension plans, the super priority charge ought not to be granted.

22 Although counsel to CEP acknowledges that the court has the discretion in the context of the CCAA to make orders that override provincial legislation, such discretion must be exercised through a careful weighing of the facts before the court. Only where the applicant proves it is necessary in the context and consistent with the objects of the CCAA may a judge make an order overriding provincial legislation. (*See Indalex (Re)*, *supra*, at paras. 179 and 189.)

23 In the circumstances of this case, counsel to CEP argues that the position of any super priority charge ordered by the court should rank after the pension plans.

24 CEP also takes the position that the Timminco Entities' obligations to the pension plans should not be suspended. Counsel notes that the Timminco Entities have contractual obligations through the collective agreement and pension plan documents to make contributions to the pension plans and, as well, the Timminco Entities owe statutory duties to the beneficiaries of the pension funds pursuant to the QSPPA. Counsel further points out that s. 49 of the QSPPA provides that any contributions and accrued interest not paid into the pension fund are deemed to be held in trust for the employer.

25 In addition, counsel takes the position that the Court of Appeal for Ontario in *Indalex (Re)*, *supra*, confirmed that, in the context of Ontario legislation, all of the contributions an employee owes a pension fund, including the special payments, are subject to the deemed trust provision of the PBA.

26 In this case, counsel to CEP points out that the special payments the Timminco Entities seek to suspend in the amount of \$95,300 per month to the Bécancour Union Pension Plan, and of \$47,743 to the Silicium Union Pension Plan, are payments that are to be held in trust for the beneficiaries of the pension plans. Thus, they argue that the Timminco Entities have a fiduciary obligation to the beneficiaries of the pension plans to hold the funds in trust. Further, the Timminco Entities' request to suspend the special payments to the Bécancour Union Pension Plan and the Quebec Silicon Union Pension Plan reveals that its interests are in conflict.

27 Counsel also submits that the Timminco Entities have not pointed to a particular reason, other than generalized liquidity problems, as to why they are unable to make special payments to their pension plans.

28 With respect to the KERPs, counsel to CEP acknowledges that the court has the power to approve a KERP, but the court must only do so when it is convinced that it is necessary to make such an order. In this case, counsel contends that the Timminco Entities have not presented any meaningful evidence on the propriety of the proposed KERPs. Counsel notes that the Timminco Entities have not named the KERPs recipients, provided any specific information regarding their

involvement with the CCAA proceeding, addressed their replaceability, or set out their individual bonuses. In the circumstances, counsel submits that it would be unfair and inequitable for the court to approve the KERPs requested by the Timminco Entities.

29 Counsel to CEP's final submission is that, in the event the KERPs are approved, they should not be sealed, but rather should be treated in the same manner as other CCAA documents through the Monitor. Alternatively, counsel to CEP submits that a copy of the KERPs should be provided to the Respondent, CEP.

### **The Position of the Timminco Entities**

30 At the time of the initial hearing, the Timminco Entities filed evidence establishing that they were facing severe liquidity issues as a result of, among other things, a low profit margin realized on their silicon metal sales due to a high volume, long-term supply contract at below market prices, a decrease in the demand and market price for solar grade silicon, failure to recoup their capital expenditures incurred in connection with the development of their solar grade operations, and the inability to secure additional funding. The Timminco Entities also face significant pension and environmental remediation legacy costs, and financial costs related to large outstanding debts.

31 I accepted submissions to the effect that without the protection of the CCAA, a shutdown of operations was inevitable, which the Timminco Entities submitted would be extremely detrimental to the Timminco Entities' employees, pensioners, suppliers and customers.

32 As at December 31, 2011, the Timminco Entities' cash balance was approximately \$2.4 million. The 30-day consolidated cash flow forecast filed at the time of the CCAA application projected that the Timminco Entities would have total receipts of approximately \$5.5 million and total operating disbursements of approximately \$7.7 million for net cash outflow of approximately \$2.2 million, leaving an ending cash position as at February 3, 2012 of an estimated \$157,000.

33 The Timminco Entities approached their existing stakeholders and third party lenders in an effort to secure a suitable debtor-in-possession ("DIP") facility. The Timminco Entities existing stakeholders, Bank of America NA, IQ, and AMG Advance Metallurgical Group NV, have declined to advance any funds to the Timminco Entities at this time. In addition, two third-party lenders have apparently refused to enter into negotiations regarding the provision of a DIP Facility.<sup>1</sup>

34 The Monitor, in its Second Report, dated January 11, 2012, extended the cash forecast through to February 17, 2012. The Second Report provides explanations for the key variances in actual receipts and disbursements as compared to the January 2, 2012 forecast.

35 There are some timing differences but the Monitor concludes that there are no significant changes in the underlying assumptions in the January 10, 2012 forecast as compared to the January 2, 2012 forecast.

**36** The January 10 forecast projects that the ending cash position goes from positive to negative in mid-February.

**37** Counsel to the Applicants submits that, based on the latest cash flow forecast, the Timminco Entities currently estimate that additional funding will be required by mid-February in order to avoid an interruption in operations.

**38** The Timminco Entities submit that this is an appropriate case in which to grant super priority to the Administration Charge. Counsel submits that each of the proposed beneficiaries will play a critical role in the Timminco Entities' restructuring and it is unlikely that the advisors will participate in the CCAA proceedings unless the Administration Charge is granted to secure their fees and disbursements.

**39** Statutory Authority to grant such a charge derives from s. 11.52(1) of the CCAA. Subsection 11.52(2) contains the authority to grant super-priority to such a charge:

11.52(1) Court may order security or charge to cover certain costs -- On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of a debtor company is subject to a security or charge -- in an amount that the court considers appropriate -- in respect of the fees and expenses of

- (a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;
- (b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and
- (c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.

11.52(2) Priority -- This court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

**40** Counsel also submits that the Timminco Entities require the continued involvement of their directors and officers in order to pursue a successful restructuring of their business and/or finances and, due to the significant personal exposure associated with the Timminco Entities' liabilities, it is unlikely that the directors and officers will continue their services with the Timminco Entities unless the D&O Charge is granted.

**41** Statutory authority for the granting of a D&O charge on a super priority basis derives from s. 11.51 of the CCAA:

11.51(1) Security or charge relating to director's indemnification -- On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge -- in an amount that the court considers appropriate -- in favour of any director or officer of the company to indemnify the director or officer against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as a director or officer of the company after the commencement of proceedings under this Act.

- (2) Priority -- The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.
- (3) Restriction -- indemnification insurance -- The court may not make the order if in its opinion the company could obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director or officer at a reasonable cost.
- (4) Negligence, misconduct or fault -- The court shall make an order declaring that the security or charge does not apply in respect of a specific obligation or liability incurred by a director or officer if in its opinion the obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct or, in Quebec, the director's or officer's gross or intentional fault.

### **Analysis**

#### **(i) Administration Charge and D&O Charge**

42 It seems apparent that the position of the unions' is in direct conflict with the Applicants' positions.

43 The position being put forth by counsel to the CEP and USW is clearly stated and is quite understandable. However, in my view, the position of the CEP and the USW has to be considered in the context of the practical circumstances facing the Timminco Entities. The Timminco Entities are clearly insolvent and do not have sufficient reserves to address the funding requirements of the pension plans.

44 Counsel to the Applicants submits that without the relief requested, the Timminco Entities will be deprived of the services being provided by the beneficiaries of the charges, to the company's detriment. I accept the submissions of counsel to the Applicants that it is unlikely that the advisors will participate in the CCAA proceedings unless the Administration Charge is granted to secure their fees and disbursements. I also accept the evidence of Mr. Kalins that the role of the advisors is critical to the efforts of the Timminco Entities to restructure. To expect that the advisors will take the business risk of participating in these proceedings without the security of the charge is neither reasonable nor realistic.



45 Likewise, I accept the submissions of counsel to the Applicants to the effect that the directors and officers will not continue their service without the D&O Charge. Again, in circumstances such as those facing the Timminco Entities, it is neither reasonable nor realistic to expect directors and officers to continue without the requested form of protection.

46 It logically follows, in my view, that without the assistance of the advisors, and in the anticipated void caused by the lack of a governance structure, the Timmico Entities will be directionless and unable to effectively proceed with any type or form of restructuring under the CCAA.

47 The Applicants argue that the CCAA overrides any conflicting requirements of the QSPPA and the BPA.

48 Counsel submits that the general paramountcy of the CCAA over provincial legislation was confirmed in *ATB Financial v. Metcalf & Mansfield Alternative Investment II Corp.*, (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 104. In addition, in *Nortel Networks Corporation (Re)*, the Court of Appeal held that the doctrine of paramountcy applies either where a provincial and a federal statutory position are in conflict and cannot both be complied with, or where complying with the provincial law will have the effect of frustrating the purpose of the federal law and therefore the intent of Parliament. See *Nortel Networks Corporation (Re)*, (2009), 59 C.B.R. (5th) 23 (Ont. C.A.).

49 It has long been stated that the purpose of the CCAA is to facilitate the making of a compromise or arrangement between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors, with the purpose of allowing the business to continue. As the Court of Appeal for Ontario stated in *Stelco Inc., (Re)* (2005), 75 O.R. (3d) 5, at para. 36:

In the CCAA context, Parliament has provided a statutory framework to extend protection to a company while it holds its creditors at bay and attempts to negotiate a compromised plan of arrangement that will enable it to emerge and continue as a viable economic entity, thus benefiting society and the company in the long run, along with the company's creditors, shareholders, employees and other stakeholders. The s. 11 discretion is the engine that drives this broad and flexible statutory scheme ...

50 Further, as I indicated in *Nortel Networks Corporation (Re)*, (2009), 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J.), this purpose continues to exist regardless of whether a company is actually restructuring or is continuing operations during a sales process in order to maintain maximum value and achieve the highest price for the benefit of all stakeholders. Based on this reasoning, the fact that Timminco has not provided any plan for restructuring at this time does not change the analysis.

51 The Court of Appeal in *Indalex Ltd. (Re)* (2011), 75 C.B.R. (5th) 19 (Ont. C.A.) confirmed the CCAA court's ability to override conflicting provisions of provincial statutes where the application

of the provincial legislation would frustrate the company's ability to restructure and avoid bankruptcy. The Court stated, *inter alia*, as follows (beginning at paragraph 176):

The CCAA court has the authority to grant a super-priority charge to DIP lenders in CCAA proceedings. I fully accept that the CCAA judge can make an order granting a super-priority charge that has the effect of overriding provincial legislation, including the PBA. ...

...  
What of the contention that recognition of the deemed trust will cause DIP lenders to be unwilling to advance funds in CCAA proceedings? It is important to recognize that the conclusion I have reached does not mean that a finding of paramouncy will never be made. That determination must be made on a case by case basis. There may well be situations in which paramouncy is invoked and the record satisfies the CCAA judge that application of the provincial legislation would frustrate the company's ability to restructure and avoid bankruptcy.

**52** The Timminco Entities seek approval to suspend Special Payments in order to maintain sufficient liquidity to continue operations for the benefit of all stakeholders, including employees and pensioners. It is clear that based on the January 2 forecast, as modified by the Second Report, the Timminco Entities have insufficient liquidity to make the Special Payments at this time.

**53** Counsel to the Timminco Entities submits that where it is necessary to achieve the objective of the CCAA, the court has the jurisdiction to make an order under the CCAA granting, in the present case, super priority over the Encumbrances for the Administration Charge and the D&O Charge, even if such an order conflicts with, or overrides, the QSPPA or the PBA.

**54** Further, the Timminco Entities submit that the doctrine of paramouncy is properly invoked in this case and that the court should order that the Administration Charge and the D&O Charge have super priority over the Encumbrances in order to ensure the continued participation of the beneficiaries of these charges in the Timminco Entities' CCAA proceedings.

**55** The Timminco Entities also submit that payment of the pension contributions should be suspended. These special (or amortization) payments are required to be made to liquidate a going concern or solvency deficiency in a pension plan as identified in the most recent funding valuation report for the plan that is filed with the applicable pension regulatory authority. The requirement for the employer to make such payments is provided for under applicable provincial pension minimum standards legislation.

**56** The courts have characterized special (or amortization) payments as pre-filing obligations

which are stayed upon an initial order being granted under the CCAA. (See *AbitibiBowater Inc., (Re)* (2009), 57 C.B.R. (5th) 285 (Q.S.C.); *Collins & Aikman Automotive Canada Inc.* (2007), 37 C.B.R. (5th) 282 (Ont. S.C.J.) and *Fraser Papers Inc. (Re)* (2009), 55 C.B.R. (5th) 217 (Ont. S.C.J.).

57 I accept the submission of counsel to the Applicants to the effect that courts in Ontario and Quebec have addressed the issue of suspending special (or amortization) payments in the context of a CCAA restructuring and have ordered the suspension of such payments where the failure to stay the obligation would jeopardize the business of the debtor company and the company's ability to restructure.

58 The Timminco Entities also submit that there should be no director or officer liability incurred as a result of a court-ordered suspension of payment of pension contributions. Counsel references *Fraser Papers*, where Pepall J. stated:

Given that I am ordering that the special payments need not be made during the stay period pending further order of the Court, the Applicants and the officers and directors should not have any liability for failure to pay them in that same period. The latter should be encouraged to remain during the CCAA process so as to govern and assist with the restructuring effort and should be provided with protection without the need to have recourse to the Director's Charge.

59 Importantly, *Fraser Papers* also notes that there is no priority for special payments in bankruptcy. In my view, it follows that the employees and former employees are not prejudiced by the relief requested since the likely outcome should these proceedings fail is bankruptcy, which would not produce a better result for them. Thus, the "two hats" doctrine from *Indalex (Re)*, *supra*, discussed earlier in these reasons at [20], would not be infringed by the relief requested. Because it would avoid bankruptcy, to the benefit of both the Timminco Entities and beneficiaries of the pension plans, the relief requested would not favour the interests of the corporate entity over its obligations to its fiduciaries.

60 Counsel to the Timminco Entities submits that where it is necessary to achieve the objective of the CCAA, the court has the jurisdiction to make an order under the CCAA suspending the payment of the pension contributions, even if such order conflicts with, or overrides, the QSPPA or the PBA.

61 The evidence has established that the Timminco Entities are in a severe liquidity crisis and, if required to make the pension contributions, will not have sufficient funds to continue operating. The Timminco Entities would then be forced to cease operations to the detriment of their stakeholders, including their employees and pensioners.

62 On the facts before me, I am satisfied that the application of the QSPPA and the PBA would frustrate the Timminco Entities ability to restructure and avoid bankruptcy. Indeed, while the

Timminco Entities continue to make Normal Cost Contributions to the pension plans, requiring them to pay what they owe in respect of special and amortization payments for those plans would deprive them of sufficient funds to continue operating, forcing them to cease operations to the detriment of their stakeholders, including their employees and pensioners.

63 In my view, this is exactly the kind of result the CCAA is intended to avoid. Where the facts demonstrate that ordering a company to make special payments in accordance with provincial legislation would have the effect of forcing the company into bankruptcy, it seems to me that to make such an order would frustrate the rehabilitative purpose of the CCAA. In such circumstances, therefore, the doctrine of paramountcy is properly invoked, and an order suspending the requirement to make special payments is appropriate (see *ATB Financial* and *Nortel Networks Corporation (Re)*).

64 In my view, the circumstances are such that the position put forth by the Timminco Entities must prevail. I am satisfied that bankruptcy is not the answer and that, in order to ensure that the purpose and objective of the CCAA can be fulfilled, it is necessary to invoke the doctrine of paramountcy such that the provisions of the CCAA override those of QSPPA and the PBA.

65 There is a clear inter-relationship between the granting of the Administration Charge, the granting of the D&O Charge and extension of protection for the directors and officers for the company's failure to pay the pension contributions.

66 In my view, in the absence of the court granting the requested super priority and protection, the objectives of the CCAA would be frustrated. It is not reasonable to expect that professionals will take the risk of not being paid for their services, and that directors and officers will remain if placed in a compromised position should the Timminco Entities continue CCAA proceedings without the requested protection. The outcome of the failure to provide these respective groups with the requested protection would, in my view, result in the overwhelming likelihood that the CCAA proceedings would come to an abrupt halt, followed, in all likelihood, by bankruptcy proceedings.

67 If bankruptcy results, the outcome for employees and pensioners is certain. This alternative will not provide a better result for the employees and pensioners. The lack of a desirable alternative to the relief requested only serves to strengthen my view that the objectives of the CCAA would be frustrated if the relief requested was not granted.

68 For these reasons, I have determined that it is both necessary and appropriate to grant super priority to both the Administrative Charge and D&O Charge.

69 I have also concluded that it is both necessary and appropriate to suspend the Timminco Entities' obligations to make pension contributions with respect to the Pension Plans. In my view, this determination is necessary to allow the Timminco Entities to restructure or sell the business as a going concern for the benefit of all stakeholders.

70 I am also satisfied that, in order to encourage the officers and directors to remain during the CCAA proceedings, an order should be granted relieving them from any liability for the Timminco Entities' failure to make pension contributions during the CCAA proceedings. At this point in the restructuring, the participation of its officers and directors is of vital importance to the Timminco Entities.

(ii) The KERPs

71 Turning now to the issue of the employee retention plans (KERPs), the Timminco Entities seek an order approving the KERPs offered to certain employees who are considered critical to successful proceedings under the CCAA.

72 In this case, the KERPs have been approved by the board of directors of Timminco. The record indicates that in the opinion of the Chief Executive Officer and the Special Committee of the Board, all of the KERPs participants are critical to the Timminco Entities' CCAA proceedings as they are experienced employees who have played central roles in the restructuring initiatives taken to date and will play critical roles in the steps taken in the future. The total amount of the KERPs in question is \$269,000. KERPs have been approved in numerous CCAA proceedings where the retention of certain employees has been deemed critical to a successful restructuring. See *Nortel Networks Corporation (Re)*, [2009] O.J. No. 1044 (S.C.J.), *Grant Forest Products Inc. (Re)*, (2009), 57 C.B.R. (5th) 128 (Ont. S.C.J.) [Commercial List], and *Canwest Global Communications Corp. (Re)*, (2009), 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J.).

73 In *Grant Forest Products*, Newbould J. noted that the business judgment of the board of directors of the debtor company and the monitor should rarely be ignored when it comes to approving a KERP charge.

74 The Monitor also supports the approval of the KERPs and, following review of several court-approved retention plans in CCAA proceedings, is satisfied that the KERPs are consistent with the current practice for retention plans in the context of a CCAA proceeding and that the quantum of the proposed payments under the KERPs are reasonable in the circumstances.

75 I accept the submissions of counsel to the Timminco Entities. I am satisfied that it is necessary, in these circumstances, that the KERPs participants be incentivized to remain in their current positions during the CCAA process. In my view, the continued participation of these experienced and necessary employees will assist the company in its objectives during its restructuring process. If these employees were not to remain with the company, it would be necessary to replace them. It is reasonable to conclude that the replacement of such employees would not provide any substantial economic benefits to the company. The KERPs are approved.

76 The Timminco Entities have also requested that the court seal the Confidential Supplement which contains copies of the unredacted KERPs, taking the position that the KERPs contain sensitive personal compensation information and that the disclosure of such information would

compromise the commercial interests of the Timminco Entities and harm the KERPs participants. Further, the KERPs participants have a reasonable expectation that their names and salary information will be kept confidential. Counsel relies on *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)* [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 at para. 53 where Iacobucci J. adopted the following test to determine when a sealing order should be made:

A confidentiality order under Rule 151 should only be granted when:

- (a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
- (b) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh the deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

77 CEP argues that the CCAA process should be open and transparent to the greatest extent possible and that the KERPs should not be sealed but rather should be treated in the same manner as other CCAA documents through the Monitor. In the alternative, counsel to the CEP submits that a copy of the KERPs should be provided to the Respondent, CEP.

78 In my view, at this point in time in the restructuring process, the disclosure of this personal information could compromise the commercial interests of the Timminco Entities and cause harm to the KERP participants. It is both necessary and important for the parties to focus on the restructuring efforts at hand rather than to get, in my view, potentially side-tracked on this issue. In my view, the Confidential Supplement should be and is ordered sealed with the proviso that this issue can be revisited in 45 days.

### **Disposition**

79 In the result, the motion is granted. An order shall issue:

- (a) suspending the Timminco Entities' obligation to make special payments with respect to the pension plans (as defined in the Notice of Motion);
- (b) granting super priority to the Administrative Charge and the D&O Charge;
- (c) approving the KERPs and the grant of the KERP Charge;
- (d) authorizing the sealing of the Confidential Supplement to the First Report of the Monitor.

G.B. MORAWETZ J.

cp/e/qllxr/qlvxw/qlhcs

1 In a subsequent motion relating to approval of a DIP Facility, the Timminco Entities acknowledged they had reached an agreement with a third-party lender with respect to providing DIP financing, subject to court approval. Further argument on this motion will be heard on February 6, 2012.

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES'  
CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C.  
1985, C. C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE  
MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF  
COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT WITH  
RESPECT TO GROWTHWORKS  
CANADIAN FUND LTD.

Court File No:

**ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
(Commercial List)**

Proceeding commenced at Toronto

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